Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. vs. Carandang

A trial court must independently evaluate the prosecution's evidence before granting a motion to withdraw an information, and its order must state the assessment and reasons; the order granting withdrawal and dismissing the criminal case is final and appealable, and the dismissal automatically cancels bail, making notice and hearing unnecessary for the release of the cash bond.

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. was the private complainant in a criminal case for estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Teresita L. Carandang was its employee who received cash advances for company expenses for various projects, subject to the obligation to liquidate the proceeds or return the amount if unused. The case concerns the withdrawal of the Information filed against her after reinvestigation.

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. filed a Complaint-Affidavit on March 30, 2007 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City against Teresita L. Carandang, its employee, for estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. After preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Job M. Mangente filed an Information with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that, from July 11, 2005 to August 30, 2006, Carandang received in trust cash advances totaling ₱161,902.80 as company expenses for various projects, under the obligation to liquidate the proceeds or return the amount if unused. The Information charged that, with intent to defraud, unfaithfulness, and grave abuse of confidence, she failed and refused to fulfill her obligation despite repeated demands and instead misapplied, misappropriated, and converted the amount to her personal use, to the damage of Personal Collection. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-07-148858. On September 20, 2007, Presiding Judge Jocelyn A. Solis-Reyes of Branch 221, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City ordered the issuance of an arrest warrant after finding prima facie evidence and probable guilt.

On July 10, 2009, Carandang filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, claiming that she did not appear during the preliminary investigation because she did not receive any subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor; she sought reinvestigation to avoid deprivation of due process. Personal Collection opposed the motion, arguing that Carandang had not been deprived of due process and that the Regional Trial Court had already found prima facie evidence. Carandang then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Reply. In an Order dated August 14, 2009, the Regional Trial Court granted the Motion for Reinvestigation.

Before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Carandang filed her Counter-Affidavit, claiming that her failure to completely liquidate the cash advances was due to the sudden termination of her employment by Personal Collection; she also claimed that she did not receive any demand letter or any offer to settle the case. Personal Collection, through representative Marilou S. Palarca, filed a Reply-Affidavit pointing out that Carandang admitted receiving the cash advances and failing to liquidate the proceeds. It argued that it had demanded the return or liquidation of the cash advances and that prior demand was unnecessary because Carandang admitted receipt. Personal Collection also filed a Compliance, claiming that the cash advances were not in the form of a contract of simple loan.

On January 29, 2010, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through State Prosecutor Liezel Aquiatan-Morales, issued a Resolution recommending dismissal of the complaint. After reinvestigation, it found that Personal Collection's cause of action was anchored primarily on Carandang's failure to liquidate her remaining cash advances, but it was unconvinced that this failure was sufficient to hold her liable for estafa. It reasoned that there would be no estafa so long as there was no demand to return the money under obligation to be returned; with the element of demand absent, the earlier finding of probable cause was overturned, and Carandang's acts could only be the subject of a civil action for sum of money. On June 15, 2010, Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with the Regional Trial Court, stating that the Office of the City Prosecutor found a lack of probable cause. Personal Collection opposed the motion, arguing that demand is not an element of estafa and that its lack would not warrant withdrawal. Carandang replied that the Office of the City Prosecutor has control of the proceedings in a criminal case and that the private offended party or private prosecutor has no right to question its actions and authority.

On November 19, 2010, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information. It found that Carandang used the cash advances to pay for the operational expenses of Personal Collection's Iloilo City branch and that her unceremonious termination from employment prevented her from fully liquidating the cash advances; thus, she was able to explain her failure to account for the amounts she had received in trust. The trial court also noted the general policy of courts not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to give investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, and it found that no exception existed requiring the court to intervene in the findings of the preliminary investigation. Personal Collection's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its Order dated October 12, 2011. Upon Carandang's motion, the Regional Trial Court, in its Order dated November 16, 2011, released the cash bond posted for Carandang's bail.

