Perez vs. Spouses Madrona

A structure that is not a nuisance per se may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention, and a public officer who threatens summary demolition despite being notified of the lack of legal basis is liable for damages.

Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered owners of a residential property in Marikina City, on which they built a house and a concrete perimeter fence in 1989. In 1999, petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office, sent a letter accusing respondents of encroaching on the sidewalk and demanding the fence's removal within seven days, citing various laws and city programs. Respondents refused, asserting that no court order authorized the demolition and that the fence did not encroach on the sidewalk. After petitioner sent a follow-up demand in 2001 giving respondents ten days to remove the fence, respondents filed a complaint for injunction.

• Ownership and Construction: Respondents are the registered owners of a residential lot in Greenheights Subdivision, Marikina City, covered by TCT No. 169365. In 1989, they built their house and enclosed the property with a concrete fence and steel gate.
• First Notice: On May 25, 1999, petitioner sent a letter directing respondents to remove their structure within seven days, claiming it protruded onto the sidewalk in violation of the National Building Code, the Marikina cleanliness and discipline program, and laws on road right-of-way.
• Respondents' Reply: On June 8, 1999, respondent Madrona replied, denying the encroachment and asserting that petitioner had no authority to demolish without a court order. He characterized the accusations as libelous and false.
• Request for Relocation Survey: On June 9, 1999, petitioner requested a copy of the relocation survey of the property. Respondents refused, viewing it as an attempt to fish for evidence.
• Second Notice: On February 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the same contents as the first, giving respondents ten days to remove the structure.
• Injunction Complaint: On March 12, 2001, respondents filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC, seeking a TRO and preliminary injunction, later made permanent, along with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
• Procedural Incidents: Petitioner was declared in default for failure to file an answer. His certiorari petition assailing the default order was dismissed by the CA. The RTC subsequently dismissed the case for failure to prosecute but reinstated it upon respondents' motion, noting that the RTC itself had suspended proceedings pending the resolution of the certiorari petition. Respondents presented evidence ex parte.
• RTC Ruling: The RTC granted the permanent injunction, holding that respondents' fence was not a nuisance per se and that there was no basis for summary demolition. Petitioner was ordered to pay attorney's fees and costs.

• Reinstatement of Complaint: Petitioner argued that respondents expressly admitted negligence, rendering the reinstatement of the dismissed complaint unjustified.
• Injunction Requisites: Petitioner contended that the requisites for injunction were absent because a mere notice does not constitute an invasion of a right and only presupposes an opportunity to be heard. He claimed the encroachment was apparent from the sketch plan, negating respondents' absolute right over the property. He further argued that clearing sidewalks is a government infrastructure project that cannot be restrained by courts under Presidential Decree No. 1818, and that the trial court erred in relying on testimonies of imminent demolition.
• Damages: Petitioner maintained that he was merely performing his official duties and is entitled to the presumption of regularity, arguing that absent clear proof of bad faith or acting beyond his authority, he cannot be held liable for attorney's fees and costs.

• Reinstatement of Complaint: Respondents countered that they did not admit negligence; the delay in prosecution was due to the RTC's own suspension order pending the resolution of the certiorari petition.
• Injunction Requisites: Respondents argued that petitioner had no legal authority to summarily demolish private structures and that the cited laws did not grant him such power. They asserted their right to peaceful possession and maintained that the fence was beside the sidewalk, not encroaching on it, and that the land had never been subject to expropriation.
• Damages: Respondents argued that the presumption of regularity was negated by petitioner's persistence in threatening demolition despite being warned that his acts were ultra vires. They sought moral damages for anxiety and sleepless nights and exemplary damages to serve as an example to other public officials.

• Reinstatement of Complaint: Whether the trial court erred in reinstating the complaint of respondents.
• Injunction: Whether the requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction are present.
• Damages: Whether petitioner is liable to pay attorney's fees, costs of suit, moral damages, and exemplary damages.

• Reinstatement of Complaint: Reinstatement was justified. A perusal of the record shows respondents never expressly or impliedly admitted negligence. The delay was attributable to the RTC's own suspension order, and respondents did not lose interest in prosecuting the case.
• Injunction: The requisites for injunction are present. Respondents possess a right to be protected—their right to the concrete fence, which cannot be removed without due process—and the threatened summary demolition constitutes a violation of that right. The fence is not a nuisance per se; by its nature, it secures the property and is not injurious to health or comfort. Being at most a nuisance per accidens, its abatement requires judicial intervention.
• Damages: Petitioner is liable for attorney's fees, costs, moral damages, and exemplary damages. The award of attorney's fees and costs is justified because respondents were forced to litigate to protect their property after petitioner ignored their reply and demanded proof of non-encroachment. The presumption of regularity was negated by petitioner's persistence in threatening summary demolition despite being put on notice that his actions were ultra vires. Moral damages of ₱10,000.00 are awarded for the anxiety and sleepless nights suffered by respondents, and exemplary damages of ₱5,000.00 are imposed to serve as an example for public officials to be circumspect in the performance of their duties.

• Nuisance per se vs. Nuisance per accidens — A nuisance per se is one that affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the law of necessity. A nuisance per accidens is one that becomes a nuisance by reason of its location or surroundings and may only be declared as such after a hearing conducted for that purpose. A perimeter fence built to secure property is not a nuisance per se; if it encroaches on a sidewalk, it is at most a nuisance per accidens that cannot be summarily abated without judicial intervention.
• Requisites for Injunction — Two requisites must concur for a writ of injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected, and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.

• "Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention." — This encapsulates the core ratio decidendi regarding the prohibition against summary demolition of structures that are not inherently dangerous or injurious.
• "Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity." — This clarifies the limits of the general welfare clause in justifying summary abatement.

• Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005 — Followed. Cited for the rule that a nuisance per accidens cannot be summarily abated without judicial intervention and that the general welfare clause does not apply to nuisances per accidens.
• Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac, No. L-15759, December 30, 1961 — Cited. Reiterated that the provisions of the Civil Code on nuisance (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed in the abatement of nuisances.
• Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Carantes, G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010 — Cited. Provided the two requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction.

• Article 2217, Civil Code — Defines moral damages as including physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Applied to award respondents moral damages for the anxiety and sleepless nights caused by the threat of demolition.
• Presidential Decree No. 1818 — Prohibits courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure and natural resource development projects of the government. Cited by petitioner but implicitly rejected as inapplicable to the summary demolition of a private fence not constituting a nuisance per se.

Renato C. Corona (CJ), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.