Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Hon. Jesus B. Mupas

A judge commits gross ignorance of the law when he issues temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction without finding the applicant's clear and unmistakable legal right and the other requisites, takes cognizance of a petition for certiorari prohibited by Section 19(g) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, or enjoins an act already accomplished; multiple counts under Rule 140 warrant separate penalties, and prior infractions may justify dismissal from service.

Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, owns the 12.9-hectare Financial Center Area (FCA) in Pasay City, parts of which it leased to entities including Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) and John Richard Real, doing business as Jecar Enterprises (Jecar). The leases expired on May 31, 2018, and PNCC elected not to renew them. The ensuing dispute implicated the Rules on Summary Procedure, particularly the prohibition in Section 19(g) on petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders, and the requisites for temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. Judge Jesus B. Mupas, Presiding Judge of Branch 112, RTC Pasay City, had previously been penalized or admonished in Mina vs. Judge Mupas, Giganto vs. Judge Mupas, and Yu vs. Judge Mupas.

Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, owns the Financial Center Area (FCA), a 12.9-hectare property located at Macapagal Boulevard, Pasay City. Parts of the FCA were leased to different entities, including Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) and John Richard Real, doing business under the name and style of Jecar Enterprises (Jecar). When the lease contracts covering the FCA expired on May 31, 2018, PNCC decided not to renew them. Several lessees, including LCDC and Jecar, refused to vacate the property, prompting PNCC to file separate ejectment cases against them.

PNCC's unlawful detainer case against Jecar, docketed as Civil Case No. M-PSY-19-00813-CV, was raffled to Branch 46 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City under Judge Rechie N. Ramos-Malabanan. On August 27, 2019, Judge Ramos-Malabanan rendered an Order directing the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Jecar. Under the said writ, Jecar was enjoined to restore in favor of PNCC the possession of the portion of the FCA that it was leasing. As evidenced by a Certificate of Delivery of Premises dated September 17, 2019, PNCC was able to take possession of the same.

Seeking the annulment of the MTC's Order granting the writ, Jecar filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV. On September 17, 2019, Judge Mupas issued an Order granting Jecar's prayer for a TRO to enjoin the MTC's implementation of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Judge Mupas likewise set a hearing for Jecar's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Aggrieved, PNCC was constrained to report Judge Mupas' actions to the Court.

PNCC argued that Judge Mupas enjoined an act that had already been accomplished and that, in taking cognizance of Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV, he directly contravened Section 19(g) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, such that Jecar's petition should not have been given due course. PNCC also found it suspicious that, upon the filing of its Position Paper on the propriety of the TRO before the RTC at 4:00 p.m. of September 17, 2019, Judge Mupas was able to cause the service of the TRO to PNCC at 5:00 p.m. of the very same day. PNCC further pointed to Judge Mupas' similar actions in Civil Case No. R-PSY-18-3000-CV, entitled "Ley Construction and Development Corporation vs. Philippine National Construction Corporation," for Injunction/Damages, where Judge Mupas issued a TRO and a WPI to enjoin PNCC from carrying out its demand, contained in a letter dated April 26, 2018, for LCDC to vacate the leased premises, or from taking steps to evict or cause the eviction of LCDC, or from taking possession of the leased premises, until further orders.

In his comment dated October 11, 2019, Judge Mupas insisted that the subject injunctive reliefs were issued in accordance with procedural rules and in the spirit of liberality. With regard to the injunctive reliefs in Civil Case No. R-PSY-18-30000-CV, he claimed that he was swayed by the employees who would lose their jobs if PNCC was allowed to evict its lessees, and he mentioned PNCC's participation in mediation proceedings which, in his view, meant that the parties were open to an amicable settlement. As to Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV, Judge Mupas admitted that a petition for certiorari is indeed not allowed under the Rules on Summary Procedure, but he defended himself by invoking the liberal application of the rules of procedure and affording the parties the opportunity to be heard; he further claimed that he was not informed by the parties that the action sought to be enjoined by LCDC had already been rendered moot, and that he had no hand in the service of the TRO to LCDC. The Office of the Court Administrator found no irregularity in the timing of the service of the TRO on September 17, 2019, considering the inherent probability of having a TRO issued and served within the span of one hour because of the court a quo's close proximity to the FCA.

• Injunctive Reliefs Enjoined Accomplished Acts: PNCC argued that Judge Mupas enjoined an act that had already been accomplished.
• Violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure: PNCC maintained that, in taking cognizance of Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV, Judge Mupas directly contravened Section 19(g) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, and that Jecar's petition should not have been given due course.
• Suspicious Timing of TRO Service: PNCC found it suspicious that, upon the filing of its Position Paper on the propriety of the TRO before the RTC at 4:00 p.m. of September 17, 2019, Judge Mupas was able to cause the service of the TRO to PNCC at 5:00 p.m. of the very same day.
• Similar Irregular Actions in the LCDC Case: PNCC pointed the Court's attention to Judge Mupas' similar actions in Civil Case No. R-PSY-18-3000-CV, where he issued a TRO and a WPI to enjoin PNCC from carrying out and implementing its demand for LCDC to vacate the leased premises, or from taking steps to evict or cause the eviction of LCDC, or from taking possession of the leased premises, until further orders.

