Primicias vs. Ocampo

The right to trial with the aid of assessors is a substantive right created and defined by express legislative enactment, not a mere procedural device; as such, it was not repealed by the Supreme Court's promulgation of the Rules of Court, and it was further reenacted by reference through Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, which incorporates the pertinent provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Cipriano P. Primicias was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two criminal offenses: violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606 for chartering a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without presidential approval (Criminal Case No. 18374), and violation of Sections 129 and 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code for failing to submit manifests and obtain customs clearance for the vessel "Antarctic" prior to its departure for a foreign port (Criminal Case No. 18375). The statutory framework at the center of the dispute traces back to Act No. 190 (the Code of Civil Procedure, effective October 1, 1901), which first allowed trial with the aid of assessors in civil cases, and Act No. 267 (effective October 17, 1901), which extended the assessor system to both civil and criminal cases in Manila courts. These provisions were carried through successive reenactments — into the Administrative Code of 1916 (Section 2449), the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Section 2477), and ultimately Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, approved June 18, 1949. The 1935 Constitution vested rule-making power in the Supreme Court and declared existing procedural laws repealed as statutes and converted into court rules subject to the Court's power to alter and modify them. Pursuant to this power, the Court promulgated the Rules of Court effective July 1, 1940, but did not incorporate the assessor provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Cipriano P. Primicias was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses. The first, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18374, charged him with violating Commonwealth Act No. 606 by knowingly chartering a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines. The second, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18375, charged him with violating Section 129 in relation to Section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code, for failing to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and for failing to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the vessel's departure for a foreign port.

Before the trial of these criminal cases commenced, petitioner filed a motion on April 23, 1952, praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved, as authorized by Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. That section provides that the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court or the Court of First Instance within the city may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, and directs the Municipal Board to prepare lists of qualified persons to serve as assessors. The City Fiscal, appearing for the People of the Philippines, opposed the motion.

On April 28, 1952, the trial court issued an order denying the motion. The court reasoned that the promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, had superseded and expressly repealed all prior rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of the Philippines. Because the Supreme Court, in exercising its rule-making power, had omitted the assessor provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure from the Rules of Court, the trial court treated the reference to the Code of Civil Procedure in Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 as a mere surplusage. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for prohibition, seeking to prevent the respondent judge from proceeding with the trial without assessors and requesting a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals certified the petition to the Supreme Court, as the petition's principal basis was Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 and respondents challenged the constitutionality of that section for allegedly contravening the constitutional requirement that rules of court shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade.

• Nature of the Right: Petitioner maintained that the right to trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right, and that the corresponding duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.
• Limitation on Rule-Making Power: Petitioner argued that, being a substantive right, the right to trial with assessors cannot be impaired by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its rule-making power, which is confined to pleading, practice, and procedure.
• Non-Repeal by Rules of Court: Petitioner contended that Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila, which created the right to trial with assessors, are substantive law and were not repealed by the promulgation of the Rules of Court.
• Reenactment by Reference: Petitioner argued that, even assuming the assessor provisions were impliedly repealed, they were later reenacted by reference in Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila, which is the present source of the right and refers to the Code of Civil Procedure merely to indicate the procedure for appointing assessors.
• Constitutionality of Section 49: Petitioner asserted that Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila is not invalid class legislation and does not violate the constitutional provision requiring uniformity of rules for courts of the same grade.

• Implied Repeal by Rules of Court: Respondents contended that with the promulgation of the Rules of Court effective July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure previously existing were superseded and expressly repealed, and that the Supreme Court's omission of the assessor provisions from the Rules signified an intent to eliminate them.
• Surplusage Doctrine: Respondents argued that the reference to the Code of Civil Procedure in Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 should be deemed a mere surplusage or the result of oversight, since the procedural framework for appointing assessors had already been eliminated from the Rules of Court.
• Unconstitutionality as Class Legislation: Respondents assailed the constitutionality of Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, contending that it contravenes the constitutional provision that rules of court shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, rendering it invalid class legislation applicable only to Manila.

