Pielago vs. People

The crime charged is determined by the recital of ultimate facts in the Information, not by the caption or designation of the offense or the provision of law cited, so an accused may be validly convicted of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code even if the Information is denominated as acts of lasciviousness, provided the facts alleged and proved constitute the elements of the former and the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is not violated.

Pielago was a resident of Barangay Allang, Ligao City, whom the four-year-old AAA and her two-year-old brother CCC knew as "Kuya Alvin." The case was prosecuted at a time when R.A. No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997) had reclassified rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, while R.A. No. 7610 governed acts of lasciviousness committed against children.

AAA, a four-year-old girl, and her two-year-old brother CCC lived in Barangay Allang, Ligao City, where they knew the petitioner Mike Alvin Pielago y Ros as "Kuya Alvin." On July 1, 2006, between 2:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m., the two children were playing with Pielago at the porch of Boyet Ros' house. After playing, the three went inside the house to watch television. After a while, Pielago turned off the television and brought AAA and CCC to a bedroom. While CCC played with a toy carabao in a corner, Pielago made AAA lie down on the bed, took off her short pants, and inserted his right hand's forefinger inside her vagina, exclaiming "masiram" (which means "delicious") as he licked it and spewed saliva on it. AAA felt pain and blood came out of her vagina, which frightened her. Pielago then made AAA lie on her chest on the same bed and fingered her anus. After a few minutes, AAA and CCC were called for lunch by their mother, BBB. Pielago immediately replaced AAA's shorts and sent her and CCC out of the bedroom.

BBB noticed bloodstains at the back portion of AAA's shorts. When BBB asked AAA what happened, AAA did not answer immediately until she said "Kuya Alvin tugsok buyay saka lubot ko buda dila pa" (which means "Kuya Alvin inserted something in my vagina and my anus and he licked me"). Incensed by what AAA told her, BBB went to a certain Manay Eden who accompanied her to the house of Boyet where she found Pielago still lying on the bed. BBB continually hit Pielago as she asked him what he did to AAA. Pielago, however, denied the accusations and maintained that he was asleep when the incident happened. At 6:00 p.m. of the same day, AAA and BBB lodged a complaint at the police station, where AAA was physically examined by a medico-legal officer who issued a report showing a superficial laceration found at the 7 o'clock position of AAA's anus and the presence of erythema in the perihymenal area and fossa navicularis caused by the insertion into the victim's genitals of a foreign object, possibly a small finger or any blunt object.

Pielago denied the charge against him and testified that on July 1, 2006, he ate lunch with Mary Grace Capinpin, Benedict Bordeos, and Jerome Monasterial in the house of his uncle, Lito Ros. Thereafter, he and Benedict rested in a nipa hut which was 3 to 4 meters away from the house. While resting, Pielago heard BBB calling her two children, AAA and CCC, who both ignored her while they were at the basketball court. Being close to the two children, Pielago convinced them to go home and even assisted them in taking their lunch. He felt sleepy so he proceeded to the house of his uncle and slept on the sofa located in the living room. AAA and CCC came in and noisily played in the living room where he was, so he transferred to the bedroom. He was sound asleep until he felt somebody boxing his back. While BBB was continually boxing Pielago, she kept on asking what he did to her child, AAA. Awakened and shocked, Pielago retorted: "What is it?" He denied her accusation because he said he was fast asleep. At that time, he saw AAA and CCC chatting at the corridor of his uncle's house. After BBB left, Pielago just went back to sleep.

Pielago added that there was an existing land dispute between his grandparents and BBB's family which could have impelled the latter to file the instant charge against him even if he had nothing to do with it. The defense also insisted that the bloodstain found on AAA's shorts may have resulted from BBB's spanking, or that it could be the menstrual blood of a teenager living in the house of Pielago's uncle who owned the short pants which AAA took and wore during the incident. This was not far-fetched because Pielago stated that after he woke up, he noticed that the clothes on top of the bed were already scattered.

The Information charged that Pielago, "with lewd design and actuated by lust," committed an act of lasciviousness upon AAA, "a minor being four (4) years old, by kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers to the vagina" of the child. The RTC found AAA's testimony clear, candid, and straightforward, and her positive identification of Pielago as her molester convincing; it brushed aside Pielago's denial as intrinsically weak. The CA agreed, finding no evidence that AAA had been coached by her mother, and held that an accused may be convicted solely on the credible, convincing, and consistent testimony of the victim.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in affirming his conviction despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Variance Between the Charge and the Conviction: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in convicting him of the crime of rape by sexual assault despite his being charged in the Information for acts of lasciviousness only.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner's conviction despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Variance Between the Charge and the Conviction: Whether the CA erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of rape by sexual assault despite his being charged in the Information for acts of lasciviousness only.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: No. The prosecution proved Pielago's guilt beyond reasonable doubt through AAA's clear, consistent, and spontaneous testimony that he inserted his forefinger into her vagina and anus, which prevails over his bare and unsubstantiated denial.
• Variance Between the Charge and the Conviction: No. The recital of ultimate facts in the Information, not its caption or the provision of law cited, determines the crime charged; the facts alleged constitute rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A(2), and Pielago's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not violated.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: The SC found no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, since factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. AAA's clear, consistent, and spontaneous testimony unrelentingly established that Pielago inserted his right hand's forefinger into her vagina and anus while she and her younger brother CCC were in his custody. Being a child of tender years, her failure to resist or struggle while Pielago molested her all the more proved how she felt intimidated by her "Kuya." Pielago's bare denial could not exculpate him from the criminal charge, it being well-settled that denial, just like alibi, cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant; mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of the appellant in the crime attributed to him. Pielago also failed to prove the alleged ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses that led to the false charges against him.