• Compliance with Procedural Rules and Liberality: Judge Mupas insisted that the subject injunctive reliefs were issued in accordance with procedural rules and in the spirit of liberality.
• Equities in the LCDC Case: With regard to the injunctive reliefs in Civil Case No. R-PSY-18-30000-CV, Judge Mupas claimed that he was swayed by the employees who would lose their jobs if PNCC was allowed to evict its lessees, and he mentioned PNCC's participation in mediation proceedings which, in his view, meant that the parties were open to an amicable settlement.
• Admission and Defense in the Jecar Case: As to Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV, Judge Mupas admitted that a petition for certiorari is indeed not allowed under the Rules on Summary Procedure, but he defended himself by invoking the liberal application of the rules of procedure and affording the parties the opportunity to be heard; he further claimed that he was not informed by the parties that the action sought to be enjoined by LCDC had already been rendered moot, and that he had no hand in the service of the TRO to LCDC.

• First Count — TRO in Civil Case No. R-PSY-18-3000-CV: Whether Judge Mupas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TRO in favor of LCDC without legal basis and without finding a clear and unmistakable right to be protected.
• Second Count — Cognizance of Certiorari Petition: Whether Judge Mupas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV despite Section 19(g) of the Rules on Summary Procedure prohibiting petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders.
• Third Count — TRO in Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV: Whether Judge Mupas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TRO in favor of Jecar to enjoin an already accomplished act and without stating all the requisites for injunctive relief.
• Service of TRO: Whether the timing of the service of the TRO on September 17, 2019 constituted an irregularity.
• Penalty for Multiple Offenses: Whether separate penalties should be imposed for each count of gross ignorance of the law and whether dismissal from service is warranted.

• First Count — TRO in Civil Case No. R-PSY-18-3000-CV: Yes. Gross ignorance of the law was established because the TRO was issued without any legal basis and without a finding of LCDC's clear and unmistakable right, its lease having expired.
• Second Count — Cognizance of Certiorari Petition: Yes. Taking cognizance of the certiorari petition violated Section 19(g) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, which prohibits petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders.
• Third Count — TRO in Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV: Yes. The TRO was issued without stating all the requisites and to enjoin an act already accomplished, Jecar's lease having expired.
• Service of TRO: No. The OCA found no irregularity in the one-hour interval between the filing of PNCC's Position Paper and service of the TRO, given the proximity of the court to the FCA.
• Penalty for Multiple Offenses: Yes. Under Rule 140 and Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Villarosa, multiple offenses require separate penalties; the first two counts drew fines of P50,000.00 and P75,000.00, while the third warranted dismissal due to Judge Mupas' prior infractions.

• First Count — TRO in Civil Case No. R-PSY-18-3000-CV: The Court adopted the OCA's finding that Judge Mupas issued the injunctive reliefs in favor of LCDC without any legal basis. Nowhere in his orders did he mention that LCDC had a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, because LCDC's lease contract with PNCC had already expired. Although a trial court judge is given latitude of discretion, he cannot grant a TRO or a WPI if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from a prima facie evaluation of the evidence. Judge Mupas merely discussed the supposed irreparable damage or injury that might result if he did not issue the injunctive reliefs. Dr. Sunico vs. Judge Gutierrez held a judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a WPI without stating the presence of the applicant's clear legal right. Thus, the first count was established.
• Second Count — Cognizance of Certiorari Petition: Judge Mupas admitted that he took cognizance of Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV notwithstanding that a petition for certiorari is prohibited by Section 19(g) of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage. The rules on the issuance of injunctive reliefs and summary procedure are elementary to the extent that non-observance and lack of knowledge on them constitute gross ignorance of the law, especially for judges who are supposed to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the procedural rules. Thus, the second count was established.
• Third Count — TRO in Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-CV: Judge Mupas violated anew the basic tenets on the issuance of injunctive reliefs when he issued a TRO in favor of Jecar, whose contract of lease had also expired, to enjoin an act that had already been accomplished. His Order did not make a pronouncement on the presence of all the requisites for the issuance of a TRO and WPI; he merely discussed the supposed irreparable damage or injury. The requisites for injunctive relief include that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Without a clear legal right, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper. Thus, the third count was established.
• Service of TRO: The OCA found no irregularity on the part of Judge Mupas as to the timing of the service of the TRO on September 17, 2019, considering the inherent probability of having a TRO issued and served to PNCC within the span of one hour because of the court a quo's close proximity to the FCA. The Court fully adopted the OCA's findings and recommendations.
• Penalty for Multiple Offenses: Gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00, and suspension from office for more than three but not exceeding six months, without salary and other benefits, or dismissal from service. In Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Villarosa, the Court ruled that if the respondent judge or justice of the lower court is found guilty of multiple offenses under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each violation. For the first two counts, the Court imposed fines of P50,000.00 and P75,000.00, respectively, or a total of P125,000.00. As to the third count, dismissal was warranted considering Judge Mupas' checkered past. His multiple infractions, especially when viewed together instead of as separate and isolated facts, show that he is unfit to discharge the duties and functions of a judge so as to warrant the imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service and all the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto. The Constitution requires that a member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence, and Judge Mupas failed to live up to the exacting standards of his office.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — A patent disregard of simple, elementary, and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. It is classified as a serious charge. The acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but may also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption; however, where the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Applied: Judge Mupas was held liable for issuing injunctive reliefs without the requisite clear legal right, taking cognizance of a prohibited certiorari petition, and issuing a TRO to enjoin an accomplished act.
• Requisites for Issuance of TRO/WPI — A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties before the case can be resolved on its merits, provided that: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. A judge cannot grant a TRO or a WPI if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from a prima facie evaluation of the evidence. Applied: Judge Mupas' orders did not state all the requisites and merely discussed irreparable damage.
• Prohibition Against Certiorari in Summary Procedure — Section 19(g) of the Rules on Summary Procedure prohibits petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court. Applied: Judge Mupas should not have taken cognizance of Jecar's Rule 65 petition.
• Injunction Cannot Enjoin Accomplished Act — Injunctive relief cannot be used to restrain an act already accomplished. Applied: Judge Mupas issued a TRO to enjoin the MTC's implementation of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction after PNCC had already taken possession.
• Separate Penalties for Multiple Offenses — If a judge is found guilty of multiple offenses under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each violation. Applied: the Court imposed fines for the first two counts and dismissal for the third.
• Dismissal for Gross Ignorance with Prior Infractions — Multiple infractions, viewed together, may show unfitness to discharge judicial duties and warrant dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits and perpetual disqualification from government employment. Applied: Judge Mupas' prior disciplinary record supported the extreme penalty.
• Judicial Competence Standard — A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence; judges must exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Applied: Judge Mupas failed to live up to the exacting standards of his office.