• Nature of the Right: Whether the right to trial with the aid of assessors is a substantive right or a procedural/remedial right subject to the Supreme Court's rule-making power.
• Effect of Rules of Court: Whether the assessor provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were impliedly repealed by the promulgation of the Rules of Court in 1940.
• Reenactment by Reference: Whether Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 reenacted the assessor provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure by reference, thereby reviving the right to trial with assessors in Manila courts.
• Constitutionality of Section 49: Whether Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 violates the constitutional provision requiring uniformity of procedural rules for all courts of the same grade and constitutes invalid class legislation.

• Nature of the Right: Yes. The right to trial with the aid of assessors is substantive in nature, as it is created and defined by express legislative enactment, and is not a mere procedural remedy subject to the Supreme Court's rule-making power.
• Effect of Rules of Court: No. The assessor provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were not impliedly repealed by the promulgation of the Rules of Court, because those provisions partake of substantive law, which is beyond the scope of the rule-making power confined to pleading, practice, and procedure.
• Reenactment by Reference: Yes. Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 reenacted the assessor provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure by reference, incorporating them as fully as if reproduced at length, and Congress is presumed to have done so deliberately, with full knowledge that the Rules of Court had omitted them.
• Constitutionality of Section 49: No. The constitutional challenge was raised for the first time on certiorari, a procedural defect barring further discussion, and the claim that the assessor right exists only in Manila is unfounded, since the substantive provisions were never repealed and remain available wherever they existed prior to the Rules of Court.

• Nature of the Right: The Court drew the distinction between substantive law, which creates, defines, or regulates rights concerning life, liberty, or property, and rules of procedure, which prescribe the method by which substantive rights may be enforced. Citing Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court and Bustos vs. Lucero, the Court defined substantive law as that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights, as opposed to adjective or remedial law which prescribes the method of enforcing them. The assessor provisions of Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 refer to the matter as a right given by law to a party litigant. This Court had previously declared the right absolute and substantial in Berbari vs. Concepcion and Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, where it was held that the intervention of assessors is "another security given by the law to the litigants" and is a "substantial right" of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all proceedings. Being substantive, the assessor provisions were properly left out of the Rules of Court, since their inclusion would have exceeded the Court's rule-making power, which the Constitution limits to matters of pleading, practice, and procedure.

• Effect of Rules of Court: The respondents' argument that the failure to incorporate the assessor provisions in the Rules of Court signified an intent to repeal them cannot stand, because the right is substantive and thus outside the scope of rule-making. The Court acknowledged that some portions of the assessor provisions — such as the method of summoning assessors, enforcing attendance, compensation, oath, duties, and effect of dissent — are remedial in character. However, because these remedial provisions are inextricably interwoven with the substantive right, the Court deemed it wise and proper to leave them intact for reasons of coordination and expediency. The Court noted that not all provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure are remedial; provisions on prescription, requisites for making a will, and succession of an adopted child's estate are admittedly substantive and were likewise not incorporated in the Rules of Court.

• Reenactment by Reference: Even assuming arguendo that the assessor provisions were purely remedial and impliedly repealed by the Rules of Court, the Court held that they were reenacted by reference in Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, approved in 1949 — nine years after the Rules of Court took effect. The mention of the Code of Civil Procedure in Section 49 indicates a reenactment or incorporation by reference. Congress, whose members were mostly lawyers, must be presumed to have known that the Rules of Court had omitted the assessor provisions, and, fully cognizant of this, deliberately reenacted them by reference. The Court recognized this as a valid exercise of legislative power, noting that while the Constitution grants rule-making power to the Supreme Court, it does not preclude Congress from enacting procedural laws or altering, amending, or supplementing rules promulgated by the Court. The practice of reference statutes was upheld as an approved method of legislation, citing American jurisprudence that the adoption of an earlier statute by reference makes it as much a part of the latter act as though incorporated at full length. The Court rejected the suggestion that the reference was a mere surplusage or oversight, as that would impute lack of foresight or negligence to the legislature.

• Constitutionality of Section 49: The constitutional challenge was rejected on two grounds. First, it was raised for the first time on certiorari, a procedural defect that bars further discussion under established precedent. Second, the premise underlying the challenge — that the assessor right exists only in Manila — is incorrect. Since the substantive provisions on assessors were never repealed by the Rules of Court, the remedy may be invoked not only in Manila but in all places where it existed prior to the Rules of Court. In criminal cases, the same remedy may be invoked in the cities of Cebu, Iloilo, and Quezon, whose charters make express reference to the Code of Civil Procedure. The claim of class legislation therefore lacks merit.

