Porto vs. Grant Institute of Trade & Technology, Inc.

A petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals may be dismissed outright for multiple procedural deficiencies — including non-payment of docket fees, absence of verification and certification against forum shopping, and failure to indicate petitioners' actual addresses — and such dismissal will be sustained even if the Court of Appeals additionally erred in ruling that administrative remedies were not exhausted. The Court of Appeals' error on the exhaustion-of-remedies ground does not warrant remand where the original procedural deficiencies remain unexcused and are jurisdictional in nature.

Petitioners Jhon Kenneth M. Porto, Chennie Ann Rose Elca, and Jomar Jonhedel B. Bruto were among seven complainants who enrolled in and completed a Cruise Ship Management Course offered by Grant Institute of Trade & Technology, Inc. (GITT), an educational institution in San Pablo City, Laguna, managed by private respondents Dr. Ruel Reyes, Atty. Janet Joy A. Reyes, Lisha Alyanna A. Reyes, Jesse R. Reyes, and Nestor R. Miranda as its Board of Directors. Upon verification with the TESDA Laguna Provincial Office, the complainants discovered that GITT lacked the requisite TESDA authority to offer the course. The dispute centers on whether the institution's officers committed estafa through false pretenses of possessing the necessary government accreditation, and on the proper procedural recourse available to complainants after the Office of the Regional Prosecutor reversed the investigating prosecutor's finding of probable cause.

Seven complainants, including petitioners Jhon Kenneth M. Porto, Chennie Ann Rose Elca, and Jomar Jonhedel B. Bruto, enrolled in and completed the Cruise Ship Management Course offered by Grant Institute of Trade & Technology, Inc. (GITT), an institution located in Greenvalley Subdivision, Barangay San Jose, San Pablo City, Laguna, managed by private respondents Dr. Ruel Reyes, Atty. Janet Joy A. Reyes, Lisha Alyanna A. Reyes, Jesse R. Reyes, and Nestor R. Miranda as its Board of Directors. Upon verification with the TESDA Laguna Provincial Office, the complainants discovered that GITT did not have the requisite TESDA authority to offer the said course. A letter dated May 23, 2019 from the TESDA Provincial Director confirmed this absence of approval.

In 2019, the seven complainants filed consolidated Complaints for Estafa and Falsification before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City. Only private respondents Dr. Ruel Reyes and Atty. Janet Joy A. Reyes submitted a Counter-Affidavit, asserting that the complaints were baseless and intended for harassment, that GITT performed in good faith all its duties to provide proper education and training, and that the complainants had successfully completed their courses. They disavowed any deception or damage.

On September 30, 2019, OCP-San Pablo City recommended the filing of seven Informations for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code against the private respondents as officers and directors of GITT, while dismissing the falsification charge as absorbed in the estafa. The OCP reasoned that the complainants relied on GITT's false pretenses of possessing the requisite government licenses and accreditation, and that GITT's good faith in bundling three existing TESDA-registered courses (Cookery NC II, Food & Beverage Services NC II, and Housekeeping NC II) into its Cruise Ship Management Course did not excuse its lack of the requisite TESDA authority. The OCP held the private respondents liable as members of GITT's Board of Directors having direct control over its operations.

Private respondents filed a Petition for Review with the Office of the Regional Prosecutor (ORP) for Region IV, which reversed the OCP's ruling on January 20, 2020. The ORP reasoned that clear and convincing evidence was needed to establish that the private respondents were fully aware of the misrepresentation, noting that GITT had applied for the requisite TESDA authority during the complainants' enrollment and had entrusted the application to its school registrar/assessment center manager, who failed to secure it and neglected to inform GITT. The ORP also noted the absence of proof of payment of tuition fees, as no receipts were presented, and observed that the complainants received their education and were able to find jobs in the Philippines and abroad. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on March 12, 2020.

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Joint Petitions for Certiorari, arguing that the ORP ignored the evidence on record and exonerated the private respondents despite their offering of courses without the requisite TESDA authority. The CA dismissed the Joint Petitions outright on November 20, 2020, citing five procedural deficiencies: failure to pay docket fees, failure to submit sworn verification and certification against forum shopping, failure to indicate actual addresses, failure to furnish ORP-Region IV with copies, and failure to sign the petitions. Petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration pleading for liberality given the COVID-19 pandemic and substantial compliance. On June 14, 2021, the CA denied the motion, agreeing in principle with the plea for procedural leniency but finding a major flaw: petitioners' failure to appeal the ORP's resolutions to the Secretary of Justice under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, rendering certiorari an improper substitute for a lost appeal.

