POPARMUCO vs. Inson

A petition for contempt will not lie against a public official whose acts, though improper and constituting grave abuse of discretion, were not a willful and contumacious refusal to obey a final and executory judgment of the Court. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose; where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and the party acts in good faith within what he believes to be his rights, the presence or absence of contumacious intent is determinative of its character.

Petitioner Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative (POPARMUCO) is a duly organized and registered cooperative of agrarian reform beneficiaries. Respondent Rodolfo T. Inson is the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Region VII, Cebu City. The case is an offshoot of Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Polo Coconut Plantation Company, Inc. (586 Phil. 69 [2008]), in which this Court reversed the Court of Appeals and declared valid the acts of the DAR in placing a 394.9020-hectare portion of the Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. property under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, including the issuance of TCT No. T-802 and CLOA No. 00114438 in favor of POPARMUCO members. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law vests in the DAR the primary responsibility of implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, including the identification, screening, and selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries, subject to the finality of judgments and the indefeasibility of Torrens titles.

Sometime in 2003, a 394.9020-hectare portion of the landholding owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. (Polo Coconut) in Polo, Tanjay, Negros Oriental was placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657. A Notice of Coverage was sent on May 23, 2003 to Polo Coconut President Rene Espina. On December 11, 2003, the DAR received from the Land Bank of the Philippines a Memorandum of Valuation indicating P85,491,784.60 as just compensation for 393.1327 hectares of the property. After Polo Coconut failed to reply to the Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the DAR conducted summary administrative proceedings, and Regional Adjudicator Atty. Arnold C. Arrieta affirmed the valuation in his March 31, 2004 Resolution.

Meanwhile, Polo Coconut's title was canceled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. On January 27, 2004, a collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award, CLOA No. 00114438, was issued, and it was registered on January 30, 2004 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-802 in favor of POPARMUCO members whom the DAR identified as agrarian reform beneficiaries. Polo Coconut moved to suspend the relocation survey, but the motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction. Polo Coconut then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, contending that the City of Tanjay had reclassified the area into mixed residential, commercial, and industrial land, and assailing the eligibility of the identified beneficiaries. On February 16, 2005, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Polo Coconut, declaring the DAR's acts not valid and ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-36318 and T-802.

In its September 3, 2008 Decision in Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Polo Coconut Plantation Company, Inc. (G.R. Nos. 168787 and 169271), this Court reversed the Court of Appeals, confirmed the acts of the DAR, and declared the issuance of TCT No. T-802 and CLOA No. 00114438 valid. The Court ruled that Polo Coconut did not exhaust its administrative remedies, that the property was never placed beyond the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and that Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law "does not limit qualified beneficiaries to tenants of the landowners." The Decision became final and executory on November 26, 2008.

On June 30, 2009, 164 alleged regular farmworkers of Polo Coconut (Alcantara, et al.) filed a Petition for Inclusion as qualified beneficiaries in TCT No. T-802/CLOA No. 00114438 and Exclusion of those named as beneficiaries therein. They alleged that they were not informed when the DAR conducted the identification and screening process, and contended that the CLOA holders were not qualified beneficiaries under Section 22. On July 1, 2009, they also filed a Petition for Immediate Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or Injunction, averring that the CLOA holders had attempted to occupy the property without authority. Acting on the petition, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and Desist Order dated July 7, 2009, directing the CLOA holders to cease and desist from entering, occupying, or taking possession of the property pending final determination of the inclusion-exclusion proceedings, and enjoining the PARO and MARO from undertaking any relocation/subdivision survey. On July 20, 2009, respondent also issued Special Order No. 070 creating an independent body to conduct a revalidation of farmer-beneficiaries, which conducted interviews from August 3 to 7, 2009.

