Prescott vs. Bureau of Immigration

A person born under the 1935 Constitution to a Filipino mother and an alien father who never formally elected Philippine citizenship within the prescribed period may nonetheless be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen where their Oath of Allegiance executed under R.A. No. 9225 constitutes substantial compliance with the formal election requirements under C.A. No. 625, and their consistent and deliberate positive acts throughout their life constitute informal election of Philippine citizenship. Administrative proceedings conducted without furnishing the respondent notice or an opportunity to be heard are void ab initio, and the filing of motions for reconsideration cannot cure such due process defect when the movant filed them precisely to raise the denial of due process and was never heard on the merits.

Prescott was born on April 10, 1950 in the Philippines to an American father, Walter Dewey Prescott, and a Filipino mother, Hilda Fernandez. Because the 1935 Constitution governed his citizenship status, he derived the citizenship of his alien father as a minor and was issued an Alien Certificate of Registration on January 12, 1951. He possessed only an inchoate right to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. He never left the Philippines from birth until 1982, was educated and employed in the country, and lost his American citizenship in 1976 for overstaying. He later naturalized as an American citizen in 2006, then applied for and was granted reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 in 2008. The Bureau of Immigration is designated under Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 as the implementing agency of R.A. No. 9225, with authority to promulgate implementing rules; the 2008 Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship recognize the DOJ's power to revoke an order of approval for reacquisition upon a substantive finding of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment after an administrative hearing before the Bureau.

Prescott was born on April 10, 1950 in the Philippines to an American father, Walter Dewey Prescott, and a Filipino mother, Hilda Fernandez. On January 12, 1951, the Bureau of Immigration issued him an Alien Certificate of Registration, as under the 1935 Constitution he derived the citizenship of his alien father during minority. He never left the Philippines from birth, pursuing his education and career in the country. On August 26, 1977, the American Embassy in Manila informed him that he had lost his American citizenship as of April 10, 1976 for overstaying in the Philippines. On May 17, 1981, he married Maria Lourdes S. Dingcong, an American citizen, in Quezon City, indicating his nationality as Filipino in their Marriage Contract. When their first child Jeffrey was born on December 10, 1981, Prescott likewise indicated his nationality as Filipino in the child's Certificate of Live Birth.

On November 11, 1982, Prescott left Manila for the United States for the first time, accompanied by Jeffrey. He began working at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. as a temporary employee in 1983. His second and third children, Dexter Ezekiel and Dana Marie, were born in the USA in 1986 and 1988, respectively. On July 15, 1999, he secured permanent employment with the World Bank. On August 5, 2006, he became a naturalized American citizen and was issued an American passport. Using it, he traveled back to the Philippines in 2007, 2008, and 2009 with a "balikbayan" status. On November 26, 2008, he applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, indicating his father's nationality as American and disclosing that he had obtained American citizenship through naturalization. The Philippine Embassy in Washington, D.C. issued an Order for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship on the same date, which the DFA confirmed. Prescott took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and was issued Identification Certificate No. WDC-2008-00688 recognizing him as a Philippine citizen. On September 1, 2009, he applied for and was issued a Philippine passport.

Sometime in 2010, Prescott retired from the World Bank and returned to the Philippines with Lourdes to settle permanently. In January 2011, Lourdes went back to the USA. On June 6, 2012, Lourdes, together with one Jesse Troutman, filed a joint letter-complaint with the Bureau alleging that Prescott had illegally reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Several notices were sent to Prescott's supposed address in Tagaytay City for hearings scheduled from July 10 to September 20, 2012, but these were returned "unserved" or marked "out of the country," and Prescott never appeared. In 2013, Lourdes filed for partial divorce in the USA while Prescott filed for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 17, 2013, the Bureau issued a Resolution declaring Prescott an American citizen who had never elected Philippine citizenship and was therefore ineligible to reacquire it under R.A. No. 9225. The Bureau recommended cancellation to the DOJ, and on November 28, 2013, Secretary De Lima approved the recommendation.

