Primicias vs. Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan

A municipal ordinance regulating traffic speeds is null and void for conflicting with a national statute when it fails to classify highways, lacks the Land Transportation Commissioner's approval, and uses vague terms inconsistent with the classifications established by the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.

Juan Augusto B. Primicias was a motorist driving through the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The Municipality, through its Municipal Council, enacted Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, to regulate vehicular traffic speed along national and provincial roads within its jurisdiction. The ordinance was enacted on March 13, 1964, shortly before Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, took effect on June 20, 1964, expressly repealing the earlier Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992) upon which the ordinance was patterned.

On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, when a member of the Municipal Police flagged him down approximately 200 meters away from a school building at Barrio Nancamaliran. The policeman informed Primicias that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, specifically for overtaking a truck. Primicias surrendered his driver's license and was issued a temporary operator's permit.

Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against Primicias in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta for violating the ordinance. In response, Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of the ordinance before the Court of First Instance, seeking a preliminary injunction to restrain the Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., Police Chief Lorenzo G. Suyat, Judge Felix D. Soriano, and Patrolman Estanislao Andrada from enforcing the ordinance and proceeding with the criminal case. The writ was issued, and Judge Soriano was enjoined from continuing the criminal proceedings.

Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, enacted by the Municipal Council on March 13, 1964, set a maximum speed limit of 20 kilometers per hour for all vehicular traffic along the National Highway and Provincial Roads within Urdaneta, specifically in crowded streets approaching intersections at blind corners, passing school zones, or thickly populated areas duly marked with sign posts. The Court of First Instance, after trial, found the ordinance null and void, holding that it had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which took effect on June 20, 1964. The lower court noted that the ordinance failed to classify the municipality's thoroughfares and was not clear and definite in its terms.

• Basis of the Ordinance: Appellants contended that the ordinance was valid, being patterned after and based on Section 53, paragraph 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law).
• Implied Repeal: Appellants argued that a later enactment of a law relating to the same subject matter as an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law.
• Lower Court Errors: Appellants assigned multiple errors to the lower court, including declaring the ordinance null and void, requiring the municipal council to give maximum allowable speed and classify highways, holding the ordinance in conflict with Section 35(b)(4) of R.A. 4136, requiring approval from the Land Transportation Commissioner, holding the ordinance unclear and indefinite, and issuing an ex-parte writ of injunction to restrain the criminal proceedings.

• Validity of the Ordinance: Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 of Urdaneta is null and void for conflicting with Republic Act No. 4136.
• Highway Classification and Approval: Whether the municipal council was required to classify highways and secure the approval of the Land Transportation Commissioner for the ordinance to be valid.
• Vagueness: Whether the ordinance is clear and definite in its terms.
• Injunction against Criminal Proceedings: Whether the lower court erred in issuing a writ of injunction to restrain the proceedings in the criminal case against Primicias.

• Validity of the Ordinance: Yes, the ordinance is null and void. It conflicts with Republic Act No. 4136, which expressly repealed Act No. 3992 and mandated that local authorities cannot specify maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in the Act.
• Highway Classification and Approval: Yes. Section 38 of R.A. No. 4136 requires local legislative bodies to classify highways, mark them with proper signs, and secure the approval of the Land Transportation Commissioner, the absence of which renders the ordinance invalid.
• Vagueness: Yes, the ordinance is not clear and definite. It uses the phrase "vehicular traffic" without distinguishing between passenger cars, motor vehicles, and motor trucks and buses, failing to provide an average man with due care the ability to ascertain whether his conduct is penalized.
• Injunction against Criminal Proceedings: No. The lower court did not err. The invalidity of the ordinance falls under the recognized exception allowing injunction to prevent the enforcement of a void law and avoid multiplicity of actions.

