Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude Carantes, et al.

A Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim confers upon its holder no vested right of ownership and no right to build permanent structures on the land, such that structures erected within an economic zone without a building and fencing permit issued by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority may be ordered demolished by the Authority. PEZA, through its building officials, has exclusive authority under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1716 to issue building permits within zones and areas it owns or administers, and through its Director General may require the removal of structures built without such permits under Section 14(i) of Republic Act No. 7916.

The Philippine Economic Zone Authority is the government agency into which the Export Processing Zone Authority created under Presidential Decree No. 66 evolved, pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916 and Executive Order No. 282 issued on October 30, 1995. Proclamation No. 1825 reserved a certain parcel of the public domain situated in Baguio City for export processing zone purposes, and the Baguio City Economic Zone is among the zones owned or administered by the Authority. Presidential Decree No. 1716, which amended Presidential Decree No. 66, vested in the Authority's Administrator the administration and enforcement of the National Building Code of the Philippines in all zones and areas owned or administered by the Authority, while Republic Act No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, governs ancestral land claims and defines ancestral lands. The dispute concerns the intersection of these regimes over a parcel within the Baguio City Economic Zone claimed by private parties under an ancestral land claim.

Respondents Joseph Jude Carantes, Rose Carantes, and the other heirs of Maximino Carantes were in possession of a 30,368-square meter parcel of land located along Loakan Road, Baguio City. On June 20, 1997, they obtained Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim No. CAR-CALC-022 over the land from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. On the strength of that CALC, respondents secured a building permit and a fencing permit from the Building Official of Baguio City, Teodoro G. Barrozo. They thereupon fenced the premises and began constructing a residential building thereon.

Respondents subsequently received a letter dated February 9, 1999 from Digna D. Torres, the Zone Administrator of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority, informing them that the house they had built had overlapped PEZA's territorial boundary. Torres advised respondents to demolish the structure within sixty days from notice, failing which PEZA would undertake the demolition at respondents' expense.

Without answering PEZA's letter, respondents filed a petition for injunction, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. On April 8, 1999, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PEZA to cease and desist from threatening respondents with demolition before their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction could be heard. On September 19, 2001, the trial court likewise issued an Order directing the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the case.

On October 2, 2001, the trial court granted respondents' petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of injunction enjoining PEZA, its agents, representatives, or anyone acting in its behalf from dispossessing, notifying, or disturbing in any manner the peaceful possession and occupation of the land by respondents. The trial court premised its ruling on the position that respondents were entitled to possess, occupy, and cultivate the subject lots on the basis of their CALC, reasoning that by the very definition of ancestral land under Republic Act No. 8371, the lots had been segregated from the lands of the public domain and that respondents' rights therein were already vested and could not be disturbed by Proclamation No. 1825, which had included the land within the export processing zone of Baguio City. PEZA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling and likewise declared that the subject lots had been set aside from the lands of the public domain.

• Exclusive Authority to Issue Permits: Petitioner claimed exclusive authority to issue building and fencing permits within ecozones under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1716, which amended Presidential Decree No. 66, maintaining that the function of administering and enforcing the National Building Code within areas owned and administered by it pertains to PEZA rather than to the local Building Official of Baguio City.
• Concurrent Authority to Order Demolition: Petitioner asserted concurrent authority to require owners of structures built without permits to remove or demolish such structures under Section 14(i) of Republic Act No. 7916, which authorizes the Director General to require removal or demolition of structures constructed without the necessary permit whether on public or private lands.
• Excusable Delay in Filing: The Office of the Solicitor General attributed the delay in appealing the Court of Appeals decision to the inadvertence of Senior State Solicitor Rodolfo Geronimo M. Pineda, the temporarily-designated officer-in-charge of Division XV, who merely noted receipt of the adverse decision without noticing its adverse character after State Solicitor Maricar S.A. Prudon-Sison went on maternity leave, and to the sparse complement of three lawyers then assigned to the division.

• Reliance on the CALC: Respondents relied on CAR-CALC-022 as the source of their right to fence the lots and build a house thereon.
• Locus of Permit-Issuing Authority: Respondents insisted that the function of issuing building and fencing permits, even within the Baguio City Economic Zone, pertains to the Office of the City Mayor and the Building Official of Baguio City, respectively.
• Late Filing of the Petition: Respondents assailed the petition for having been filed only after almost three months from petitioner's receipt of the Court of Appeals decision.

• Timeliness of the Petition: Whether the petition for review on certiorari may be given due course notwithstanding its filing almost three months after receipt of the assailed Court of Appeals decision.
• Authority to Issue Building and Fencing Permits: Whether it is PEZA or the City Engineer of Baguio City who has the legal authority to issue building and fencing permits for constructions within the PEZA-Baguio City Economic Zone.
• Sufficiency of the CALC: Whether respondents' Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim is sufficient to disregard the provisions of the National Building Code of the Philippines.
• Propriety of the Demolition Demand and of Injunctive Relief: Whether petitioner may require respondents to demolish the structures they had built within the territory of the PEZA-Baguio City Economic Zone.

• Timeliness of the Petition: No, the petition was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period under Rule 45, but the lapse was overlooked in the interest of substantial justice, a departure from the rule binding a party to counsel's mistakes being warranted where the mistake would result in serious injustice and where allowing the assailed decision to stand would sanction a violation of substantive law.
• Authority to Issue Building and Fencing Permits: PEZA. Under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1716, the administration and enforcement of the National Building Code in all zones and areas owned or administered by the Authority is vested in its Administrator or duly authorized representative, who appoints Building Officials charged with issuing building permits in the different zones.
• Sufficiency of the CALC: No. A CALC confers no greater rights than those enumerated in Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article VII of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1993, which limits the claimant to peaceful occupation and cultivation and does not include the right to build permanent structures.
• Propriety of the Demolition Demand and of Injunctive Relief: Yes as to the demolition demand; the injunction was improperly issued. PEZA acted well within its functions under Section 14(i) of Republic Act No. 7916 when it demanded demolition, and respondents failed to establish the second requisite of injunction — that the acts sought to be enjoined violate a right of theirs.

• Timeliness of the Petition: An appeal must be perfected within the reglementary period provided by law, failing which the decision becomes final and executory; a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must be filed within fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from, and review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. The Docket Division of the OSG received a copy of the Court of Appeals decision on November 7, 2007, yet the petition was filed only on February 1, 2008, almost three months later. While the Court recognized the OSG's difficulty in having only three lawyers working full time on its cases, the OSG could easily have asked for an extension of time, and as the government agency tasked to represent the government in litigations it should perform its duty with promptness and utmost diligence. Nonetheless, although a party is bound by the acts of its counsel, including the latter's mistakes and negligence, a departure from that rule is warranted where the mistake or neglect would result in serious injustice to the client, and procedural rules may be relaxed for persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. The Court was inclined to overlook the procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice, more so because allowing the assailed decision to go unchecked would set a precedent sanctioning a violation of substantive law.
• Authority to Issue Building and Fencing Permits: Section 205 of Presidential Decree No. 1096 provides that, except as otherwise provided therein, the Building Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Code and enforcing orders and decisions made pursuant thereto, and that due to the exigencies of the service the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers to act as Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction. The position of Building Official is a regular item in the organizational structure of the local government, and only in case of urgent necessity may the Secretary of Public Works designate the incumbent District Engineer, Municipal Engineer or City Engineer. This was the applicable law even for areas covered by the Export Processing Zone Authority until Presidential Decree No. 1716 was enacted on August 21, 1980. Presidential Decree No. 1716 further amended Presidential Decree No. 66, the law creating the EPZA, by creating the PEZA; Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916 provides that the existing EPZA created under Presidential Decree No. 66 shall evolve into and be referred to as the PEZA in accordance with guidelines and regulations set forth in an executive order issued for the purpose. Thus, on October 30, 1995, Executive Order No. 282 was enacted, and under Section 1 thereof all the powers, functions and responsibilities of EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66, as amended, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the powers, functions and responsibilities of PEZA under Republic Act No. 7916, shall be assumed and exercised by PEZA. Among such powers is the administration and enforcement of the National Building Code in all zones and areas owned or administered by EPZA, as expressly provided in Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1716, which function has not been repealed and does not appear inconsistent with any of the powers and functions of PEZA under Republic Act No. 7916, and therefore subsists. Complimentary thereto, Section 14(i) of Republic Act No. 7916 empowers the Director General to require owners of houses, buildings or other structures constructed without the necessary permit, whether on public or private lands, to remove or demolish such structures within sixty days after notice, and upon failure of the owner to do so, the Director General or his authorized representative may summarily cause its removal or demolition at the expense of the owner, any existing law, decree, executive order and other issuances or part thereof to the contrary notwithstanding. By specific provision of law, it is PEZA, through its building officials, which has authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands, and corollary thereto PEZA, through its Director General, may require owners of structures built without said permit to remove such structures within sixty days, failing which PEZA may summarily remove them at the owner's expense. As regards fencing permits on ancestral lands, particularly within Baguio City and the rest of the Cordilleras, Section 12 of DENR Circular No. 03-90 provides that as soon as an ancestral land claim is found valid and in meritorious cases, the Special Task Force may recommend to the City/Municipal Mayor's Office the issuance of a fencing permit to the applicant over areas actually occupied at the time of filing. That is the general rule. Considering, however, that in this case a fencing permit is issued complementary to a building permit and that within the premises of PEZA it is the Authority that may properly issue a building permit, it is only fitting that fencing permits be issued by the Authority.
• Sufficiency of the CALC: In the parallel case of Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Borreta, Benedicto Carantes invoked CAR-CALC-022, the same CALC invoked by respondents, to put up structures on the land subject of that case, and the Court refused to recall the writ of demolition issued by the trial court, holding that Carantes is a mere applicant for the issuance of a certificate of ownership of an ancestral land who has yet to acquire a vested right as owner thereof so as to exclude the land from the areas under PEZA. No good reason appearing to depart from that ruling, respondents were found similarly situated. As holders of a CALC, respondents possess no greater rights than those enumerated in Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article VII of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1993, namely: (1) the right to peacefully occupy and cultivate the land, and utilize the natural resources therein, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations applicable thereto; (2) the right of the heirs to succeed to the claims subject to existing rules and regulations; (3) the right to exclude from the claim any other person who does not belong to the family or clan; and (4) the right to utilize trees and other forest products inside the ancestral land subject to the rules as well as customary laws. Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is limited to occupation in relation to cultivation. Unlike Paragraph 1, Section 1, Article VII of the same DENR DAO, which expressly allows ancestral domain claimants to reside peacefully within the domain, nothing in Section 2 grants ancestral land claimants a similar right, much less the right to build permanent structures on ancestral lands — an act of ownership that pertains to one who has a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title. On this score alone, respondents' action for injunction had to fail. Even if respondents had established ownership of the land, they could not simply put up fences or build structures thereon without complying with applicable laws, rules and regulations, in particular Section 301 of Presidential Decree No. 1096, which mandates that no person, firm or corporation, including any agency or instrumentality of the government, shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish any building or structure or cause the same to be done without first obtaining a building permit from the Building Official assigned in the place where the subject building is located or the building work is to be done, and supplementary thereto a fencing permit must also be secured from the Building Official concerned before fences may be installed in the premises.
• Propriety of the Demolition Demand and of Injunctive Relief: Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction; as a main action, it seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and contained in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction. Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose; to authorize a temporary injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief; and preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse. These principles are equally relevant to actions seeking permanent injunction. At the outset, petitioner does not pose an adverse claim over the subject land, nor does it dispute that respondents hold building and fencing permits over the lots; the question is whether respondents may build structures within the Baguio City Economic Zone on the basis of their CAR-CALC-022 and the building and fencing permits issued by the City Building Official. From the foregoing disquisition, it clearly appears that respondents likewise failed to satisfy the second requisite in order that an injunction may issue, and PEZA acted well within its functions when it demanded the demolition of the structures which respondents had put up without first securing building and fencing permits from the Authority.

