Philippine Geothermal, Inc. vs. NLRC

An employee who, after uniform medical clearance of fitness to work, incurs prolonged unauthorized absences despite repeated warnings may be validly dismissed for gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282(b) of the Labor Code, although equitable separation pay of one-half month salary for every year of service may still be awarded.

Philippine Geothermal, Inc. employed Edilberto M. Alvarez beginning 2 July 1979, later as Steam Test Operator II in its Well Testing Section. The employment was governed by the Labor Code provisions on termination for just cause and by company rules providing that employees incurring unauthorized absences of six or more days are subject to dismissal. Alvarez subsequently sustained a work-connected right-wrist injury that triggered extended paid leaves, medical referrals at company expense, and successive fitness certifications.

Edilberto M. Alvarez was first employed by Philippine Geothermal, Inc. on 2 July 1979 and was serving as Steam Test Operator II when, on 31 May 1989, a steam-pressured chicksan swivel joint assembly exploded while he was checking a geothermal well. His right arm was placed in a plaster cast and he was confined at San Pablo Doctor's Hospital from 31 May to 3 June 1989. Attending physician Dr. Oscar M. Brion diagnosed complete fracture/dislocation of the distal radius, complete fracture of the styloid process with dislocation of the ulna, and right pelvic contusion, requiring about forty-five days recuperation. Petitioner granted a fifty-day work-connected accident leave with pay until 29 July 1989 and, at its expense, referred Alvarez to Dr. Liberato A.C. Leagogo, Jr. of the Philippine Orthopedic Institute.

On 26 July 1989 Dr. Leagogo certified Alvarez fit to return to work for light work only, so that when Alvarez reported on 31 July 1989 he was assigned to calibration of barton recorders. On 13 November 1989 Dr. Leagogo certified that, five months post-injury, Alvarez could be given moderate working activities involving pulling, pushing, carrying and turning 20 to 25 lbs., and that on the sixth month he could return to his previous job. Despite this, Alvarez continued to absent himself, and by the end of 1989 he had used ten days vacation leave, eighteen days sick leave, fifteen days WCA leave and four days emergency leave for the period starting 31 July 1989. On 28 December 1989 Dr. Leagogo certified the injury completely healed and that Alvarez could return to pre-injury work, a conclusion confirmed the same day by Dr. Angela D.V. Garcia, who found no contraindications to attending work.

Thereafter petitioner wrote Alvarez on 29 December 1989 directing immediate return to regular duty as Operator II and warning that future absences would be subject to existing leave policy. When Alvarez failed to report from 2 to 10 January 1990, petitioner wrote again on 11 January 1990 placing him on absent without official leave and without pay status and warning of further disciplinary action; Alvarez merely handwrote on the company copy, Please wait for my doctor's medical certificate from Dr. Relampagos. Successive consultations produced the same result: on 19 January 1990 Dr. Victoria Pineda of the National Orthopedic Hospital certified limitations of right wrist motion but fit for work; on 1 February 1990 Dr. Relampagos certified him fit for light job; and on 6 February 1990 Dr. Francisco, after interpreting St. Luke's Medical Center tests, certified no hindrance to office work. Alvarez nevertheless did not report for work in January and February 1990.

On 7 February 1990 petitioner notified Alvarez that the certificates of Drs. Garcia, Pineda, Relampagos, Francisco and Leagogo all indicated fitness to work, that absences from 11 January to 6 February 1990 would be charged to sick leave, and that such credits would be exhausted on 8 February 1990. When Alvarez was then absent from 8 to 28 February 1990, a total of eighteen working days, petitioner issued a fourth letter noting recovery as certified by four physicians, noting exhaustion of sick leaves as of 7 February 1990, reminding him that six or more days of unauthorized absence warranted dismissal, and giving a final warning to report on Monday, 5 March 1990 or face termination. Alvarez neither reported nor explained his continued absences, and petitioner terminated his employment on 9 March 1990. The record showed that from August to December 1989 he had reported only seventy-seven times while incurring forty-seven absences, and the labor arbiter upheld the dismissal as valid while the NLRC ordered reinstatement without backwages.

• Timeliness of Appeal to the NLRC: Petitioner argued that respondent Commission abused its discretion and acted beyond jurisdiction by entertaining an appeal filed out of time, contending that private respondent received the labor arbiter's decision on 5 September 1991 and filed the appeal only on 20 September 1991, beyond the ten-day reglementary period ending 16 September 1991, and that the appeal fee was likewise paid four days late.
• Validity of Dismissal on the Merits: Petitioner maintained that even on the merits the termination of Alvarez was valid and justified, as overwhelming uniform medical evidence showed fitness to work while Alvarez incurred prolonged unexplained and unauthorized absences in violation of company policy and Article 282 of the Labor Code.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Whether the appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC was filed within the ten-day reglementary period and whether late payment of the appeal fee warranted dismissal of the appeal.
• Validity of Dismissal: Whether Edilberto M. Alvarez was validly dismissed for gross and habitual neglect of duties based on prolonged unauthorized absences despite medical certifications of fitness to work.