• Variance Between the Charge and the Conviction: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and the designation in the Information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. In this case, the designation of the offense was changed from acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. The SC held that Pielago's right to be properly informed was not violated because the factual allegations in the Information determine the crime charged against the accused, not the designation of the offense given by the prosecutor, which is merely an opinion not binding on the courts. Quoting Malto vs. People, the SC reiterated that what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information; it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged. People vs. Rayon, Sr. was cited to the same effect: the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. The variance between the two crimes was therefore not fatal to Pielago's conviction. To obtain a conviction for rape by sexual assault, the prosecution must establish the elements of Article 266-A(2) — the insertion of the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into another person's genital or anal orifice — and this element was clearly present when AAA straightforwardly testified that Pielago inserted his forefinger into her vagina and anus. Testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. AAA's unrelenting narration, accompanied by her categorical identification of Pielago as the malefactor, established the case for the prosecution.

• Recital of facts determines the crime charged — The crime being charged in an Information is determined by the recital of ultimate facts and circumstances, not by the caption, title, or preamble of the Information, nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated. The prosecutor's designation of the offense is merely an opinion and is not binding on the courts. Applied here, the Information's caption of acts of lasciviousness did not prevent conviction for rape by sexual assault because the facts recited — kissing the vagina and inserting a finger into the vagina of a four-year-old — constituted the latter crime.
• Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation — The accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and the designation of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise and to allow preparation of the defense. The right is not violated, however, where the facts alleged in the Information — regardless of the caption — sufficiently charge the crime for which the accused is convicted. Applied here, Pielago could not claim surprise because the factual allegations described the acts constituting rape by sexual assault.
• Credibility of child-victim testimony — Testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. The trial court's factual findings on the credibility of the rape victim are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Applied here, AAA's clear, consistent, and spontaneous testimony, with her positive identification of Pielago, sufficed to establish the crime.
• Denial as a defense — Denial, like alibi, cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant; mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim. Applied here, Pielago's bare denial and his claim of an unproven ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses failed to overcome AAA's testimony.
• Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance — Voluntary surrender may be credited in favor of an accused who surrendered to the police authorities before a warrant of arrest could be issued against him. Applied here, both the RTC and the CA correctly credited Pielago with this mitigating circumstance in fixing the indeterminate penalty.

• "What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information." — The ratio decidendi on the second issue, quoted from Malto vs. People and made the basis for rejecting Pielago's claim that he could only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness.
• "the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information." — From People vs. Rayon, Sr., cited with approval to reinforce the rule that the factual recital, not the provision cited, controls.
• "when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed." — The canonical formulation on the weight of a child-victim's testimony, used to justify relying on AAA's unrelenting narration and categorical identification of Pielago.
• "Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crime attributed to him." — The rule disposing of Pielago's defense of denial as intrinsically weak against the victim's positive testimony.

• Malto vs. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643 — Controlling precedent; the SC quoted it for the rule that the recital of facts, not the title or designation of the offense, determines the crime charged in the Information.
• People vs. Rayon, Sr., G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013 — Reiterated the same rule: the character of the crime is determined by the recital of ultimate facts and circumstances, not by the caption, preamble, or specification of the provision of law.
• Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 272 — Cited by the CA and relied on for the principle that it is not the nomenclature of the offense that determines the crime in the Information but the recital of facts of the commission of the offense.
• People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 198017, June 13, 2012 — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
• People vs. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 817 — Cited for the rule that denial, like alibi, cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant.
• People vs. De los Santos, Jr., G.R. No. 186499, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 784 — Cited for the rule that mere denial, without strong evidence, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of the accused.
• People vs. Ogarte, G.R. No. 182690, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 395 — Cited for the rule that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, and that a girl-child's claim of rape carries with it all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.
• People vs. Asprec, G.R. No. 182457, January 20, 2013 — Cited as the basis for increasing the award of exemplary damages from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.

• Article 266-A(2), Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 — Defines rape by sexual assault as committed by any person who, under any of the circumstances in paragraph 1, inserts his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Applied here, Pielago's insertion of his forefinger into AAA's vagina and anus, AAA being under twelve years of age, satisfied the elements of the crime.
• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for rape and recognizes the qualifying circumstance of the victim being under seven years of age. Applied here, the RTC took into account the qualifying circumstance that AAA was "less than seven (7) years of age" in imposing the penalty.
• Rule 115, Section 1(b), Rules of Court — Entitles the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Applied here, the SC held the right was not violated because the factual allegations in the Information, not its caption, determine the crime charged.
• Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610 — The provision on acts of lasciviousness against children, cited as the original designation of the offense in the Information against Pielago.
• R.A. No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997) — Reclassified rape, including rape by sexual assault, under the Revised Penal Code; the law under which Pielago was ultimately convicted.
• R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004) — Cited in the footnote for the withholding of the victim's real name and those of her immediate family members, with fictitious initials used to protect the victim's identity.