• CA Error on Dismissal Grounds: Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in dismissing their Joint Petitions for Certiorari on the ground of failure to exhaust the DOJ-NPS appellate process, and in failing to consider the main issue of ORP-Region IV's alleged grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withdrawal of the Informations.
• DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A: Petitioners pointed out that the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal had been amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A, which delegated to Regional State Prosecutors the authority to resolve with finality appeals from preliminary investigations outside Metro Manila relating to cases cognizable before first-level trial courts, and that this had been affirmed by the Court in Cariaga vs. Sapigao.
• Procedural Leniency: Petitioners prayed for the CA's liberality, citing the COVID-19 pandemic, their counsel's advanced age (70 years old), and their substantial compliance with the Rules of Court, asserting that their addresses were part of their verification, that counsel's address sufficed for constructive notice, and that the pandemic constituted a fortuitous event excusing delayed docket fee payment.
• Remand: Petitioners prayed for the reversal of the CA's resolutions and for remand to the CA for further proceedings on the merits.

• Unpaid Docket Fees: Private respondents alleged that petitioners still had not paid the corresponding docket fees for their Joint Petitions for Certiorari.
• Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: Private respondents reiterated the CA's reasoning that petitioners failed to exhaust available remedies in the DOJ-NPS appellate process, citing the scope and coverage of DOJ Department Circular No. 70 as basis, while omitting any mention of DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A.

• Propriety of Outright Dismissal: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Joint Petitions for Certiorari outright.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Joint Petitions for Certiorari on the additional ground of failure to exhaust the DOJ-NPS appellate process.

• Propriety of Outright Dismissal: No. The CA was correct in dismissing the Joint Petitions outright due to multiple procedural deficiencies, including non-payment of docket fees (a jurisdictional requirement), absence of verification and certification against forum shopping, failure to indicate petitioners' actual addresses, failure to furnish ORP-Region IV, and failure to sign the petitions.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Yes, the CA erred. Under DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A, as consistently reiterated by subsequent circulars, resolutions of Regional State Prosecutors in cases cognizable by first-level courts outside the NCR are promulgated with finality and are no longer appealable to the Secretary of Justice. The estafa amounts involved fall within the jurisdiction of first-level trial courts pursuant to R.A. No. 10951.

• Propriety of Outright Dismissal: The Court affirmed each of the five procedural grounds cited by the CA. First, Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court requires mandatory disclosure of petitioners' actual addresses; the Joint Petitions contained no addresses at all, only identification numbers, and petitioners could not substitute counsel's address for their own, as held in Atianzar vs. Heirs of Bangoy. Second, the COVID-19 pandemic was not a fortuitous event excusing non-payment of docket fees, because the Court's Administrative Circular No. 41-2020 mandated full court operations beginning June 1, 2020, with no extensions for filings due thereafter; counsel was physically present at the CA premises and could have paid the fees or used postal money orders. Third, non-payment of docket fees is jurisdictional — the court acquires jurisdiction only upon payment — and the record showed no payment had been made even up to the present. Fourth, the age and mobility issues of counsel did not excuse non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements, especially since counsel had already reached the CA premises. Fifth, the CA's record lacked the signature page and verification/certification against forum shopping, and petitioners offered no proof to the contrary; without these, what was filed was a mere scrap of paper. Sixth, per Robina Farms Cebu vs. Villa, failure to file the mandatory certification against forum shopping cannot be cured by later submission and is fatal to an original petition; Rule 46, Section 3 expressly provides for dismissal without need of any hearing upon motion. Seventh, while a public respondent need not actively participate, it must still be impleaded and furnished a copy of the petition.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The CA committed grave error in ruling that petitioners still needed to elevate the case to the Secretary of Justice. DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A, promulgated on July 10, 2000, delegated to Regional State Prosecutors the authority to resolve with finality appeals from resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by first-level courts outside the NCR. This circular was consistently reiterated by subsequent DOJ issuances (DOJ Department Circular Nos. 18, 3-A, 5, 34, and 27), affirming that ORP resolutions in such cases are final and no longer appealable to the Secretary of Justice. The Court in Cariaga vs. Sapigao laid out the governing rules: where a complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealed to the ORSP, whose ruling is with finality. The CA erroneously stated that estafa cases are not cognizable by first-level courts, but R.A. No. 10951 amended Article 315 of the RPC such that estafa involving amounts not exceeding P1,200,000 is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period — well within the six-year imprisonment threshold of first-level court jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691. The amounts allegedly defrauded (approximately P108,000 per petitioner, or P756,000 total for seven complainants) clearly fell within first-level court jurisdiction. Petitioners therefore had no remaining administrative remedy and properly resorted to certiorari. However, despite this error, the CA's earlier dismissal on the multiple procedural deficiencies barred remand, as those defects — particularly non-payment of docket fees — were jurisdictional and rendered the case beyond the Court's power of review due to petitioners' negligence.

• Jurisdiction over certiorari petitions requires payment of docket fees — The court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees. Non-payment is not a mere procedural lapse but a jurisdictional defect that is fatal to the petition. The Court applied this doctrine to sustain the CA's dismissal, noting that the record was bereft of any indication that petitioners had paid the docket fees even up to the present.

• Certification against forum shopping is mandatory and cannot be cured by belated submission — The abject failure to file the mandatory certification against non-forum shopping along with an initiatory pleading cannot be cured by a later submission and is fatal to an original petition. The Court applied this by affirming that the CA's record contained no verification or certification at all, and that petitioners did not even submit the same when they filed their motion for reconsideration.

• Actual addresses of petitioners must be disclosed in original petitions — Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court requires the mandatory disclosure of the actual addresses of all petitioners in an original case filed before the CA. A petitioner's counsel's address cannot substitute for the petitioner's own address. The Court found petitioners' non-compliance inexcusable, as they indicated only identification numbers and no addresses at all.

• Finality of ORP resolutions in first-level court cases outside NCR — Under DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A and its subsequent reiterations, resolutions of Regional State Prosecutors on appeals from Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by first-level courts outside the NCR are promulgated with finality and are no longer appealable to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice may review such resolutions only in the exercise of discretionary supervisory power, not as part of the appellate process. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioners had properly exhausted administrative remedies and were correct in elevating the case to the CA via certiorari.

• Certiorari as improper substitute for lost appeal — A petition for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal. The CA invoked this doctrine but erred in its application because petitioners had no remaining administrative appeal available under the DOJ-NPS framework as amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A.

• "in both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees." — This passage states the jurisdictional nature of docket fee payment, which the Court applied to sustain the CA's dismissal of the Joint Petitions and to bar remand despite the CA's error on the exhaustion-of-remedies issue.

• "the abject failure to file the mandatory certification against non-forum shopping along with an initiatory pleading cannot be cured by a later submission, and is in fact fatal to an original petition." — This formulation, drawn from Robina Farms Cebu vs. Villa, articulates the mandatory and non-curable character of the certification against forum shopping requirement in original petitions before the CA.

• "a resolution on appeal of the ORP in a region outside Metro Manila (vis-à-vis preliminary investigations in cases cognizable before the first-level trial courts) is promulgated with finality." — This passage defines the controlling rule on the finality of ORP resolutions under DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A, establishing that no further appeal to the Secretary of Justice is available in such cases, and that certiorari to the CA is the proper recourse after denial of a motion for reconsideration.

• Cariaga vs. Sapigao, 811 Phil. 819 (2017) — Controlling precedent cited by both petitioners and the CA for the proposition that the DOJ-NPS appellate process depends on where the complaint was filed and which court has original jurisdiction. The Court relied on this case's enumerated rules to determine that ORP resolutions in first-level court cases outside the NCR are final and no longer appealable to the Secretary of Justice.

• Atianzar vs. Heirs of Bangoy, G.R. No. 247815, March 2, 2020 — Followed for the rule that it is mandatory to include the actual addresses of all petitioners in a petition for certiorari before the CA, and that counsel's address cannot substitute for the petitioner's own.

• Robina Farms Cebu vs. Villa, 784 Phil. 636 (2016) — Followed for the doctrine that failure to file the mandatory certification against non-forum shopping with an initiatory pleading cannot be cured by later submission and is fatal to an original petition.

• Colarina vs. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 271 (1999) — Followed for the principle that while payment of docket fees may be liberally construed in certain cases, it should not be ignored or belittled, and the payment in the proper amount should be followed subject only to strictly construed exceptions.

• Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 833 Phil. 734 (2018) — Cited for the jurisdictional rule that the court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of prescribed docket fees.

• Heirs of Guiambangan vs. Municipality of Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat, 791 Phil. 518 (2016) — Cited for the proposition that failure to implead a public respondent is not a ground for dismissal of the filed action, though the Court noted the CA's earlier dismissal on other grounds was sufficient.

• Section 3, Rule 46, Rules of Court — Requires that original petitions filed before the CA must be accompanied by a certification against non-forum shopping and must contain the actual addresses of all petitioners; failure to comply is sufficient ground for dismissal without need of any hearing upon motion. The Court applied this provision to sustain the CA's outright dismissal on the grounds of missing addresses and absent certification against forum shopping.

• Section 1, DOJ Department Circular No. 70 (2000 NPS Rule on Appeal) — States that the Rule applies to appeals from resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor, Regional State Prosecutors, and Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases subject of preliminary investigation. The CA invoked this provision to require petitioners to appeal to the Secretary of Justice, but the Court held that this circular was amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A.

• DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A — Delegates to Regional State Prosecutors the authority to resolve with finality appeals from resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by first-level courts outside the NCR. The Court held that this circular, as consistently reiterated by subsequent DOJ issuances, governs the DOJ-NPS appellate process and renders ORP resolutions final in such cases, making further appeal to the Secretary of Justice merely discretionary and not part of the appellate process.

• Article 315, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 10951 — Adjusts the penalty thresholds for estafa based on the amount of fraud. The Court applied the amended thresholds to determine that estafa involving amounts not exceeding P1,200,000 is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, placing the amounts involved (approximately P108,000 per petitioner) within the jurisdiction of first-level trial courts.

• Section 32, B.P. Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by R.A. No. 7691 — Grants first-level trial courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years. The Court applied this provision in conjunction with the amended Article 315 to conclude that the estafa charges fell within first-level court jurisdiction, thereby triggering the finality rule under DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A.

Inting, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concurred. Caguioa, J., was on official leave.