Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

The negligent parking of the dump truck was the legal and proximate cause of the accident, while Dionisio’s own negligence was merely contributory and mitigated damages under Article 2179 of the Civil Code; the last clear chance doctrine does not apply in Philippine civil law where contributory negligence is not an absolute bar to recovery.

Dionisio was injured when his Volkswagen car collided with a Ford dump truck parked on General Lacuna Street in Bangkal, Makati, in the early morning of November 15, 1975. The truck was owned by Phoenix and had been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver, with Phoenix’s permission because work was scheduled early the next morning. Dionisio sued for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Phoenix and Carbonel denied liability, arguing that Dionisio’s reckless driving was the true proximate cause. Both lower courts found Carbonel negligent in parking the truck and held his negligence as the proximate cause, but they failed to squarely address Dionisio’s alleged negligence. The case reached the SC on petition for review.

Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home to 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati, in the early morning of November 15, 1975, after attending a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase, Dionisio had taken a shot or two of liquor. He was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets in Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street. According to Dionisio, his car headlights suddenly failed. He switched them on bright and saw a Ford dump truck looming about two and a half meters away from his car. The dump truck was owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction, Inc. and was parked on the right-hand side of General Lacuna Street, facing oncoming traffic. It was parked askew, not parallel to the street curb, in such a manner as to stick out onto the street and partly block the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights or early warning reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, because work was scheduled early the following morning. Dionisio claimed he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left, but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result, he suffered physical injuries including permanent facial scars, a nervous breakdown, and the loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio’s injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on, and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel, ordering them to pay jointly and severally P15,000 for hospital bills and replacement of lost dentures, P150,000 as loss of expected income, moral damages, P10,000 as exemplary damages for wanton disregard to settle, P4,500 as attorney’s fees, and costs.

Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The IAC in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the trial court but modified the award of damages. It reduced the compensatory damages to P6,460.71, the only amount it found actually proved; reduced the loss of expected income to P100,000 because Dionisio had voluntarily resigned and his loss of income was not solely attributable to the accident; and reduced the moral damages to P50,000 as excessive and unconscionable. The award of P10,000 as exemplary damages, P4,500 as attorney’s fees, and costs remained untouched. The IAC casually conceded that Dionisio was “in some way, negligent” but failed to see the relevance of that negligence and made no further mention of it.

Both the trial court and the IAC made explicit findings that Carbonel was negligent in the manner he parked the dump truck and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio’s injuries. However, both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause was Dionisio’s reckless driving. The SC examined the record and found sufficient evidence to resolve the factual issues of whether Dionisio had a valid curfew pass, whether he was speeding, whether he purposely turned off his headlights or they malfunctioned, and whether he was intoxicated. The SC found no valid curfew pass on Dionisio or in his car; a certification issued two years after the accident did not specify any serial number, date, or period of effectivity. Patrolman Cuyno, who was stationed about 200 meters away and arrived at the scene almost immediately, testified that people gathered there told him Dionisio’s car was moving fast and did not have its headlights on. The SC held this testimony admissible as part of the res gestae. Dionisio claimed he was traveling at a moderate 30 kilometers per hour and that his headlights malfunctioned, but the SC found he was hurrying home, driving faster than he should have been, and had extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection, thus failing to see the dump truck. On intoxication, Patrolman Cuyno testified that Dionisio smelled of liquor, and Dionisio admitted taking a shot or two, but the SC found this insufficient to show he was so heavily under the influence as to make his driving per se reckless imprudence. The SC concluded Dionisio was negligent, but that his negligence was only contributory; the legal and proximate cause remained Carbonel’s negligent parking.

• Phoenix and Carbonel argued that the true legal and proximate cause of the accident was Dionisio’s own recklessness, not the manner in which the dump truck was parked.
• Dionisio was allegedly speeding at the time of the accident.
• He was allegedly driving under the influence of liquor.
• He was allegedly driving without his headlights on.
• He was allegedly without a valid curfew pass.
• They contended that if there was negligence in the parking of the dump truck, that negligence was merely a “passive and static condition.”
• Dionisio’s recklessness was an “efficient intervening cause” that determined the accident and his injuries.
• Therefore, Dionisio’s negligence should be regarded as the legal and proximate cause.
• They invoked the “last clear chance” doctrine.
• Even if Carbonel was negligent, Dionisio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
• Having failed to take that chance, Dionisio should bear his own injuries alone.
• Phoenix claimed it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of its dump truck driver.
• It should not be held liable for Carbonel’s negligence.