On July 23, 2009, POPARMUCO members filed a Motion to Quash the Cease and Desist Order with Motion for Reconsideration, alleging lack of prior notice and that the Order defied this Court's September 3, 2008 Decision. On July 30, 2009, POPARMUCO members filed before the DAR Regional Adjudication Board a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution seeking to enforce the September 3, 2008 Decision. POPARMUCO then filed before this Court a Petition for Contempt against respondent Inson, raising grounds of violation of due process, defiance of the final and executory Decision, and entitlement of its members as registered owners. During the pendency of the Petition, respondent dismissed the Motion to Quash in a September 29, 2009 Order and proceeded to issue a March 12, 2010 Order disqualifying some of petitioner's members. The March 12, 2010 Order declared, among others, that 109 of the petitioners in the inclusion/exclusion case were qualified beneficiaries, 62 were disqualified, 39 CLOA holders (petitioner's members) were disqualified for not being connected with Polo Coconut, six were disqualified for having migrated, and 102 existing CLOA holders maintained their status as qualified beneficiaries. Respondent further directed the PARO to facilitate the inclusion of the qualified beneficiaries in CLOA No. 00114438 by filing a petition for amendment/correction of the CLOA. Petitioner's members subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an Appeal of the March 12, 2010 Order, which the DAR Secretary dismissed in an April 3, 2013 Order for lack of merit.

• Defiance of Final Judgment: Petitioner argued that respondent, in issuing the Cease and Desist Order, committed acts amounting to "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment" of this Court in G.R. Nos. 168787 and 169271.
• Due Process Violation: Petitioner argued that respondent issued a Cease and Desist Order without any notice, in violation of petitioner's members' constitutional right to due process.
• Finality of Beneficiary Qualification: Petitioner argued that respondent defied this Court's September 3, 2008 Decision, which ruled with finality on the qualification of petitioner's members as beneficiaries in the landholding covered under TCT No. T-802/CLOA No. 00114438.
• Ownership Rights: Petitioner argued that its members, as registered owners of the landholding, are entitled to the property as the last step in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program implementation.
• Indefeasibility of Title: Petitioner argued that Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, on the indefeasibility of a title, cannot be subverted by the DAR's rules and regulations.
• Binding Effect of Prior Decision: Petitioner argued that the petitioners in the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion were under the control of the previous landowner and some were parties in G.R. Nos. 168787 and 169271; thus, they were bound by the September 3, 2008 Decision.
• Mootness Contested: Petitioner contended that the Petition has not been mooted, as the adjudged agrarian reform beneficiaries have not been installed in the land despite the finality of the September 3, 2008 Decision.

• No Legal Impediment: Respondent argued that the September 3, 2008 Decision is no legal impediment to his taking cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion and issuance of a Cease and Desist Order, as this Court had recognized the Department Secretary's exclusive jurisdiction over the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, including the identification and selection of its beneficiaries.
• Statutory Authority: Respondent argued that his issuance of the Cease and Desist Order is authorized under Section 22, which vests in the DAR the power to reassess the qualification of identified beneficiaries, and even strip them of their rights if found to have violated agrarian laws.
• Scope of Prior Decision: Respondent argued that the September 3, 2008 Decision "did not pass on the merits of [petitioner's members'] qualifications as farmer beneficiaries," and that the discussion on beneficiaries was included merely to highlight the DAR's exclusive jurisdiction over issues on the program's implementation.
• Factual and Legal Bases: Respondent argued that he had legal and factual bases to issue the Cease and Desist Order, as the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion alleged that petitioner's members were not seasonal farmworkers but outsiders not related to the Polo Coconut management and the land.
• Authority to Issue Cease and Desist Order: Respondent argued that Section 20 of DAR Administrative Order No. 03-03 authorizes the Regional Director to issue a Cease and Desist Order on grounds of grave or irreparable damage, mootness of the case, or the need to maintain peace and order.
• Mootness: Respondent averred that petitioner's voluntary submission to the DAR's jurisdiction, through the Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal, has rendered the case moot, and that the DAR Secretary's April 3, 2013 Order affirms that his cognizance of the Petition did not constitute defiance of the September 3, 2008 Decision.

• Cognizance of Inclusion/Exclusion Petition: Whether respondent Regional Director's cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion of farmer beneficiaries, and his subsequent issuance of the July 7, 2009 Cease and Desist Order and the March 12, 2010 Order disqualifying some of petitioner's members, constitute defiance of this Court's September 3, 2008 Decision in G.R. Nos. 168787 and 169271.

• Cognizance of Inclusion/Exclusion Petition: No. Respondent's cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion and his issuance of the Cease and Desist Order and the March 12, 2010 Order were improper, but they do not constitute indirect contempt of court. The Petition for Contempt was dismissed for lack of merit, as respondent's acts did not qualify as a willful disobedience to this Court nor a willful disregard of its authority.

