Pineda vs. Court of Appeals

A writ of preliminary injunction cannot issue where the acts sought to be enjoined have already been accomplished or consummated, since the writ's sole objective is to preserve the status quo ante litem — the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status preceding the actual controversy, existing at the time of the filing of the case. The trial court must not use its injunctive relief to alter that status; grave abuse of discretion is committed when it does so, and the error is correctible by certiorari.

Michelle I. Pineda was the lessee-operator of the canteen of Lakandula High School, a public secondary school, under an arrangement with the school represented by its principal. The Department of Education regulates the management and operation of public secondary school canteens and their turnover to teachers' cooperatives through Department Order No. 95, Series of 1998, the "Revised Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to Teachers Cooperatives." Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6655 vests in the Department of Education the administration, supervision, and control of all public secondary schools and their personnel.

Michelle I. Pineda, a canteen operator, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Lakandula High School, a public secondary school, represented by its principal, Dr. Alice B. Blas, for the lease of the school canteen. Executed on May 14, 2004, the agreement granted Pineda a five-year lease at a monthly rental of ₱20,000.00, plus an additional ₱4,000.00 monthly for the school's feeding program and medicines for the school clinic. Pineda thereafter renovated the canteen and equipped it with new utensils, tables, chairs, and electric fans.

On August 5, 2004, the faculty and personnel of the school sent a letter to Division School Superintendent Dr. Ma. Luisa Quiñones questioning the validity of the May 14, 2004 agreement. Dr. Blas replied on September 17, 2004, and an exchange of correspondence followed. Meanwhile, on August 14, 2004, Pineda and Dr. Blas executed another Memorandum of Agreement superseding the first. This second agreement followed the standard form under Department Order No. 95, Series of 1998, the "Revised Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to Teachers Cooperatives."

On October 20, 2004, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Isabelita M. Santos and Administrative Officer Vicente N. Macarubbo wrote Dr. Quiñones relaying their observations on the controversy and recommending that their findings be submitted to the DepEd Central Office for its final word. They were of the view that Dr. Blas did not violate any rule in executing the August agreement and found the lease to Pineda beneficial to the school. Dr. Quiñones then wrote the DepEd seeking its decision on the matter.

On February 11, 2005, the DepEd, through Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, declared the August agreement "null and void ab initio" and ordered it cancelled. Pineda was ordered to cease and desist from further managing and operating the canteen, and the management and operation of the canteen were to revert to the Home Economics Department of the school. This prompted Pineda to file a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court.

On March 14, 2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the enforcement of Usec. Gascon's decision. DepEd, represented by Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones, and Ms. Olympiada Camilo, who succeeded Dr. Blas as principal, sought dismissal of Pineda's petition on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action; the trial court denied the motion on June 7, 2005. DepEd, this time represented by Assistant Secretary Camilo Miguel M. Montesa, then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

The CA affirmed the June 7, 2005 order denying the motion to dismiss but reversed the March 14, 2005 order granting the writ. It found that the DepEd's cancellation order had already been partially implemented — as Pineda herself recognized in her amended petition, which alleged that on February 22, 2005, school guards prevented the canteen workers from entering the school and the delivery of softdrinks, and that additional canteens had sprouted in the Home Economics and dressmaking rooms — and that this was the status quo. It further found that Pineda appeared to have no clear or unmistakable right to protect since the agreement granting her the right to operate the canteen had been invalidated, and that there was no pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences because the purported damage was readily quantifiable. Pineda then filed the present petition for certiorari.

• Locus Standi: Pineda argued that the CA gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to DepEd's petition notwithstanding that Asec. Montesa was not a party at all in SCA No. 2797, hence had no locus standi; even assuming DepEd had standing, Asec. Montesa was not duly authorized to file the petition.
• Motion for Reconsideration: Pineda maintained that the CA gravely abused its discretion in not dismissing outright the petition since no motion for reconsideration was filed from the March 14, 2005 and June 7, 2005 Orders, in manifest violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Dissolution of the Writ: Pineda contended that the CA gravely abused its discretion in dissolving the writ of injunction issued by the RTC, thereby unjustifiably interfering with the lower court's discretion in issuing the writ in her favor as one with a clear and unmistakable legal right to the remedy, especially since respondents did not file a motion to dissolve bond with the trial court or at least file affidavits in support of their opposition.

