Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

A common carrier is not an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers; its liability for injuries caused by the willful acts of strangers is governed by Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which requires that the carrier's employees, through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family, could have prevented or stopped the act — a standard lower than the extraordinary diligence generally required of carriers.

Jose Pilapil was a paying passenger of Alatco Transportation Company, Inc., a common carrier engaged in the business of transporting passengers by bus along the national highway between Iriga City and Naga City in Camarines Sur. The dispute centers on the extent of a common carrier's liability under the Civil Code when a passenger is injured not by any defect in the carrier's equipment or by the negligence of its employees, but by the willful act of a stranger — a bystander who threw a stone at the moving bus.

On September 16, 1971, at about 6:00 P.M., Jose Pilapil boarded Alatco Transportation Company's Bus No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City, as a paying passenger bound for Naga City. While the bus was en route along the national highway, upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, an unidentified man — a bystander along the highway — hurled a stone at the left side of the bus. The stone struck Pilapil above his left eye.

Respondent's personnel immediately brought Pilapil to the provincial hospital in Naga City, where he was confined and treated. Because the sight of his left eye was impaired, he was then taken to Dr. Malabanan of Iriga City, who treated him for another week. Since no improvement in his left eye's vision was observed, Pilapil proceeded to V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City, where he was treated by Dr. Capulong. Despite this treatment, Pilapil partially lost the vision of his left eye and sustained a permanent scar above it.

Pilapil thereafter filed an action for recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I, arising from the stone-throwing incident. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering Alatco to pay P10,000.00 as actual and material damages, P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, P300.00 for medical expenses, and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs. Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57354-R. On October 19, 1979, the Court of Appeals, sitting in a Special Division of Five, reversed and set aside the trial court's judgment. Pilapil then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.

• Nature of Common Carrier's Business: Petitioner argued that the nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of certain risks, and that the stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in injury to a passenger is one such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability.
• Failure to Rebut Presumption of Negligence: Petitioner contended that respondent common carrier failed to rebut the presumption of negligence against it by proving that it exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers.
• Adequate Precautions Not Taken: Petitioner charged the carrier with negligence on the ground that the injury could have been prevented had mesh-work grills covered the windows of the bus.
• Public Policy: Petitioner maintained that it is in the greater interest of the State to make a carrier liable for such stone-throwing incidents rather than have the bus-riding public lose confidence in the transportation system.

• Common Carrier as Insurer: Whether the nature of the business of a common carrier makes it an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers against all risks, including injuries caused by the willful acts of strangers.
• Standard of Diligence for Acts of Strangers: Whether the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers under Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code is the applicable standard for determining liability when the injury is caused by the willful act of a stranger, or whether Article 1763 governs and imposes only the diligence of a good father of a family.
• Rebuttal of Presumption of Negligence: Whether the presumption of negligence against the common carrier was rebutted where the injury was caused wholly by the act of a stranger over whom the carrier had no control, knowledge, or ability to prevent.
• Reasonableness of Precautions: Whether the carrier was negligent for failing to install mesh-work grills on bus windows to guard against stone-throwing by strangers.

• Common Carrier as Insurer: No. Neither the law nor the nature of the transportation business makes a common carrier an insurer of the passenger's absolute safety; liability rests upon negligence, not absolute guarantee.
• Standard of Diligence for Acts of Strangers: Article 1763 governs. When the injury results from the willful act of a stranger, the degree of care required of the carrier is only that of a good father of a family, not extraordinary diligence.
• Rebuttal of Presumption of Negligence: Yes, the presumption was rebutted. The injury arose wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control, knowledge, or ability to prevent, and involved no defect in the means of transport or negligence of the carrier's employees.
• Reasonableness of Precautions: No. The rule of ordinary care does not require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions against unlawful acts of strangers; a carrier using vehicles of the most approved type in general use cannot be charged with negligence for failing to install mesh-work grills.

• Common Carrier as Insurer: The Court reasoned that a common carrier, in consideration of the right granted by the public to engage in transporting passengers and goods, does not consent to become an insurer of all risks. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties imposed by law and holds itself liable for breach thereof. While Articles 1733 and 1755 require extraordinary diligence and create a presumption of negligence against the carrier when a passenger is injured, the law does not make the carrier an insurer of absolute safety. The presumption of fault under Article 1756 is a mere disputable presumption that relieves the passenger of the burden of introducing evidence but yields to contrary proof showing either that the carrier exercised the required diligence or that the injury was due to a fortuitous event. The legislative intent, as discerned from the Code Commission and Congress, was to curb recklessness of drivers and operators — not to impose absolute liability.

