PNCC vs. Court of Appeals

A tollway franchisee cannot escape liability for its own negligence in maintaining safe road conditions by invoking a private agreement with another party to which the injured motorist is not a privy; the successive negligent acts of two parties acting independently, which combine as the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, render them joint tortfeasors solidarily liable under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

PNCC is the franchisee granted authority under Presidential Decree No. 1113, as amended by P.D. No. 1894, to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities along the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX), with the concomitant right to collect toll fees and the obligation to keep the expressway safe for motorists. PASUDECO is a sugar milling company that transports sugarcane through Pampanga. Following the 1991 Mount Pinatubo eruption, which heavily damaged national bridges along PASUDECO's regular transport routes, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) allowed PASUDECO trucks to traverse the NLEX under a Memorandum of Agreement dated November 5, 1991, which, among other conditions, made PASUDECO responsible for "accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval." PNCC was furnished a copy of the MOA and, by letter dated October 22, 1992, interposed no objection thereto.

PNCC is the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities of the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX), with the concomitant obligation to keep it safe for motorists. PASUDECO is a sugar milling company that transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. When the 1991 Mount Pinatubo eruption heavily damaged the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang, PASUDECO requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to pass through the NLEX. On November 5, 1991, the TRB and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) allowing PASUDECO trucks to use the NLEX under specified conditions, including that PASUDECO trucks move in convoy, stay on the right lane, observe tollway safety measures, and that "accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO." The MOA was to remain in force only while the damaged national bridges remained impassable. PNCC was furnished a copy of the MOA and, by letter dated October 22, 1992, informed PASUDECO that it interposed no objection.

At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, PNCC security supervisor Alex Sendin and his co-employees Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX when they encountered a pile of sugarcane in the middle of the north and southbound lanes. They placed lit cans with diesel oil and lane dividers with reflectorized markings to warn motorists of the obstruction. Believing the sugarcane belonged to PASUDECO, as it was the only milling company in the area, they proceeded to the PASUDECO office and requested a payloader or grader. PASUDECO's equipment supervisor and transportation superintendent, Engineer Oscar Mallari, informed them that no equipment operator was available at that hour but promised to send someone to clear the area. Sendin and his team returned to Km. 72 and manned the traffic.

At around 4:00 a.m., five PASUDECO men arrived and began clearing the highway, stacking the sugarcane at the roadside. They left at about 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcane stalks scattered on the road. The highway remained wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcane. Believing the bulk of the obstruction had been removed and with dawn approaching, Sendin and his team removed the lighted cans and lane dividers and returned to their office to make the necessary report. At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing, Inc., was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla at approximately 65 kilometers per hour along the NLEX, accompanied by his sister Regina Latagan and his friend Ricardo Generalao, en route to Baguio for their grandmother's first death anniversary. As the vehicle ran over the scattered flattened sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times, throwing the car about fifteen paces from the scattered sugarcane. Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla subsequently observed black and white flattened sugarcanes on both lanes of the road.

On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan, and Generalao filed a complaint for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC of Manila, alleging that PNCC negligently failed to keep the NLEX safe, that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcane on the expressway, and that the combined gross negligence of both was the direct and proximate cause of Latagan's injuries and the damage to Arnaiz's car. The RTC found PASUDECO liable to Latagan but dismissed the case against PNCC and dismissed the claims of Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the CA modified the RTC decision, holding both PASUDECO and PNCC jointly and solidarily liable to Latagan, finding that PNCC was negligent in removing the warning devices while scattered sugarcane stalks and wet road conditions persisted.

• PASUDECO's Sole Liability: Petitioner asserted that the trial court was correct in holding only PASUDECO liable, since PASUDECO had assumed responsibility for accidents under the MOA between it and the TRB, and only PASUDECO was given a permit to pass through the route.
• Absence of PNCC Negligence: Petitioner insisted that respondents failed to prove that PNCC was negligent in the operation and maintenance of the NLEX, maintaining that its personnel had done their part in clearing the expressway of sugarcane piles and that only a few scattered flattened sugarcanes remained when its men left Km. 72.
• MOA as Shield: Petitioner argued that any liability arising from the spilled sugarcanes should be borne by PASUDECO pursuant to the MOA provision stating that "accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO."
• Respondents' Own Fault: Petitioner argued that respondents should bear the consequences of their own fault or negligence, and that the proximate and immediate cause of the mishap was respondent Arnaiz's reckless imprudence or gross negligence.