Personal Collection filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and the Motion to Release Bond. It argued that the trial court failed to make its own evaluation of the merits and only relied on Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales' recommendation; that the trial court had already found probable cause when it issued the arrest warrant on September 20, 2007; and that Carandang had admitted in her reply-affidavit that she received funds in trust but had not liquidated the balance, so all elements of estafa were present. It also alleged that it was deprived of due process when the trial court granted the Motion to Release Cash Bond without Personal Collection receiving a copy of the motion. The Court of Appeals found that the Regional Trial Court had conducted an independent assessment of the facts, basing its order on the pleadings filed by the parties, and that the probable cause for preliminary investigation was separate from the probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant. It also found that, by the time the trial court ruled on the withdrawal, Carandang had already filed her counter-affidavit and subsequent pleadings, unlike when the arrest warrant was issued.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Withdrawal: Petitioner argued that the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion when it reversed and set aside its earlier finding of probable cause despite Carandang's express admissions showing that all elements of the crime of estafa were present.
• No Independent Evaluation: Petitioner maintained that the trial court merely adopted the Resolution of Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales and did not make any independent determination of probable cause.
• Unsubstantiated Basis: Petitioner claimed that the basis of Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales' finding that Carandang was willing to fully liquidate her cash advance was Carandang's unsubstantiated and self-serving statements.
• Due Process on Release of Cash Bond: Petitioner argued that the Motion to Release Cash Bond violated Rule 15, Sections 2, 5, and 6 of the Rules of Court, which require that motions be in writing, be set for hearing, and contain proof of service; the trial court did not deny that Personal Collection was not given notice or an opportunity to appear, which was tantamount to deprivation of due process.
• Private Complainant's Standing: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled that a private complainant in a criminal suit may file a special civil action for certiorari only in a limited capacity; it claimed that Rodriguez vs. Gadiane stated there was no limitation to the capacity of a private complainant to seek judicial review of assailed orders, and that its interest in the civil aspect of the case was the basis of its standing.

• No Abuse of Discretion: Respondent argued that the Regional Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and that the ruling granting the withdrawal was not irregular.
• Notice and Hearing on Bond: Respondent argued that her Motion to Release Cash Bond was granted after notice and hearing.
• State as Party in Interest: Respondent claimed that in criminal cases, the party in interest is the State and that the private offended party is only a witness for the State; thus, the Petition for Review should be dismissed for lack of merit.

• Withdrawal of Information: Whether the Regional Trial Court correctly allowed the withdrawal of the Information against Teresita L. Carandang upon a finding that there was a lack of probable cause.
• Due Process on Release of Cash Bond: Whether petitioner Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. was deprived of due process when it was allegedly not given notice or opportunity to be heard on respondent Teresita L. Carandang's Motion to Release Cash Bond.
• Propriety of Certiorari / Standing: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Petition for Certiorari was improper, since it is only the State which may pray for the reinstatement of the criminal case.

• Withdrawal of Information: Yes. The Regional Trial Court correctly allowed the withdrawal. It conducted an independent assessment of the prosecution's evidence and explained why the elements of estafa were not met after reinvestigation; no grave abuse of discretion attended its order.
• Due Process on Release of Cash Bond: No. Petitioner was not deprived of due process. The dismissal of the case automatically cancelled bail under Rule 114, Section 22; no notice or hearing was necessary for the release of the cash bond, and the trial court's order did not apply the deposit to fines or costs.
• Propriety of Certiorari / Standing: Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that certiorari was improper. The order granting withdrawal and dismissing the criminal case was final, and appeal under Rule 122, Section 1 was the proper remedy; certiorari cannot substitute for appeal. The Court nonetheless resolved the merits for judicial economy.

