Potot vs. People of the Philippines

Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment of conviction becomes final upon the accused's written waiver of appeal; the trial court then loses jurisdiction to set it aside on the private complainant's motion, and only the accused may seek modification or reconsideration before finality.

Joey Potot was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2739 before the RTC, Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar, for the death of Rodolfo Dapulag. Rosalie Dapulag, Rodolfo's wife, was the private complainant, while Lolito Dapulag was named as respondent in the petition. The Rules of Court govern when a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside and when new trial or reconsideration may be granted, while the Constitution supplies the guarantee against double jeopardy.

On or about November 2, 1999, at about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning in the public cemetery of Mondragon, Northern Samar, Rodolfo Dapulag, also known as Pili, was stabbed with a knife locally called "dipang." An information filed on December 12, 1999 in the RTC, Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2739, charged Joey Potot y Surio with homicide, alleging that he armed himself with the weapon, with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable cause, attacked and stabbed Rodolfo and inflicted a mortal wound that caused his death.

Upon arraignment on February 1, 2000, the information was read to Potot in his own dialect; assisted by counsel, he pleaded guilty to the charge. He invoked the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, the latter because he surrendered voluntarily to the Philippine National Police Headquarters immediately after the commission of the crime. The public prosecutor did not object and manifested that no aggravating circumstance attended the crime. After satisfying itself that Potot understood the meaning and consequences of his plea, the RTC rendered and promulgated in open court its Decision convicting him of homicide, appreciating the two mitigating circumstances, and sentencing him to an indeterminate imprisonment of two years four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Rodolfo Dapulag in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs. The Decision also provided for full deduction of preventive imprisonment if the records showed that Potot had expressly agreed in writing to abide by the rules governing convicted prisoners during detention and was entitled to the privilege under the law.

On February 3, 2000, Potot, through counsel, filed a manifestation with motion informing the RTC that he was not appealing the Decision and praying for a commitment order so he could immediately serve his sentence. Attached to the motion was Potot's letter to the court stating that he did not intend to appeal.

On February 11, 2000, Rosalie Dapulag, the victim's wife, filed through counsel a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and the case heard again because there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice. The motion bore the conformity of the public prosecutor and alleged that the true facts were revealed by eyewitnesses Eduardo Boyson and Jimuel Marquita on December 8, 1999: Rodolfo Dapulag was killed by Potot with the aid of Doming Jarilla and Marlito Nazam, who respectively held Rodolfo's right and left arm to ensure the commission of the crime. The motion alleged that this information was deliberately withheld by the eyewitnesses during the police investigation and the preliminary investigations conducted by the presiding judge of the MCTC of Mondragon-San Roque and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, upon the solicitations of Mayor Elito Dapulag, who in good faith believed that including Jarilla and Nazam would make the prosecution more difficult; the witnesses withheld the information until Jimuel Marquita revealed it to the private offended party on December 8, 1999. Affidavits of Jimuel Marquita and Eduardo Boyson were attached.

Potot opposed the motion, asserting that there was no irregularity in the preliminary investigation and in the proceedings before the trial court and that the Decision could no longer be modified or set aside because it had become final when he formally waived his right to appeal. On May 3, 2000, the RTC granted the private complainant's motion and set aside its February 1, 2000 Decision. It ordered the records remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and filing of the corresponding charge, and denied Potot's motion for a commitment order. The RTC's order stated that the case as originally referred to the MCTC was for murder; that the MCTC found a prima facie case and recommended that the accused be held for trial; that the prosecutor's resolution reviewing the preliminary investigation did not discuss the participation of two others allegedly in conspiracy with the accused; and that the exclusion of Doming Jarilla and Marlito Nazam was orchestrated by the Municipal Mayor, who in good faith prevailed upon the witnesses not to implicate them, with the Provincial Prosecutor in conformity.