• Validity of the Ordinance: Act No. 3992 was expressly repealed by Section 63 of Republic Act No. 4136, which took effect on June 20, 1964. Thus, the validity of the ordinance must be determined vis-a-vis R.A. No. 4136. The ordinance, which limits speed to 20 kph without regard to road type, conflicts with Section 35(b) and Section 36 of R.A. No. 4136, the latter explicitly stating that no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in the Act. As a fundamental principle, municipal ordinances are subordinate to state laws and must give way when there is a conflict.
• Highway Classification and Approval: Section 38 of R.A. No. 4136 mandates that public highways be classified for traffic purposes by the local board or council, marked with appropriate signs, and subject to the approval of the Commissioner. These provisions are construed as mandatory because they concern public interests and rights. The Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfares, nor was there any showing that the marking of streets was done with the Commissioner's approval. Consequently, the ordinance violates Section 62 of the Code, which enjoins local authorities from enacting or enforcing ordinances in conflict with the Act.
• Vagueness: The ordinance's use of "vehicular traffic" without defining it or distinguishing between types of vehicles renders it vague. Section 35(b) of R.A. No. 4136 specifies different speeds for different kinds of vehicles (passenger cars/motorcycles vs. motor trucks/buses) and defines what constitutes a motor vehicle and passenger automobile. For a regulatory ordinance, clearness, definiteness, and certainty are essential so that an average person can understand whether particular acts will incur a penalty.
• Injunction against Criminal Proceedings: While the general rule is that criminal prosecutions may not be blocked by injunction, exceptions exist, including when the statute or ordinance relied upon is unconstitutional or invalid. Because the ordinance was declared invalid, the injunction was proper to prevent the use of the law in an oppressive manner and to avoid a multiplicity of prosecutions under a void ordinance.

• Subordination of Ordinances to Statutes — Municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state; whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way. Applied to invalidate the speed ordinance that conflicted with the speed limits and procedures mandated by R.A. No. 4136.
• Mandatory Construction of Public Duty Statutes — Statutes conferring power upon a public body or officer to perform acts concerning public interests or rights are generally regarded as mandatory, even if the language is permissive, as they impose duties rather than confer privileges. Applied to hold that the requirements under Section 38 of R.A. No. 4136 to classify highways and secure the Commissioner's approval are mandatory.
• Void for Vagueness Doctrine (Ordinances) — A regulatory ordinance must be clear, definite, and certain so that an average man, with due care, can understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts. Applied to strike down the ordinance for failing to distinguish between types of vehicles under the blanket term "vehicular traffic."
• Exceptions to Injunction Against Criminal Prosecution — Criminal prosecution may ordinarily not be blocked by injunction, except to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights, prevent oppressive enforcement, or when the statute or ordinance relied upon is invalid. Applied to sustain the injunction against the criminal case since the ordinance was void.

• "An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is 'must not contravene . . . the statute,' for it is a 'fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.'" — Establishes the controlling principle that local ordinances must yield to conflicting national statutes, forming the basis for invalidating the speed ordinance.
• "statutes which confer upon a public body or officer . . . power to perform acts which concern the public interests or rights of individuals, are generally, regarded as mandatory although the language is permissive only since the are construed as imposing duties rather than conferring privileges." — Defines the rule for construing statutory powers involving public interest, used to justify the mandatory nature of highway classification and approval requirements under R.A. No. 4136.
• "Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that 'an average man should be able with due care, after reading it,, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct.'" — Articulates the standard for definiteness required in penal and regulatory ordinances, which the Urdaneta ordinance failed to meet.

• Enrile vs. Vinuya, 37 SCRA 381 (1976) — Cited to support the general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law on the same subject matter.
• City of Basilan vs. Hechanova, 58 SCRA 711 (1974) — Cited for the doctrine that when there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way.
• Vda. de Mesa, et al. vs. Mencias, etc., et al., 18 SCRA 533 (1966) — Cited for the rule that statutes conferring power concerning public interests are construed as mandatory.
• Ramos vs. Torres, 25 SCRA 557 (1968) — Cited for the exceptions to the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be enjoined.

• Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) — Expressly repealed Act No. 3992 and all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the Code, bringing the validity of the ordinance under the ambit of R.A. No. 4136.
• Section 35(b), Republic Act No. 4136 — Sets the maximum allowable speeds for different types of motor vehicles on various classifications of roads. The ordinance was found to conflict with this section by imposing a blanket 20 kph limit without classifying roads or vehicles.
• Section 36, Republic Act No. 4136 — Prohibits provincial, city, or municipal authorities from enacting or enforcing any ordinance specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in the Act.
• Section 38, Republic Act No. 4136 — Requires the classification of highways by the local board or council, the provision of appropriate signs, and approval by the Land Transportation Commissioner. The ordinance was invalidated for failing to comply with these mandatory requisites.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. Abad Santos, J., concurred separately, noting that the ordinance was in effect a speed trap for unwary motorists for which Urdaneta had become notorious.