Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

A duly approved municipal zoning plan or Urban Land Use Plan, as an official act of the Sangguniang Bayan exercising its statutory authority over municipal roads and land use, prevails over private testimonial evidence in determining the existence and location of a camino vecinal, and binds not only the contending parties but also the general public.

The Pilapil spouses own a 6,598-square-meter parcel of land in sitio Bahak, barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Liloan, Cebu, corresponding to Lot No. 320 and Lot No. 323, formerly belonging to Marcelo Pilapil, grandfather of petitioner Socrates Pilapil. The Colomida spouses, residents of Mandaue City, purchased a separate 10,910-square-meter parcel (later found to contain 6,448 square meters) also located in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, approximately 70 meters from the National Road. The Colomidas claimed to have acquired a road right of way from Sesenando Longakit leading toward the National Road, but that right of way ended at the portion of the Pilapil property where a camino vecinal allegedly existed. Under the then-governing Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), the Sangguniang Bayan possessed authority to adopt zoning ordinances, construct and maintain municipal streets, and close municipal roads, while the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator was tasked with formulating development plans for Sangguniang Bayan approval.

The Pilapil spouses own a 6,598-square-meter parcel of land in sitio Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu, covered by Tax Declaration No. 15067 and corresponding to Lot No. 320 and Lot No. 323, the land having formerly belonged to Marcelo Pilapil, grandfather of Socrates Pilapil. On June 4, 1981, the Colomida spouses purchased from Esteria vda. de Ceniza and the heirs of Leoncio Ceniza a parcel of land also located in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, covered by Tax Declaration No. 19764 and described as bounded by Gregorio Longakit's properties on the north, south, and west, and by Manglar on the east, with an area of 10,910 square meters. This parcel, per Plan Psu-07-002763, was found to contain only 6,448 square meters and was later covered by Free Patent No. (VII-1)-15448 issued on March 23, 1982, and Original Certificate of Title No. P-20588 in the name of the Colomidas. The property is located approximately 70 meters from the National Road. The Colomidas claimed they had acquired from Sesenando Longakit a road right of way leading toward the National Road, but this right of way ended at the portion of the Pilapil property where a camino vecinal allegedly existed all the way to the National Road.

In early July 1981, the Colomidas attempted to improve the camino vecinal for the convenience of the public, but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them with bodily harm and threatened to fence off the road. On July 16, 1981, the Colomidas filed a petition for injunction and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. R-20732 and raffled to Branch 17. The Colomidas alleged that even if the camino vecinal could not be proved, they were entitled to its use under Articles 649 to 651 of the Civil Code as their only access to a public highway, and prayed that in such event the road be considered a right of way with compensation fixed at ₱10.00 per square meter. On July 29, 1981, the Pilapils filed a separate action for damages against the Colomidas in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-R. On August 18, 1981, the Pilapils filed their Answer denying the existence of a camino vecinal on their property, asserting that fencing was a valid exercise of ownership, and setting up counterclaims for attorney's fees, reimbursement for damages to their land, and moral and exemplary damages.

During trial, the Colomidas presented Gorgonio Colomida, Jr., Sesenando Longakit, and Florentino Pepito as witnesses, along with documentary exhibits including Resolution No. 106 of the Municipal Council of Liloan passed on August 18, 1973, authorizing residents of Bahak to repair and improve a camino vecinal, and a sketch prepared by Longakit purportedly showing the camino vecinal traversing the Pilapil property. Longakit testified that he had resided in Bahak since birth in 1933, that both sides of the camino vecinal formerly belonged to Marcelo Pilapil, and that carabao carts and later four-wheeled vehicles could pass through it. Pepito, 79 years old and a former councilor from 1955 to 1967 who chaired the Committee on Roads and Bridges, testified that the camino vecinal was located between the two lots formerly owned by Marcelo Pilapil and that his own tax declaration showed his land bounded on the north by a camino vecinal. The Pilapils presented Roman Sungahid, Engineer Epifanio Jordan (Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Liloan), and Socrates Pilapil. Engineer Jordan testified on Liloan's Urban Land Use Plan, which he prepared and submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for approval, and which showed the camino vecinal running along the side of the Pilapil property rather than traversing it. Socrates Pilapil admitted on cross-examination that before he fused his two tax declarations for Lots 320 and 323 into a single Tax Declaration No. 15067 in 1985, the separate declarations had shown a camino vecinal at the south boundary of Lot 320 and the north boundary of Lot 323, but the camino vecinal no longer appeared after the fusion.

The trial court credited the Colomidas' witnesses and found that a camino vecinal traversed the Pilapil property, basing its conclusion on Resolution No. 106, Longakit's testimony and sketch, and Pepito's testimony, while discrediting the Pilapils' version as unsupported conclusions. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto, treating the case as one of witness credibility and finding no exception to the rule on conclusiveness of trial court findings of fact. The Supreme Court, however, found that the unrebutted evidence of the Municipality of Liloan's approved Urban Land Use Plan — an official act of the Sangguniang Bayan — established that the camino vecinal ran along the side of the Pilapil property, not across it, and that this official determination prevailed over private testimonial evidence.

• Disregard of Official Municipal Act: Petitioner argued that the respondent Court of Appeals disregarded the official act of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Liloan, specifically the approved Urban Land Use Plan, which showed the camino vecinal running along the side of their property rather than traversing it.
• Selective Quotation of Testimony: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals quoted merely a portion of the testimony of a witness and not the totality of his testimony, thereby distorting the evidentiary record.
• Consideration of Exhibits Not Formally Offered: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals considered documentary exhibits not formally offered in evidence.
• Improper Award of Damages to Respondents: Petitioner contended that the affirmance of the award of damages to the Colomidas was erroneous.
• Denial of Damages to Petitioners: Petitioner maintained that the denial of their claim for damages — for destruction of concrete slabs, coconuts, bananas, and other fruit trees caused by a bulldozer hired by the Colomidas — was improper.

• Conclusiveness of Findings of Fact: Respondent prayed for dismissal of the petition on the basis of the rule on conclusiveness of findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower courts' factual findings should not be disturbed.
• Dilatory Intent: Respondent averred that the petition was but another attempt on the part of the Pilapils to unjustly delay the final resolution of the case.

• Existence and Location of Camino Vecinal: Whether a camino vecinal exists in sitio Bahak, barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Liloan, and if so, whether it traverses the property of the Pilapils or merely passes along its side.
• Evidentiary Weight of Approved Zoning Plan: Whether the Municipality of Liloan's approved Urban Land Use Plan, as an official act of the Sangguniang Bayan, prevails over private testimonial evidence in determining the location of the camino vecinal.
• Damages Awards: Whether the awards of actual damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to the Colomidas, and the denial of damages to the Pilapils, were proper.

• Existence and Location of Camino Vecinal: The camino vecinal exists but does not traverse the Pilapil property; it runs along the side thereof, as established by the approved Urban Land Use Plan of the Municipality of Liloan.
• Evidentiary Weight of Approved Zoning Plan: Yes. The approved zoning plan, as an official act of the Sangguniang Bayan exercising its statutory authority, prevails over private testimonial evidence and binds all parties and the general public.
• Damages Awards: The awards were rendered moot, the lower courts' decisions having been set aside and Civil Case No. R-20732 dismissed.

• Existence and Location of Camino Vecinal: Both parties agreed that a camino vecinal existed in sitio Bahak, but disagreed on whether it traversed the Pilapil property or ran along its side. The trial court and the Court of Appeals relied on the testimonies of Sesenando Longakit and Florentino Pepito, elderly residents who recalled using the road since childhood, and on Longakit's hand-drawn sketch. The Supreme Court found this reliance misplaced. Engineer Epifanio Jordan, the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Liloan, prepared an Urban Land Use Plan or zoning map which was submitted to and approved by the Sangguniang Bayan. Jordan testified that the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak "passes the side of the land of Socrates Pilapil." The Court noted that in the zoning map, other proposed streets and passageways were labeled "proposed," but the camino vecinal in question was not so labeled, indicating it was an existing road. Furthermore, the old map from which Jordan based his plan, drawn by Atty. Sotero Auman, showed the camino vecinal passing between Lot Nos. 320 and 323. The Court found that the lower courts failed to appreciate the role and function of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, who had statutory authority to prepare development plans even without specific instructions.

• Evidentiary Weight of Approved Zoning Plan: Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (the then-applicable Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair, and maintenance of municipal streets, and to prohibit encroachments on them. A camino vecinal is a municipal road and property for public use. The establishment, closure, or abandonment of the camino vecinal was the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan, and no private party could interfere with such right. The approval of the Urban Land Use Plan by the Sangguniang Bayan constituted a determination of, among other things, the location of the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak. This was a supervening event, as the plan was prepared and approved after the filing of the Colomidas' petition, but it was relied upon, introduced in evidence without objection from the Colomidas, and evaluated by the trial court. Under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, issues not raised by the pleadings but tried by express or implied consent are treated as if raised in the pleadings. The official act of the Sangguniang Bayan, duly proved, bound not only the Pilapils and the Colomidas but also the general public. The solemn declarations of elderly residents could not overturn the decision of the municipality. The inconsistency regarding whether Jordan was instructed by the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor was deemed trivial, since the mayor was both a member and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, and what invested the zoning map with legal effect was its approval by the Sangguniang Bayan, not the authority of the person who ordered or prepared it.

