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Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Gobonseng, Jr.

The petition was granted, reversing the Court of Appeals and reinstating the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for collection of rentals. Respondent's claim for rentals from 1982 to 1991 lacked factual and legal basis because the gasoline station was dealer-owned and operated by the former lot owner, not the petitioner petroleum company. Furthermore, respondent was estopped from claiming rentals after admitting to being in possession of the property and executing an agreement waiving further claims and allowing rent-free use of the property to the operator.

Primary Holding

A lot owner is estopped from claiming rentals from a petroleum company operating through a dealer-owned station when the owner executed a waiver of claims and allowed rent-free use of the property to the dealer-operator.

Background

On January 5, 1982, Julio Tan Pastor sold Lot No. 853-A to respondent Carlos Ang Gobonseng, Jr. for P1.3 million, though the Deed of Absolute Sale stated P13,000 to avoid fees; a simultaneous Memorandum of Agreement reflected the true price. Gobonseng registered the sale and obtained TCT No. 13607. Tan Pastor's postdated checks for the balance bounced, prompting a BP 22 criminal case. Prior to the sale, Tan Pastor operated a gasoline station on the lot, initially with other companies and later with Basic Land Oil and Energy Corporation (BLECOR). In 1982, Pilipinas Shell acquired BLECOR, and Tan Pastor continued operating the station as a Shell dealer until 1991. In 1991, Gobonseng demanded rentals from Shell, which Shell denied, citing the dealer-owned nature of the station. Shell facilitated a settlement between Gobonseng and Tan Pastor, resulting in a January 30, 1992 Agreement where Gobonseng allowed Tan Pastor rent-free use of the lot for three years and both parties waived all further claims against each other. Following this, Tan Pastor executed an Affidavit of Desistance in the BP 22 case. On November 13, 1992, Gobonseng sued Tan Pastor and Shell for rentals from 1982 to 1991.

History

  1. Filed complaint for collection of rentals and damages in the RTC of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 40 (Civil Case No. 10389)

  2. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and ordered respondent to pay petitioner P150,000.00

  3. Appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 63777)

  4. CA reversed the RTC decision, ordering petitioner to pay P8,000 per month as reasonable compensation from 1982 to 1991, plus 12% interest, 20% attorney's fees, and reinstating petitioner's cross-claim against co-defendants

  5. Motion for Reconsideration denied by the CA

  6. Filed Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 163562)

Facts

  • The Sale and Registration: On January 5, 1982, Julio Tan Pastor sold Lot No. 853-A to Gobonseng for P1.3 million. To avoid correct legal fees, the Deed of Absolute Sale indicated only P13,000, while a simultaneous Memorandum of Agreement reflected the true terms. Gobonseng registered the sale and secured TCT No. 13607.
  • Bouncing Checks: Tan Pastor presented postdated checks for the balance, which were dishonored for insufficient funds, stop payment order, or closed account, leading to a criminal charge for violation of BP 22 against Gobonseng.
  • Operation of the Gas Station: Tan Pastor had operated a gasoline station on the lot. In 1982, Pilipinas Shell acquired BLECOR, Tan Pastor's previous partner. Tan Pastor continued as a Shell dealer on the property until 1991.
  • Demand for Rentals: In 1991, Gobonseng demanded rentals from Shell. Shell disowned liability, explaining the station was dealer-owned and demands should be directed to Tan Pastor. Shell facilitated a meeting between Gobonseng and Tan Pastor.
  • The 1992 Agreement: On January 30, 1992, Gobonseng and Tan Pastor executed an Agreement allowing Tan Pastor rent-free use of the lot for three years (1992-1994), non-extendible, with a penalty for delayed vacating. Both parties declared they had no further claims against each other and waived any such claims. Tan Pastor subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance in the BP 22 case, leading to its dismissal.
  • The Lawsuit: On November 13, 1992, Gobonseng filed a suit for collection of rentals and damages against Tan Pastor and Shell, claiming unpaid rentals from 1982 to 1991.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Ownership and Delivery: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in upholding respondent's ownership of the lot under Article 1496 of the Civil Code because there was no delivery of the property to respondent.
  • Source of Obligation: Petitioner maintained that the CA erred in holding it liable for rentals under Article 1157 of the Civil Code because the gasoline station was dealer-owned, meaning Tan Pastor was the operator, not Shell.
  • Appreciation of Facts: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in reversing the trial court's factual findings on the ground that the judge who penned the decision was not the one who heard the witnesses.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Ownership and Entitlement to Rentals: Respondent countered that he sufficiently established ownership of the lot through the Deed of Absolute Sale, Memorandum of Agreement, TCT No. 13607, and payment of real estate taxes, entitling him to rentals from Shell due to the gas station's existence on his property.
  • Recognition by Shell: Respondent argued that Shell recognized his ownership and right to collect rentals when it sought his permission to refurbish the gasoline station.
  • Validity of Trial Court's Decision: Respondent maintained that the CA correctly disregarded the trial court's findings because the deciding judge had not heard the testimonies of the witnesses.