• Withdrawal of Information: Once an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and has authority to determine whether the case should be dismissed; the court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. Dismissal for lack of probable cause protects the accused from trial on insufficient evidence, but judges must proceed with caution because the evidence before them is preliminary. When probable cause exists, the court must proceed with arraignment and trial; if the evidence absolutely fails to support probable cause, the case should be dismissed. In either case, the judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the State and offended party to due process. The Court cited Spouses Dimatulac vs. Judge Villon for the principle that judicial discretion is not unfettered and must balance the interests of the accused, the State, and the offended party. It also noted that once an information is filed and a warrant is issued after a judicial determination of probable cause, subsequent technical dismissals are inequitable and should generally be avoided. Thus, in granting or denying a motion to withdraw an information, the court must conduct a cautious and independent evaluation of the prosecution's evidence and be convinced that the merits warrant either dismissal or continuation. Under Baltazar vs. People, the trial judge must himself be convinced that there was no sufficient evidence, and this conclusion can only be reached after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution; it is not enough merely to accept the prosecution's word. The order granting withdrawal must state the judge's assessment of the evidence and reasons, clearly show why the earlier probable cause assessment was erroneous, and make the independent judicial discretion palpable; failure renders the order void. Lee vs. KBC Bank N.V. enumerated matters that should be contained in such an order: (1) positively state that the evidence is insufficient; (2) include a discussion of the merits; (3) assess whether the DOJ conclusion is supported by evidence; (4) look at the basis of the recommendation; (5) embody the assessment in the order; and (6) state the reasons for granting the motion. Jose vs. Suarez found grave abuse where the trial court failed to make an independent evaluation. Conversely, Ramos vs. People and Torres, Jr. vs. Spouses Torres-Aguinaldo showed that no grave abuse exists where the trial court independently considered the evidence, the DOJ findings, the private offended party's opposition, and the accused's comment. The Court acknowledged that the trial court erroneously stated that investigating officers had sufficient discretion to determine probable cause. However, the trial court rendered a more satisfactory justification. Its November 19, 2010 Order showed that it made its own assessment of the prosecution's evidence as embodied in the January 29, 2010 Resolution. It explained how the elements of estafa were not met based on the additional evidence presented by Carandang at reinvestigation. It considered Personal Collection's opposition, giving the private offended party an opportunity to be heard. The Order quoted the elements of estafa and noted that demand is not an element or condition precedent, but failure to account upon demand is only circumstantial evidence of misappropriation that can be rebutted. The trial court found that Carandang satisfactorily explained her failure to liquidate: she used the cash advances for the operational expenses of Personal Collection's Iloilo City branch, as evidenced by the Cash Advance Summary as of November 23, 2006 prepared by Marilou S. Palarca, and she was willing to fully liquidate, having made partial liquidation, but her unceremonious termination prevented completion. The earlier finding of probable cause was for the issuance of the arrest warrant, based on the prosecutor's Resolution and attached documents. After reinvestigation, Carandang presented her defense, and the additional evidence prompted the prosecutor's reversal and the motion to withdraw. That additional evidence formed the basis of the trial court's evaluation that probable cause was lacking. Since there was insufficient evidence that the trial court erred in finding a lack of probable cause, the grant of the withdrawal was upheld.

• Due Process on Release of Cash Bond: Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court governs cancellation of bail. It provides that upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of death; that bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction; and that in all instances the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. Among the instances when bail is automatically cancelled is dismissal of the case. Since cancellation is automatic upon dismissal, no notice or hearing is even necessary. The release of the amount posted as bail is a separate matter. When the cash bond is made to answer for fines or costs, automatic cancellation is not succeeded by immediate release. In this case, the dismissal due to withdrawal of the information resulted in the automatic cancellation of Carandang's bail. Further, the trial court's November 16, 2011 Order did not state that there was any need for the deposit to be applied to fines or costs. The Order granted the Motion to Release Cash Bond, there being no objection from the prosecution and it appearing that the Information was considered withdrawn under the November 19, 2010 Order; it ordered the release of the cash bond posted under OR No. 038430 dated June 30, 2009 and directed the Clerk of Court to withdraw the amount from the judiciary fund and deliver it to Carandang or her authorized representative. The trial court correctly granted the release. Personal Collection's right to due process was not violated when it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard on the Motion to Release Cash Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary because the bail was automatically cancelled upon dismissal. Petitioner's hypothetical objections would have been superfluous and unnecessary since the release was already warranted under the Rules of Court.

• Propriety of Certiorari / Standing: The Court noted that the procedural vehicle invoked by petitioner was inappropriate. In its Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, Personal Collection claimed it had no recourse to appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. This was incorrect. Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. An order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and the remedy to question this final order is an appeal. Santos vs. Orda held that the Order granting the motion to withdraw the Informations and ordering the case dismissed is final because it disposed of the case and terminated the proceedings, leaving nothing to be done by the court; the proper remedy is appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for appeal where the latter remedy is available. A special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure a party's failure to timely appeal. Appealing the withdrawal of an information does not violate the right against double jeopardy. First Women's Credit Corp. vs. Baybay explained that the prohibition against appeal in case a criminal case is dismissed as the accused would be placed in double jeopardy does not apply where the motion was granted before arraignment. The case cited by petitioner, Rodriguez vs. Gadiane, concerned a special civil action for certiorari to assail an interlocutory order suspending a criminal proceeding due to a prejudicial question, not an order dismissing the case or acquitting the accused. If the case is dismissed or if there is an acquittal, the appeal of the criminal aspect must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State; the private complainant's capability to question the dismissal or acquittal is limited to the civil aspect. Despite petitioner's claim that its petition was not an appeal of an order dismissing the criminal case, the grant of the Motion to Withdraw Information dismissed the criminal case. Further, in its Petition for Certiorari, petitioner assailed the Regional Trial Court's findings of lack of probable cause due to alleged insufficiency of evidence and because all elements of estafa were present. Thus, petitioner questioned the trial court's allegedly erroneous conclusions of fact and law, which are errors of judgment that cannot be corrected by an extraordinary writ of certiorari. Despite the use of an improper remedy, the Court proceeded to decide the issues to pursue judicial economy, because the prospective opportunity cost that may be expended by the parties and the courts far outweighed the likelihood of success of the aggrieved party, and Court resources would be more efficiently expended by discussing the merits.

