Prieto vs. Cajimat

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 cannot be used to relitigate the factual finding that the deceased motorcyclist was not negligent where the issue requires review of the probative value of evidence and no recognized exception applies; the party alleging negligence must prove it by preponderance of evidence. As registered owner of the tricycle, Prieto is solidarily liable with the negligent driver under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Erlinda Cajimat is the mother of Narciso Cajimat III. Prieto was the registered owner of the red Yamaha tricycle involved in the incident. The claim for damages is governed by the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delict, Articles 2176 and 2180.

At around 7:40 in the evening of January 14, 2003, Rondal, Jr. was driving Prieto's red Yamaha tricycle with plate number BT 9799 along the southbound lane of the national highway of Barangay 2 Garreta, Badoc, Ilocos Norte. Rondal, Jr. overtook two tricycles in front of him and occupied the northbound lane, resulting in a head-on collision with a black Yamaha "chop-chop" motorcycle driven by Cajimat III. Cajimat III suffered a fractured skull which caused his instantaneous death.

A criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide was filed against Rondal, Jr. before the MCTC of Badoc-Pinili, Badoc, Ilocos Norte, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730-B. Erlinda, Cajimat III's mother, filed a separate civil action for damages before the RTC against Rondal, Jr. and Prieto, the registered owner of the red Yamaha tricycle. Erlinda alleged that Rondal, Jr. did not have a driver's license and was intoxicated at the time of the incident, and that his gross negligence in managing, driving, and operating the tricycle was the direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the collision; she prayed for burial and miscellaneous expenses totaling P200,000.00, attorney's fees, moral damages, and exemplary damages. Petitioners, for their part, alleged that Rondal, Jr. had been careful and prudent while driving at a moderate speed, that he took and drove the tricycle without Prieto's consent and authority, and that the collision was caused by Cajimat III's own negligence, recklessness, and imprudence in driving an unregistered and unlighted "chop-chop" motorcycle at full speed. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued; Erlinda presented the testimony of SPO1 Proceso Villa, the responding officer who investigated the collision, while petitioners presented their own testimonies. Petitioners relied on a report prepared by SPO4 Wilson Calaycay stating that the motorcycle had no headlights and blinkers on its front and rear portions, but SPO1 Villa testified that he was not sure whether there was no headlight because the motorcycle was in a sliding position and he immediately took Rondal, Jr. to the police station and proceeded to the clinic to check the victim's condition.

The RTC found no evidentiary proof that Cajimat III's motorcycle did not have a headlight at the time of the collision, and it found that Prieto's allegations that Rondal, Jr. was not his employee and did not ask consent to drive the tricycle were not sufficiently substantiated and were self-serving. The CA found no cogent reason to assume that Cajimat III's motorcycle had no headlights or blinkers at the time of the collision, noting that a disinterested eyewitness testified in Criminal Case No. 2730-B that the motorcycle had its headlights on and that the impact totally damaged the motorcycle's front portion.

• Proximate Cause: Petitioners argued that the absence of a license plate, headlight, and blinkers sufficiently proved Cajimat III's negligence in driving his "chop-chop" motorcycle, as stated in the report prepared by SPO4 Wilson Calaycay and supposedly strengthened by the testimonies of Erlinda and SPO1 Villa; they emphasized that the deceased should not have been driving an unlighted motorcycle without blinkers at nighttime, and that Erlinda had no right to recover damages when the deceased's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
• Rondal's Care and Prieto's Lack of Consent: Petitioners maintained that Rondal, Jr. had been careful and prudent while driving at a moderate speed, and that he took and drove the tricycle without Prieto's consent and authority.
• Deceased's Negligence: Petitioners contended that the collision was caused by Cajimat III's own negligence, recklessness, and imprudence in driving an unregistered and unlighted "chop-chop" motorcycle at full speed.

• Rondal's Gross Negligence: Respondent Erlinda posited that at the time of the incident, Rondal, Jr. did not have a driver's license and was intoxicated, and that the direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the collision was his gross negligence in managing, driving, and operating the red Yamaha tricycle.
• Damages: Respondent prayed for payment of burial and miscellaneous expenses totaling P200,000.00, attorney's fees, moral damages, and exemplary damages.

• Proximate Cause: Whether the proximate cause of Cajimat III's death was his own negligence, such that Erlinda has no right to recover damages.

• Proximate Cause: No. Petitioners' claim that Cajimat III was negligent for driving without headlights and blinkers raised a question of fact, and the RTC and CA's finding that no sufficient evidence proved it was binding under Rule 45; the party alleging negligence failed to prove it by preponderance of evidence.