• Cognizance of Inclusion/Exclusion Petition: The Court first established the scope of the DAR's jurisdiction in agrarian law implementation cases. Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law vests the DAR with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The identification and selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries involve the administrative implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, not the Adjudication Board. Under DAR Administrative Order No. 03-03, the Regional Director has primary jurisdiction over all agrarian law implementation cases, including the classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries.

However, the Court found that by the time the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion was filed on June 30, 2009, the September 3, 2008 Decision declaring the validity of CLOA No. 00114438 had attained finality, and TCT No. T-802 had already become incontrovertible. The finality of the Decision meant that its decrees could no longer be altered, modified, or reversed, and the issue on the qualification of the existing CLOA holders had long been laid to rest. As registered property owners, petitioner's members were entitled to the protection given to every Torrens title holder, and their rights may only be forfeited in case of violations of agrarian laws, as well as noncompliance with the restrictions and conditions under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The Court cited Estribillo vs. Department of Agrarian Reform and Heirs of Nuñez, Sr. vs. Heirs of Villanoza for the principle that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings, including CLOAs, are as indefeasible as those issued in judicial proceedings, and become irrevocable and incontrovertible after the expiration of one year from issuance.

Nevertheless, the Court held that respondent's erroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed as grave abuse of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for contempt. Citing Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Paruñgao, the Court defined contempt of court as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, signifying not only a willful disregard of the court's order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court, and the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. The court's contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, not vindictive, purpose, and only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised.

Applying these principles, the Court found no clear and contumacious conduct on the part of respondent. Respondent justified his cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion based on the Department's exclusive prerogative in the identification, selection, and subsequent re-evaluation of agrarian reform beneficiaries. While this justification was erroneous in light of the final and executory Decision, the presence or absence of contumacious intent is determinative of the character of the act. The Court held that respondent's acts do not qualify as a willful disobedience to this Court nor a willful disregard of its authority, and thus the Petition for Contempt was dismissed.

• Contempt of Court — Contempt of court is a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, signifying not only a willful disregard of the court's order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court, and the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. The court's contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, not vindictive, purpose, and only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. In this case, the Court applied this doctrine to find that respondent's erroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion, while improper, did not constitute contempt because there was no clear and contumacious refusal to obey the Court's final and executory Decision.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — A judgment, once it attains finality, becomes immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. This rule rests on the principle that all litigation must come to an end, however unjust the result of error may appear. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the September 3, 2008 Decision, having become final and executory on November 26, 2008, could no longer be altered, and the issue of beneficiary qualification had been laid to rest.

• Indefeasibility of Torrens Titles Issued in Administrative Proceedings — Certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings, including Certificates of Land Ownership Award and Emancipation Patents, are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial registration proceedings. Such titles become irrevocable and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent or from registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds. Section 24 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 9700, explicitly provides that CLOAs, being titles brought under the operation of the Torrens system, are conferred with the same indefeasibility and security afforded to all titles under the said system. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that TCT No. T-802 had become incontrovertible, and petitioner's members, as registered property owners, were entitled to the protection given to every Torrens title holder.

• Jurisdiction over Agrarian Law Implementation Cases — The identification and selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries involve the administrative implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, not the Adjudication Board. Under DAR Administrative Order No. 03-03, the Regional Director has primary jurisdiction over all agrarian law implementation cases, including the classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries, while the DAR Secretary has appellate jurisdiction. The Court applied this doctrine to explain the basis of respondent's asserted authority, while noting that such authority could not override the finality of the September 3, 2008 Decision.

• "Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court's order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court." — This passage, quoting Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Paruñgao, defines the controlling doctrine of contempt of court and establishes the standard for determining whether an act is contemptuous.

• "In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its character. . . . To constitute contempt, the act must be done wil[l]fully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose." — This passage, quoting St. Louis University, Inc. vs. Olairez, establishes that the intent of the alleged contemnor is the gravamen of the contempt offense, and was the basis for the Court's finding that respondent acted without contumacious intent.

• "Still, respondent's erroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed as grave abuse of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for contempt. 'No one who is called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.'" — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning that an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, even if amounting to grave abuse of discretion, is not punishable as contempt but should be corrected through a petition for certiorari.