• Independent Judicial Evaluation in Withdrawal of Information — Once an information is filed, the court, not the prosecution, has full control of the case, and the information may not be dismissed without its approval. In resolving a motion to withdraw, the trial judge must independently assess the prosecution's evidence and be convinced that there is no sufficient evidence; merely accepting the prosecution's conclusion is insufficient. The order must state the judge's assessment and reasons, show why the earlier probable cause finding was erroneous, and make the exercise of judicial discretion palpable; otherwise, the order is void. Applied: the Regional Trial Court's November 19, 2010 Order sufficiently explained why the elements of estafa were not met after reinvestigation and considered Personal Collection's opposition, so no grave abuse of discretion attended the withdrawal.
• Final Order and Appeal as the Proper Remedy — An order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final because it disposes of the case and terminates the proceedings. The proper remedy is appeal under Rule 122, Section 1, unless the accused would be placed in double jeopardy; certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for appeal. Applied: the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Personal Collection's Petition for Certiorari was improper, although the Supreme Court still resolved the merits for judicial economy.
• Limited Standing of the Private Complainant — When a criminal case is dismissed or the accused is acquitted, the appeal on the criminal aspect must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State. The private complainant's capability to question the dismissal or acquittal is limited to the civil aspect of the case. Applied: Personal Collection's petition sought reinstatement of the criminal case, which only the State could pursue; its interest was limited to the civil aspect.
• Automatic Cancellation of Bail upon Dismissal — Under Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, bail is deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. Because cancellation is automatic, no notice or hearing is necessary for the cancellation. The release of the cash bond is a separate matter; if the bond is not applied to fines or costs, the amount must be returned to the accused. Applied: the dismissal of the estafa case automatically cancelled Carandang's bail, and the trial court correctly released the cash bond without notice or hearing to Personal Collection.
• Reversal of Prior Probable Cause upon Independent Reassessment — Courts are not absolutely barred from reversing a prior determination of probable cause upon reassessment of the evidence. No grave abuse of discretion exists when an earlier finding of probable cause is overturned if the judge arrived at the later conclusion upon an independent study of the available facts, allegations, and evidence on record. Applied: the Regional Trial Court's earlier probable cause finding was only for the issuance of the arrest warrant; after reinvestigation, additional evidence presented by Carandang justified the later finding of no probable cause.
• Demand in Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) — Demand is not an element of estafa or a condition precedent to its prosecution. The accused may be convicted if the prosecution proves misappropriation or conversion of money or property held in trust. Failure to account upon demand is only circumstantial evidence of misappropriation and may be rebutted. Applied: the Regional Trial Court found that Carandang satisfactorily explained her failure to liquidate the cash advances, so the failure to account did not establish probable cause for estafa.
• Balancing Rights in Probable Cause Determinations — A judge's discretion in dismissing a criminal case for lack of probable cause is not unfettered. The judge must act with cautious discernment and ensure that the action does not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the State and the offended party to due process of law. Applied: the Regional Trial Court considered both the prosecution's evidence and Personal Collection's opposition before granting the withdrawal, thereby balancing the competing rights.