• Failure to State a Cause of Action: DepEd sought the dismissal of Pineda's petition before the RTC on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.

• Locus Standi: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to DepEd's petition for certiorari notwithstanding that Asec. Montesa was not a party in SCA No. 2797.
• Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in not dismissing outright the petition despite the absence of a motion for reconsideration from the March 14, 2005 and June 7, 2005 Orders.
• Reglementary Period: Whether the petition before the CA was filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary period.
• Dissolution of the Writ: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC.

• Locus Standi: No. DepEd was the proper party and real party in interest, and Asec. Montesa, having taken over Usec. Gascon's functions, was authorized to institute the petition on its behalf.
• Motion for Reconsideration: No. The absence of a motion for reconsideration was excused, the case involving an urgent necessity for resolution and a matter of public interest affecting the welfare of students.
• Reglementary Period: No. Pineda failed to raise the alleged procedural lapse in her Comment and Memorandum, and no new issue may be raised in a pleading which by due diligence could have been raised earlier.
• Dissolution of the Writ: No. The writ of preliminary injunction could no longer lie because the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated, leaving nothing to enjoin.

• Locus Standi: In her petition before the RTC, Pineda impleaded Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones, and Ms. Camilo in their official capacities as Undersecretary of DepEd, Division Superintendent, and Principal of Lakandula High School, respectively. Although the petition described Usec. Gascon as a merely nominal party, it stated that Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo were being sued for having been tasked to immediately carry out his February 11, 2005 order. DepEd was thus the proper party, and the three were merely its representatives sued in their official capacities. A review of Usec. Gascon's order discloses that the cancellation of the August-MOA was pursuant to DepEd's existing guidelines on the turnover of school canteens to teachers' cooperatives under Department Order No. 95, Series of 1998; he was simply applying a DepEd policy. What was actually being assailed before the RTC was the implementation of DepEd's existing guidelines through the nullification of the August-MOA. As Asec. Montesa merely took over the functions of Usec. Gascon, he was authorized to institute the petition before the CA to advance and pursue the policies of his office. Applying Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, DepEd is the real party in interest for it would surely be affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the final resolution of the case. It would be absurd not to recognize the legal standing of Asec. Montesa as representative of DepEd while considering Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo as the proper parties when they were merely tasked to implement a directive emanating from a superior official of the DepEd.

• Motion for Reconsideration: The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant the court a quo an opportunity to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule is circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, as enumerated in Domdom vs. Sandiganbayan, including where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government, and where public interest is involved. The present case concerns the implementation or application of a DepEd policy which had been enjoined by the RTC. There was an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interest of the government. Moreover, the subject matter involves the operation of the canteen of a public secondary school, a matter of public interest affecting the welfare of the students, thus justifying the relaxation of the settled rule.

• Reglementary Period: Pineda pointed out that the March 14, 2005 Order was received by DepEd on March 16, 2005, and that the latter filed its petition before the CA on June 28, 2005, beyond the sixty-day reglementary period. Going over DepEd's petition, it appears that DepEd reckoned the sixty-day period from June 28, 2005, the date of its receipt of the June 7, 2005 Order. Pineda's Comment and Memorandum, however, did not raise this procedural lapse as an issue; instead, she put forth her own arguments in support of the two RTC orders. The rule in pleadings and practice is that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings. It was thus too late in the day for Pineda to question the procedural lapse.

• Dissolution of the Writ: The Court found no cogent reason for the CA's reversal and setting aside of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the RTC. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated. The DepEd had already prohibited Pineda from operating the school canteen, and since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTC's preliminary writ should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action; its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case; the trial court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such status. Here, the Decision of Undersecretary Gascon dated February 11, 2005, ordering Pineda to cease and desist from operating and managing the school canteen and to revert the management thereof to the Home Economics Department and to the Principal, had already been partially implemented, as evident from the allegations of Pineda in her amended petition. While the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court, grave abuse of discretion is committed when it does not maintain the status quo which is the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy; such a commission is correctible through a writ of certiorari. In this case, the status quo ante litem — the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of the case — was that Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school canteen. For said reason, the trial court cannot make use of its injunctive power to change said status.

