Perez vs. Commission on Elections

After a candidate for the House of Representatives has been proclaimed elected and has assumed office, exclusive original jurisdiction over a petition to declare him ineligible lies with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; the COMELEC may continue a disqualification proceeding after the election only if the candidate has not yet been proclaimed. On the merits, residence for election law purposes means domicile, and substantial evidence of actual residence in the district—not contrary voter registration or certificates of candidacy—satisfies the one-year residency requirement.

Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo was a candidate for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections, while Marcita Mamba Perez was a voter and citizen. The dispute implicated the constitutional one-year district residency requirement for Members of the House of Representatives under Art. VI, §6, the COMELEC's authority over disqualification cases under R.A. No. 6646, §6, and the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal over members' eligibility under Art. VI, §17.

On March 26, 1998, Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30, 1998, Marcita Mamba Perez, as a voter and citizen, filed with the COMELEC a petition for Aguinaldo's disqualification, alleging that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one year immediately before the election as required by Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution. In support, she presented Aguinaldo's certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections; his voter's affidavit used in the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1997 elections; and his voter registration record dated June 22, 1997, all stating that he was a resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel, Municipality of Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of Cagayan. Perez alleged that Aguinaldo filed an application for transfer of his voter registration from Gattaran, Cagayan (First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (Third District) only on December 17, 1997, and that the application was approved only on January 7, 1998. She prayed that, if the case was not finally decided before the elections and Aguinaldo obtained the highest number of votes, his proclamation be suspended.

In his answer, Aguinaldo claimed that while he had been a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan in 1990, he transferred his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting an apartment at No. 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in order to hide his mistress from public view because, at that time, his marriage to his former wife was still subsisting. He presented the affidavit of the apartment owner, Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, stating that Aguinaldo had been his lessee since July 1990; a contract of lease for another residential apartment at Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996, between Aguinaldo as lessee and Tomas T. Decena as lessor; his marriage license dated January 7, 1997; his marriage certificate with Lerma Dumaguit dated January 18, 1998; the birth certificate of their daughter, Geniah Laureen D. Aguinaldo; and various letters, all showing that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one year before the May 11, 1998 elections.

On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC unanimously dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding Aguinaldo qualified to run as Representative for the Third District of Cagayan. The next day, May 11, 1998, the elections were held, and Aguinaldo was elected Representative of the Third District of Cagayan with 65,058 votes over his rival Manuel N. Mamba's 58,507 votes. On May 16, 1998, he was proclaimed elected, and on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office. On May 22, 1998, Perez filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating her allegation that Aguinaldo lacked the requisite residency and arguing that his proclamation was not a legal impediment to the continuation of the hearing on her motion under R.A. No. 6646, §6. The COMELEC en banc denied her motion on June 11, 1998.

The COMELEC found that Aguinaldo changed his residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis of the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the lease contract for the Kamias Street apartment, the marriage certificate dated January 18, 1998, the birth certificate of his daughter, and various letters addressed to him and his family. These documents, according to the COMELEC, showed that Aguinaldo was a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections. The Supreme Court noted that substantial evidence supported this finding and that nothing in the record detracted from its merit.

• Residence and Domicile: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondent had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan since July 1990 when he rented an apartment there to hide his mistress. She maintained that transfer of residence to the place where private respondent kept his mistress cannot amount to a change of domicile because one's domicile is the place where one and one's legitimate family resides.
• Continuity of Domicile of Origin: Petitioner contended that private respondent could not have changed his residence to Tuguegarao in 1990 because his certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections, as well as his voter registration records, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997, indicated that he was a resident of Gattaran, which is in the First District of Cagayan. She averred that, in the absence of clear and positive proof, one's domicile of origin should be deemed to continue, and that to effect a change of domicile one must prove an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and unequivocal acts corresponding with that intention.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction and Continuation of Proceedings: Petitioner replied that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction over the case because she filed the petition for disqualification on March 30, 1998, before the May 11, 1998 elections, and that pursuant to R.A. No. 6646, §6, the COMELEC could continue the proceedings for the determination of private respondent's disqualification. She also argued that the proclamation of private respondent was not a legal impediment to the continuation of the hearing on her motion.

• Loss of COMELEC Jurisdiction: Respondent argued that after his proclamation on May 16, 1998 and his assumption of office on June 30, 1998, the COMELEC lost jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications for the office of Representative.
• Jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: Respondent argued further that the case should have been filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
• Dismissal of the Petition: Respondent asked that the instant petition be dismissed.

• Jurisdiction over the Petition: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari and eventually pass upon private respondent's eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction After Proclamation: Whether the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's motion for reconsideration after private respondent had already been proclaimed elected.
• Residency Qualification: Whether private respondent was ineligible for the office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan for lack of the one-year residency requirement under Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution.

• Jurisdiction over the Petition: No. At the time the petition for certiorari was filed on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives; under Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondent's ineligibility.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction After Proclamation: No. R.A. No. 6646, §6 authorizes the continuation of disqualification proceedings after the elections only if the respondent has not been proclaimed; private respondent's proclamation barred further consideration of petitioner's action.
• Residency Qualification: No. Substantial evidence supported the COMELEC's finding that private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan since July 1990 and for more than one year before the May 11, 1998 elections.

• Jurisdiction over the Petition: The petition for disqualification was decided by the COMELEC First Division on May 10, 1998; the elections were held on May 11, 1998; private respondent was proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and took his oath of office on May 17, 1998; petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration only on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998. R.A. No. 6646, §6 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. Because private respondent had already been proclaimed, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion. At the time of the filing of the petition for certiorari on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives, and under Art. VI, §17 the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has exclusive original jurisdiction over a petition for the declaration of his ineligibility. Lazatin vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal teaches that the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred and that the power is as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Petitioner's remedies should have been either to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification and move for an order suspending the proclamation pending the hearing, and, if the motion was denied before proclamation, to file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin the proclamation; or to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal within ten days after the proclamation on May 16, 1998. Neither remedy was available at the time of the petition.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction After Proclamation: Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides that if a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and may, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. The provision authorizes continuation only if the respondent has not been proclaimed. Here, private respondent was proclaimed on May 16, 1998 before petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration on May 22, 1998. The proclamation barred further consideration of petitioner's action, and the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion.
• Residency Qualification: Even assuming that the Court had jurisdiction, the residency challenge lacked merit. Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution requires a Member of the House of Representatives to be a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected and a resident thereof for not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. Aquino vs. COMELEC explains that the residence contemplated by election law is domicile—the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community. The COMELEC found that private respondent changed his residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao in July 1990 based on the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the lease contract for the Kamias Street apartment, the marriage certificate dated January 18, 1998, the birth certificate of his daughter, and various letters. These established that he was a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one year before the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner's contrary evidence—certificates of candidacy for governor in 1988, 1992, and 1995, voter registration records, the latest dated June 22, 1997, and voting in Gattaran in 1987, 1988, 1992, and 1995—did not overcome the substantial evidence. Registration as a voter in one district is not proof that a person is not domiciled in another district; Faypon vs. Quirino held that registration in a place other than one's residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence. Nor are statements in certificates of candidacy for governor decisive; under Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, it is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, that is decisive, and the statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would render a candidate ineligible. For the office of governor, what is required is residency in the province, not in any district or municipality, so private respondent's prior statements of residence in Gattaran, Cagayan were not inconsistent with residence in Tuguegarao, also in Cagayan. Private respondent had actually been a resident of the Third District for more than seven years since July 1990, a claim rendered credible by his service as governor from 1988 to 1998 and the convenience of maintaining residence in Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan. Gallego vs. Vera remains the polestar: when the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. Considering that private respondent had been governor of the entire province of Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as Representative of its Third District, he was familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency, and the residency requirement was satisfied.