Prescott discovered the revocation only by chance in February 2014 when the DFA denied his application for passport renewal. He repeatedly requested copies of the case records from the DOJ but was told the November 28, 2013 Resolution had become final and executory. No case file or record was ever released to him. On February 11, 2015, the Bureau directed him to submit a counter-affidavit on the deportation charge, and on August 5, 2015, issued a charge sheet alleging he misrepresented himself as Filipino and fraudulently indicated his father's nationality as Filipino in his passport application. His name was placed on the Bureau's watchlist. The Bureau issued a deportation order on March 29, 2016, and a warrant of deportation on August 22, 2016. On August 25, 2016, at 9:00 p.m., Prescott was arrested at a restaurant in Bacoor, Cavite, escorted by six Bureau personnel, and brought to Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan. He filed an urgent motion for release on August 30, 2016, but the Bureau denied his motion for bail and treated his motion to dismiss as a motion for reconsideration. He received the charge sheet only on October 26, 2016. His subsequent motions for reconsideration and to re-open the case were denied, the latter with finality on October 5, 2017. In August 2018, the NBI informed the Bureau that Prescott allegedly had pending criminal cases before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, which the Bureau cited as a ground for non-deportation; however, no such cases actually existed, as confirmed by Certificates of No Pending Cases. In October 2018, due to his deteriorating health at age 67, Prescott was granted a medical pass for confinement at Medical Center Manila through PAO's assistance. He filed a Memorandum to the DOJ on December 4, 2018, deemed an appeal, and a motion for release on recognizance on January 31, 2019; both remained unacted upon. On March 13, 2019, Prescott filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Petition for Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila, Branch 10, seeking declaration of his Philippine citizenship and release from detention.

• Collateral Attack: Petitioner maintained that the complaint filed by Lourdes and Troutman before the Bureau was a collateral attack on his Philippine citizenship, arguing that any assault on citizenship ought to have been filed before a court of justice and not before an administrative agency, since the DOJ is only empowered to revoke reacquisition in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment—not on the basis of his birth circumstances under the 1935 Constitution.
• Presumption of Regularity: Petitioner argued that the grant of his application for reacquisition means he has always been Filipino, the Order granting his application enjoying the presumption of regularity and authenticity, with supporting documents showing he is the son of a Filipino mother and thus a natural-born citizen.
• Statelessness and 1973 Constitution: Petitioner contended that upon the revocation of his American citizenship in 1977, he did not become stateless but was considered a Philippine citizen under the 1973 Constitution.
• Proper Remedy: Petitioner insisted that he availed of the proper remedy through his Petition for Declaratory Relief, and that because his right to due process was seriously transgressed when he was never furnished notices of the Bureau proceedings, the DOJ Resolution dated November 28, 2013 is void, meaning there was never a breach to speak of.
• Habeas Corpus: Petitioner maintained that the petition for habeas corpus is proper as he remains detained for an unreasonable period of time despite the finality of the deportation order against him.
• Not an Alien: Petitioner argued that he is not an overstaying or undocumented alien, nor did he misrepresent any factual information to acquire Philippine citizenship.

• Jurisdiction to Cancel: Respondent countered that the Bureau and DOJ are clothed with jurisdiction to cancel the decree of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the 2008 Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship, and that the proceedings before the Bureau and the final revocation by the DOJ are direct attacks on his citizenship.
• Finality of Rulings: Respondent argued that the Bureau and DOJ rulings have attained finality, rendering the petition for declaratory relief and habeas corpus improper remedies.
• Failure to Exhaust Remedies: Respondent maintained that petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies in the ordinary course of law.
• Questions of Fact: Respondent argued that the Petition for Review on Certiorari raises questions of fact outside the cognizance of a Rule 45 petition.
• Not Filipino: Respondent riposted that Prescott is not a Filipino since he never elected Philippine citizenship, and cannot invoke good faith based on his belief that he is Filipino since he was issued an ACR.
• Not Stateless: Respondent argued that Prescott is not stateless as he is clearly a naturalized American citizen.
• Due Process Afforded: Respondent asserted that Prescott was afforded due process in the Bureau proceedings as he was able to file numerous motions for reconsideration before the Bureau and the DOJ.
• Custody with PAO: Respondent contended that Prescott is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus since his physical custody is with PAO, not the Bureau or DOJ, and that the fault in the delay of deportation lies with PAO for its refusal to turn him over.