• Reviewability of Factual Issues: Whether the petition raises only questions of fact, which are not reviewable under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
• PNCC's Negligence: Whether PNCC was negligent in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists when its personnel removed warning devices while flattened sugarcane stalks and wet road conditions persisted.
• Effect of the MOA: Whether the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB exempts PNCC from liability to third-party motorists who are not parties to the agreement.
• Joint and Solidary Liability: Whether PNCC and PASUDECO are joint tortfeasors solidarily liable for the injuries sustained by Latagan.
• Arnaiz's Negligence: Whether Arnaiz's negligence was the proximate cause of the mishap or merely contributory, and whether petitioner may change its theory on appeal.

• Reviewability of Factual Issues: Yes. The issues raised are factual in nature and not reviewable under Rule 45; no exception to the rule was present. The petition was destined to fail on this ground alone, though the Court nonetheless reviewed the records and found the petition bereft of merit.
• PNCC's Negligence: Yes. PNCC failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX, its personnel having removed warning devices while flattened sugarcane and wet road conditions persisted, creating undue risk of harm to motorists.
• Effect of the MOA: No. The MOA cannot exempt PNCC from liability to third-party motorists, as Latagan was not a party thereto; the MOA's coverage is limited to damages to toll facilities, not injuries to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the agreement.
• Joint and Solidary Liability: Yes. PASUDECO's and PNCC's successive negligent acts were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan's injuries, rendering them joint tortfeasors solidarily liable under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
• Arnaiz's Negligence: Contributory only. Arnaiz's negligence was merely contributory, not the proximate cause; petitioner was barred from changing its theory on appeal after having pleaded contributory negligence in its Answer.

• Reviewability of Factual Issues: The issues raised by petitioner—whether PNCC was negligent, whether the MOA shields PNCC, and whether Arnaiz's negligence was the proximate cause—are factual in nature. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised before the Supreme Court, and while exceptions exist, none was present in this case. The petition was destined to fail on this ground alone. The Court nonetheless reviewed the records and found the petition bereft of merit.

• PNCC's Negligence: As franchisee under Presidential Decree No. 1113, as amended by P.D. No. 1894, PNCC had the obligation to keep the NLEX safe for motorists. The test for negligence, as declared in Picart vs. Smith, is whether the defendant used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation, and whether a prudent person could foresee harm to the injured person as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued. PNCC's personnel removed the lighted cans and lane dividers even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground and the highway remained wet from sugarcane juice and sap. PNCC should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing at night or in the early morning hours. The CA correctly observed that PNCC declared the area free from obstruction merely because there were no longer "piles" of sugarcane, yet evidence showed scattered sugarcane stalks remained, warranting the continued presence of sufficient warning devices.

• Effect of the MOA: The MOA between PASUDECO and TRB cannot shield PNCC from liability because respondent Latagan was not a party thereto. The CA correctly ruled that PNCC's obligation to maintain the expressway should not be relegated to other parties by virtue of a private agreement. Moreover, the MOA's language refers only to "accidents or damages to the toll facilities" and does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA. The MOA thus provides no basis for exempting PNCC from its independent duty of diligence owed to all motorists.

• Joint and Solidary Liability: PASUDECO's negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness or straps, and PNCC's negligence in removing emergency warning devices while scattered sugarcane stalks and wet road conditions remained, were two successive negligent acts that were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan's injuries. Under the doctrine articulated in Sabido vs. Custodio and Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed, either is responsible for the whole injury. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause. Article 2194 of the Civil Code provides that the responsibility of two or more persons liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Accordingly, PASUDECO and PNCC are joint tortfeasors solidarily liable for the resulting damage.