• Dionisio argued that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel parked the dump truck.
• The truck was parked askew, sticking out onto the street, partly blocking oncoming traffic.
• There were no lights or early warning reflector devices near the truck.
• He contended that his own negligence, if any, was only contributory and should mitigate damages under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, not bar recovery.
• He objected to Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony as hearsay.
• The facts testified to were not acquired through official information and were not given pursuant to any duty.
• He argued that his intoxication was not sufficiently established to constitute reckless imprudence per se.
• He defended the IAC’s findings and the reduced awards of damages.

• Proximate Cause: Whether the negligent parking of the dump truck was the legal and proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio’s injuries.
• Contributory Negligence: Whether Dionisio’s own negligence was merely contributory or an efficient intervening cause that superseded Carbonel’s negligence.
• Last Clear Chance: Whether the last clear chance doctrine applies to absolve petitioners from liability.
• Employer Liability: Whether Phoenix is liable for Carbonel’s negligence under culpa in vigilando.
• Damages: Whether the damages awarded should be mitigated due to Dionisio’s contributory negligence.
• Admissibility: Whether Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was admissible as res gestae.

• Proximate Cause: Yes. The SC held that the negligent parking of the dump truck was the legal and proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio’s injuries.
• Contributory Negligence: Dionisio’s negligence was only contributory, not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
• Last Clear Chance: No. The last clear chance doctrine does not apply to absolve petitioners from liability.
• Employer Liability: Yes. Phoenix is solidarily liable for Carbonel’s negligence; it failed to overcome the presumption of negligence in supervision.
• Damages: Yes. The aggregate compensatory damages, loss of expected income, and moral damages were reduced by 20%; exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs were borne exclusively by petitioners.
• Admissibility: Yes. Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was admissible as part of the res gestae.

• Proximate Cause:

  • The SC found Carbonel negligent in parking the dump truck askew, sticking out onto the street, without lights or warning reflectors.
  • This improper parking created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street.
  • The collision was a natural and foreseeable consequence of Carbonel’s negligence; had the truck not been parked that way, the collision would in all probability not have occurred.
  • The SC rejected the “cause versus condition” distinction as almost entirely discredited. A passive condition can be an efficient cause if it created the very risk that materialized.
  • Carbonel’s negligence was an indispensable and efficient cause, not merely a passive and static condition.

• Contributory Negligence:

  • The SC found Dionisio negligent: he was hurrying home, driving faster than he should have been, and extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection, causing him not to see the dump truck.
  • The absence of a valid curfew pass supported the inference that he was speeding and had turned off his headlights to avoid detection by police.
  • Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was admissible as res gestae; people at the scene said Dionisio’s car was moving fast and had no headlights.
  • On intoxication, Dionisio admitted taking a shot or two and smelled of liquor, but the evidence was insufficient to show he was so heavily under the influence as to make his driving per se reckless imprudence. Mere intoxication is not negligence.
  • Dionisio’s negligence was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. It was foreseeable that a driver might negligently drive into an improperly parked truck. The risk created by Carbonel included the foreseeable negligence of others.
  • Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, contributory negligence mitigates damages but does not bar recovery.

• Last Clear Chance:

  • The SC rejected the application of the last clear chance doctrine.
  • The doctrine originated in common law to mitigate the harshness of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery.
  • Article 2179 of the Civil Code rejects contributory negligence as an absolute bar. The task is to determine whose negligence was the legal or proximate cause of the injury, not merely to determine chronology.
  • The relative time of the negligent acts is only one factor; more fundamental are the nature of the negligent act and the character and gravity of the risks created.
  • Accepting petitioners’ proposition would come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle that a person must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission.

• Employer Liability:

  • Carbonel’s proven negligence created a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
  • Phoenix failed to overcome this presumption.
  • Phoenix allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, and it failed to show any effort to supervise the manner in which the truck was parked when away from company premises.
  • This constituted culpa in vigilando. Phoenix is solidarily liable with Carbonel.