• Nature of Attack: Whether the complaint filed by Lourdes and Troutman is a collateral attack on Prescott's citizenship.
• Due Process: Whether the proceedings before the Bureau and the November 28, 2013 Resolution of the DOJ are void for having been rendered without due process.
• Propriety of Remedies: Whether Prescott properly availed of the petition for declaratory relief and petition for habeas corpus.
• Citizenship Status: Whether Prescott, who was born under the 1935 Constitution to an American father and a Filipino mother, is a natural-born Filipino, hence eligible to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225.
• Release from Detention: Whether Prescott may be released from detention.

• Nature of Attack: No. The complaint was a direct attack on Prescott's citizenship, its object being to annul or set aside the order granting his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, not a mere incident in an action seeking different relief.
• Due Process: Yes. The Bureau proceedings and the DOJ Resolution dated November 28, 2013 are void ab initio for having been conducted and issued in violation of Prescott's constitutional right to due process, he having never received notices or been afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard.
• Propriety of Remedies: Declaratory relief — No, it is not the proper remedy to secure a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship. Habeas corpus — Yes, it is proper to assail the legality of Prescott's detention, his citizenship being a threshold issue determinable as an incident to the habeas corpus petition.
• Citizenship Status: Yes. Prescott is a natural-born Philippine citizen, his 2008 Oath of Allegiance under R.A. No. 9225 constituting substantial compliance with the formal election requirements under C.A. No. 625, and his lifelong positive acts constituting informal election of Philippine citizenship.
• Release from Detention: Yes. Prescott, being a Philippine citizen, is not the proper subject of deportation; the Bureau lacks jurisdiction to arrest or detain him, and the deportation order is void.

• Nature of Attack: An attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside a judgment or enjoin its enforcement, and collateral when the attack is merely an incident in an action seeking different relief. The complaint before the Bureau squarely attacked Prescott's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and directly prayed for its revocation; the ambiguity in his citizenship was the main issue, not a mere incident. The procedure under C.A. No. 473 on cancellation of naturalization certificates does not apply because Prescott did not obtain Philippine citizenship through naturalization; R.A. No. 9225 governs. Under Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004, the Bureau is designated as the implementing agency of R.A. No. 9225, and under the 2008 Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship (Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-005), the DOJ may revoke an order of approval for reacquisition upon a substantive finding of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment after an administrative hearing before the Bureau. The 1987 Administrative Code likewise ordains the Bureau and DOJ to implement laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens. The authority to revoke an improperly granted order of approval lies with the DOJ after the appropriate administrative hearing before the Bureau.

• Due Process: The right to due process is guaranteed not only in judicial but also in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Under the Ang Tibay requirements, the party must be given the right to present evidence, the tribunal must consider that evidence, the decision must be based on substantial evidence, and the decision must be rendered in a manner that the parties know the issues and reasons. Here, the Bureau and DOJ do not contest that Prescott never received the notices allegedly sent for the scheduled hearings; they admit the notices were "returned with the comment 'moved out.'" Nor was Prescott furnished a copy of the DOJ Resolution dated November 28, 2013; he discovered it only by chance when his passport renewal was denied. He was deprived of any opportunity to present his case and submit evidence. The argument that his filing of motions for reconsideration cured the due process defect was rejected: mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure a due process defect, especially when the motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the right to due process and the opportunity to be heard on the merits remained elusive. Neither the Bureau nor the DOJ passed upon Prescott's arguments or allowed him to air his defenses; they repeatedly brushed aside his appeals by reasoning that the DOJ Resolution had become final and executory. A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.

• Propriety of Remedies: A petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 requires, among others, that there be no breach of the document in question and that the issue involve construction or validity of an instrument or statute. Beginning with Tan vs. Republic, the Court has held that declaratory relief is an improper remedy to secure a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship, as there is no law authorizing such a proceeding; citizenship may be passed upon only as an incident of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to an actual controversy. Here, Prescott's citizenship is a threshold issue in his habeas corpus petition, which determines the legality of his detention. The power to deport is limited to aliens; if the respondent to a deportation proceeding is a citizen, the Bureau lacks jurisdiction and its proceedings are void. Thus, while the dismissal of the declaratory relief petition is in order, the citizenship issue may be settled by treating the declaratory relief petition as an incident to the habeas corpus petition.