• Arnaiz's Negligence: Both the trial court and the CA agreed that Arnaiz's negligence was merely contributory, warranting mitigation of damages under Article 2179 of the Civil Code. Petitioner itself had characterized Arnaiz's negligence as contributory in its Answer to the complaint, stating that the direct and proximate cause was PASUDECO's gross negligence "coupled with the contributory negligence of Arnaiz in driving his car at an unreasonable speed." Petitioner's attempt to change its theory on appeal—now claiming Arnaiz's negligence was the proximate and immediate cause—was impermissible. A party that adopts a certain theory in the trial court may not change that theory on appeal, as doing so would be unfair to the opposing party and offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.

• Test for Negligence (Picart vs. Smith) — The test for determining negligence is whether the defendant used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation, and whether a prudent person, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, could foresee harm to the injured person as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued. The existence of negligence is determined not by the personal judgment of the actor but by the standard of the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence. The Court applied this test to find PNCC negligent for removing warning devices while hazardous road conditions persisted, as PNCC should have foreseen that the wet and obstructed highway would endanger motorists.

• Joint Tortfeasors' Solidary Liability — Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. The Court applied this doctrine to hold PASUDECO and PNCC solidarily liable for Latagan's injuries, as their successive negligent acts combined as the direct and proximate cause.

• Contributory Negligence (Article 2179) — When the plaintiff's own negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm suffered, which falls below the standard required for the injured party's own protection. The Court applied this provision to treat Arnaiz's negligence as merely mitigating, not barring, recovery.

• Prohibition Against Changing Theory on Appeal — When a party adopts a certain theory in the trial court, it will not be permitted to change its theory on appeal, as doing so would be unfair to the other party and offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. The Court applied this principle to bar PNCC from shifting its position from contributory negligence (as pleaded in its Answer) to proximate cause (as argued in its petition).

• "The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private agreement, to other parties." — This passage, quoted from the Court of Appeals' ruling, articulates the principle that a tollway operator's statutory duty of diligence to motorists cannot be displaced by a private agreement to which the motorist is not a party.

• "Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA." — This defines the limited scope of the MOA's liability-shifting provision, clarifying that it covers only toll facility damages and not injuries to third-party motorists.

• "Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor." — This is the canonical formulation of the joint tortfeasors doctrine as applied in Philippine jurisprudence, drawn from Sabido vs. Custodio and central to the Court's ruling on solidary liability.

• "When a party adopts a certain theory in the trial court, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process." — This states the procedural bar against shifting theories on appeal, which the Court invoked to reject PNCC's attempt to recharacterize Arnaiz's negligence as the proximate cause.

• Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918) — Controlling precedent for the test of negligence. The Court adopted and applied the "ordinary prudent person" standard and the reasonable foresight of harm test to determine that PNCC was negligent in removing warning devices while hazardous road conditions persisted.
• Sabido vs. Custodio, G.R. No. L-21512, 31 August 1966, 17 SCRA 1088 — Applied as authority for the principle that concurrent or successive negligent acts combining as the proximate cause of a single injury render each tortfeasor liable for the whole injury, even where each act alone might not have caused the entire damage.
• Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130068, 1 October 1998, 297 SCRA 30 — Followed for the doctrine that joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable, that each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result, and that no actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors.
• People vs. De los Santos, G.R. No. 131588, 27 March 2001, 355 SCRA 415 — Cited for the formulation of the negligence test involving reasonable foresight of harm followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of that foresight.
• Drilon vs. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 949 (1997) — Cited as authority for the prohibition against changing theories on appeal.

• Article 2176, Civil Code — Defines quasi-delict: whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Applied as the statutory basis for PNCC's and PASUDECO's quasi-delict liability, there being no pre-existing contractual relation between them and the respondents.
• Article 2194, Civil Code — Provides that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Applied to hold PNCC and PASUDECO jointly and solidarily liable for Latagan's injuries, as their successive negligent acts combined as the direct and proximate cause.
• Article 2179, Civil Code — Provides that when the plaintiff's negligence is merely contributory, the plaintiff may recover damages but the courts shall mitigate the award. Applied to treat Arnaiz's negligence as merely contributory, warranting mitigation rather than barring recovery.
• Presidential Decree No. 1113, as amended by P.D. No. 1894 — The franchise law granting PNCC the right to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities along the NLEX. Cited to establish PNCC's concomitant obligation to keep the expressway safe for motorists.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.