Picart vs. Smith, Jr.

The test for negligence is whether the defendant, in acting as he did, used the reasonable care and prudence that an ordinary person would have used in the same situation. If the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident but failed to take it, he is liable for the resulting damages, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

The case involves a motor vehicle accident in 1912, during the early adoption of automobiles in the Philippines. It addresses the standard of care required of drivers and the apportionment of liability when both parties are negligent.

• Filed in the Court of First Instance of La Union.
• The CFI absolved the defendant from liability.
• The plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

• The plaintiff, Amado Picart, was riding his pony across the Carlatan Bridge.
• The defendant, Frank Smith, Jr., approached from the opposite direction in an automobile at about 10-12 mph.
• The defendant sounded his horn multiple times as he approached.
• The plaintiff, seeing the automobile and hearing the horn, pulled his pony to the right side of the bridge railing (the wrong side) instead of moving to his left.
• The defendant, assuming the plaintiff would move to the proper side, continued driving toward the center of the bridge.
• When it became clear the plaintiff would not move, the defendant, instead of stopping or veering widely to the left, attempted to squeeze past by turning slightly to the right.
• The automobile passed so close to the pony that it became frightened, turned, and was struck on the leg by the car's flange. The pony fell, died, and the plaintiff was injured.

• The defendant was negligent in maneuvering his automobile, creating an unreasonable risk of harm.
• The defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident by stopping or taking a different course but failed to do so.
• The prior negligence of the plaintiff should not bar recovery because the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.

• The defendant was not negligent; he sounded his horn and attempted to pass safely.
• The plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence by positioning himself on the wrong side of the bridge, which should bar or reduce his recovery.
• The criminal case for the same incident had been dismissed, which should have a bearing on civil liability.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the dismissal of the preliminary criminal investigation before a justice of the peace constitutes res judicata on the civil liability.
• Substantive Issues:
  1. Whether the defendant was guilty of negligence.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars his recovery.
  3. Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applies.

• Procedural: The dismissal of a criminal case during a preliminary investigation does not constitute res judicata on the issue of civil liability. The SC distinguished it from a judgment on the merits.
• Substantive:
  1. Yes, the defendant was negligent. The SC applied the reasonable person standard. A prudent person in the defendant's position would have foreseen the risk of frightening the horse and should have stopped or taken a wider berth. The defendant's failure to do so constituted negligence.
  2. The plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery. The SC applied the last clear chance doctrine. The plaintiff's negligence was antecedent and remote. The defendant, having the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary care, failed to do so. His negligence was the immediate and determining cause of the accident.
  3. The last clear chance doctrine applies. The negligent acts were not contemporaneous. After the plaintiff was in a position of peril and could not escape, the defendant had a fresh opportunity and a clear duty to avoid the harm. His failure to act on that opportunity makes him solely liable.

• Reasonable Person (or Ordinary Prudent Person) Standard for Negligence — Negligence is the failure to exercise the care that a person of ordinary prudence would have used under the same circumstances. The standard is objective, not based on the defendant's personal judgment. The SC stated: "Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences."
• Last Clear Chance Doctrine (or Doctrine of Proximate Cause) — Even if the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, the defendant is liable if he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary care and failed to do so. The person who had the final opportunity to prevent the harm, and whose negligence was therefore the proximate cause, bears the full liability. The SC held: "the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party."

• "The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that."
• "Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist."
• "the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party."

• Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) — Cited and distinguished. In Rkes, the SC applied contributory negligence to reduce damages proportionally. The SC distinguished Picart because in Rkes, the defendant's negligence was a passive omission (failure to maintain a track), whereas in Picart, the defendant was actively operating the automobile and had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.
• U.S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela (31 Phil. Rep., 564) — Cited for the principle that a dismissal at a preliminary investigation does not constitute a judgment on the merits and thus has no effect on civil liability.

• Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code (then in force) — These articles establish the obligation to repair damage caused by fault or negligence. The SC applied them to hold the defendant civilly liable.
• Article 1103 of the Spanish Civil Code — Provides that liability for negligence is enforceable, subject to the courts' discretion in calibrating it. The SC used this to support its finding of liability.

• Justice Malcolm (Concurring) — Agreed with the application of the last clear chance rule. He emphasized that the rule applies only when the plaintiff's negligence is not concurrent with the defendant's and when the plaintiff is in a position where he cannot extricate himself. He found Justice Street's factual finding—that the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the accident at the moment of collision—to be determinative.

• N/A — Justice Johnson reserved his vote but did not file a written dissent.