• "A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law." — This states the canonical standard for gross ignorance of the law applied to Judge Mupas' violations.
• "When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law." — This articulates the ratio for holding a judge liable for ignorance of elementary rules.
• "A cursory perusal of the reasons advanced by Judge Mupas show that nowhere in any of the foregoing Orders did he make a pronouncement on the presence of all of the requisites for the issuance of a TRO and WPI." — This applies the requisites rule to the assailed orders.
• "For the first two counts of gross ignorance of the law, the Court hereby imposes against Judge Mupas a fine in the amount of P50,000.00 and P75,000.00, respectively, or a total of P125,000.00." — This states the penalty for the first two counts.

• Enriquez vs. Judge Caminade, 519 Phil. 781 (2006) — Cited for the rule that judges must exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws; lack of conversance with a basic legal principle constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
• Department of Justice vs. Judge Mislang, 791 Phil. 219 (2016) — Elaborated gross ignorance of the law as disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence; also cited for the penalty for gross ignorance as a serious charge.
• Dr. Sunico vs. Judge Gutierrez, 806 Phil. 94 (2017) — Controlling precedent finding a judge guilty of gross ignorance for issuing a WPI without stating the presence of the applicant's clear legal right; relied on for the first count.
• Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Villarosa, A.M. No. RTJ-20-2578, January 28, 2020 — Held that if a judge is found guilty of multiple offenses under Rule 140, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each violation; applied in imposing separate fines and dismissal.
• Mina vs. Judge Mupas, 578 Phil. 41 (2008) — Prior disciplinary case where Judge Mupas was found guilty of undue delay in rendering an order and fined P10,000.00; considered in imposing dismissal.
• Giganto vs. Judge Mupas, A.M. No. RTC-15-2430, July 20, 2015 — Prior case where Judge Mupas was admonished to be mindful of his actions so as to avoid the appearance of impropriety; considered in imposing dismissal.
• Yu vs. Judge Mupas, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2491, July 4, 2018, 870 SCRA 391 — Prior case where Judge Mupas was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and fined P35,000.00; considered in imposing dismissal.
• Felongco vs. Judge Dictado, 295 Phil. 767 (1993) — Cited for the principle that multiple infractions, viewed together, may show unfitness and warrant dismissal from service.

• Section 19(g), Rules on Summary Procedure — Prohibits petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court. Applied: Judge Mupas violated it by taking cognizance of Jecar's Rule 65 petition.
• Rule 58, Rules of Court — A preliminary injunctive writ issues only upon a showing of the applicant's clear legal right; the requisites include material and substantial invasion, clear and unmistakable right, and urgent and paramount necessity. Applied: Judge Mupas' orders lacked findings on these requisites.
• Rule 140, Rules of Court — Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00, and suspension from office for more than three but not exceeding six months, without salary and other benefits, or dismissal from service; multiple offenses require separate penalties. Applied: the Court imposed fines and dismissal.
• Article VIII, Section 7(3), 1987 Constitution — A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. Applied: Judge Mupas failed to meet this standard.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, Hernando, Carandang, Lopez, Delos Santos, Gaerlan, and Rosario, JJ., concur. Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., on official leave.