People vs. Yuman

Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, requires unlawful aggression as an indispensable first requisite, and a slight push of the head with the hand does not constitute unlawful aggression warranting the employment of a deadly weapon in defense.

Marciano Martin and Beatriz Yuman, without being joined in lawful wedlock, lived as husband and wife for three or four years until February 26, 1935, when Marciano left their common dwelling. The case was prosecuted under the old Penal Code, which defined legitimate self-defense as an exempting circumstance in Article 8, No. 4, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Marciano Martin and Beatriz Yuman lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage for three or four years until February 26, 1935, when Marciano left their common dwelling. On the afternoon of March 5, 1935, Beatriz went to look for him at the cockpit of Mandaluyong. From there they came to Manila in a vehicle and, while on the way, talked of his absence and the many debts they had. Marciano intimated to Beatriz his determination to end their relations and urged her to return home alone. When they arrived at the corner of Legarda and Bustillos streets in Sampaloc, they alighted and she suggested that they go home together. Marciano, rude and hostile, objected, warning her not to meddle with his affairs and to do as she pleased, whereupon Beatriz stabbed him with the penknife she was carrying, inflicting a wound in the right lumbar region which injured the kidney.

When Marciano realized he had been wounded, he ran, pursued by Beatriz with weapon in hand. In his flight, Marciano ran into traffic policeman Eduardo Dizon, whom he asked to arrest "that woman" who had wounded him. Policeman Dizon saw Beatriz and commanded her to surrender the penknife, which she did instantly. When asked why she had wounded Marciano, she replied that Marciano "after having taken advantage of her" had abandoned her. She was immediately arrested and placed in custody, where she freely and voluntarily gave a written statement to the police officials — Exhibit D — from which the foregoing statement of facts was taken, the Court finding it to be a true, correct, and spontaneous version of the occurrence. The following day, Marciano Martin died as a result of the wound.

At trial, Beatriz testified to a different version, claiming that the deceased had compelled her to alight from the vehicle and pushed her head, causing her to feel dizzy and injure her foot, and that it was then she opened the penknife. She made no mention of this incident in her written statement of March 6th, and when questioned about the discrepancy during trial, she said only that she "was not able to declare very well because they had been intimidating me during the night," without attempting to deny or attack openly the contents of her statement. On the witness stand, she also admitted that there was no motive to justify her assaulting him and that she had no intention of attacking him, stating that the penknife was closed and she only opened it when she felt dizzy and her sight became dim.

• Self-Defense: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in failing to take into consideration the presence of all the elements of legitimate self-defense, or at least certain circumstances mitigating her criminal liability.
• Lack of Intention to Cause So Grave an Injury: Appellant prayed that this mitigating circumstance be appreciated, asserting she did not intend to cause so grave an injury as that committed.
• Provocation: Appellant claimed that provocation on the part of the deceased immediately preceded the attack, alleging the deceased pushed her head, causing her foot to be injured.
• Obfuscation: Appellant argued she acted under obfuscation due to the deceased's harsh treatment and his determination to end their relationship after years of cohabitation.
• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant prayed that voluntary surrender be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Lack of Instruction: Appellant contended that lack of instruction should be taken into consideration, she being a mere wage-earner who could not sign her statement and had to affix her thumbmark.

• Self-Defense: Whether the act of the accused in stabbing the deceased was justified by legitimate self-defense, complete or incomplete.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the mitigating circumstances of (a) lack of intention to cause so grave an injury, (b) provocation, (c) obfuscation, (d) voluntary surrender, and (e) lack of instruction should be appreciated in favor of the accused.

• Self-Defense: No. The appeal on the ground of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, is without merit, because unlawful aggression — the indispensable first requisite — was not present.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Partially granted. Obfuscation and lack of instruction were appreciated; lack of intention to cause so grave an injury, provocation, and voluntary surrender were disallowed.

• Self-Defense: The Court found that the stabbing occurred in the manner and under the circumstances stated in the accused's spontaneous written statement (Exhibit D), not in accordance with her subsequent testimony at trial. Under Exhibit D, the act of mortally wounding Marciano Martin had not been preceded by aggression on his part. Without unlawful aggression, there is no occasion to inquire into the reasonable necessity of the means employed or the existence of sufficient provocation, since both presuppose unlawful aggression. Even accepting as true the accused's belated allegation that the deceased pushed her head with his hand — an allegation made only at trial and absent from her written statement — such an act does not constitute the unlawful aggression contemplated by the Code. The Court relied on a series of prior decisions establishing that a slight push, a blow with the back of the hand, or a shove does not amount to unlawful aggression endangering personal safety so as to justify the use of a deadly weapon. The accused herself admitted on the witness stand that there was no motive to justify her assault and that she had no intention of attacking him.

