Pilar vs. Commission on Elections

A person who files a certificate of candidacy but later withdraws it remains a “candidate” within the meaning of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 and is mandatorily required to file a statement of contributions and expenditures; failure to do so subjects the person to the prescribed administrative fine, which is not erased by withdrawal.

For the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections, Juanito C. Pilar filed a certificate of candidacy for member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela on March 22, 1992. Three days later, on March 25, 1992, he withdrew that certificate. Following the elections, COMELEC found that Pilar had not filed the statement of contributions and expenditures mandated by Republic Act No. 7166 and its implementing Resolution No. 2348. COMELEC imposed an administrative fine of P10,000 and denied reconsideration. Pilar contested the fine before the Supreme Court, asserting that his withdrawal rendered him a “non-candidate” not subject to the statutory duty.

• Filing and Withdrawal: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, he withdrew that certificate.
• Omission and COMELEC Sanction: Petitioner did not file the statement of contributions and expenditures required by law. COMELEC imposed upon him an administrative fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the omission, and the fine was affirmed on reconsideration and by the COMELEC En Banc.
• Petitioner’s Defense: Petitioner contended that his withdrawal made him a “non-candidate” who never entered the political contest and neither won nor lost; consequently, he was not covered by the filing obligation.

• Meaning of “Candidate” under R.A. No. 7166: Petitioner argued that Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 applies only to persons who pursued their candidacies through the election and were voted upon, maintaining that “candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost.”
• Effect of Withdrawal: Petitioner maintained that his withdrawal three days after filing extinguished any obligation to file a statement of contributions and expenditures, as he was a “non-candidate.”

• Plain Text of the Statute: Respondent COMELEC countered that Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 uses the words “every candidate” without qualification, and under the principle ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos, no distinction may be drawn between candidates who pursued their campaigns and those who withdrew.
• Mandatory Nature of “Shall”: COMELEC argued that the word “shall” in the provision imposes a mandatory duty, particularly given the public interest in clean elections, and that compliance is required regardless of withdrawal.
• Implementing Rules: COMELEC relied on its Resolution No. 2348, Section 13, which directs election officials to advise in writing “all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy” to file the required statement, making no exception for withdrawal.

• Coverage of Withdrawn Candidates: Whether a person who filed a certificate of candidacy but later withdrew it is included in the term “every candidate” under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 for purposes of the obligation to file a statement of contributions and expenditures.

• Coverage of Withdrawn Candidates: The phrase “every candidate” in Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 embraces all who filed certificates of candidacy, including those who subsequently withdrew. The statute draws no distinction between a candidate who pursues the campaign and one who withdraws; thus, under the rule ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos, courts may not create one. The mandatory character of the word “shall” reinforces the universal obligation, particularly because the state’s interest in financial transparency in elections is paramount. The COMELEC’s implementing resolution, which speaks of “all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy,” confirms this construction. The evil sought to be prevented—undisclosed contributions and expenditures that could influence an election—is not too remote, as a withdrawn candidate may still have received contributions or incurred expenditures even in a short campaign. Moreover, the rule does not exempt a candidate with no financial activity; Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348 requires even a nil statement. Finally, Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not affect administrative liabilities already incurred, so petitioner’s withdrawal did not extinguish the fine.

• Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish): Applied to hold that “every candidate” in R.A. No. 7166, Section 14, includes candidates who withdrew because the provision contains no qualification limiting the term to those who remain through the election.
• Mandatory construction of “shall” in election disclosure laws: The use of “shall” in a statute requiring the filing of campaign finance statements denotes a mandatory duty, especially where public policy and public interest are involved; non-compliance triggers the prescribed administrative fine.
• Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy does not extinguish incurred administrative liabilities: Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) states that the filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal, or administrative liabilities a candidate may have incurred. An administrative fine for failure to file a contribution and expenditure statement survives withdrawal.

• “As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term ‘every candidate’ must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.” — Encapsulates the Court’s interpretive reasoning.
• “The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.” — Articulates the policy foundation for mandatory disclosure.
• “It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.” — Rebuts the argument that a withdrawn candidate has no need to report.

• Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 (1987): Cited for the principle ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos — courts must not distinguish where the law does not.
• Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 (1981): Cited in a cf. signal for the same rule of statutory construction.
• Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946): Cited for the rule that no distinction shall be made in applying a statute where none is indicated.
• Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 (1988) and Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 (1952): Cited for the rule that “shall” in a statute imports a mandatory, enforceable duty, especially where public interest is concerned.
• State ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423 (1937), Sparkman v. Saylor, 180 Ky. 263 (1918): American state decisions supporting the mandatory nature of campaign expense disclosure provisions.

• Section 14, Republic Act No. 7166 (Synchronized National and Local Elections and Electoral Reforms Act): Mandates that “every candidate” file a statement of contributions and expenditures within thirty days after the election, imposes an administrative fine for failure, and uses the mandatory “shall.” Applied to include a candidate who withdrew.
• Section 13, COMELEC Resolution No. 2348 (Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures): Directs election officials to advise “all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy” to file statements. Confirmed that withdrawal does not remove the obligation.
• Section 15, COMELEC Resolution No. 2348: Provides that a candidate with no contributions or expenditures must file a statement reflecting that fact, underscoring that filing is absolute and not contingent on financial activity.
• Fourth paragraph, Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code): States that the filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal, or administrative liabilities a candidate may have incurred. Applied to hold that withdrawal did not extinguish the administrative fine.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concurred. Justice Kapunan was on leave.

• Justice Melo (with Justice Padilla concurring): Dissented on the ground that the term “candidate” designates a person who “actually submits himself and is voted for at our election” (citing Santos v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643 (1916)). One who withdraws a certificate of candidacy three days after filing cannot be voted for and thus is not a candidate bound to file a statement. The dissent also emphasized that no charge existed that petitioner used his aborted candidacy to raise funds or extort money, making the majority’s construction unduly burdensome and unnecessary. The dissent voted to grant the petition.