• Standard of Diligence for Acts of Strangers: The Court held that while extraordinary diligence is the general standard, Article 1763 specifically governs when the injury is caused by the willful acts or negligence of strangers. Under that provision, a carrier is responsible for injuries to a passenger caused by strangers only if the carrier's employees, through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family, could have prevented or stopped the act. The negligence for which the carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission of its employees to prevent the tort when it could have been foreseen and prevented. The Court noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, the degree of care required is only that of a good father of a family — a lower standard than extraordinary diligence.

• Rebuttal of Presumption of Negligence: The presumption of negligence was rebutted because the injury was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, nor to the negligent or willful acts of the carrier's employees. The injury arose wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control, knowledge, or ability to prevent. To hold otherwise would make the carrier an insurer of absolute safety, contrary to legislative intent.

• Reasonableness of Precautions: The Court rejected the argument that mesh-work grills should have been installed. Although such a precaution could have prevented the injury, the rule of ordinary care and prudence does not require one to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions against unlawful acts of strangers. A carrier that uses vehicles of the most approved type, in general use by others in the same occupation, and that exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in suitable condition, cannot be charged with negligence. As to the public policy argument, the Court deferred to Congress as the body empowered to enact laws protecting the public from the risks of lawlessness, declining to judicially expand carrier liability.

• Common Carrier Not an Insurer — A common carrier is not an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. While the law requires extraordinary diligence in the transport of passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against the carrier when a passenger is injured, liability ultimately rests upon negligence — the failure to exercise the degree of diligence the law requires — not upon an absolute guarantee of safety. The presumption of negligence under Article 1756 is disputable and may be rebutted by proof that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence or that the injury was due to a fortuitous event.

• Article 1763 Standard for Acts of Strangers — When a passenger's injury is caused by the willful act or negligence of a stranger, the carrier's liability is governed by Article 1763 of the Civil Code, not the general extraordinary diligence standard of Articles 1733 and 1755. Under Article 1763, the carrier is liable only if its employees, through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family, could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. The applicable standard of care is thus the diligence of a good father of a family, not extraordinary diligence. The negligence attributable to the carrier is the negligent omission of its employees to prevent the tort when it could have been foreseen and prevented.

• Reasonableness of Precautions Against Unlawful Acts of Strangers — The rule of ordinary care does not require a carrier to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. A carrier using vehicles of the most approved type, in general use by others in the same occupation, and exercising a high degree of care in maintaining them, cannot be charged with negligence for failing to adopt extraordinary protective devices such as mesh-work grills on windows.

• "While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers." — This passage articulates the fundamental principle distinguishing the presumption of negligence from absolute insurer liability, a distinction central to the Court's ruling.

• "A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." — This is the text of Article 1763 as quoted by the Court, establishing the governing standard for stranger-caused injuries and the lower diligence threshold applicable in such cases.

• "the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the factual basis for rebutting the presumption of negligence and exonerating the carrier.

• Strong vs. Iloilo-Negros Air Express Co., 40 OG Supp. 12 p. 274 — Cited for the proposition that the law does not make a common carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
• Alfaro vs. Ayson, 54 OG Dec. 1, 1958, p. 7920 — Cited in support of the principle that carrier liability rests upon negligence rather than absolute guarantee of safety.
• Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 — Cited alongside Article 1174 of the Civil Code for the principle that the presumption of negligence is rebuttable by proof of extraordinary diligence or fortuitous event.
• Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil. 75 — Cited for the proposition that neither the law nor the nature of the transportation business makes the carrier an insurer, but that liability rests upon negligence.
• Irwin vs. Louisville & N.R. Co., 50 Southern Reporter 62 — Cited for the principle that the carrier is not charged with the duty of providing vehicles so as to absolutely prevent all injuries, and that using vehicles of the most approved type in general use precludes a finding of negligence.

• Article 1733, Civil Code — Requires common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of passengers according to all circumstances of each case. The Court cited this as the general standard of diligence but held it inapplicable where Article 1763 specifically governs stranger-caused injuries.
• Article 1755, Civil Code — Restates the extraordinary diligence requirement: a common carrier is bound to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances. The Court noted this provision qualifies the duty to only what human care and foresight can provide.
• Article 1756, Civil Code — Creates a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier when a passenger is injured. The Court held this presumption is merely disputable and yields to contrary proof of extraordinary diligence or fortuitous event.
• Article 1763, Civil Code — Governs injuries caused by the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or strangers; holds the carrier responsible only if its employees, through the diligence of a good father of a family, could have prevented or stopped the act. The Court applied this as the controlling provision, establishing a lower standard of care than extraordinary diligence for stranger-caused injuries.
• Article 1174, Civil Code — Cited in connection with the rebuttal of the presumption of negligence through proof of fortuitous event.
• Articles 1170 and 1173, Civil Code — Cited for the principle that liability for damages rests upon negligence or fault.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Sarmiento, and Regalado concurred.