Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines

An employer cannot independently appeal a final judgment of conviction against an accused-employee who has jumped bail, as the employer's subsidiary civil liability is merely incidental to and dependent upon the employee's primary civil liability, which becomes final and executory upon the employee's waiver of appeal.

On August 26, 1990, a passenger bus owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., operated by its driver Napoleon Roman, was involved in an accident in San Juan, La Union, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries. Roman was subsequently charged with reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical injuries, and damage to property.

• The Accident and Charges: On August 26, 1990, a bus owned by petitioner, driven by its employee Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union. Roman was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical injuries, and damage to property.
• The RTC Judgment: On July 27, 1994, the RTC convicted Roman, sentencing him to imprisonment and ordering him to pay damages to the victims. The court ruled that petitioner would be subsidiarily liable in case of Roman's insolvency.
• Flight of the Accused: Roman jumped bail and remained at large. Counsel for Roman, hired by petitioner, filed a notice of appeal, which was denied.
• Employer's Appeal: On August 6, 1994, petitioner filed its own notice of appeal from the RTC judgment. The RTC gave due course to this appeal on April 29, 1997.
• CA Proceedings: The OSG moved to be excused from filing a brief. The private prosecutor moved to dismiss the appeal. The CA granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the employer could not independently dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case because the judgment against the accused had become final and executory due to his flight.

• Right to Appeal: Petitioner argued that as an employer who participated in the defense of its accused-employee, it is considered a party to the criminal case and must be accorded the right to appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
• Applicability of Precedents: Petitioner maintained that the doctrines in Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil do not apply because, unlike the employers in those cases, it actively participated in the criminal case against its employee.

• Finality of Judgment: Respondent countered that the institution of a criminal case implies the institution of the civil action; thus, once the employee's conviction becomes final due to his jumping bail, the employer's subsidiary liability becomes conclusive and enforceable.
• No Independent Dispute: Respondent argued that allowing the employer to independently dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment.

• Employer's Right to Appeal: Whether an employer who participated in the defense of its accused-employee may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
• Applicability of Precedents: Whether the doctrines in Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil apply to the instant case.

• Employer's Right to Appeal: The appeal was correctly dismissed. An employer is not a direct party to the criminal case against its employee and cannot act independently on its own behalf, but only in defense of the accused. When the accused jumps bail, he waives his right to appeal, rendering the judgment final and executory. The employer's subsidiary liability is incidental to and dependent on the primary civil liability of the accused. Allowing the employer to appeal would improperly amend, nullify, or defeat the final judgment and potentially violate the accused's right against double jeopardy, as the whole case would be open to review without his consent.
• Applicability of Precedents: The doctrines in Alvarez and Yusay apply. Petitioner's participation in the defense does not transform the nature of its liability, which remains subsidiary. The basic tenet of those cases is that the employer's liability is subsidiary and dependent on the employee's conviction, which has attained finality.

• Subsidiary Civil Liability of Employers — Under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter's insolvency, provided: (1) they are indeed the employers; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against the employees has not been satisfied due to insolvency. This liability is incidental to and dependent on the primary civil liability of the employee. The judgment of conviction against the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer with regard to both the existence and the amount of the civil liability.
• Waiver of Right to Appeal by Flight — An accused who jumps bail or escapes from confinement during the pendency of the appeal is deemed to have waived the right to appeal. The judgment against such appellant becomes final and executory.
• Civil Action Deemed Instituted with Criminal Action — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless waived, reserved, or instituted prior. Only the civil liability ex delicto is deemed included; independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code may proceed separately.

• "When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability."
• "The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee."

• Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 57 (1988) — Established that an employer's subsidiary liability is enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee and that provisions on subsidiary liability are deemed written into the judgments.
• Yusay v. Adil, 164 SCRA 494 (1988) — Held that allowing employers to dispute civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment.
• Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670 (1956) — Declared that employers, strictly speaking, are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees, although they have an interest therein by reason of their subsidiary liability.
• People v. Ang Gioc, 73 Phil. 366 (1941) — Ruled that the right of appeal may be waived by implication, such as when the accused flees after the case has been submitted for decision.

• Article 103, Revised Penal Code — Imposes subsidiary liability on employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. Applied to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable upon proof of the employee's insolvency.
• Section 1, Rule 111, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action. Applied to establish that the employer's subsidiary liability is enforced based on the judgment of conviction.
• Section 8, Rule 124, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Authorizes the dismissal of an appeal if the appellant escapes from prison, jumps bail, or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. Applied by analogy to hold that the accused-employee waived his right to appeal by jumping bail.

Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.