Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC

Venue in labor cases is permissive and intended for the worker's benefit, and a Rule 65 petition against the NLRC cannot be used to re-examine factual findings supported by evidence, including a finding of no abandonment.

Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. employed Roberto Nieva as a driver on the Legaspi City-Pasay City route. The dispute implicated Section 1(a), Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, which fixes venue by reference to the complainant's workplace, and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which governs petitions for certiorari against the NLRC.

Roberto Nieva was employed as a driver by Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. on April 13, 1977 and was assigned to the Legaspi City-Pasay City route. On May 15, 1989, he sideswiped an owner-type jeep, damaging the latter's park light. The jeep's owner turned out to be a PC colonel, who arrested Nieva and brought him to Camp Crame, where a criminal complaint was filed against him.

Nieva obtained his release from detention through a bail bond secured by Philtranco. Philtranco suspended him for thirty days effective June 8, 1989. After serving the suspension, Nieva reported back to work, but a few days after resuming his driving duties he was re-arrested on the ground that his bail bond was fake. He reported the incident to Philtranco's management. On October 15, 1989, Philtranco's administrative officer, Epifanio Llado, advised Nieva that, to avoid re-arrest, he would have to refrain from driving until a settlement could be reached with the jeep owner. From then on, Nieva would report for work only to be told to wait until his case was settled.

The case was finally settled on July 20, 1991, with Philtranco paying for the damages to the jeep. Three days later, Nieva reported for work, but he was requested to file a new application because he was no longer considered an employee of Philtranco, allegedly for being absent without leave from October 19 to November 20, 1989. Aggrieved, Nieva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and 13th month pay with the NLRC's National Capital Region Arbitration Branch in Manila, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 03-01891-92 and assigned to Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan.

Philtranco did not appear at the first four conferences scheduled by the arbiter, prompting a warning that it would be declared in default if it failed to appear at the next hearing. After its representative appeared, Philtranco filed a position paper with a motion to dismiss on August 28, 1992, arguing that the complaint should have been lodged with the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch in Legaspi City because Nieva was a resident there and was hired, assigned, and based in Legaspi City. The labor arbiter denied the motion on January 26, 1993. Nieva then presented his evidence. On August 30, 1993, Philtranco filed a second motion to dismiss, which was likewise denied for raising no new arguments. Philtranco thereafter presented evidence to prove that Nieva had abandoned his work by being absent without leave from October 19 to November 20, 1989. It cited two irregularity reports covering October 19-31 and November 1-20, 1989; a letter from its assistant manager requiring Nieva to report within five days on pain of being dropped from the roll; and a termination letter from its company lawyer for Nieva's failure to report for work as directed.

After considering the evidence, the labor arbiter gave more credence to Nieva's version. The arbiter found that Nieva's absences were incurred with Philtranco's permission because he had been instructed not to drive until his case was settled, and that Philtranco never refuted Nieva's assertion that Llado had given this instruction. The arbiter dismissed the abandonment allegation, noting that Nieva's persistence in pursuing his claim and his repeated reporting for duty negated abandonment.

• Improper Venue: Petitioner argued that the complaint should have been lodged with the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch in Legaspi City, not the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch, because Nieva was a resident of Legaspi City and was hired, assigned, and based there; petitioner cited Section 1(a), Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.
• Grave Abuse in Award: Petitioner contended that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Philtranco should be imposed back wages and separation pay.
• Abandonment and Factual Findings: Petitioner maintained that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact and in confirming the labor arbiter's decision that there was no abandonment of work; it cited the alleged paucity of Nieva's evidence and its own exhibits, including two irregularity reports for absence without leave from October 19-31 and November 1-20, 1989, a letter from its assistant manager requiring Nieva to report within five days on pain of being dropped from the roll, and a termination letter from its company lawyer for failure to report for work.

• Venue: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied Philtranco's motion to dismiss the complaint based on improper venue.
• Backwages and Separation Pay: Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Philtranco should be imposed back wages and separation pay.
• Abandonment and Findings of Fact: Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction as to its findings of fact and when it confirmed the labor arbiter's decision that there was no abandonment of work by Nieva and that he showed persistence to return to work.

• Venue: No. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Philtranco's motion to dismiss for improper venue; the venue rule is permissive and for the worker's benefit, and Manila was part of Nieva's workplace because he plied the Legaspi City-Pasay City route.
• Backwages and Separation Pay: No. The NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the award; the labor arbiter's findings were supported by evidence and the Court will not re-evaluate them under Rule 65.
• Abandonment and Findings of Fact: No. The NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion; the finding of no abandonment was supported by evidence, and the immediate filing of an illegal dismissal complaint is inconsistent with abandonment.