Issues

  • Ownership of the Property: Whether respondent validly acquired ownership of Lot No. 853-A despite the alleged lack of delivery and non-payment of the purchase price.
  • Liability for Rentals: Whether petitioner is liable for the payment of rentals for the use of the lot occupied by a dealer-owned gas station.
  • Appreciation of Facts: Whether the CA correctly disregarded the trial court's findings of fact on the ground that the deciding judge was not the one who heard the witnesses.

Ruling

  • Ownership of the Property: The issue of ownership was rendered moot by the parties' subsequent acts. Both admitted the sale. A contract of sale is consensual and valid upon meeting of minds as to object and price; payment goes into performance, not perfection. Failure to pay does not vitiate the contract but gives rise to a right to demand fulfillment or cancellation. Respondent properly registered the sale.
  • Liability for Rentals: The claim for rentals lacked factual and legal basis. The station was dealer-owned, supported by evidence and respondent's own failure to demand rentals from 1982 to 1991. Respondent admitted in court that he was in actual possession of the property from 1982 to 1991. Furthermore, respondent executed a 1992 Agreement waiving all further claims and allowing Tan Pastor rent-free use, estopping him from demanding rentals. Shell's letter seeking permission to refurbish was merely a consequence of being informed of the change in ownership and the 1992 Agreement, not an admission of rental liability.
  • Appreciation of Facts: The CA erred in disregarding the trial court's findings. A decision is not invalid merely because the ponente took over from a colleague who heard the witnesses, absent grave abuse of discretion or misapprehension of facts. The trial court relied on transcripts and exhibits. Exceptions to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts applied, as the CA's findings conflicted with the RTC's and overlooked relevant facts.

Doctrines

  • Consensual Nature of Contracts of Sale — A contract of sale is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties as to the object and the price. The manner or fact of payment goes into the performance of the contract, not its perfection; failure to pay does not vitiate the contract but gives rise to a right to demand fulfillment or cancellation.
  • Estoppel — Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or asserting anything contrary to that established as the truth in legal contemplation. A party who, by their own act or omission, intentionally leads another to believe a particular thing is true cannot falsify that truth in litigation arising from such act or omission. Applied to bar respondent from demanding rentals after waiving claims and allowing rent-free use of the property.
  • Validity of Decisions by Substitute Judges — The validity of a decision is not impaired by the fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who presided at the trial, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or misapprehension of facts. The substitute judge may rely on transcripts and exhibits.
  • Exceptions to the Rule that the Supreme Court is Not a Trier of Facts — The Supreme Court may evaluate evidence when: (1) findings are grounded on speculation; (2) inference is manifestly mistaken; (3) grave abuse of discretion; (4) judgment based on misapprehension of facts; (5) conflicting findings of fact; (6) findings go beyond issues or are contrary to admissions; (7) findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) conclusions without citation of evidence; (9) facts in petition are undisputed; (10) findings premised on absence of evidence; (11) CA overlooked relevant facts justifying a different conclusion.

Key Excerpts

  • "It must be stressed that a contract of sale is not a real, but a consensual contract. ... a contract of sale, being consensual in nature, becomes valid and binding upon the meeting of the minds of the parties as to the object and the price."
  • "Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or asserting, by their own deed or representation, anything contrary to that established as the truth, in legal contemplation."
  • "The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial."

Precedents Cited

  • Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126376, November 20, 2003 — Followed: A contract of sale is consensual and perfected upon meeting of minds; payment goes to performance, not perfection.
  • Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005 — Followed: Enumerated the exceptions to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
  • Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Casa Montessori International, G.R. No. 149 and G.R. No. 149507, May 28, 2004 — Followed: Defined the doctrine of estoppel under the Rules of Court and Civil Code.
  • People v. Ulzoron, G.R. No. 121979, March 2, 1998 — Followed: A decision is not invalid merely because the ponente took over from a colleague who presided at trial, absent grave abuse of discretion.

Provisions

  • Article 1496, Civil Code — Cited by petitioner regarding ownership passing to the vendee. The Court implicitly applied the consensual nature of sale, noting that ownership passed upon perfection of the contract.
  • Article 1157, Civil Code — Cited by petitioner regarding sources of obligation. Applied to determine that no legal obligation arose for Shell to pay rentals, given the dealer-owned nature of the station and the lack of legal basis for the claim.
  • Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for review filed before the Supreme Court.
  • Section 2(a), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Cited in relation to the presumption of estoppel.
  • Article 1431, Civil Code — Cited in relation to the doctrine of estoppel.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna