Peralta-Labrador vs. Bugarin

The one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is jurisdictional; once the period lapses, the MTC loses jurisdiction over the case, and the proper remedy is an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria before the Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the failure of the parties to raise the defense of prescription does not vest the MTC with jurisdiction.

Petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador claimed ownership of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, a 400 sq. m. parcel in Sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, which she purchased in 1976 from spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto. Respondent Silverio Bugarin, on the other hand, claimed that the disputed area is included in a 4,473 sq. m. lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-13011, and that he had been in continuous possession since 1955. The case involves the application of the summary action of forcible entry under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the action be filed within one year from unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.

On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a complaint for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership" with the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales, docketed as Civil Case No. 328. She alleged that she is the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, a 400 sq. m. lot located at Sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, having purchased it in 1976 from spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto. In 1977, she was issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid the taxes due thereon. In 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways constructed a road that traversed Cadastral Lot No. 2650, separating 108 sq. m. from the rest of her lot, for which she was issued Tax Declaration No. 02-2460R in 1991. Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate it despite petitioner's pleas.

In his Answer with Counterclaims, respondent contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 sq. m. lot covered by OCT No. P-13011, and that he had been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955. In his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to allege that the questioned lot is covered by OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he planted fruit-bearing trees in the property. Respondent further pleaded the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription.

The petitioner's complaint alleged that she had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since she acquired it in 1976, until the time when the defendant took possession forcibly "two years ago." The complaint also alleged that in or before 1990, the land was traversed by a new National Highway, segregating the western portion which became the land in question. On direct examination, petitioner even stated that the unlawful possession of respondent started in 1990. The MTC ruled in favor of respondent, declaring him the owner of the controverted lot on the basis of OCT No. P-13011, and dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to prove prior physical possession and ownership. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision. The Court of Appeals partially granted the petition, deleting the declaration of ownership and the monetary awards because OCT No. P-13011 was not formally offered in evidence, but affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

• Ownership and Prior Physical Possession: Petitioner argued that she is the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, having purchased it in 1976, and that she had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession thereof in the concept of an owner since acquisition until respondent forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. portion.
• Error in Dismissal: Petitioner maintained that the lower courts erred in dismissing her complaint for recovery of possession and ownership, as she had sufficiently established her prior physical possession and ownership over the disputed lot.

• Coverage by OCT No. P-13011: Respondent contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 sq. m. lot covered by OCT No. P-13011, and that he had been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955.
• Defenses of Lack of Cause of Action and Prescription: Respondent pleaded the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, although he failed to allege that the questioned lot is covered by OCT No. P-13011 in that amended pleading.

• Jurisdiction of the MTC: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the forcible entry case given that the alleged unlawful deprivation of possession occurred more than one year before the filing of the complaint.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Ownership: Whether the complaint should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to prove that the disputed 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650.

• Jurisdiction of the MTC: No. The MTC had no jurisdiction over the case because the petitioner's own allegations showed that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996, exceeding the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria before the RTC.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Ownership: Yes. Even if the MTC had jurisdiction, the complaint should still be dismissed because petitioner failed to prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, having relied only on a Survey Notification Card that does not reflect the disputed lot and having never caused a survey of the lot after the construction of the new road.

• Jurisdiction of the MTC: The Court applied the rule that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Examining the averments of the complaint, the Court found that petitioner alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976 and forcible entry thereon by respondent. However, her allegation that the unlawful possession occurred "two years" prior to the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996, meant that the cause of action for forcible entry had already prescribed. Citing Lopez vs. David Jr. and Bongato vs. Malvar, the Court reiterated that forcible entry is a quieting process, and the one-year time bar complements the summary nature of the action. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess, or an accion reivindicatoria, an action to recover ownership as well as possession. The Court further held that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent, citing Bongato vs. Malvar and Bayog vs. Natino. Thus, the failure of respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription did not vest the MTC with jurisdiction.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Ownership: The Court applied the principle ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat — he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. Petitioner admitted that she had never seen the Cadastral Map of San Felipe, Zambales, and relied only on the Survey Notification Card from the Bureau of Lands, which does not reflect the 108 sq. m. lot subject of the case. Neither did she cause the survey of Cadastral Lot No. 2650 after the construction of the new road to prove that the segregated portion on the western side is part thereof. Failing to discharge this burden, the dismissal of the complaint was proper. The Court also noted that ownership of the lot in question cannot be awarded to respondent because OCT No. P-13011 and the Survey Plan were not formally offered in evidence. While the issue of ownership may be passed upon in ejectment cases for the sole purpose of determining the nature of possession, no evidence conclusively showed that the lot in question is covered by said OCT or any other title of respondent.

• Forcible Entry Prescription and Jurisdiction — An action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. When entry is made through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed may file either an accion publiciana, a plenary action to recover the right of possession, or an accion reivindicatoria, an action to recover ownership as well as possession, before the RTC. The one-year time bar is jurisdictional; the MTC loses jurisdiction over the case once the period lapses.
• Jurisdiction Determined by Complaint Allegations — Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In ascertaining whether an action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined. If the complaint's own allegations show that the unlawful deprivation exceeded one year, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the forcible entry case.
• Non-Waiver of Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.
• Burden of Proof — Ei Incumbit Probatio Qui Dicit, Non Qui Negat — He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. The plaintiff in an ejectment case must prove prior physical possession and ownership; failure to discharge this burden warrants the dismissal of the complaint.

• "It is clear that petitioner's averment make out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by respondent. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996, the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the complaint's own allegations revealed that the one-year prescriptive period had lapsed, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction.
• "It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case." — This passage establishes the non-waiver rule for subject matter jurisdiction and its application to the facts.
• "Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. Failing to discharge this burden, the dismissal of the complaint is proper." — This passage articulates the burden of proof principle applied to petitioner's failure to prove that the disputed lot is part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650.

• Lopez vs. David Jr., G.R. No. 152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535 — Cited for the proposition that an action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one-year time bar for filing the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action; proceedings in the MTCs are nullified when they improperly assume jurisdiction over a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession exceeded one year.
• Bongato vs. Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, August 14, 2002, 387 SCRA 327 — Cited for the rule that the one-year period for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry, but when entry is made through stealth, it is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it; after the lapse of the one-year period, the proper remedy is accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria before the RTC. Also cited for the non-waiver rule on jurisdiction.
• Sps. Tirona vs. Hon. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285 (2001) — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined.
• Sps. Boyboy vs. Atty. Yabut, Jr., 449 Phil. 664 (2003) — Cited for the principle ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat — he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
• Sps. Refugia vs. CA, 327 Phil. 982 (1996) — Cited for the rule that the issue of ownership may be passed upon in ejectment cases for the sole purpose of determining the nature of possession.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth may at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court for the restitution of such possession. The Court applied this provision to find that the petitioner's cause of action had prescribed because the unlawful possession occurred two years before the filing of the complaint.

Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.; Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Antonio T. Carpio, and Adolfo S. Azcuna.