Plus Builders, Inc. vs. Revilla, Jr.

A lawyer's obligation to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of a client's cause must not be performed at the expense of truth and justice; however, mitigating factors such as over-zealousness in defending indigent clients, length of service, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse, family circumstances, and humanitarian considerations may justify a reduction in the penalty imposed for gross misconduct.

Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. stemming from his representation of tenant-farmers—Leopoldo de Guzman, the Heirs of Bienvenido de Guzman, Apolonio Ilas, Gloria Martirez Siongco, the Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez, and Maria Esguerra—in a land dispute before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD). The PARAD found the tenants to be mere tenants and not rightful possessors or owners of the subject land, a ruling ultimately sustained by the Supreme Court. Despite the finality of that decision, respondent continued to pursue legal remedies on behalf of his clients, prompting the administrative complaint for gross misconduct.

On November 15, 1999, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a decision in favor of complainant Plus Builders, Inc. and against several tenant-farmers—Leopoldo de Guzman, the Heirs of Bienvenido de Guzman, Apolonio Ilas, Gloria Martirez Siongco, the Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez, and Maria Esguerra—who were clients of respondent Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that these tenants were mere tenants and not rightful possessors or owners of the subject land. The case was elevated through the appellate hierarchy all the way to the Supreme Court, which sustained complainant's rights over the land.

Despite the finality of the decision, respondent continued to pursue his clients' cause. He was found to have committed intentional falsehood before the court and to have misused court processes with the intent to delay execution of the judgment, filing several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and ultimately an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law by holding themselves out as his partners or associates in his law firm.

Respondent was not the original counsel in the case. The prior lawyer-client relationship had been terminated because the tenants felt their former counsel did not adequately explain or argue their position, refused to listen to them, and even castigated them. As new counsel, respondent relied on what the tenants told him during interviews—that they had been in open, adverse, continuous, and notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than fifty years. He thus filed the action to quiet title to determine his clients' rights respecting the subject property, asserting that he was merely exhausting all possible remedies and defenses available to them, particularly as his clients had been subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary eviction by the complainant.

On September 13, 2006, the Supreme Court found respondent guilty of gross misconduct and suspended him from the practice of law for two years. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, praying that the penalty be reduced to a mere reprimand or admonition. On August 15, 2008, he also wrote to the Office of the Bar Confidant requesting a clearance for renewal of his notarial commission, noting that the administrative cases against him had not yet been resolved with finality and citing his family's financial difficulties.

• Good Faith and Valid Legal Theory: Respondent maintained that the courses of action he took were not meant to unduly delay execution of the DARAB decision but were based on his serious study, research, and experience as a litigation lawyer for more than twenty years and on the facts given to him by his clients. He believed his actions constituted a valid and proper legal theory designed to protect the rights and interests of his clients.
• Reliance on Clients' Representations: Respondent argued that as new counsel, he candidly relied on what the tenants told him during interviews—that they had been in open, adverse, continuous, and notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than fifty years—and that the action to quiet title was resorted to in order to determine his clients' rights respecting the subject property.
• Exhaustion of Remedies: Respondent posited that he was only being protective of his clients' interests as a good father would protect his own family, and that his services to the tenants were almost pro bono.
• Unauthorized Practice of Law: Respondent submitted that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he permitted his name to be used for the unauthorized practice of law. He contended that he was counsel only of the individual tenants and not of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC), and that he merely shared office space with other lawyers in the cooperative.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Respondent argued that he did not deserve a two-year suspension, citing his more than twenty years as a member of the bar, his service as former president of the IBP Marinduque Chapter, his work as a legal aide lawyer handling detention prisoners and pro bono cases, his membership in Couples for Christ, and his status as the sole breadwinner of his family with a jobless wife, four school-age children, a bedridden mother, and a sick sister to support.

• Propriety of Penalty: Whether the penalty of two years' suspension from the practice of law imposed upon respondent for gross misconduct should be reduced.

• Propriety of Penalty: Yes, in part. The two-year suspension was reduced to six months, the Court finding sufficient mitigating circumstances—including respondent's over-zealousness in defending indigent clients, his acknowledgment of misfeasance, his length of service, family circumstances, and remorse—to warrant a degree of leniency, while affirming that a lawyer's duty to defend a client's cause must not be performed at the expense of truth and justice.

• Propriety of Penalty: The Court reaffirmed the principle that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence regardless of the case's importance or whether it is pro bono or fee-based. A lawyer's devotion to his client's cause entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure what is justly due the client, but this obligation is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or misusing court processes. Respondent's acts—filing an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision, committing intentional falsehood, and allowing non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law—constituted violations of these canons. However, the Court found that respondent's acts were committed out of over-zealousness and a misguided desire to protect the interests of poor and uneducated clients, rather than from malice or dishonesty. The Court recognized his dedication and conviction in defending the less fortunate as commendable, while stressing that his first and foremost responsibility is as an officer of the court. Considering mitigating factors—respondent's length of service, acknowledgment of his infractions, remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations—the Court was persuaded to extend leniency and found a six-month suspension sufficient.

• Lawyer's Duty Not to Delay Justice — Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent's filing of multiple motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision constituted misuse of court processes warranting disciplinary sanction.
• Defense of Client vs. Duty to the Court — A lawyer's devotion to his client's cause entitles him to present every defense provided by law to enable the client's cause to succeed, but this obligation is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice. The Court applied this principle by acknowledging respondent's commendable dedication to his indigent clients while affirming that his over-zealousness did not excuse violations of his duty as an officer of the court.
• Mitigating Factors in Lawyer Discipline — The Court may refrain from imposing the appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors such as the respondent's length of service, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and advanced age. These factors have varying significance in the Court's determination of the imposable penalty. In this case, the Court reduced the suspension from two years to six months based on these mitigating considerations.

• "This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice." — This passage articulates the controlling principle that a lawyer's duty to zealously defend a client is bounded by the lawyer's higher duty to the court and to the administration of justice, forming the ratio decidendi for affirming the finding of misconduct while allowing a penalty reduction.
• "However, the Court also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing the appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondent's length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondent's advanced age, among other things, which have varying significance in the Court's determination of the imposable penalty." — This passage enumerates the mitigating factors the Court considers in disciplinary cases against lawyers, providing the doctrinal basis for the reduction of penalty from two years to six months.

• Santiago vs. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 68 — Cited for the principle that a lawyer who accepts a case is expected to give full attention, diligence, skill, and competence regardless of the case's importance or whether it is fee-based or pro bono.
• Miraflor vs. Hagad, A.C. No. 2468, May 12, 1995, 244 SCRA 106 — Cited for the proposition that a lawyer's devotion to his client's cause entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure what is justly due the client.
• Plus Builders, Inc. vs. Garcia, A.C. No. 7056, September 13, 2006, 501 SCRA 615 — The original decision in this case, cited for the principle that lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law, but this obligation must not be performed at the expense of truth and justice.
• Ali vs. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 220 — Cited for the criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case.
• Ramos vs. Pallugna, A.C. No. 5908, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 220 — Cited for the Code of Professional Responsibility provision that a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case.
• Rayos vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 169079, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 477 — Cited for the principle that the Court may show compassion and refrain from imposing appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors.

• Code of Professional Responsibility — The Court invoked the canons requiring lawyers to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice and prohibiting the undue delay of a case through the impeding of execution of a judgment or the misuse of court processes. These provisions were applied to hold that respondent's filing of multiple motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision constituted violations warranting disciplinary action.

Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice), Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta.