Petra Vda. de Borromeo vs. Hon. Julian B. Pogoy

The Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation requirement under PD No. 1508 applies only where the parties to the dispute are "individuals" or natural persons, not where any party is a juridical person such as an intestate estate. Where the real party in interest is a juridical person, the action may be filed directly in court without referral to the Barangay Lupon.

The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo owned a building bearing the deceased's name, located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. The building was leased to petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in advance within the first five days of the month. Private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes was the administrator of the estate and a resident of Cebu City. PD No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, established a system of barangay-level settlement of disputes as a condition precedent to filing certain actions in court.

The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo owned a building at F. Ramos St., Cebu City, which was leased to petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in advance within the first five days of each month. Private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes served as administrator of the estate.

On August 28, 1982, Atty. Reyes served upon petitioner a letter demanding payment of overdue rentals for the period from March to September 1982, and thereafter demanding that she vacate the premises. When petitioner failed to comply, Atty. Reyes instituted an ejectment case against her on September 16, 1982, in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City, docketed as Civil Case No. R-23915.

On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground of want of jurisdiction, pointing out that the parties were residents of the same city and that respondent had failed to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court as required by PD No. 1508. Respondent Judge denied the motion, reasoning that the Clerk of Court's acceptance of the complaint for filing, with payment of the docket fee, could be considered as meeting the precondition, since the Clerk would not have accepted the filing otherwise given the standing circular from the Chief Justice requiring barangay conciliation for certain cases.

In his comment and memorandum before the Supreme Court, private respondent admitted not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation process but justified the omission by citing paragraph 4, Section 6 of PD 1508, which allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations. The Clerk of Court disclosed that there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint.

• Want of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the Municipal Trial Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the ejectment case because respondent Atty. Reyes, as plaintiff, failed to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court for conciliation as required by PD No. 1508, the parties being residents of the same city as alleged in the complaint.

• Statute of Limitations Exception: Private respondent admitted not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation process but argued that paragraph 4, Section 6 of PD 1508, which allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations, applied to the case at bar.
• Presumption of Regularity: Respondent Judge justified his denial of the motion to dismiss by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance by the Clerk of Court of his official duty, reasoning that the Clerk's acceptance of the complaint for filing could be considered as meeting the precondition for barangay conciliation.

• Applicability of Barangay Conciliation Requirement: Whether the Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation requirement under PD No. 1508 applies to an ejectment suit filed by an administrator of an intestate estate against a lessee.
• Statute of Limitations Exception: Whether the exception under paragraph 4, Section 6 of PD 1508, allowing direct filing of an action where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations, applies to the case at bar.

• Applicability of Barangay Conciliation Requirement: No. The conciliation requirement under PD No. 1508 does not apply because the real party in interest in the ejectment case is the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo, a juridical person, and Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508 requires referral only where the parties are "individuals" or natural persons.
• Statute of Limitations Exception: No. The exception does not apply because less than a month had elapsed between the letter-demand dated August 28, 1982, and the filing of the complaint on September 16, 1982, leaving at least eleven full months of the one-year prescriptive period under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, which was ample time to undergo the conciliation process.

• Applicability of Barangay Conciliation Requirement: Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." The law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate estate. In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes was a mere nominal party suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, the real party in interest is the intestate estate under administration, which is a juridical person. Accordingly, the plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in court without coursing it to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

• Statute of Limitations Exception: Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, counted from demand to vacate the premises. In this case, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed on September 16, 1982 — less than a month had elapsed, leaving at least eleven full months of the prescriptive period. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Thus, private respondent had ample time to bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail, and it could not be truthfully asserted that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.

• Katarungang Pambarangay Conciliation Requirement (PD No. 1508) — With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies. However, under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals," meaning natural persons, and not juridical persons such as corporations, partnerships, corporation sole, testate or intestate estates. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the administrator of an intestate estate, as a nominal party suing for a juridical person, may file an ejectment complaint directly in court without undergoing barangay conciliation.

• Real Party in Interest Rule — Under Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the administrator of an estate may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended. Nevertheless, the real party in interest remains the estate under administration. The Court applied this rule to determine that the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo, being a juridical person, was the real party in interest in the ejectment case, thereby removing the dispute from the coverage of the barangay conciliation requirement.

• "With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies." — This passage establishes the general rule that barangay conciliation is a precondition to filing certain actions, providing the framework for the Court's analysis of whether the requirement applies to the case at bar.

• "Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are 'individuals.' An 'individual' means 'a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution.' Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, defining the scope of the barangay conciliation requirement and excluding juridical persons from its coverage.

• "In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration." — This passage applies the real party in interest rule to determine that the estate, not the administrator, is the actual party, thus placing the case outside the barangay conciliation requirement.

• Desbarat vs. Vda. de Laureano, 18 SCRA 116 — Cited for the proposition that the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry and detainer actions under Article 1147 of the Civil Code is counted from demand to vacate the premises.
• Calubayan vs. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the counting of the prescriptive period for ejectment cases from demand to vacate.
• Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the prescriptive period for forcible entry and detainer actions.
• Limjoco vs. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 — Cited for the proposition that an intestate estate is a juridical person, supporting the Court's conclusion that the estate, not the administrator, is the real party in interest.

• Section 4(a), PD No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) — Provides that any individual who has a cause of action against another individual involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon may complain orally or in writing to the Barangay Captain. The Court interpreted this provision to limit the conciliation requirement to disputes between natural persons, excluding juridical persons such as intestate estates.
• Section 4(e), PD No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) — Provides the time limit for the Pangkat to arrive at a settlement or resolution of the dispute within fifteen days from the day it convenes, extendible for another period not exceeding fifteen days. The Court used this provision to compute the maximum time needed for conciliation proceedings, which should take no more than 60 days.
• Paragraph 4, Section 6, PD No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) — Allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations. The Court found this exception inapplicable because ample prescriptive time remained.
• Article 1147, Civil Code — Provides the one-year prescriptive period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer, counted from demand to vacate the premises. The Court applied this provision to determine that the respondent had at least eleven full months remaining in the prescriptive period.
• Section 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended. The Court applied this rule to determine that the administrator was a mere nominal party and that the estate was the real party in interest.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concurred. Aquino, J., concurred in the result.