PLDT vs. Pingol

A judicial admission in a pleading regarding the date of dismissal is conclusive and binding, establishing the accrual of the cause of action for purposes of computing the prescriptive period, and oral follow-ups do not interrupt prescription because Article 1155 of the Civil Code requires a written extrajudicial demand or written acknowledgment of the debt.

Roberto R. Pingol was hired by PLDT as a maintenance technician in 1979. In April 1999, he was hospitalized for paranoid personality disorder and subsequently incurred prolonged absences. From September 16 to December 31, 1999, Pingol was absent without official leave, prompting PLDT to send notices warning that seven consecutive days of unauthorized absence constituted grounds for termination under company practice. Pingol failed to return, and his employment was terminated on January 1, 2000.

• Employment and Hospitalization: Respondent Roberto R. Pingol was employed as a maintenance technician by petitioner PLDT in 1979. On April 13, 1999, Pingol was admitted to The Medical City for paranoid personality disorder, discharging on May 14, 1999. He reported for work but frequently absented himself due to his mental condition.
• Unauthorized Absences and Termination: From September 16 to December 31, 1999, Pingol was absent without official leave. PLDT sent notices warning that unauthorized absence for seven consecutive days was subject to termination under PLDT Systems Practice A-007. Pingol failed to report for work, and PLDT terminated his services on January 1, 2000, on the grounds of unauthorized absences and abandonment of office.
• Filing of the Complaint: On March 29, 2004, Pingol filed a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal and Monetary Claims against PLDT. In the complaint, Pingol alleged under oath that he was dismissed on January 1, 2000. He claimed that the prescriptive period should not account for the years 2001 to 2003, asserting he made follow-ups regarding his financial benefits during that time, receiving only empty promises.

• Judicial Admission on Date of Dismissal: Petitioner argued that respondent's sworn declaration in his complaint stating January 1, 2000 as his date of dismissal constituted a judicial admission under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, requiring no further proof and precluding contradiction.
• Prescription of Cause of Action: Petitioner maintained that based on respondent's own admission, the illegal dismissal complaint was filed beyond the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, rendering the cause of action prescribed.

• Lack of Proof of Dismissal and Notice: Respondent countered that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the sending of warning notices and that his dismissal itself was unsupported by evidence.
• Accrual of Cause of Action: Respondent argued that his cause of action did not accrue on January 1, 2000, because he was not categorically and formally dismissed nor were his monetary claims categorically denied on that date.
• Interruption of Prescription: Respondent asserted that his continuous follow-ups with petitioner from 2001 to 2003 tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

• Prescription of Illegal Dismissal Claim: Whether respondent's complaint for constructive dismissal was filed within the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
• Prescription of Money Claims: Whether respondent's money claims were filed within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code.
• Accrual and Interruption of Prescription: Whether the cause of action accrued on January 1, 2000, based on respondent's judicial admission, and whether oral follow-ups validly interrupted the prescriptive period.

• Prescription of Illegal Dismissal Claim: The complaint for illegal dismissal was filed beyond the four-year prescriptive period. Respondent's allegation in his complaint that he was dismissed on January 1, 2000, constituted a judicial admission that was binding and conclusive, not having been shown to be made through palpable mistake. The action filed on March 29, 2004, was exactly four years and three months after the accrual of the cause of action.
• Accrual of Cause of Action: The cause of action accrued on January 1, 2000, the date respondent was prevented from performing his job and the date he himself cited as his dismissal date. Under Article 1150 of the Civil Code, prescription is counted from the day the action may be brought, which is when the claim starts as a legal possibility.
• Interruption of Prescription: The prescriptive period was not validly interrupted. Article 1155 of the Civil Code, applied suppletorily to labor cases, provides that prescription is interrupted only by the filing of an action, a written extrajudicial demand, or a written acknowledgment of the debt. Respondent's alleged oral follow-ups did not satisfy the requirement of a written demand, and no written acknowledgment of the debt was made by petitioner.

• Judicial Admissions — Admissions made by a party in the pleadings or during the trial are conclusive and do not require further proof. They cannot be contradicted except by a showing that they were made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Applied to hold that respondent's sworn statement in his complaint fixing the date of dismissal on January 1, 2000, was binding and established the accrual date for prescription.
• Accrual of Cause of Action — A cause of action accrues when there is a right in favor of the plaintiff, an obligation on the defendant to respect it, and a breach by the defendant. The prescriptive period begins from the day the action may be brought, i.e., when the claim starts as a legal possibility. Applied to determine that the cause of action accrued on the date respondent was formally prevented from working, which he admitted was January 1, 2000.
• Interruption of Prescription in Labor Cases — In the absence of a specific provision in the Labor Code, Article 1155 of the Civil Code applies suppletorily to interrupt the prescriptive period for money claims. Prescription is interrupted only by: (1) filing before the court, (2) written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, or (3) written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. Applied to rule that respondent's unproven oral follow-ups did not toll the prescriptive period.

• "Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and so does not require further evidence to prove them. These admissions cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."
• "Although the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it does not necessary follow that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights."

• Callanta v. Carnation Phils., 145 SCRA 268 (1986) — Followed. Established that an action for illegal dismissal constitutes an action "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff" under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, prescribing in four years.
• Pepsi Cola Bottling Company v. Guanzon, 254 Phil. 578 (1989) — Followed. Held that a complaint for illegal dismissal can be dismissed on the ground of prescription based on the date of dismissal alleged by the employee in the complaint itself.
• International Broadcasting Corporation v. Panganiban, 514 SCRA 404 (2007) — Followed. Upheld the suppletory application of Article 1155 of the Civil Code to labor cases regarding the interruption of prescriptive periods for money claims.

• Article 1146, Civil Code — Provides that actions upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff must be instituted within four years. Applied as the prescriptive period for the illegal dismissal claim.
• Article 291, Labor Code — Provides that money claims arising from employer-employee relations must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Applied as the prescriptive period for the monetary claims.
• Article 1150, Civil Code — Provides that the time for prescription is counted from the day the action may be brought. Applied to determine that the prescriptive period commenced on the date of dismissal.
• Article 1155, Civil Code — Provides that prescription is interrupted by the filing of an action, a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, or a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. Applied suppletorily to hold that oral follow-ups did not interrupt prescription.
• Section 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that judicial admissions do not require proof and may be contradicted only by a showing of palpable mistake. Applied to bind respondent to the dismissal date stated in his complaint.

Carpio, A.T. (Chairperson), Nachura, A.E.B., Peralta, D.M., Abad, R.A.