• "Judges must act with cautious discernment and faithfully exercise their judicial discretion when dismissing cases for lack of probable cause. An order granting the withdrawal of an information based on the prosecutor's findings of lack of probable cause must show that the judge did not rely solely on the prosecution's conclusions but had independently evaluated the evidence on record and the merits of the case." — This is the Court's opening statement of the governing standard; it frames the ratio on independent judicial evaluation.
• "The order granting the withdrawal of an information must state the judge's assessment of the evidence and reasons in resolving the motion. It must clearly show why the court's earlier assessment of probable cause was erroneous. The court should not merely accept the prosecution's findings and conclusions. Its independent judicial discretion in allowing the information to be withdrawn must not only be implied but must be palpable in its order." — This states the requisites for a valid withdrawal order and the consequence of noncompliance.
• "An order grating a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and the remedy to question this final order is an appeal." — This is the Court's holding on the proper remedy; it explains why certiorari was improper.
• "Since cancellation of bail is automatic upon the dismissal of the case, no notice or hearing is even necessary, as the cancellation takes place when any of the three (3) enumerated instances takes place." — This is the ratio for rejecting the due process claim regarding the release of the cash bond.

• Santos vs. Orda, 634 Phil. 452 (2010) — Cited for the rule that an order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final; the proper remedy is appeal, and certiorari is not a substitute for appeal.
• First Women’s Credit Corp. vs. Baybay, 542 Phil. 607 (2007) — Cited for the rule that appealing the withdrawal of an information does not violate double jeopardy where the motion was granted before arraignment.
• Rodriguez vs. Gadiane, 527 Phil. 691 (2006) — Distinguished; it concerned an interlocutory order suspending a criminal proceeding due to a prejudicial question, not an order dismissing the case or acquitting the accused.
• Baltazar vs. People, 582 Phil. 275 (2008) — Cited for the requirement that the trial judge must personally assess the prosecution's evidence; mere acceptance of the prosecution's word is insufficient.
• Lee vs. KBC Bank N.V., 624 Phil. 115 (2010) — Cited for the matters that should be contained in an order granting or denying a motion to withdraw an information.
• Jose vs. Suarez, 714 Phil. 310 (2013) — Cited for the rule that failure to make an independent evaluation of the merits constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
• Ramos vs. People, 639 Phil. 51 (2010) — Cited as the converse where the order granting withdrawal showed that the trial court exercised judicial discretion; also cited for the rule that courts may reverse a prior probable cause finding upon independent reassessment.
• Torres, Jr. vs. Spouses Torres-Aguinaldo, 500 Phil. 365 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the trial court independently considered the DOJ findings, the private offended party's opposition, and the accused's comment.
• Spouses Dimatulac vs. Judge Villon, 358 Phil. 328 (1998) — Cited for the principle that judicial discretion is not unfettered and must balance the rights of the accused, the State, and the offended party.
• Salonga vs. Pano, 219 Phil. 402 (1985) — Cited for the rule that dismissal for lack of probable cause protects the accused from having to undergo trial based on insufficient evidence.
• Carmen Liwanag vs. CA, G.R. No. 114398, October 24, 1997 — Cited in the trial court's order for the elements of estafa.
• Lee vs. People, G.R. No. 157781, April 11, 2005 — Cited in the trial court's order for the rule that demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion, and that failure to account upon demand is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
• Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 224974, July 3, 2017 — Cited for the rule on automatic cancellation of bail upon dismissal of the case.

• Rule 122, Section 1, Rules of Court — Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. Applied: the order granting the motion to withdraw the information and dismissing the criminal case was final; appeal was the proper remedy, and certiorari was improper.
• Rule 114, Section 22, Rules of Court — Cancellation of bail. Bail is deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction; cancellation is without prejudice to any liability on the bail. Applied: the dismissal of the case due to withdrawal of the information automatically cancelled Carandang's bail, so no notice or hearing was necessary.
• Rule 114, Section 14, Rules of Court — Deposit of cash as bail. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs, while the excess shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. Applied: the trial court's order did not state that the deposit needed to be applied to fines or costs, so the release of the cash bond to Carandang was warranted.
• Article 315, paragraph 1(b), Revised Penal Code — Estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence. Applied: the Information charged Carandang under this provision; after reinvestigation, the trial court found a lack of probable cause because Carandang satisfactorily explained her failure to liquidate the cash advances and demand was absent.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Certiorari. Applied: the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals was an improper substitute for appeal, since appeal was available from the final order dismissing the criminal case.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Petition for Review on Certiorari. Applied: this was the procedural vehicle by which Personal Collection sought review before the Supreme Court.
• Rule 15, Sections 2, 5, and 6, Rules of Court — Petitioner invoked these provisions, which require motions to be in writing, set for hearing, and with proof of service. Applied: the Court held that no notice or hearing was necessary for the release of the cash bond because bail was automatically cancelled upon dismissal.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Samuel R. Martires, and Alexander G. Gesmundo concurred. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno issued the certification.