• Rights Conferred by a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim — A CALC is not a title. Its holder is a mere applicant for the issuance of a certificate of ownership of an ancestral land who has yet to acquire a vested right as owner thereof. The rights of a CALC holder are limited to those enumerated in Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article VII of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1993: (1) the right to peacefully occupy and cultivate the land and utilize the natural resources therein, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; (2) the right of the heirs to succeed to the claims subject to existing rules and regulations; (3) the right to exclude from the claim any other person who does not belong to the family or clan; and (4) the right to utilize trees and other forest products inside the ancestral land subject to the rules and customary laws. Notably, the right to reside peacefully within the domain is expressly granted only to ancestral domain claimants under Paragraph 1, Section 1, Article VII of the same DAO, and not to ancestral land claimants; consequently, a CALC holder has no right to build permanent structures on ancestral land, an act of ownership pertaining to one who has a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondents' injunction action had to fail on this score alone.
• PEZA's Exclusive Authority Over Building Permits Within Its Zones — Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1716 vests in the Administrator of the Authority, or his duly authorized representative, the administration and enforcement of the National Building Code of the Philippines in all zones and areas owned or administered by the Authority, and authorizes him to appoint qualified personnel to act as Building Officials charged with issuing building permits in the different zones, with all fees and dues collected accruing to the Authority. This function was not repealed by Republic Act No. 7916 and is not inconsistent with any of PEZA's powers thereunder, and was assumed by PEZA through Section 1 of Executive Order No. 282. Accordingly, it is PEZA, through its building officials, that has authority to issue building permits for structures within areas it owns or administers, whether on public or private lands.
• Director General's Power to Compel Demolition — Section 14(i) of Republic Act No. 7916 empowers the Director General to require owners of houses, buildings or other structures constructed without the necessary permit, whether on public or private lands, to remove or demolish such structures within sixty days after notice; upon the owner's failure to do so, the Director General or his authorized representative may summarily cause removal or demolition at the owner's expense, any existing law, decree, executive order and other issuances or part thereof to the contrary notwithstanding. The Court held that PEZA acted well within its functions when it demanded demolition of structures built without permits from the Authority.
• Fencing Permits as Complementary to Building Permits — Under Section 12 of DENR Circular No. 03-90, the general rule is that the Special Task Force may recommend to the City/Municipal Mayor's Office the issuance of a fencing permit to an applicant over areas actually occupied at the time of filing. Because a fencing permit is issued complementary to a building permit, however, and because within PEZA premises it is the Authority that may properly issue a building permit, fencing permits within such premises must likewise be issued by the Authority.
• Requisites of Injunction — Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. In actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose, and the complainant must make out at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief; preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse. These principles are equally relevant to actions seeking permanent injunction. Respondents failed the second requisite because PEZA's demolition demand was a lawful exercise of its functions.
• Relaxation of Procedural Rules in the Interest of Substantial Justice — Although a party is bound by the acts of its counsel, including the latter's mistakes and negligence, a departure from this rule is warranted where such mistake or neglect would result in serious injustice to the client, and procedural rules may be relaxed for persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. The Court applied this doctrine to excuse the OSG's nearly three-month delay in filing the Rule 45 petition, particularly because allowing the assailed decision to go unchecked would set a precedent sanctioning a violation of substantive law.

• "Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is limited to occupation in relation to cultivation." — This is the ratio decidendi on the nature and limits of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim, and it is the proposition for which the case is most often cited in subsequent jurisprudence on ancestral land claims.
• "By specific provision of law, it is PEZA, through its building officials, which has authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands." — This passage states the controlling rule on the locus of permit-issuing authority within economic zones, resolving the conflict between PEZA and the local Building Official of Baguio City.
• "Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right." — This is the canonical formulation of the requisites of injunction applied by the Court, drawn from City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng, and it supplies the framework under which respondents' action failed.
• "More so, when to allow the assailed decision to go unchecked would set a precedent that will sanction a violation of substantive law." — This passage articulates the justification for the Court's relaxation of the fifteen-day reglementary period under Rule 45, framing the procedural liberality as subordinate to the prevention of a substantive-law violation.

• Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Borreta, G.R. No. 142669, March 15, 2006, 484 SCRA 664 — Controlling precedent expressly followed. The Court treated the case as parallel because Benedicto Carantes therein invoked CAR-CALC-022, the same CALC invoked by respondents, and the Court had refused to recall the writ of demolition, holding that a CALC holder is a mere applicant who has yet to acquire a vested right as owner so as to exclude the land from the areas under PEZA.
• City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng, G.R. No. 180206, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 88 — Cited as the source of the two requisites of injunction applied in the case.
• Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Ruiz, No. L-33952, March 9, 1987, 148 SCRA 326 — Cited for the rule that preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, a principle the Court extended to actions seeking permanent injunction.
• TFS, Incorporated vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 166829, April 19, 2010 — Cited for the settled rule that an appeal must be perfected within the reglementary period or the decision becomes final and executory, and for the principle that procedural rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.