Potot filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the May 3, 2000 order because the Decision had become final and that the order would place him in double jeopardy. On May 26, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Potot then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

• Finality of Judgment: Petitioner argued that the February 1, 2000 Decision had become final when he formally waived his right to appeal, so it could no longer be modified or set aside.
• No Irregularity: Petitioner asserted that there was no irregularity in the preliminary investigation of the case and in the proceedings before the trial court.
• Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy: Petitioner contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the May 3, 2000 order because the Decision had become final, and that the order would place the accused in double jeopardy.

• Finality of Judgment: Whether the RTC could set aside its February 1, 2000 judgment of conviction after Potot had expressly waived his right to appeal and the judgment had become final.
• Motion by Private Complainant: Whether the RTC could grant the private complainant's motion for reconsideration/retrial when the motion was not initiated by the accused or by the trial court with the accused's consent.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the assailed orders would violate Potot's constitutional right against double jeopardy.
• Irregularity and Prosecutor's Discretion: Whether the alleged failure to include two other individuals and the downgrading of the charge from murder to homicide justified setting aside the judgment and remanding the records for re-evaluation.

• Finality of Judgment: No. Under Section 7, Rule 120, only the accused may ask to modify or set aside a judgment of conviction before it becomes final; Potot's written waiver of appeal made the judgment final, and the RTC lost jurisdiction to alter or revoke it.
• Motion by Private Complainant: No. Section 1, Rule 121 allows new trial or reconsideration before finality only on motion of the accused or at the trial court's instance with the accused's consent; the private complainant's motion, even with the public prosecutor's conformity, did not comply.
• Double Jeopardy: Yes. All requisites were present—valid information, jurisdiction, plea, and conviction—so reprosecution for homicide or an offense necessarily included therein would violate the constitutional guarantee.
• Irregularity and Prosecutor's Discretion: No. The records showed no irregularity in the preliminary investigation; the witnesses had withheld the information, and the public prosecutor has quasi-judicial discretion to determine the crime charged and who should be charged.

• Finality of Judgment: Section 7, Rule 120 provides that a judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected; except where the death penalty is imposed, it becomes final after the lapse of the appeal period, partial or total service of sentence, written waiver of appeal, or application for probation. Only the accused may ask for modification or setting aside, and only before finality. Potot filed on February 3, 2000, three days after promulgation, a manifestation expressly waiving appeal and praying for a commitment order. The waiver caused the judgment to become final and unalterable. The trial court therefore had no authority to issue the May 3, 2000 order setting aside the February 1, 2000 Decision. Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City and a long line of cases held that a final judgment becomes immutable; any error does not justify amendment except clerical errors or mistakes.
• Motion by Private Complainant: Section 1, Rule 121 provides that at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction was not initiated by Potot or by the trial court with his consent; it was filed by the private complainant with the public prosecutor's conformity. It should have been denied outright as violative of Section 1, Rule 121.
• Double Jeopardy: Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibits subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted; the objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest. The requisites are: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All were established: Potot was charged with homicide under a valid information in Criminal Case No. 2739 before the RTC with jurisdiction; he was arraigned and pleaded guilty; he was convicted and sentenced. Having been placed in jeopardy for homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense or any offense necessarily including or included in the first charge.
• Irregularity and Prosecutor's Discretion: The records do not show any irregularity in the preliminary investigation before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office. The private complainant's motion questioned the prosecutor's alleged failure to appreciate sworn statements of two prosecution witnesses implicating two other individuals and the downgrading of the initial charge of murder to homicide. But the motion itself revealed that the vital information was deliberately withheld by the witnesses during the police investigation and the preliminary investigations conducted by the MCTC judge and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, so the prosecutor who reviewed the records could not have appreciated it. The complainant did not appeal from the prosecutor's finding of probable cause for homicide. The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial prerogative to determine what crime should be filed and who should be charged, and retains full discretion and control of criminal prosecution under Section 5, Rule 110. People vs. Vergara held that the fiscal assumes full direction and control and has quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether to file a case, whether a prima facie case exists, whom to include, and what evidence to present.