• Substantive vs. Remedial Law Distinction — Substantive law creates, defines, or regulates rights concerning life, liberty, or property, or the powers of agencies for the administration of public affairs; rules of procedure merely prescribe the method by which substantive rights may be enforced in courts of justice. The distinction determines the scope of the Supreme Court's constitutional rule-making power: the Court may alter and modify procedural rules but cannot eliminate substantive rights created by legislative enactment. The Court applied this doctrine to classify the right to trial with assessors as substantive, placing it beyond the reach of the rule-making power and outside the scope of implied repeal by the Rules of Court.

• Reference Statutes Doctrine — A statute that refers to another statute and makes it applicable to the subject of legislation incorporates the referenced provisions as fully as if reproduced at full length. This is an approved method of legislation used to avoid unnecessary repetition in the statute books. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, by referring to the Code of Civil Procedure for the manner of invoking assessors, reenacted and incorporated the assessor provisions of that Code, reviving the right even if it had previously been impliedly repealed.

• Right to Trial with Aid of Assessors as a Substantial Right — The intervention of assessors is not an empty formality but a security given by law to litigants, constituting a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all proceedings. This doctrine, previously articulated in Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, was reaffirmed and applied to hold that the respondent judge's denial of the motion for assessors constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• "Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law. A substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be enforced in courts of justice." — This passage, quoted from Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, articulates the foundational distinction between substantive and remedial law that governs the scope of the Supreme Court's rule-making power and underpins the Court's classification of the assessor right as substantive.

• "The adoption of an earlier statute by reference makes it as much a part of the latter act as though it had been incorporated at full length. This is true of a legislative act which refers to another act for the procedure to be taken." — This passage defines the reference statute doctrine and supplies the legal basis for the Court's holding that Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 reenacted the assessor provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure by reference.

• "It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the proceedings." — Quoted from Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, this passage establishes the assessor right as a substantial right whose denial invalidates proceedings, and was relied upon to conclude that the respondent judge acted with abuse of discretion.

• Bustos vs. Lucero, 46 Off. Gaz., January Supp., pp. 445, 448 (81 Phil. 640) — Cited with approval for its definitions of substantive law, which the Court used to distinguish the assessor right from mere procedural rules and to place it beyond the scope of the rule-making power.

• Berbari vs. Concepcion, et al., 40 Phil. 320 — Cited as authority for the proposition that the right to trial with the aid of assessors has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court.

• Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, 54 Phil. 344 — Cited as the leading case establishing that the intervention of assessors is a substantial right of which litigants cannot be deprived without vitiating all proceedings; the quoted passage from this case formed the doctrinal core of the Court's ruling.

• Section 13, Article VIII, 1935 Philippine Constitution — Vests the Supreme Court with rule-making power and provides that rules of court "shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade." The Court interpreted this provision as limiting the rule-making power to pleading, practice, and procedure, and as not precluding Congress from enacting procedural laws or supplementing rules promulgated by the Court. The uniformity requirement was invoked by respondents as the basis for their constitutional challenge, which the Court rejected.

• Section 49, Republic Act No. 409 (Revised Charter of the City of Manila) — Provides that the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court or the Court of First Instance within the city may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, and directs the Municipal Board to prepare lists of qualified persons. The Court held that this section reenacted the assessor provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure by reference and is the present source of the right to trial with assessors in Manila courts.

• Sections 154–161, Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) — The original provisions allowing trial with the aid of assessors in civil and criminal cases. The Court held that these provisions are substantive law, were not repealed by the Rules of Court, and were reenacted by reference through Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409.

• Section 2477, Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Act No. 2711) — The predecessor provision that carried forward the assessor right from the Administrative Code of 1916 into the Revised Administrative Code, and which in turn became Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409. The Court traced the legislative lineage of the assessor right through this provision.

Chief Justice Paras, and Justices Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, and Labrador concurred.

Justice Reyes filed a separate concurring opinion, stating that in view of Section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, approved June 18, 1949, authorizing the use of assessors in the trial of civil and criminal cases in the City of Manila, he concurred in the result.