• Timeliness of Appeal: No abuse of discretion. The NLRC's factual finding that the appeal was filed by registered mail on 16 September 1991 was left undisturbed, and late payment of the appeal fee did not warrant dismissal in light of the broader interest of justice.
• Validity of Dismissal: Yes. The dismissal was valid and justified, Alvarez having been guilty of seriously neglecting his duties through prolonged unauthorized absences after uniform medical clearance, in violation of company policy and Article 282(b) of the Labor Code.

• Timeliness of Appeal: The ten-day period from receipt on 5 September 1991 expired on Sunday, 15 September 1991, so filing was due on the next business day, 16 September 1991. The NLRC found as fact that the appeal was filed by registered mail on that date with copies furnished to petitioner's counsel the same day, a factual finding not to be disturbed. As to the four-day delay in paying the appeal fee, dismissal was not required because the broader interest of justice and the objective of deciding the case on the merits demanded that the appeal be given due course.
• Validity of Dismissal: As early as 26 July 1989 Alvarez was certified fit for light work, on 13 November 1989 fit for moderate work with return to pre-injury duties by December 1989, and on 28 December 1989 completely healed, with four other physicians likewise certifying fitness for work or office work. Notwithstanding these certifications, Alvarez incurred forty-seven absences from August to December 1989 and was absent without official leave for eighteen working days from 8 to 28 February 1990 after exhaustion of sick leaves. The employer had shown sympathy by granting fifty days paid WCA leave plus additional WCA leave and by issuing four warnings culminating in a final deadline of 5 March 1990, which Alvarez ignored without explanation. Such conduct constituted serious neglect of duties and violation of the known six-day company rule, justifying termination, though equitable separation pay was deemed adequate.

• Gross and habitual neglect as just cause for dismissal — An employer may validly dismiss an employee for gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282(b) of the Labor Code. The doctrine was applied where the employee, despite repeated medical clearances of fitness and repeated warnings, incurred prolonged unexplained absences, including eighteen consecutive working days of absence without official leave.
• Liberal construction of procedural rules in labor appeals — The broader interest of justice and the desired objective of deciding the case on the merits demand that an appeal be given due course despite minor delay in payment of the appeal fee. The doctrine was applied to reject dismissal of the NLRC appeal based on a four-day delay in fee payment.
• Balanced protection of labor and management — While the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor to balance inherent economic inequality, it does not authorize oppression or self-destruction of the employer nor compel retention of an employee shown to be a gross liability. The doctrine was applied to sustain dismissal despite compassion for loss of livelihood, tempered by an award of separation pay.
• Equitable separation pay despite valid dismissal — Separation pay of one-half month salary for every year of service may be awarded as equitable relief to an employee terminated for unauthorized absences even where dismissal is valid, following Cando vs. National Labor Relations Commission. The doctrine was applied to grant such pay from 2 July 1979 until dismissal on 9 March 1990.

• "the broader interest of justice and the desired objective of deciding the case on the merits demand that the appeal be given due course." — States the liberal labor-appeals rule relied upon to excuse the four-day delay in payment of the appeal fee.
• "While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the disposition of casses involving termination of employment since it affects one's source or means of livelihood, it should not be overlooked that the benefits accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain the services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. The law in protecting the rights of the employees authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." — Articulates the limit of pro-labor compassion and the ratio for sustaining dismissal for gross neglect.
• "Justitia nemini neganda est (Justice is to be denied to none)." — Caps the discussion that tilting the scale too far for labor at the expense of the employer results in injustice.

• C.W. Tan Manufacturing vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 79596, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 240 — Followed as authority that broader interest of justice requires giving due course to a labor appeal despite procedural delay in appeal fee payment.
• Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Alonzo, G.R. No. 78090, 26 July 1991, 199 SCRA 617 — Cited to support the principle that labor protection does not compel retention of an employee shown to be a gross liability and does not authorize oppression or self-destruction of the employer.
• Cando vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 91344, 14 September 1990, 189 SCRA 666 — Followed as basis for awarding separation pay of one-half month salary for every year of service to an employee terminated for unauthorized absences.

• Article 282(b), Labor Code — Provides that an employer may validly dismiss an employee for gross and habitual neglect of duties. Applied to sustain dismissal where the employee incurred forty-seven absences from August to December 1989 and eighteen days of absence without official leave from 8 to 28 February 1990 despite uniform fitness certifications.
• Company policy on unauthorized absences — Provides that employees incurring unauthorized absences of six days or more are subject to dismissal. Applied together with Article 282 to justify termination after eighteen working days of unauthorized absence and disregard of a final warning to report on 5 March 1990.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concurred. Mendoza, J., took no part.