• Citizenship Status: Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, children born to Filipino mothers and alien fathers do not automatically become Philippine citizens; they follow the citizenship of their alien father unless, upon reaching the age of majority, they elect Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. 625 prescribes the formal requisites for election: a written, sworn statement filed with the civil registry, accompanied by an oath of allegiance. While the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 are silent on the exact period, Cueco vs. Secretary of Justice determined it should be within a "reasonable time," i.e., three years, subject to extension under certain circumstances such as when the person has always considered himself Filipino. Election may be done formally under C.A. No. 625 or informally through positive acts demonstrating choice of Philippine citizenship, as recognized in In Re: Florencio Mallare (exercise of suffrage) and Co vs. Electoral Tribunal (numerous categorical acts revealing intention). Prescott never formally elected within the prescribed period, but his 2008 Oath of Allegiance under R.A. No. 9225 constitutes substantial compliance with C.A. No. 625's formal requirements, as it encapsulates the same assurance of loyalty, fidelity, and allegiance that the formal election requirement seeks to ensure. His lifelong positive acts—being born and raised in the Philippines, consistently identifying as Filipino in his Marriage Contract and his child's birth certificate, losing his American citizenship for overstaying, having to naturalize to become American, traveling as a balikbayan, reacquiring Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, and choosing to retire in the Philippines—demonstrate informal election. Even if the Oath of Allegiance cannot serve as formal election, Prescott is still deemed a natural-born Filipino pursuant to the 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness, to which the Philippines acceded in 2022, which obliges a Contracting State to grant nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. Prescott became stateless when he lost his American citizenship and was not recognized as Philippine under the 1935 Constitution. The Convention's Article 1(4) applies retroactively to persons born before its entry into force. Having elected Philippine citizenship, albeit belatedly, Prescott is a natural-born citizen under Article IV, Section 1(3) in relation to Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, and was eligible to reacquire citizenship under R.A. No. 9225.

• Release from Detention: Habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. Prescott was arrested and detained pursuant to a warrant of deportation following the revocation of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. The Bureau and DOJ have no jurisdiction to arrest or detain him for two reasons: first, the Bureau proceedings and the DOJ Resolution are void ab initio for violation of due process; and second, the Bureau has no jurisdiction to deport Prescott since he is a natural-born Philippine citizen, not an alien. Where there is deprivation of constitutional rights, the court is ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy. The OSG's argument that habeas corpus does not lie because PAO holds custody was rejected: PAO is acting as the Bureau's agent, a Bureau officer guards Prescott, and the Bureau agreed to release him to PAO only temporarily for medical reasons. The Bureau continues to have physical and legal custody over him. Prescott has been detained for seven years, is 73 years old, and suffers from medical conditions. His immediate release is in order.

• Direct vs. Collateral Attack on Citizenship — An attack on a person's citizenship is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside the judgment or enjoin its enforcement; it is collateral when, in an action to obtain different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is made as an incident thereof. The Court applied this distinction to hold that the complaint before the Bureau was a direct attack because it squarely sought revocation of Prescott's reacquisition of citizenship, making citizenship the main issue rather than a tangential one.

• Administrative Due Process (Ang Tibay Requirements) — The seven requirements of administrative due process are: (1) the right to a hearing, including the right to present one's case and submit evidence; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) there must be evidence to support the finding; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented; (6) the tribunal must act on its own independent consideration; and (7) the decision must be rendered in a manner that the parties know the issues and reasons. The Court found that all these requirements were violated because Prescott never received notice of the proceedings and was never afforded an opportunity to be heard.

• Motion for Reconsideration Does Not Cure Due Process Defect — The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure a due process defect, especially if the motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the right to due process and the opportunity to be heard on the merits has remained elusive. If a person has not been given the opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations or rebut the evidence presented against him, a due process problem exists, and it worsens if the person is found liable without having been charged and this finding is confirmed in the appeal or reconsideration process without allowing him to rebut or explain his side.

• Election of Philippine Citizenship Under the 1935 Constitution — Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, a child born to a Filipino mother and an alien father possesses merely an inchoate right to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Election may be done formally pursuant to C.A. No. 625 (written, sworn statement filed with the civil registry, accompanied by an oath of allegiance) or informally through positive acts demonstrating choice of Philippine citizenship. The period for election is a "reasonable time," i.e., three years, subject to extension under special circumstances, such as when the person has always considered himself Filipino.

• Substantial Compliance with Formal Election Requirements — An Oath of Allegiance executed under R.A. No. 9225 may constitute substantial compliance with the formal election requirements under C.A. No. 625, as it encapsulates the same assurance of loyalty, fidelity, and allegiance that the formal election requirement seeks to ensure. The apprehension of disloyalty which the 1935 Constitution sought to eliminate is non-existent where the person has unequivocally expressed loyalty through consistent and deliberate actions throughout his entire life.

• 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness — A Contracting State is obliged to grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless, including where the person was unable to acquire the nationality of the State in whose territory he was born because he has passed the age for lodging an application, provided the nationality of one of his parents at the time of birth was that of the Contracting State. Article 1(4) applies to persons born before as well as after the Convention's entry into force. Even prior to accession, the Convention's principles are binding as generally accepted principles of international law.

• Declaratory Relief Not Proper for Citizenship Declaration — There is no law authorizing a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is a citizen. Citizenship may be passed upon only as an incident of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to an actual controversy. A declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where the judgment would require judicial investigation of disputed facts.

• Habeas Corpus as Remedy for Illegal Detention Following Void Proceedings — Where a person is deprived of constitutional rights, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction, and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention. The inquiry is addressed to whether the proceeding or judgment under which the person has been restrained is a complete nullity, not merely whether an error was committed within jurisdiction.

• "The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure any due process defect, especially if the same was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the right to due process considering that up until that point, the opportunity to be heard on the merits has remained elusive." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on why the Bureau and DOJ proceedings were void ab initio, clarifying that filing motions for reconsideration does not satisfy administrative due process when the movant was never heard on the merits in the first place.

• "if a person has not been given the opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations or rebut the evidence presented against him, or raise substantive defenses through the proper pleadings before a quasi-judicial body (like the COA) where he or she stands charged, then a due process problem exists." — Quoted from Fontanilla vs. Commission Proper, this formulation defines the core of administrative due process and was applied to hold that Prescott's due process rights were violated throughout the Bureau and DOJ proceedings.

• "The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons." — Quoted from Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this passage establishes the doctrine of informal election of Philippine citizenship through positive acts, which the Court applied to Prescott's lifelong conduct.

• "where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its ugly head." — This passage states the controlling principle that judgments rendered without due process are void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally, providing the foundation for the Court's nullification of the Bureau proceedings and DOJ Resolution.

• Queto vs. Catolico, 142 Phil. 49 (1970) — Established the rule that an attack on citizenship is allowed only through a direct action for nullity, and that the initiative for cancellation of naturalization must come from the Solicitor General or proper fiscal. The Court distinguished this case, noting that C.A. No. 473's procedure does not apply because Prescott did not obtain citizenship through naturalization.

• Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) — The seminal case laying out the seven requirements of administrative due process. The Court applied these requirements to find that Prescott's right to due process was violated because he never received notice or an opportunity to be heard.

• Fontanilla vs. Commission Proper, 787 Phil. 713 (2016) — Held that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure a due process defect when the motion was filed precisely to raise the denial of due process. The Court relied on this to reject the OSG's argument that Prescott's filing of motions for reconsideration satisfied due process.

• Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632 (1960) — Established that declaratory relief is an improper remedy to secure a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship, and that citizenship may be passed upon only as an incident of the adjudication of rights in an actual controversy. The Court applied this to dismiss the declaratory relief petition while allowing citizenship to be determined as an incident to the habeas corpus petition.

• In Re: Florencio Mallare, 158 Phil. 50 (1974) — First introduced the concept of informal election of Philippine citizenship, recognizing exercise of suffrage as sufficient to show preference for Philippine citizenship. The Court relied on this line of cases to find that Prescott's positive acts constituted informal election.

• Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 276 Phil. 758 (1991) — Held that informal election may be made through numerous categorical acts revealing intention to choose Philippine citizenship, and acknowledged the anomalous discrimination under the 1935 Constitution between children of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers. The Court applied this reasoning to Prescott's lifelong conduct and to the curative nature of the 1987 Constitution's provisions.

• Cabiling Ma vs. Fernandez, Jr., 639 Phil. 577 (2010) — Held that where formal election has been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, late registration may be allowed if positive acts of citizenship have been publicly, consistently, and continuously done. The Court found the logic applicable to Prescott's circumstances.

• Cueco vs. Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of Immigration, 115 Phil. 90 (1962) — Determined that election of Philippine citizenship must be done within a "reasonable time," i.e., three years, subject to extension under certain circumstances such as when the person has always considered himself Filipino. The Court applied the extension principle to Prescott's case.

• Article IV, Section 1(4), 1935 Constitution — Provides that those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship are Philippine citizens. Applied to determine Prescott's citizenship status, the Court finding that he validly elected Philippine citizenship through substantial compliance and informal election.

• Article IV, Section 1(3), 1987 Constitution — Provides that those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, are citizens of the Philippines. Applied to confirm Prescott's citizenship upon his valid election.

• Article IV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Defines natural-born citizens as those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship, and provides that those who elect Philippine citizenship under Section 1(3) shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Applied to classify Prescott as a natural-born citizen.

• Article III, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Applied to hold that the Bureau and DOJ proceedings were void ab initio for violating Prescott's right to administrative due process.

• Commonwealth Act No. 625 — Prescribes the formal requisites for electing Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution: a written, sworn statement filed with the civil registry, accompanied by an oath of allegiance. Applied to determine that Prescott's 2008 Oath of Allegiance under R.A. No. 9225 constituted substantial compliance.

• Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003) — Governs the retention and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Applied as the governing law for Prescott's reacquisition, the Court holding he was eligible thereunder as a natural-born citizen.

• Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 — Designates the Bureau of Immigration as the implementing agency of R.A. No. 9225, empowering it to promulgate implementing rules and regulations. Applied to confirm the Bureau's authority to hear complaints regarding applications under R.A. No. 9225.

• 2008 Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship (BI Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-005), Section 19 — Recognizes the DOJ's authority to revoke an order of approval for reacquisition upon a substantive finding of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment after an administrative hearing. Applied to confirm the DOJ's revocation power, though the Court found the proceedings void for lack of due process.

• 1987 Administrative Code, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1, Section 3 and Chapter 10, Section 31 — Ordain the DOJ and Bureau to implement laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens. Applied to confirm the statutory basis for the agencies' authority.

• Rule 63, Revised Rules of Court, Section 1 — Governs petitions for declaratory relief. Applied to hold that declaratory relief is not the proper remedy to seek a declaration of Philippine citizenship.

• Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court, Section 1 — Governs the writ of habeas corpus, extending to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. Applied to grant Prescott's release from detention.

• Republic Act No. 6768 (Balikbayan Program) — Defines "balikbayan" as a Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the Philippines, or a former Filipino citizen naturalized in a foreign country who returns. Applied as evidence that the government recognized Prescott as a Filipino or former Filipino when he traveled as a balikbayan.

• 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness, Article 1(4) — Obliges a Contracting State to grant nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless, including where the person has passed the age for lodging an application, provided the nationality of one of his parents at birth was that of the Contracting State. Applied as an alternative ground to recognize Prescott as a Philippine citizen, as he would have been stateless after losing his American citizenship without being recognized as Filipino under the 1935 Constitution.

Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concurred.

Leonen, SAJ., wrote a separate concurring opinion. Caguioa, J., wrote a concurring opinion in which he discussed the requirement to formally elect Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution in relation to C.A. No. 625, arguing that the Oath of Allegiance sworn by Prescott in 2008 encapsulated the assurance of complete loyalty, fidelity, and allegiance that the formal election requirement sought to ensure, and that the apprehension of disloyalty was non-existent given Prescott's consistent and deliberate actions throughout his life. Justice Caguioa's reasoning on substantial compliance and the 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness was extensively adopted in the majority opinion.