Perez vs. Catindig

A lawyer who contracts a second marriage during the subsistence of a valid prior marriage commits grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment, especially where the lawyer knowingly used a foreign divorce decree he understood to be ineffective under Philippine law and married abroad to evade jurisdiction, thereby exhibiting a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and the law.

Dr. Elmar O. Perez and Atty. Tristan A. Catindig were former classmates at the University of the Philippines who reconnected in 1983. Atty. Catindig was at that time married to Lily Corazon Gomez, having wed her in 1968 in both a Methodist and a Catholic ceremony, with whom he had four children. Atty. Karen E. Baydo was an associate lawyer employed at Atty. Catindig's law firm. The administrative complaint for disbarment was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002, charging both respondents with gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Dr. Elmar O. Perez and Atty. Tristan A. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after graduation. Their paths crossed again sometime in 1983, when Atty. Catindig began courting Dr. Perez. Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already married to Lily Corazon Gomez, having wed her on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. He claimed he married Gomez only because he got her pregnant and feared a scandal that could jeopardize his Harvard Law School scholarship. Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez he was in the process of obtaining a foreign divorce to dissolve his marriage to Gomez and would eventually marry her once the divorce was decreed.

Sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Atty. Catindig assured Dr. Perez that the divorce was lawful and valid and that no impediment to their marriage remained. On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia, USA. Their union produced a son named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic. Years later, Dr. Perez discovered that her marriage to Atty. Catindig was a nullity because the Dominican Republic divorce decree was not recognized under Philippine law. When she confronted Atty. Catindig, he assured her he would legalize their union by obtaining a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under Philippine law and promised to legally adopt their son. In 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of this promise; he responded that he still needed to obtain Gomez's consent to the petition.

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez received an anonymous letter informing her of Atty. Catindig's affair with Atty. Karen E. Baydo, an associate lawyer at his firm. She subsequently discovered a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo, dated April 25, 2001, in which he professed his love and promised to marry her once his "impediment is removed." Five months into their alleged relationship, Atty. Baydo purportedly asked Atty. Catindig to halt the affair until he could obtain an annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son, moving to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City, where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

Atty. Catindig, in his comment, admitted marrying Gomez in 1968 but claimed their relationship deteriorated due to Gomez's serious intimacy problems, leading to a de facto separation in 1984. He stated that upon the advice of a mutual friend, Atty. Wilhelmina Joven, he and Gomez obtained a Dominican Republic divorce and filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984. He claimed Dr. Perez knew the Dominican Republic divorce had no effect in the Philippines and that she demanded marriage notwithstanding, so he married her in July 1984 in the USA to lend a "modicum of legitimacy" to their relationship. He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason he left Dr. Perez, asserting his relationship with Dr. Perez had deteriorated as early as 1997, that Atty. Baydo joined his firm only in September 1999, and that she rejected his romantic overtures and resigned in January 2001. Atty. Baydo, for her part, denied any affair, claiming she rejected Atty. Catindig's advances because he was married and too old for her, and that she resigned from his firm as a result of his persistent pursuit.

• Gross Immorality of Atty. Catindig: Dr. Perez alleged that Atty. Catindig committed gross immorality by marrying her despite knowing that his prior marriage to Gomez still subsisted under Philippine law, and by assuring her falsely that the Dominican Republic divorce decree was valid and removed all impediments to their marriage.
• Extramarital Affair with Atty. Baydo: Dr. Perez alleged that Atty. Catindig engaged in a scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, supported by an anonymous letter and a love letter written by Atty. Catindig to Atty. Baydo professing his love and promising marriage once his "impediment is removed."
• Pattern of Immoral Conduct: Dr. Perez contended that Atty. Catindig's abandonment of her and their son after 17 years of cohabitation, coupled with his pursuit of Atty. Baydo, demonstrated a pattern of grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.

• Transparency and Lack of Intent: Atty. Catindig claimed he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony and that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez regarding the status of his marriage. He asserted that Dr. Perez knew their marriage was invalid and that he married her only because he loved her and feared losing her.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Atty. Catindig argued that Dr. Perez's allegations were uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits as required under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, and that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez's uncorroborated testimony.
• Denial of Affair with Atty. Baydo: Atty. Catindig denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason he left Dr. Perez, asserting that his relationship with Dr. Perez had deteriorated as early as 1997 and that Atty. Baydo had rejected his advances and resigned from his firm in January 2001.
• Atty. Baydo's Denial: Atty. Baydo denied having an affair with Atty. Catindig, claiming she rejected his romantic overtures because he was married and too old for her, and that she resigned from his firm due to his persistent pursuit.