• Damages:

  • Considering the comparative negligence of Dionisio and petitioners, the SC allocated damages on a 20-80 ratio.
  • Dionisio bears 20% of the damages awarded by the IAC, except the P10,000 exemplary damages and P4,500 attorney’s fees and costs.
  • Petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix pay the remaining 80% solidarily.
  • The exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs are borne exclusively by petitioners.
  • Phoenix is entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.
  • The SC saw no sufficient reason to disturb the reduced awards of damages made by the IAC.

• Admissibility:

  • Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was not admissible under the official records exception to the hearsay rule.
  • It was admissible as part of the res gestae under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court.
  • Res gestae consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of a startling event, rendering inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer, and made as a spontaneous reaction.
  • An automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event to evoke spontaneous reactions.
  • The testimony should have been considered and given substantial weight.

• Proximate Cause — The cause that, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The SC applied this to hold Carbonel’s negligent parking as the legal and proximate cause of Dionisio’s injuries.
• Cause vs. Condition — The distinction between an active “cause” and a passive “condition” is almost entirely discredited. A condition can be an efficient cause if it created the risk that materialized. The SC applied this to hold that the improperly parked dump truck was not a mere passive condition.
• Foreseeable Intervening Cause — If the intervening cause is one that in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one that the defendant has reason to anticipate under the circumstances, it does not supersede the defendant’s responsibility. The SC applied this to hold that Dionisio’s negligence was a foreseeable intervening cause.
• Contributory Negligence — Negligence on the part of the plaintiff that contributes to his own injury. Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, it mitigates damages but does not bar recovery. The SC applied this to reduce damages by 20%.
• Last Clear Chance — A common law doctrine that permits recovery to a negligent plaintiff if the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. The SC held it has no role in Philippine civil law where contributory negligence is not an absolute bar under Article 2179.
• Culpa in Vigilando — Negligence in supervision. An employer is presumed negligent in supervising its employees if an employee’s negligence causes injury. The SC applied this to hold Phoenix liable for Carbonel’s negligence.
• Res Gestae / Excited Utterances — A hearsay exception for spontaneous statements made under the stress of a startling event. The SC applied this to admit Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony about what people at the scene said.
• Solidary Liability — The employer and employee are solidarily liable for the damages caused by the employee’s negligence. The SC applied this to Phoenix and Carbonel, with Phoenix entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.

• “Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active ‘cause’ of the harm and the existing ‘conditions’ upon which that cause operated. … ‘Cause’ and ‘condition’ still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited.”
• “The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible.”
• “Dionisio’s negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver’s negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.”
• “The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others.”
• “It is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.”
• “To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission.”
• “Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence.”

• Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918) — The last clear chance doctrine was imported into Philippine jurisdiction by this case. The SC discussed and limited its application, holding it has little role where contributory negligence is not an absolute bar.
• Rakes vs. Manila Railroad Co., 7 Phil. 359 (1907) — Cited in relation to the common law rule of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery, which Article 2179 rejected.
• Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359 (1907) — Cited for the allocation of damages on a comparative negligence or proportional basis.
• People vs. Berame, 72 SCRA 184 (1976) — Cited for the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and the admissibility of excited utterances.
• Poblete vs. Fabros, 93 SCRA 202 (1979); Umali vs. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 (1976); Saludares vs. Martinez, 29 SCRA 745 (1969) — Cited for the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer in supervising employees properly and adequately.
• Lanuzo vs. Ping, 100 SCRA 205 (1980) — Cited for the employer’s right to reimbursement from the negligent employee.
• Wright vs. Manila Railroad Co., 28 Phil. 116 (1914) — Cited for the rule that mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does it establish a want of ordinary care.
• Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 (1910) — Cited in relation to comparative negligence and proportional damages.

• Article 2179, Civil Code — Provides that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages; but if the plaintiff’s negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The SC applied this to reduce damages by 20%.
• Article 2180, Civil Code — Provides that employers are liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, and that the employer’s liability ceases if they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The SC applied this to hold Phoenix liable under culpa in vigilando.
• Rule 130, Section 36, Rules of Court — The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. The SC applied this to admit Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony as excited utterances.
• Rule 130, Section 38, Rules of Court — The official records exception to the hearsay rule. The SC held this was not the applicable exception for Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony.

• Yap (Chairman), J.
• Narvasa, J.
• Cruz, J.
• Gancayco, J.
• Sarmiento, J.
• Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

None.