• Mitigating Circumstances — Lack of Intention to Cause So Grave an Injury: This circumstance was erroneously appreciated by the trial court. The stab wound was not only mortal, but the accused pursued the fleeing victim with knife in hand and would likely have inflicted further wounds but for the timely arrival of Policeman Dizon. This marked obstinacy in the aggression revealed her intention to cause the injury to its full extent.

• Mitigating Circumstances — Provocation: The alleged provocation — that the deceased pushed her head, causing her foot to be injured — was a belated allegation made only at trial and not mentioned in her statement before the police. The Court found it not established by the evidence.

• Mitigating Circumstances — Obfuscation: This circumstance was properly appreciated in favor of the accused, given the peculiar circumstances of the case: the parties had lived together for three or four years, and the deceased had given the accused harsh treatment on the afternoon in question shortly before the aggression. The facts were distinguishable from United States vs. Hicks and People vs. Hernandez, cited by the prosecution.

• Mitigating Circumstances — Voluntary Surrender: The trial court correctly disregarded this circumstance, citing People vs. Siojo.

• Mitigating Circumstances — Lack of Instruction: This circumstance was appreciated, it appearing from the record that the accused was a mere wage-earner who could not sign her statement before the police and had to affix her thumbmark.

• Unlawful Aggression as Indispensable Requisite of Self-Defense — Unlawful aggression is the fundamental and indispensable first requisite of legitimate self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. Without it, there is no occasion to inquire into the reasonable necessity of the means employed or the lack of sufficient provocation, since both presuppose unlawful aggression. Not every act of physical contact constitutes unlawful aggression; a slight push of the head with the hand, a blow with the back of the hand, a shove, or an attempt to strike with a bench or chair — none of these, without more, places the person attacked in actual peril such as to justify the employment of a deadly weapon in defense. The aggression must amount to an act of violence endangering personal safety or rights.

• Spontaneous Statement vs. Trial Testimony — Where an accused gives a free and voluntary written statement to the police shortly after the incident, and that statement is found to be a true, correct, and spontaneous version of the occurrence, it prevails over subsequent testimony given at trial that contradicts it, particularly where the accused makes no open attempt to deny the contents of the written statement and offers only a vague explanation for the discrepancy.

• Obfuscation as Mitigating Circumstance — Obfuscation may be appreciated where the accused and the deceased had lived together for a considerable period and the deceased gave the accused harsh treatment shortly before the aggression, distinguishing the case from situations where no comparable relationship or provocation existed.

• "There is no occasion to speak her of the 'reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it', nor is it necessary to inquire whether or not there was 'sufficient provocation' on the part of the one involving legitimate self-defense because both circumstances presuppose unlawful aggression which, we repeat, was not present in the instant case." — This passage articulates the doctrinal principle that unlawful aggression is the indispensable gateway requisite of self-defense; without it, the other elements need not be examined.

• "Considering that an unlawful aggression, as a fundamental requisite of self-defense is not necessarily implied in any act of aggression against a particular person, when the author of the same does not persist in his purpose or when he desists therefrom to the extent that the person attacked is no longer in peril: ..." — Quoted from a 1909 decision, this defines the contours of unlawful aggression and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on self-defense.

• "This marked obstinacy of the accused in her aggression clearly reveals her intention to cause to its full extent the injury she has committed." — This passage explains why the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury cannot be appreciated where the accused pursued the fleeing victim with weapon in hand.

• United States vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217 — Cited by the prosecution for a contrary ruling on obfuscation; distinguished by the Court on the ground that the facts of the instant case — involving years of cohabitation and harsh treatment — were different.
• People vs. Hernandez, 43 Phil. 104 — Cited by the prosecution alongside United States vs. Hicks against appreciating obfuscation; likewise distinguished on the facts.
• People vs. Siojo — Cited as authority for the correct refusal to appreciate voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance in the instant case.
• Decision of November 30, 1909 (Gazette of April 21, 1910) — Cited for the principle that unlawful aggression is not necessarily implied in any act of aggression where the author does not persist in his purpose or desists.
• Decision of November 19, 1883 (Gazette of February 3, 1884) — Cited for the principle that a hard blow on the head, as the only act preceding the pulling of a knife, does not constitute unlawful aggression calling for legitimate defense.
• Decision of January 25, 1908 (Gazette of July 12, 1909) — Cited for the principle that holding the accused by the necktie and giving a blow on the neck with the back of the hand are provocations, not unlawful aggression, where no weapon was drawn or possessed.
• Decision of May 4, 1907 (Gazette of October 16 and 22, 1908) — Cited for the principle that neither a shove nor an attempt to strike with a bench or chair constitutes real aggression for purposes of self-defense.

• Article 8, No. 4, Penal Code (old) — Defines legitimate self-defense as an exempting circumstance, requiring as characteristic elements an act of violence amounting to unlawful aggression endangering personal safety or rights, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Applied to reject the accused's claim of self-defense for failure to establish the first requisite.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concurred.