Primary Holding
An alleged foreign judgment invoked as res judicata does not deprive the Court of First Instance of jurisdiction over the subject matter where the actions filed — adjudication of title to shares and suit to enforce a foreign judgment — fall within its general jurisdiction conferred by law.
Background
Eugene Arthur Perkins and Idonah Slade Perkins were spouses with competing claims to shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company registered in Eugene's name, including cash and stock dividends declared thereon. The Court of First Instance of Manila exercised general jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to property and enforcement of judgments pursuant to the Administrative Code as amended and Act No. 136 as amended.
History
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Court of First Instance of Manila, July 5, 1938 — Eugene Arthur Perkins filed complaint against Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for recovery of P71,379.90 dividends on 52,874 shares and recognition of his right to control and disposal.
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Court of First Instance of Manila, September 5, 1938 — ordered Perkins to include Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard as defendants; complaint was amended to pray that they be adjudged without interest and summons by publication was served on the non-residents.
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Court of First Instance of Manila and Supreme Court (G.R. No. 46831), January 8, 1940 — petitioner's objection to jurisdiction over her person having been overruled, she filed an answer with cross-complaint setting up a New York Supreme Court judgment and praying enforcement thereof.
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Court of First Instance of Manila, June 5, 1940 — petitioner's demurrer to respondent's reply on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by reason of res judicata was overruled, prompting the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Facts
On July 5, 1938, Eugene Arthur Perkins filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for recovery of P71,379.90, consisting of dividends declared and made payable on 52,874 shares of stock registered in his name but withheld by the company, and for recognition of his right to control and disposal of said shares to the exclusion of all others. The company answered that withholding was due to demands made with respect to said shares by Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard, and prayed that the adverse claimants be made parties and required to interplead and settle rights among themselves.
Thereafter, on September 5, 1938, the trial court ordered Eugene Arthur Perkins to include Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard as defendants. The complaint was accordingly amended to allege ownership in Eugene of the shares as part of the conjugal partnership between him and his wife Idonah Slade Perkins, that Idonah and Engelhard asserted adverse claims which were invalid, unfounded and made only to vex, hinder and delay Eugene in lawful control and use, and to pray that Benguet be ordered to recognize Eugene's exclusive right and that Idonah and Engelhard be held to have no interest and be excluded. Summons by publication was served upon the non-resident defendants pursuant to court order.
On December 9, 1938, Engelhard filed his answer to the amended complaint. On January 8, 1940, after her objection to jurisdiction over her person was overruled by the trial court and by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 46831, Idonah Slade Perkins filed her answer with cross-complaint setting up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against Eugene from the Supreme Court of the State of New York declaring her sole legal owner entitled to possession and control of the shares together with all cash dividends declared thereon, and praying for affirmative reliefs including $185,400 for cash dividends from February 1930 to March 30, 1937, delivery of certificates for 48,000 shares issued as stock dividend on 24,000 shares, interest at 7% per annum, costs and extra allowance, execution to enforce the New York judgment, and other relief. To this answer and cross-complaint, Eugene filed a reply and answer setting up several defenses to enforcement of the New York judgment in this jurisdiction. Instead of demurring on either of the two grounds specified in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Idonah on June 5, 1940 filed a demurrer to the reply on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because the New York judgment was res judicata. The demurrer having been overruled, she filed the present petition alleging the respondent judge would disregard her constitutional rights and annul the final, subsisting New York judgment.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Res Judicata as Divesting Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York in her favor was res judicata on all questions constituting the subject matter of Civil Case No. 53317 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
- Lack of Jurisdiction over Subject Matter and Prohibition: Petitioner maintained that the Court of First Instance of Manila was without jurisdiction to annul, amend, reverse or modify the New York judgment in any respect, that the order overruling the demurrer should be annulled, and that the respondent judge and his successors should be permanently prohibited from taking any action except to dismiss the case.
Issues
- Jurisdiction over Subject Matter: Whether, in view of the alleged New York judgment claimed to be res judicata on all questions raised, the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 53317.
Ruling
- Jurisdiction over Subject Matter: Yes. Jurisdiction was retained because both the amended complaint for adjudication of title to shares and the cross-complaint to enforce the New York judgment fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance conferred by law.
Ruling Rationale
- Jurisdiction over Subject Matter: Jurisdiction over the subject matter was defined as the nature of the cause of action and relief sought, conferred by the sovereign authority organizing the court and sought in the general nature of its powers or authority specially conferred. The amended complaint called for adjudication of title to certain Benguet Consolidated Mining Company shares and granting of affirmative reliefs excluding adverse claimants, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila under sec. 146, et seq., Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 145, and sec. 56, Act No. 136, as amended by Act No. 400. Similarly, the cross-complaint brought suit upon the alleged New York judgment and asked for judgment enforcing it and execution thereon, a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) within the same general jurisdiction. Whether validity and efficacy would be given to the New York judgment goes to the merits and the rights of the parties inter se, not to the power of the court, since the test is power to enter upon inquiry, not correctness of conclusion, remediable by appeal if erroneous.
Doctrines
- Jurisdiction over the subject matter — Jurisdiction over the subject matter means the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought, conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and to be sought in the general nature of its powers or in authority specially conferred. Applied to hold that an action to adjudicate title to mining shares and to exclude adverse claimants was within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila under the Administrative Code and Act No. 136, as amended.
- Action upon a foreign judgment — A suit to enforce a foreign judgment, as recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court), falls within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to adjudicate, settle and determine. Applied to hold that petitioner's own cross-complaint praying enforcement and execution of the New York judgment was itself cognizable by the court below.
- Jurisdiction vs. exercise of jurisdiction; error of judgment — The test of jurisdiction is whether the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion is right or wrong; an erroneous decision is reversible on appeal but remains a rightful exercise of jurisdiction. Applied to reject the fear that giving or refusing effect to the pleaded res judicata would constitute lack of power, since that determination concerns the merits.
Key Excerpts
- "By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred." — Defines jurisdiction over the subject matter and anchors the holding that the share-title and foreign-judgment claims are cognizable by the Court of First Instance.
- "The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong." — States the canonical test distinguishing power to decide from correctness, defeating the claim that res judicata ousts jurisdiction.
- "If its decision is erroneous, its judgment case be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court — and the rightful exercise — of its jurisdiction." — Explains that the anticipated ruling on the New York judgment is a merits question reviewable by appeal, not prohibition.
Provisions
- Section 146, et seq., Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 145; Section 56, Act No. 136, as amended by Act No. 400 — Cited as conferring general jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Manila to adjudicate title to the Benguet shares and grant the affirmative reliefs prayed in the amended complaint and cross-complaint.
- Section 309, Code of Civil Procedure (now Section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) — Cited as recognizing an action upon a foreign judgment; applied to characterize petitioner's cross-complaint seeking enforcement and execution of the New York judgment as within the lower court's adjudicatory power.
- Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure — Noted as specifying the two grounds for demurrer to a reply, neither of which was invoked by petitioner who instead demurred on alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, Moran and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.