• Immutability of final judgments — A judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable; any error, assuming one was committed, will not justify amendment except to correct clerical errors or mistakes. The SC applied this after Potot's written waiver of appeal made the February 1, 2000 conviction final.
• Finality of judgment of conviction under Section 7, Rule 120 — Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment of conviction becomes final after the lapse of the appeal period, when the sentence has been partially or totally served, when the accused has waived in writing the right to appeal, or when the accused has applied for probation. Only the accused may ask for modification or setting aside before finality. Applied: Potot's written waiver made the judgment final and removed the RTC's authority to set it aside.
• New trial or reconsideration under Section 1, Rule 121 — Before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may grant new trial or reconsideration only on motion of the accused or at the court's own instance with the accused's consent. Applied: the private complainant's motion, despite the public prosecutor's conformity, could not validly set aside the judgment.
• Double jeopardy requisites — To invoke double jeopardy, there must be (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court with jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Applied: all requisites were present, barring reprosecution for homicide or an offense necessarily included therein.
• Quasi-judicial discretion of the public prosecutor — The public prosecutor has full direction and control of criminal prosecution and quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether to file a case, whether a prima facie case exists, whom to include in the charge, and what evidence to present. Applied: the alleged omission of two other individuals and the downgrading from murder to homicide did not justify setting aside the final judgment, especially since the witnesses had withheld the information.

• "A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected." — Section 7, Rule 120, as quoted by the SC, establishes that only the accused may seek modification or setting aside before finality; this supported the ruling that the private complainant's motion could not disturb the conviction.
• "It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction." — The SC used this to reject the private complainant's motion as a vehicle for setting aside Potot's conviction.
• "Since the motion for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction was not initiated by the accused (petitioner) or at the instance of the trial court with his consent, the same should have been denied outright as being violative of the above provision." — The SC applied Section 1, Rule 121 and held the private complainant's motion procedurally impermissible.
• "To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent." — The SC enumerated the requisites and found all present, so the assailed orders would violate Potot's constitutional guarantee.

• Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88 (1994) — Controlling precedent on the immutability of final judgments; cited to hold that a final judgment cannot be amended except for clerical errors.
• People vs. Vergara, 221 SCRA 560 (1993) — Relied on for the public prosecutor's full direction and control and quasi-judicial discretion in criminal prosecution, and for the objective of double jeopardy.
• U.S. vs. De Iro, 33 Phil. 475, 479 (1916) — Cited in support of the rule that once a judgment becomes final, the trial court loses jurisdiction to alter, modify, or revoke it.
• People vs. Español, 114 SCRA 911, 922-923 (1982) — Cited in support of the effect of a written waiver of appeal in causing the judgment to become final and unalterable.
• Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175 (1994) — Cited for the requisites of double jeopardy; applied because all requisites were established.

• Section 7, Rule 120, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended — Governs modification of judgment; only the accused may move to modify or set aside a judgment of conviction before finality, and a written waiver of appeal makes the judgment final. Applied: Potot's waiver finalized the February 1, 2000 Decision and stripped the RTC of authority to set it aside.
• Section 1, Rule 121, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs new trial or reconsideration; before finality, the court may grant it on motion of the accused or at its own instance with the accused's consent. Applied: the private complainant's motion did not satisfy this requirement.
• Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right against double jeopardy; prohibits subsequent prosecution for a crime of which the accused was previously acquitted or convicted. Applied: because all requisites were present, reprosecution for homicide or an included offense was barred.
• Section 7, Rule 117, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended — Cited for the requisites of double jeopardy; applied because the SC found all requisites established.
• Section 5, Rule 110, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended — Provides that criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. Applied: the public prosecutor had quasi-judicial discretion to determine the crime charged and who should be charged, so the alleged omission and downgrading did not justify setting aside the judgment.