• Residence as Domicile in Election Law — For purposes of election law, residence means domicile: the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain. The purpose of the residency requirement is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community. The Court applied this doctrine by upholding the COMELEC's finding that private respondent had actually resided in Tuguegarao, Cagayan since July 1990, more than one year before the May 11, 1998 elections.
• Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal — Under Art. VI, §17 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has exclusive original jurisdiction over a petition for the declaration of a Member's ineligibility. The word "sole" in the constitutional grant emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction, which is as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that once private respondent had been proclaimed and had taken his oath of office, the COMELEC and the Supreme Court could no longer entertain the disqualification case.
• Effect of Proclamation on a Disqualification Case Under R.A. No. 6646, §6 — R.A. No. 6646, §6 authorizes the COMELEC or the Court to continue with the trial and hearing of a disqualification action after the election, and to suspend the proclamation of a winning candidate when the evidence of guilt is strong, but only if the candidate has not yet been proclaimed. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that private respondent's proclamation on May 16, 1998 barred further consideration of petitioner's action and deprived the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction over her motion for reconsideration.
• Voter Registration and Certificates of Candidacy Are Not Conclusive of Domicile — Registration as a voter in one district is not proof that a person is not domiciled in another district, and the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, is decisive for the constitutional residency requirement. A certificate of candidacy statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would render a candidate ineligible. The Court applied this doctrine by rejecting petitioner's reliance on private respondent's voter records and prior certificates of candidacy for governor.
• Will of the Electorate in Residency Cases — When the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. The Court applied this doctrine by noting that private respondent had served as governor of the entire province of Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election and was therefore familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency.

• "Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." — This is the statutory text of R.A. No. 6646, §6, which the Court construed to permit continuation of disqualification proceedings only if the candidate has not yet been proclaimed.
• "The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred." — This passage, quoted from Lazatin vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, anchors the Court's holding that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has exclusive original jurisdiction over the eligibility of a Member of the House.
• "It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." — This passage from Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC states the rule the Court used to reject petitioner's reliance on private respondent's prior certificates of candidacy.
• "As always, the polestar of adjudication in cases of this nature is Gallego v. Vera, in which this Court held: "[W]hen the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected."" — This passage states the Court's final rationale for upholding private respondent's qualification and respecting the electorate's choice.

• Lazatin vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391, 401 (1988) — Quoted for the exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction; the word "sole" emphasizes that the jurisdiction is complete and unimpaired.
• Aquino vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, 420-421 (1995) — Cited for the definition of residence in election law as domicile, the place where a party has his permanent home and intends to return and remain.
• Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1941) — Described as the polestar of adjudication; held that when evidence of lack of residence is weak or inconclusive and the purpose of the law would not be thwarted, the will of the electorate should be respected.
• Faypon vs. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) — Cited for the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
• Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 301, 326 (1995) — Cited for the rule that the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, is decisive, and that such a statement is material only when there is a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a disqualifying fact.

• Art. VI, §6, 1987 Constitution — Requires a Member of the House of Representatives to be a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected and a resident thereof for not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. The Court applied this provision by finding that private respondent satisfied the one-year residency requirement.
• Art. VI, §17, 1987 Constitution — Vests the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal with exclusive original jurisdiction over the declaration of ineligibility of a Member of the House. The Court applied this provision by holding that it had no jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari once private respondent had been proclaimed and had taken his oath of office.
• R.A. No. 6646, §6 — Governs the effect of a disqualification case; it authorizes the COMELEC or the Court to continue the trial and hearing after the election and to suspend proclamation when the evidence of guilt is strong, but only if the candidate has not been proclaimed. The Court applied this provision by holding that private respondent's proclamation barred further consideration of petitioner's action.
• Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Rule 17 — Provides for a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal within ten days after the proclamation of a Representative-elect. The Court cited this remedy as one petitioner should have pursued but could no longer avail of.
• Local Government Code, §39(a) — Provides that what is required for the election of governor is residency in the province, not in any district or municipality. The Court used this provision to explain that private respondent's prior certificates of candidacy stating residence in Gattaran, Cagayan were not inconsistent with residence in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

Davide, Jr., C.J.; Melo, Puno, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, JJ., concurred. Vitug, J., concurred in the result; Panganiban, J., concurred in the result and only on the ground of jurisdiction. Bellosillo and Quisumbing, JJ., were on official leave; Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., took no part.