• Proximate Cause: The SC began with the procedural rule that a Rule 45 petition covers only questions of law; a question of law does not involve examination of the probative value of evidence, and once the issue invites review of evidence, it is a question of fact. Petitioners' claim that Cajimat III was negligent because his motorcycle had no headlights and blinkers required the SC to review the evidence, so it was a question of fact. The SC did not find any of the recognized exceptions: (1) conclusion grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures; (2) inference manifestly mistaken; (3) grave abuse of discretion; (4) judgment based on misapprehension of facts; (5) findings of fact premised on absence of evidence and contradicted by evidence on record. On the merits, the RTC and CA found no sufficient evidence that the motorcycle had no headlight and blinkers. SPO4 Calaycay's report stating that the motorcycle had no headlights and blinkers on its front and rear portions was belied and uncorroborated by SPO1 Villa, the investigating officer, who testified that he was not sure whether there was no headlight because the motorcycle was in a sliding position and he immediately took Rondal, Jr. to the police station and proceeded to the clinic to check the victim's condition. The party alleging a fact must prove it; under Section 1, Rule 131, the burden of proof rested on petitioners to establish their case by preponderance of evidence, but aside from their allegations, no other evidence proved that the deceased was negligent. The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence that can affect the results of the case, should not be ignored; absent clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness, or capriciousness, the lower court's findings are binding and conclusive. Thus, the SC found no reversible error and denied the petition.

• Question of law vs. question of fact under Rule 45 — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 covers only questions of law. A question of law does not involve examination of the probative value of evidence; if the issue requires review of evidence, it is a question of fact. The SC applied this to petitioners' claim about lack of headlights and blinkers, holding it was a question of fact and not reviewable absent exceptions.
• Exceptions to the rule against factual review — The rule admits exceptions:
  • Conclusion grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;
  • Inference manifestly mistaken;
  • Grave abuse of discretion;
  • Judgment based on misapprehension of facts;
  • Findings of fact premised on absence of evidence and contradicted by evidence on record. The SC found none of these exceptions in the case.
• Burden of proof in civil cases — Under Section 1, Rule 131, burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his/her claim or defense, or any fact in issue, by the amount of evidence required by law. The SC applied this to petitioners, who alleged the deceased's negligence but presented no evidence beyond allegations; they failed to prove it by preponderance of evidence.
• Vicarious liability of the registered owner of a motor vehicle — Under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is considered the employer of the tortfeasor-driver and is primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter; insofar as third persons are concerned, the actual employer is merely an agent of the registered owner. The CA applied this to Prieto, and the SC affirmed the CA with modifications.
• Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages — When the actual damages proved are less than the sum allowed by the SC as temperate damages, now pegged at P50,000.00, the award of temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual damages. The SC applied this by deleting the P29,000.00 actual damages and awarding P50,000.00 temperate damages.

• "It is well-settled that this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to examine, review, or evaluate the evidence all over again. As a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts." — This states the Rule 45 limitation that controlled the SC's refusal to review the factual finding on the deceased's alleged negligence.
• "For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by any of the litigants. The resolution of the issue must solely depend on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is obvious that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact." — This defines the question-of-law versus question-of-fact distinction applied to petitioners' claim about the motorcycle's lack of headlights and blinkers.
• "Simply put, the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his/her claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law." — This anchors the SC's holding that petitioners failed to prove the deceased's negligence by preponderance of evidence.
• "However, We deem it necessary to delete the actual damages in the amount of P29,000.00 and award P50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu thereof in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence that when the actual damages is less than the sum allowed by the Court as temperate damages, now pegged at P50,000.00, the award of temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual damages." — This explains the SC's modification of the damages award.

• Century Iron Works, Inc. vs. Bañas, 711 Phil. 576, 586 (2013) — Cited for the rule that a question of law does not involve examination of the probative value of evidence; if it does, it is a question of fact.
• Uyboco vs. People, 749 Phil. 987, 992 (2014) — Cited for the exceptions to the rule that the SC is not a trier of facts and for the finality accorded to trial court factual findings.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited to support the correctness of the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs.
• People vs. Racal, 817 Phil. 665, 685-686 (2017) — Cited for the rule that when actual damages are less than the sum allowed as temperate damages, temperate damages may be awarded in lieu of actual damages.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — A petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law; the SC applied this to reject petitioners' factual challenge to the finding that the deceased's motorcycle had headlights and blinkers.
• Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court — Defines burden of proof as the duty of a party to prove the truth of his/her claim or defense, or any fact in issue, by the amount of evidence required by law; the SC applied this to petitioners, who alleged the deceased's negligence but failed to prove it by preponderance of evidence.
• Article 2176, Civil Code — Defines quasi-delict and establishes liability for damage caused by fault or negligence; the SC affirmed liability under this provision in relation to Article 2180.
• Article 2180, Civil Code — Makes employers liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which they are employed; the CA applied this to hold Prieto, as registered owner, solidarily liable with Rondal, Jr., and the SC affirmed with modifications.