Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

The last clear chance doctrine does not apply where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations; it would be inequitable to exempt a negligent common carrier and its owners on the ground that another driver was likewise negligent.

On December 24, 1966, seven passengers boarded a jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan. Their contract was for P24.00 per passenger. While traversing barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the jeepney's right rear wheel detached. The vehicle made an abrupt U-turn from the eastern lane into the western lane, where Bus No. 753 of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, driven by Tomas delos Reyes, collided with it. Three passengers died; others were injured.

• The Passenger Contract and Configuration: About 11:00 a.m. on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales, and Zenaida Parejas boarded the Mangune jeepney at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan. They paid P24.00 for the trip. Mercedes Lorenzo was on the front seat with the driver; Caridad Pascua, Alejandro Morales, and Zenaida Parejas occupied the left rear seat; Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales were on the right rear seat.

• The Mechanical Failure and U-Turn: Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney detached while it was running on the eastern lane, its right of way. Driver Manalo stepped on the brake, causing the jeepney to execute a sudden U-turn. It invaded and eventually stopped on the western lane, facing south instead of north, and blocking the greater portion of the western lane.

• The Collision: Almost immediately after the jeepney encroached on the western lane — or after stopping for a couple of minutes per the jeepney owner's version — Bus No. 753 of Philippine Rabbit, driven by Tomas delos Reyes and approaching from the north, bumped the right rear portion of the jeepney from behind. The point of impact was on the western lane, about three feet from the center line and two meters from the western edge of the pavement.

• Physical Evidence: Police investigators Tacpal and Cacalda prepared a sketch (Exhibit "K") showing skid marks of the jeepney: a straight mark approximately 35 meters long on the eastern shoulder, then a mark at a sharp angle of about 15 meters crossing the eastern lane to the point of impact on the western lane. No skid marks from the bus were found. The road was straight, six meters wide, with unobstructed visibility for 200 meters north and south. Weather was fair.

• Resulting Injuries and Deaths: Three jeepney passengers — Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales, and Adelaida Estomo — died from severe injuries including skull fractures, rib fractures, internal hemorrhage, and ruptured spleen. Caridad Pascua sustained lacerations, hematoma, and multiple abrasions.

• Prior Criminal Proceedings: A criminal complaint for Multiple Homicide was filed against both drivers. Probable cause was found against Manalo; his case was elevated to the Court of First Instance, where he was convicted and served sentence without appeal. The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

• Civil Complaints Filed: Three separate civil complaints were consolidated. In Civil Case No. 1136, spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua, and Caridad Pascua sued for her own injuries. In Civil Case No. 1139, spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda Meriales. In Civil Case No. 1140, spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento sued as heirs of Adelaida Estomo. All complaints impleaded spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit, and delos Reyes. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer, was impleaded only in Civil Case No. 1136.

• Trial Court Findings: The trial court found Manalo negligent based on: (1) unrebutted testimony that passengers had warned him to slow down but were ignored; (2) the police sketch showing the jeepney's tracks from the eastern shoulder to the western lane; (3) skid marks described as scratches from the jeepney's undercarriage after wheel detachment; (4) Manalo's conviction for multiple homicide through reckless imprudence; and (5) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court absolved delos Reyes after finding he had insufficient time and space to avoid the collision, and that he did attempt to swerve right.

• Appellate Court Findings: The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed, applying the last clear chance doctrine, the presumption that a vehicle bumping from behind is at fault, and the substantial factor test. It calculated the bus's speed at 80-90 kilometers per hour and concluded delos Reyes failed to exercise due care to avoid the accident.

• Misapplication of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Petitioner argued that the last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable to a suit by passengers against their carrier for breach of contract of carriage, relying on Anuran, et al. v. Buño, et al. The carrier's contractual obligation is independent of any negligence by a third party.

• Misappreciation of the Presumption Against the Rear-Ending Vehicle: Petitioner contended that the appellate court erred in applying the presumption that a driver who bumps the rear of another vehicle is negligent, because the jeepney's abrupt U-turn rebutted that presumption.

• Incorrect Application of the Substantial Factor Test: Petitioner maintained that the bus driver's conduct was not a substantial factor in causing the harm; the proximate cause was the detached wheel and the jeepney's sudden U-turn, which left the bus driver with insufficient time and no viable evasive options.

• Applicability of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Private respondents supported the appellate court's application of the doctrine, asserting that delos Reyes had the last opportunity to avoid the collision and failed to exercise reasonable care.

• Speed and Failure to Avoid Collision: Private respondents argued that the bus was traveling at an excessive speed (80-90 kph) and that delos Reyes made no effort to swerve left or right to avoid the jeepney, making his negligence a substantial factor in causing the deaths and injuries.

• Presumption of Negligence on the Rear Bumper: Private respondents relied on the rule that a vehicle hitting another from behind is presumed negligent, and maintained that the presumption was not adequately rebutted by evidence of the U-turn.

• Last Clear Chance: Whether the last clear chance doctrine applies to a passenger's action for breach of contract of carriage against the common carrier, thereby exempting the carrier from liability when another tortfeasor had the final opportunity to avoid the harm.

• Negligence and Proximate Cause: Whether the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the jeepney driver and owners, or the negligence of the bus driver.

• Solidary Liability of Driver and Carrier: Whether the jeepney driver may be held jointly and severally liable with the jeepney owners for breach of the contract of carriage.