• Gross Immorality — Atty. Catindig: Whether Atty. Catindig committed grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment by contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of a valid prior marriage.
• Gross Immorality — Atty. Baydo: Whether Atty. Baydo committed grossly immoral conduct by engaging in an affair with Atty. Catindig.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the complaint against Atty. Catindig could proceed notwithstanding the alleged absence of corroborating affidavits under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

• Gross Immorality — Atty. Catindig: Yes. Atty. Catindig committed grossly immoral conduct by marrying Dr. Perez while his marriage to Gomez remained valid and subsisting, warranting the penalty of disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Gross Immorality — Atty. Baydo: No. The charge against Atty. Baydo was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the complainant having failed to present clear and preponderant proof of a mutual amorous relationship.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No, the objection was without merit. Atty. Catindig's own admissions in his pleadings that he married Dr. Perez while his prior marriage subsisted provided ample basis for disciplinary sanction, rendering the lack of corroborating affidavits immaterial.

• Gross Immorality — Atty. Catindig: The Court applied the standard that immoral conduct is "gross" when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or committed under scandalous or revolting circumstances shocking the community's sense of decency. Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to grossly immoral conduct. Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez in 1968 in both Methodist and Catholic ceremonies. In 1984, he obtained a Dominican Republic divorce he himself knew was not recognized under Philippine law, married Dr. Perez in the USA the same year, and did so deliberately outside Philippine jurisdiction to avoid a bigamy charge. His own admissions established a pattern of conduct that was not only corrupt and unprincipled but reprehensible to the highest degree. He used his legal skills to create a façade of validity for an invalid marriage, making a mockery of the institution of marriage. The Court noted that while the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, the seriousness of the offense — deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage protected by the Constitution and the law — compelled the ultimate penalty.

• Gross Immorality — Atty. Baydo: The Court applied the rule that in disbarment proceedings, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof rests on the complainant, with the required quantum being preponderance of evidence. Dr. Perez presented only an anonymous letter and a love letter written by Atty. Catindig to Atty. Baydo. The anonymous letter proved only that Dr. Perez received information about an alleged affair, not the truth of the allegations. The love letter proved only that Atty. Catindig wrote to Atty. Baydo professing his love; it did not establish that Atty. Baydo reciprocated or was in a relationship with him. The evidence was insufficient to prove a mutual amorous relationship.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Atty. Catindig argued that Dr. Perez's allegations were uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits as required under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Court found this objection deserving of scant consideration because Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted. This admission provided an independent and sufficient basis for disciplinary action, regardless of whether Dr. Perez's allegations were corroborated by third-party affidavits.

• Gross Immoral Conduct as Ground for Disbarment — Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, showing moral indifference to the opinion of upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency. The Court applied this framework to hold that contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.

• Good Moral Character as Continuing Requirement — Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession but must remain intact to maintain one's good standing. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character; it expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. The Court relied on this principle to emphasize that lawyers, both in their official and private conduct, must display exemplary behavior.

• Burden of Proof in Disbarment Proceedings — In suspension or disbarment proceedings, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. The evidence required is preponderance of evidence. The Court applied this standard to dismiss the charge against Atty. Baydo, finding that the anonymous letter and love letter did not meet the preponderance threshold.

• Caution in the Exercise of Disbarment Power — The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty such as temporary suspension could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. The Court nonetheless imposed disbarment, finding that the seriousness of Atty. Catindig's offense made it the most appropriate penalty.

• "Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency." — This passage provides the canonical formulation of the distinction between immoral and grossly immoral conduct, the threshold required for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

• "Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct." — This is the direct rule applied to Atty. Catindig's conduct, establishing that bigamous marriage by a lawyer per se constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action.

• "By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process." — This passage captures the Court's ratio for imposing the ultimate penalty of disbarment, emphasizing that Atty. Catindig's status as a lawyer and law professor aggravated his deliberate manipulation of legal mechanisms to create a façade of validity for an invalid marriage.

• Arnobit vs. Atty. Arnobit, 590 Phil. 270 (2008) — Cited for the proposition that good moral character is a continuing requirement for members of the bar, not merely a condition precedent to admission, and that such character involves the will to do right even when unpleasant.
• Cordova vs. Cordova, 259 Phil. 278 (1989) — Cited for the principle that moral delinquency affecting fitness to practice law includes conduct that outrages generally accepted moral standards, particularly conduct that makes a mockery of the institution of marriage.
• Tucay vs. Atty. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336 (1999) — Cited as authority for the rule that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman.
• Garrido vs. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, 625 Phil. 347 (2010) — Cited for the distinction between immoral conduct and grossly immoral conduct as the threshold for disbarment.
• Sps. Donato vs. Atty. Asuncion, Sr., 468 Phil. 329 (2004) — Cited for the rule that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for misconduct showing fault or deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.

• Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Applied to Atty. Catindig's contracting of a second marriage during the subsistence of a valid prior marriage.
• Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Applied to Atty. Catindig's conduct, which discredited the legal profession.
• Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession, whether in public or private life. Applied to Atty. Catindig's pattern of immoral conduct.
• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Authorizes the Supreme Court to remove or suspend a member of the bar for grossly immoral conduct, among other grounds. Applied as the statutory basis for Atty. Catindig's disbarment.
• Section 1, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court — Requires that a disbarment complaint be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts alleged and/or by documents substantiating said facts. Atty. Catindig invoked this provision, but the Court found his objection immaterial because his own admissions supplied sufficient basis for disciplinary action.

Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen. Justice Francis H. Jardeleza took no part.