• Section 9, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the grant of a final injunction, providing that if after trial it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party enjoined or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction. Cited as the procedural basis for the injunction sought by respondents and as the frame for the requisites the Court applied.
• Section 301, Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines) — Mandates that no person, firm or corporation, including any agency or instrumentality of the government, shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish any building or structure without first obtaining a building permit from the Building Official assigned in the place where the subject building is located or the building work is to be done. Applied to hold that even a landowner cannot build without complying with the Code, and that a fencing permit is supplementary to a building permit.
• Section 205, Presidential Decree No. 1096 — Provides that, except as otherwise provided, the Building Official shall be responsible for carrying out the Code's provisions and enforcing orders and decisions made pursuant thereto, and that the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers to act as Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction. Construed as the general rule that yields to the special provision in Presidential Decree No. 1716 for areas owned or administered by the Authority.
• Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1716 — Vests in the Administrator or his duly authorized representative the administration and enforcement of the National Building Code in all zones and areas owned or administered by the Authority, and directs him to appoint qualified personnel to act as Building Officials charged with issuing building permits in the different zones, with all fees and dues collected accruing to the Authority. This is the principal provision sustaining PEZA's exclusive permit-issuing authority.
• Section 14(i), Republic Act No. 7916 — Empowers the Director General to require owners of houses, buildings or other structures constructed without the necessary permit, whether on public or private lands, to remove or demolish such structures within sixty days after notice, and upon failure of the owner to do so, to summarily cause removal or demolition at the owner's expense, any existing law, decree, executive order and other issuances or part thereof to the contrary notwithstanding. Applied to uphold PEZA's demolition demand.
• Section 11, Republic Act No. 7916 — Provides that the existing Export Processing Zone Authority created under Presidential Decree No. 66 shall evolve into and be referred to as the Philippine Economic Zone Authority in accordance with guidelines and regulations set forth in an executive order issued for the purpose. Cited in tracing PEZA's succession to EPZA's powers.
• Section 1, Executive Order No. 282 (October 30, 1995) — Provides that all the powers, functions and responsibilities of EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66, as amended, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the powers, functions and responsibilities of PEZA under Republic Act No. 7916, shall be assumed and exercised by PEZA. Cited as the mechanism by which PEZA acquired the National Building Code enforcement function.
• Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article VII, DENR Department Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1993 — Enumerates the rights of ancestral land claimants: the right to peacefully occupy and cultivate the land and utilize the natural resources therein subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; the right of the heirs to succeed to the claims; the right to exclude non-members of the family or clan; and the right to utilize trees and other forest products subject to the rules and customary laws. Construed as the outer limit of respondents' rights as CALC holders, notably omitting any right to build permanent structures.
• Paragraph 1, Section 1, Article VII, DENR Department Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1993 — Grants ancestral domain claimants the right to occupy, cultivate and utilize the land and all natural resources found therein, as well as to reside peacefully within the domain, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations. Cited in contrast to Section 2 to show that the right of residence was deliberately withheld from ancestral land claimants.
• Section 12, DENR Circular No. 03-90 — Provides that the Special Task Force, after evaluating reports, shall endorse valid ancestral land claims to the Secretary for the issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim, and that as soon as an ancestral land claim is found valid and in meritorious cases, it may recommend to the City/Municipal Mayor's Office the issuance of a fencing permit to the applicant over areas actually occupied at the time of filing. Applied as the general rule, subject to the exception that within PEZA premises fencing permits are issued by the Authority.
• Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) — The statute defining ancestral lands and governing ancestral land claims, relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in holding that the subject lots had been segregated from the public domain. The Court rejected that application to CALC holders.
• Proclamation No. 1825 — Reserved for export processing zone purposes a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Baguio. The trial court held it could not disturb respondents' vested rights; the Court's ruling effectively restored its operative effect over the subject land.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the Chief Justice's certification that the conclusions in the Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Conchita Carpio Morales, Associate Justice (Chairperson)
• Arturo D. Brion, Associate Justice
• Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice
• Roberto A. Abad, Associate Justice (additional member per Special Order No. 843)