• Amount of Indemnity: Whether the indemnity awarded for loss of life should be increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Last Clear Chance: The last clear chance doctrine was inapplicable. The doctrine arises only in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not govern where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce contractual obligations. It would be inequitable to exempt the negligent jeepney driver and its owners on the ground that another driver was likewise negligent, as established in Anuran, et al. v. Buño, et al.

• Negligence and Proximate Cause: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. The trial court's findings — unrebutted testimony that the jeepney was running fast after being warned, the police sketch showing an abrupt U-turn, and Manalo's criminal conviction — were supported by substantial evidence. The presumption that the rear-ending driver is at fault was rebutted by the abruptness of the jeepney's U-turn. The bus driver had at most 3.24 seconds to react, and swerving right to the narrow, grassy shoulder or left back into the jeepney's path were not reasonable options. Under Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the New Civil Code, a common carrier is presumed negligent upon the death or injury of a passenger; this presumption was not overcome by proof of extraordinary diligence or fortuitous event.

• Solidary liability excluded: The jeepney driver (Manalo) could not be held jointly and severally liable with the jeepney owners. The contract of carriage is exclusively between the carrier and the passenger; the carrier bears sole contractual responsibility even if the breach results from the driver's negligence. Article 2181 of the New Civil Code provides that an employer who pays for damage caused by an employee may recover from that employee, contradicting the notion of solidary liability. The carrier's liability under Article 1759 is direct and primary, not merely vicarious.

• Amount of Indemnity: Under Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code, as interpreted by prevailing jurisprudence, the indemnity for loss of life was increased from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00 for each deceased passenger.

• Last Clear Chance Inapplicable to Breach of Contract of Carriage — The last clear chance doctrine applies only in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, because it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent carrier on the ground that another driver was likewise negligent. (Reiterating Anuran, et al. v. Buño, et al., 17 SCRA 224.)

• Presumption of Negligence in Breach of Contract of Carriage — In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier observed extraordinary diligence prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the New Civil Code, or that the death or injury was due to a fortuitous event. (Citing Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657.)

• Carrier's Liability Exclusive and Direct; No Solidary Liability with Driver — The contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger. In the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible to the passenger, even if the breach is due to the driver's negligence. The carrier can neither shift its liability to the driver nor share it with him, because the driver's negligence is the carrier's own. Holding the driver solidarily liable would render the carrier's liability personal rather than vicarious, contradicting Article 2181 of the New Civil Code, which gives the employer a right of reimbursement against the negligent employee. (Citing Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, 16 SCRA 742.)

• Mechanical Defect Not a Caso Fortuito — An accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that avoids the carrier's liability for damages. (Citing Son v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892.)

• "The principle about 'the last clear chance,' would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." — This passage directly states the ratio decidendi distinguishing contractual from quasi-delictual liability and negates the appellate court's primary basis for reversal.

• "In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event." — This excerpt encapsulates the burden-shifting framework governing breach of contract of carriage.

• "The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver." — This passage defines the exclusive nature of the carrier's contractual liability and the non-solidary character of the driver's obligation vis-à-vis the passenger.

• Anuran, et al. v. Buño, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 224 — Followed. In that case, an improperly parked jeepney was bumped by a speeding truck; the Supreme Court held both drivers and owners solidarity liable and rejected the appellate court's application of the last clear chance doctrine to exonerate the jeepney owners. The ruling was applied here to preclude the use of the last clear chance doctrine in a passenger's contract action.

• Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657 — Followed. Established the presumption of carrier negligence upon passenger death or injury, which may be overcome only by proof of extraordinary diligence or fortuitous event.

• Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742 — Followed. Held that the carrier is exclusively responsible to the passenger for breach of contract of carriage, even if the breach is due to the driver's negligence; the driver is not solidarily liable with the carrier.

• Son v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 — Followed. An accident caused by defects in the automobile or through the driver's negligence is not a caso fortuito.

• Heirs of Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 51165, June 21, 1990 — Followed for the proposition that the indemnity for loss of life should be increased to P30,000.00.

• Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756, New Civil Code — These articles establish the standard of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers. Article 1733 mandates extraordinary diligence for passenger safety. Article 1755 requires carrying passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons." Article 1756 creates a presumption of fault or negligence upon the death or injury of a passenger. The Court applied all three to find that the jeepney owners failed to overcome the presumption.

• Article 1759, New Civil Code — Declares that common carriers are liable for death or injuries to passengers through the negligence of their employees, and this liability does not cease upon proof of diligence in selection and supervision. This supported the carrier's direct and exclusive liability.

• Article 2181, New Civil Code — Provides that whoever pays for damage caused by dependents or employees may recover from the latter. The Court relied on this to rule out solidary liability between carrier and driver, as the employer's right of reimbursement is inconsistent with joint and several obligation.

• Article 1217, New Civil Code — Governs solidary obligations and the right of reimbursement among solidary debtors. The Court cited this to show that making the driver solidarily liable would improperly convert the carrier's vicarious liability into personal liability, contradicting Article 2181.

• Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206, New Civil Code — Article 1764 applies Article 2206 to the death of a passenger. Article 2206 fixes the minimum indemnity for death at P3,000.00. The Court applied prevailing jurisprudence to increase this to P30,000.00.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concurred.