• Status Quo Ante Litem — The status quo that a preliminary injunction seeks to preserve is the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. The trial court must not use its injunctive relief to alter such status. In this case, the status quo ante litem was that Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school canteen; the RTC therefore could not use its injunctive power to change that state of affairs.

• Preliminary Injunction as a Provisional Remedy — A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Because the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated, the writ could no longer lie, there being nothing more to enjoin.

• Real Party in Interest — Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, the real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. DepEd was the real party in interest because it would be affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the final resolution of the case; Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones, and Ms. Camilo were merely its representatives sued in their official capacities, and Asec. Montesa, having taken over Usec. Gascon's functions, was authorized to institute the petition on DepEd's behalf.

• Exceptions to the Motion for Reconsideration Requirement — The general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie is circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, including: (a) where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter is perishable; (d) where a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. The Court applied the exceptions for urgent necessity and public interest, the case involving the operation of a public secondary school canteen affecting the welfare of students.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Injunctive Relief — While the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court, grave abuse of discretion is committed when it does not maintain the status quo which is the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. Such a commission is correctible through a writ of certiorari.

• Prohibition on Raising New Issues in a Pleading — No new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings. Pineda's failure to raise the alleged procedural lapse in her Comment and Memorandum barred her from questioning it later.

• "A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully." — This passage, quoted by the Court from the CA decision, states the canonical definition and purpose of a preliminary injunction, which the Court adopted as the controlling principle for resolving the third ground.

• "Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such status." — This passage defines the status quo ante litem and supplies the ratio decidendi for the denial of the petition: the RTC's writ improperly altered the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of the case.

• "The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated." — This passage states the Court's principal holding that a writ of preliminary injunction cannot issue where the acts sought to be enjoined have already been consummated, leaving nothing to enjoin.

• "The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved." — This passage, quoted from Domdom vs. Sandiganbayan, enumerates the recognized exceptions to the motion-for-reconsideration requirement before certiorari, which the Court applied to excuse DepEd's failure to move for reconsideration.

• Domdom vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 182382-83, February 24, 2010 — Cited as the source of the enumeration of well-defined exceptions to the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration before a petition for certiorari may lie; the Court applied the exceptions for urgent necessity and public interest.
• Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. vs. CIR, G.R. No. 157594, March 9, 2010 — Cited for the rule that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings; applied to bar Pineda from belatedly questioning the alleged procedural lapse in the filing period.
• Director of Lands vs. CA, 363 Phil 117, 128 (1999) — Cited in Toshiba as authority for the same rule on the prohibition against raising new issues in a subsequent pleading.
• Caneland Sugar Corporation vs. Alon, G.R. No. 142896, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 28, 33 — Cited for the rule that a writ of preliminary injunction cannot lie where the acts sought to be enjoined have already been accomplished or consummated; applied to hold that the RTC's writ should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin.
• Overseas Workers Welfare Administration vs. Chavez, G.R. Nos. 169802, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 451, 471-472 — Cited for the rule that grave abuse of discretion is committed when the trial court does not maintain the status quo which is the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested status preceding the actual controversy, and that such error is correctible by certiorari.

• Rule 3, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court — Defines the real party in interest as the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Applied to hold that DepEd, not its individual officials, is the real party in interest, and that Asec. Montesa was authorized to institute the petition on its behalf.
• Rule 65, Section 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires a motion for reconsideration before a petition for certiorari may be filed. The Court relaxed the requirement in light of the recognized exceptions for urgent necessity and public interest.
• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the special civil action for certiorari; invoked by Pineda in her petition before the RTC and by DepEd in its petition before the CA, and identified by the Court as the proper remedy to correct grave abuse of discretion in injunctive relief.
• Republic Act No. 6655, Section 7 — Vests in the Department of Education the administration, supervision, and control of all public secondary schools and their personnel. Cited as the statutory backdrop for DepEd's authority over the operation of the school canteen.
• Department Order No. 95, Series of 1998 — The "Revised Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to Teachers Cooperatives." The August-MOA was executed in accordance with this issuance, and Usec. Gascon's cancellation order was issued pursuant to these existing guidelines; the Court characterized the assailed act as the implementation of a DepEd policy.

• Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson)
• Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
• Diosdado M. Peralta
• Roberto A. Abad