• Damages Awards: Having determined that the camino vecinal did not traverse the Pilapil property, the Court set aside the lower courts' decisions and dismissed Civil Case No. R-20732, rendering the awards of damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses moot. The Court also noted that the Pilapils' claim for damages to plants and crops had been separately litigated before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and resolved against them, and that there was insufficient proof of such damage or that the Pilapils had planted trees on the camino vecinal.

• Official Acts of Local Government Units — The establishment, closure, or abandonment of a camino vecinal (municipal road) is the sole prerogative of the municipality through its Sangguniang Bayan. No private party can interfere with such right. A duly approved zoning plan or Urban Land Use Plan, as an official act of the Sangguniang Bayan exercising its statutory authority, prevails over private testimonial evidence in determining the existence and location of municipal roads, and binds not only the contending parties but also the general public.
• Property for Public Use of Local Government Units — The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. Property for public use consists of provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service. These are governed by the same principles as property of public dominion. A camino vecinal is a municipal road and is property for public use.
• Supervening Events Tried by Consent — Under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they are treated as if raised in the pleadings. A supervening fact, such as the subsequent approval of a zoning plan, duly proved as an official act of the municipality and introduced without objection, may be considered by the court and binds the parties.
• Authority of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator — The Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator has statutory authority to formulate integrated development objectives and prepare comprehensive plans for consideration and approval of the Sangguniang Bayan and the municipal mayor. Even without instructions from anyone, the coordinator may prepare such plans on his own initiative by virtue of his functions. What invests a zoning map with legal effect is its approval by the Sangguniang Bayan, not the authority of the person who ordered or prepared it.

• "It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private party can interfere with such right." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: municipal roads are under the exclusive prerogative of the local government unit, and private claims cannot override official municipal determinations.
• "Such supervening fact, duly proved to be an official act of the Municipality of Liloan, binds not only the Pilapils and the Colomidas, but also the general public. The solemn declarations of old people like Sesenando Longakit and Florentino Pepito cannot overturn the decision of the Municipality of Liloan." — This passage establishes the hierarchy between official governmental acts and private testimonial evidence, a principle central to the Court's disposition.
• "What invested the zoning map with legal effect was neither the authority of the person who ordered its preparation nor the authority of the person who actually prepared it, but its approval by the Sangguniang Bayan." — This passage clarifies that the legal force of a zoning plan derives from legislative approval by the Sangguniang Bayan, not from the procedural chain of preparation, resolving the lower courts' confusion over who directed the coordinator.

• Sambrano vs. Arzaga, 22 Phil. 130 (1912) — Cited as authority for the proposition that an ocular inspection of the premises would have been a wise course of action in view of the divergent versions of the parties regarding the location of the camino vecinal.

• Article 423, Civil Code — Provides that the property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. Applied to classify a camino vecinal as property for public use of the municipality.
• Article 424, Civil Code — Enumerates property for public use of provinces, cities, and municipalities, including municipal streets. Applied to establish that a camino vecinal, as a municipal road, falls under property for public use governed by the same principles as property of public dominion.
• Section 10, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) — Governs the closure of roads by local government units, providing that a local government unit may close any barangay, municipal, city, or provincial road through its head acting pursuant to a Sangguniang resolution. Applied to underscore the municipality's authority over the camino vecinal.
• Section 149(x) and (z), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 — Grants the Sangguniang Bayan the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair, and maintenance of municipal streets and prohibit encroachments. Applied to establish the Sangguniang Bayan's authority over the Urban Land Use Plan and municipal roads.
• Section 161(4)(a) and (e), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 — Defines the functions of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, including formulating development objectives and preparing comprehensive plans for Sangguniang Bayan approval. Applied to establish that Engineer Jordan had statutory authority to prepare the zoning map even without specific instructions.
• Section 5, Rule 10, Rules of Court — Allows issues not raised by the pleadings to be tried by express or implied consent and treated as if raised in the pleadings. Applied to validate the trial court's consideration of the supervening approval of the zoning plan, which was introduced without objection from the Colomidas.
• Section 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications for witnesses. Cited by the Court of Appeals in rejecting the Pilapils' claim that Longakit and Pepito were incompetent to testify; the Supreme Court found this issue moot in light of the approved zoning plan.
• Articles 649 to 651, Civil Code — Govern the easement of right of way. Invoked by the Colomidas as an alternative prayer should the camino vecinal not be proved; rendered moot by the Court's finding that the official zoning plan controlled.

Justices Gutierrez, Jr., Romero, and Melo concurred. Justice Bidin took no part.