• "Here, by the time the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion was filed on June 30, 2009, the September 3, 2008 Decision declaring the validity of CLOA No. 00114438 had attained finality and TCT No. T-802 had already become incontrovertible. As registered property owners, petitioner's members were entitled to the protection given to every Torrens title holder." — This passage states the Court's finding that the finality of the prior Decision and the indefeasibility of the Torrens title rendered respondent's subsequent actions improper.

• Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Polo Coconut Plantation Company, Inc., 586 Phil. 69 (2008) — Controlling precedent; the prior final and executory Decision in G.R. Nos. 168787 and 169271 that declared the validity of CLOA No. 00114438 and TCT No. T-802, and which the respondent was alleged to have defied.

• Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Paruñgao, 701 Phil. 444 (2013) — Followed; cited for the definition of contempt of court and the principle that an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court to be contemptuous.

• St. Louis University, Inc. vs. Olairez, 730 Phil. 444 (2014) — Followed; cited for the principle that intent is the gravamen of the contempt offense, and that the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

• Estribillo vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 526 Phil. 700 (2006) — Followed; cited for the principle that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings, including CLOAs and Emancipation Patents, are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial registration proceedings.

• Heirs of Nuñez, Sr. vs. Heirs of Villanoza, G.R. No. 218666, April 26, 2017 — Followed; cited for the principle that a CLOA title registered under the Torrens system becomes irrevocable and indefeasible after the expiration of one year.

• Sutton vs. Lim, 700 Phil. 67 (2012) — Followed; cited for the principle that the Adjudication Board's jurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of registered CLOAs is confined to agrarian disputes.

• Concha vs. Rubio, 631 Phil. 21 (2010) — Followed; cited for the principle that the identification and selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries involve the administrative implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR.

• Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Amante, 493 Phil. 570 (2005) — Followed; cited to clarify that Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law pertains to both the DAR's administrative and quasi-judicial functions.

• Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Calanza, 647 Phil. 507 (2010) — Followed; cited for the principle that the court's contempt power should be exercised with restraint and only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey.

• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Suntay, 678 Phil. 879 (2011) — Followed; cited for the principle of immutability of final judgments.

• Section 22, Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) — Defines qualified beneficiaries and the order of priority in the distribution of lands, and mandates the DAR to adopt a system of monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The Court applied this provision to explain the DAR's authority over beneficiary qualification, while noting that the issue had been laid to rest by the final and executory Decision.

• Section 24, Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 9700 — Provides that the rights and responsibilities of beneficiaries commence from their receipt of a duly registered emancipation patent or certificate of land ownership award, and that CLOAs and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible after one year from registration, being titles brought under the operation of the Torrens system. The Court applied this provision to hold that TCT No. T-802 had become incontrovertible.

• Section 50, Republic Act No. 6657 — Vests the DAR with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The Court applied this provision to establish the scope of the DAR's jurisdiction in agrarian law implementation cases.

• Section 16, Republic Act No. 6657 — Outlines the procedure for compulsory land acquisition, including the sending of notice to the landowner, the conduct of summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation, and the issuance of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court discussed this provision to explain the process by which the property was acquired and distributed.

• Section 105, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Cited by petitioner for the principle of indefeasibility of a title; the Court discussed the indefeasibility of titles issued in administrative proceedings in relation to this provision.

• Section 13, Executive Order No. 129-A — Created the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and authorized it to assume the DAR's quasi-judicial functions. The Court discussed this provision to distinguish the Adjudication Board's jurisdiction from the DAR's administrative jurisdiction over beneficiary identification and selection.

• DAR Administrative Order No. 03-03 (2003 Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases) — Governs agrarian law implementation cases, vesting the Regional Director with primary jurisdiction over all such cases, including the classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries. The Court applied this provision to explain the basis of respondent's asserted authority.

• DAR Administrative Order No. 07-03 — Provides the qualifications, disqualifications, and rights and obligations of agrarian reform beneficiaries, and the operating procedures for their identification, screening, and selection. The Court discussed this provision to explain the administrative framework for beneficiary selection.

• DAR Administrative Order No. 03-09 — Provides the rules and procedures for canceling CLOAs and other titles under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and recognizes the State's recognition of the indefeasibility of CLOAs, Emancipation Patents, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program. The Court discussed this provision in relation to the grounds for cancellation of CLOAs.

• Peralta (Chairperson)
• A. Reyes, Jr.
• Hernando
• Carandang (designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018)

N/A — The case text does not indicate any dissenting opinion.