• Venue: Venue pertains to the trial and relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than to the substance and merits of the case. Section 1(a), Rule IV of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure speaks of the complainant/petitioner's workplace, showing that the rule is intended for the exclusive benefit of the worker, who may waive it. The provision is permissive, as held in Dayag vs. NLRC, because it uses the word "may" and allows a different venue when the interests of substantial justice demand it, with the constitutional protection accorded to labor as a paramount and compelling factor, provided the venue chosen is not altogether oppressive to the employer. Nieva, as a driver of Philtranco, was assigned to the Legaspi City-Pasay City route. Under Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC, the workplace is the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose, and Manila could be considered part of the complainant's territorial workplace. Thus, the filing of the complaint with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch was proper.
• Backwages and Separation Pay: Philtranco's challenge to the award was tied to its attack on the factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 prospers only if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor official's conclusion. The Court cannot re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its special field. The labor arbiter found that Nieva's absences were incurred with Philtranco's permission because he was instructed not to drive until his case was settled, and this assertion was never refuted. Since the findings were supported by evidence on record, they were accorded due respect and finality. No grave abuse of discretion was shown.
• Abandonment and Findings of Fact: The labor arbiter considered Nieva's absence from work as not equivalent to abandonment. The immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal by an employee, as in this case, is inconsistent with abandonment. Nieva's persistence in pursuing his claim and his repeated reporting for duty negated abandonment. Because the findings of fact of the labor arbiter and the NLRC were supported by evidence on record, they were accorded due respect and finality. The NLRC did not commit abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse, in affirming the labor arbiter's findings.

• Venue in labor cases is permissive and for the worker's benefit — Under Section 1(a), Rule IV of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure, cases may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the complainant's workplace. The provision uses "may" and is permissive; it is intended for the exclusive benefit of the worker, who may waive it. A different venue may be allowed when substantial justice demands, provided it is not altogether oppressive to the employer. Applied: Nieva's filing in Manila was proper because Manila formed part of his territorial workplace as a driver on the Legaspi City-Pasay City route.
• Workplace for venue purposes — For venue, the workplace is the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose; it includes the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment, or travel. For field, ambulant, or itinerant workers, the workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive salaries/wages or work instructions and report results. Applied: as a driver plying the Legaspi City-Pasay City route, Nieva's workplace included Manila/Pasay.
• Grave abuse of discretion as the standard for Rule 65 against the NLRC — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction. It does not permit an inquiry into the correctness of the evaluation of evidence, nor does it allow the Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate witness credibility, or substitute the factual findings of an administrative tribunal with expertise. Applied: Philtranco's factual challenge to the non-abandonment finding and award failed.
• Finality of supported factual findings — Findings of fact of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, when supported by evidence on record, must be accorded due respect and finality. Applied: the finding that Nieva's absences were permitted and that he did not abandon his work was supported by evidence.
• Abandonment — Abandonment is negated by the employee's immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal; such action is inconsistent with abandonment. Applied: Nieva's filing of the illegal dismissal complaint and his repeated reporting for duty showed he did not abandon his job.

• "This provision is obviously permissive, for the said section uses the word "may," allowing a different venue when the interests of substantial justice demand a different one. In any case, as stated earlier, the Constitutional protection accorded to labor is a paramount and compelling factor, provided the venue chosen is not altogether oppressive to the employer." — The Court quoted this from Dayag vs. NLRC to establish that the NLRC venue rule is permissive and may yield to substantial justice, with labor protection as a paramount consideration.
• "Since the private respondent's regular place of assignment is the vessel MV Cotabato Princess which plies the Manila-Estancia-Iloilo-Zamboanga-Cotabato route, we are of the opinion that Labor Arbiter Arthur L. Amansec was correct in concluding that Manila could be considered part of the complainant's territorial workplace." — Quoted from Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC and relied upon as exactly in point to support the conclusion that Manila formed part of Nieva's territorial workplace because of his route.
• "It should be noted that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will prosper only if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor official or officer in determining his conclusion. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its special field." — This passage states the standard for Rule 65 petitions against the NLRC and explains why Philtranco's factual challenge to the non-abandonment finding could not succeed.
• "Time and again, we have held that the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal by an employee, as in this case, is inconsistent with abandonment." — This is the Court's ratio on abandonment, applied to Nieva's immediate filing of the illegal dismissal complaint.

• Dayag vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124193, March 6, 1998 — Quoted for the rule that Section 1(a), Rule IV of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure is permissive, uses "may," and allows a different venue when substantial justice demands, with labor protection as a paramount and compelling factor.
• Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 507 (1996) — Cited as exactly in point; held that Manila could be considered part of the complainant's territorial workplace because the vessel's route included Manila, supporting venue in Manila for Nieva's route.
• Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 209 SCRA 834 (1992) — Cited for the proposition that the worker may waive the venue benefit.
• NFL vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113466, December 15, 1997, citing ComSavings Bank vs. NLRC, 257 SCRA 307 (1996) — Cited for the Rule 65 standard and the rule against re-evaluating evidence in labor certiorari.
• ComSavings Bank vs. NLRC, 257 SCRA 307 (1996) — Cited for according due respect and finality to supported factual findings.
• PASUDECO vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 112650, May 29, 1997 — Cited for the rule that the immediate filing of an illegal dismissal complaint is inconsistent with abandonment.
• Jackson Building Condominium Corporation vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 329 (1995) — Cited together with PASUDECO for the same abandonment rule.

• Section 1(a), Rule IV, New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission — Provides that all cases Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner. For venue, workplace is the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose; it includes the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment, or travel. For field, ambulant, or itinerant workers, workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive salaries/wages or work instructions and report results. The Court applied this to hold venue was permissive and Manila was part of Nieva's workplace.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for certiorari and requires a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction. The Court applied it to decline re-examination of the NLRC's factual findings.

Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ.