People vs. Yau

The conviction for kidnapping for ransom was affirmed where the prosecution established all elements of the crime—intent to deprive the victim of liberty, actual deprivation of liberty, and the motive of extorting ransom—through positive identification and circumstantial evidence, and where the accused's warrantless arrest was deemed waived for failure to object before entering plea.

Petrus Yau, a British national, and Susana Yau, his Filipino wife, were charged with kidnapping for ransom of Alastair Joseph Onglingswam, an American lawyer and businessman. The couple owned the house in Bacoor, Cavite where the victim was detained for twenty-two days. The case arose under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which defines and penalizes kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. The accused-appellants were married in September 2001 but had been separated since June 2003, with Petrus living in one house and Susana in another.

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, left the Makati Shangrila Hotel and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the taxicab was traveling along EDSA within the vicinity of SM Megamall, Alastair received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that the driver, whom he later identified as Petrus Yau, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was being spoken to. Thereafter, Alastair felt groggy and decided to hang up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up, his head was covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.

When Alastair complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man wearing a red mask who introduced himself as "John" approached him and removed the plastic bag and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he would be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, a tape recorder, phone, and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. Alastair was allowed to call his girlfriend and father, initially with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told to reveal that he was kidnapped for ransom, with his kidnappers demanding US$600,000.00 as ransom and ₱20,000.00 a day as room and board fee.

On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila about the situation, and a meeting with representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged. Subsequently, Iris Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00, and she wired US$1,000.00 to Ong Kwai Ping through Metro Bank and Trust Company. Alastair's brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight deposits to Ong Kwai Ping's account in Metro Bank, amounting to ₱200,000.00, to ensure his brother's safety and eventual release. During Alastair's twenty-two days of captivity, he was allowed to communicate with his family almost daily and was served meals almost five times a day either by John or Susana Yau. He was also maltreated—beaten with sticks and made to lay down biting a piece of wood used as a target for a rifle.

On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 in the morning, PACER operatives positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway and eventually chanced upon the vehicle. They followed it, flagged it down, and approached the driver, who identified himself as Petrus Yau, a British national. When shown a picture of the private complainant and asked if he knew him, Petrus answered that the man was being kept in his house. He was immediately placed under arrest and informed of his constitutional rights. Petrus led the team to his house, and the PACER members found a man sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed, who later identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam. During trial, Alastair positively identified Petrus as his captor and the taxi driver, and DNA testing conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that the DNA found in the mask used by the captor matched that of Petrus.

Petrus denied the accusation, claiming that the supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the case against him and his family. He claimed he was at home sleeping on January 20, 2004, and that on February 11, 2004, he was abducted by three men, beaten, and taken into custody. He claimed he bought the taxi for personal use and/or resale, not to earn a living as a taxi driver. Susana denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every time the latter served Alastair's food, claiming she and Petrus were separated since June 2003 and that she lived at a different address. The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, rejected the defenses of alibi and frame-up as unsubstantiated, and convicted both accused-appellants.

• Illegal Arrest: Petrus argued that the trial court gravely erred in not finding that he was illegally arrested and that the pieces of object evidence allegedly seized were inadmissible.
• Positive Identification: Petrus argued that the trial court gravely erred in finding that there was positive identification of him as the alleged kidnapper.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Petrus argued that the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
• Lack of Counsel During Inquest: Petrus claimed that during the inquest proceedings, he was not assisted by counsel and was not informed of his constitutional rights.
• Separate Living Arrangement: Susana insisted that the trial court erred in not giving credence to her claim that she was living separately from her husband, Petrus Yau.
• Omission from Sworn Statement: Susana argued that the trial court erred in not considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by Alastair dated February 12, 2004, even when the victim was asked if there was another person assisting Petrus.
• Basis of Probable Cause: Susana argued that the trial court erred in not considering the Resolution of the Department of Justice dated February 13, 2004, which found probable cause against her because she was the registered owner of the house where Alastair was held captive, not because she served food to the victim.
• Conviction as Accomplice: Susana argued that the trial court erred in convicting her as an accomplice.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The Office of the Solicitor General maintained its positions and arguments in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446, presenting the prosecution's narration of the kidnapping and the evidence establishing the accused-appellants' guilt.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The OSG presented the prosecution's evidence, including the victim's positive identification of Petrus, the circumstantial evidence, and the DNA match, to establish the commission of the crime and the identity of the culprits.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be disturbed on appeal.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution evidence was sufficient to prove the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits beyond reasonable doubt.
• Degree of Responsibility: Whether the degree of responsibility of each accused-appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom was correctly determined.
• Legality of Warrantless Arrest: Whether the accused-appellants' warrantless arrests and the admissibility of seized evidence should result in their acquittal.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's factual findings on the credibility of witnesses, having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, were accorded great respect and conclusive effect, with no cogent reason found to deviate from such findings.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The prosecution established all elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, through positive identification and circumstantial evidence that constituted an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that Petrus was the author of the crime.
• Degree of Responsibility: Yes. Petrus was correctly held liable as principal, and Susana was correctly held liable as an accomplice, the elements of accomplice liability under Article 18 of the RPC having been established.
• Legality of Warrantless Arrest: No. The accused-appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests for failing to raise the objection before entering their pleas, and the illegality of arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court reiterated the ruling in People vs. Maxion that the issue of credibility of witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, which is in a better position to decide such questions having heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under examination. The trial court's factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect. Such findings assume even greater weight when affirmed by the CA. The RTC gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the accused-appellants, and the Court found no cogent reason to deviate from these findings.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution's task in every criminal case is two-fold: to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged and to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. The prosecution satisfactorily discharged this burden. Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115, and he had a good look and ample opportunity to remember the facial features of the driver. Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask as belonging to Petrus, having met his kidnapper five times a day for an hour each time during his captivity. Aaron John also insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he talked over the phone for three weeks was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent. There was no showing that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus.

The Court applied the requisites for conviction based on circumstantial evidence under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The combination of established facts included: the victim was rescued inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana; the taxi cab was found in Petrus's possession; the driver's license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were recovered inside the taxi; incriminating evidence was found in the house where the victim was rescued; two cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in Petrus's possession; and the DNA examination on the red mask matched Petrus's DNA profile.

The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. All elements were duly established: Petrus is a private individual; he kidnapped Alastair by using a sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious; he took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana, where the victim was handcuffed and chained; Alastair was taken against his will; and Petrus made demands for the delivery of ransom in the amount of US$600,000.00.

• Degree of Responsibility: Petrus was liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana was liable only as an accomplice, as there was no evidence indubitably proving that she participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence against her was Alastair's testimony that she gave food to him or accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would bring food. The elements of accomplice liability under Article 18 of the RPC are: (1) community of design—knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, the accomplice concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) cooperation in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband but kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food. She not only countenanced Petrus's illegal act but also supplied him with material and moral aid. The act of giving food was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of the crime but merely an expression of sympathy or feeling of support to her husband. In case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal, per People vs. De Vera.

Alastair's failure to mention Susana's name in his sworn statement did not prejudice his positive identification of her. Affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. Testimonies given during trial are more exact and elaborate, and sworn statements are often executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident.

The defenses of alibi and frame-up were rejected. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove, and must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. Apart from their bare allegations, no competent and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin defenses, and no dubious reasons or improper motive could have impelled the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify.

• Legality of Warrantless Arrest: Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before they entered their respective pleas. Considering this lapse and their full and active participation in the trial, they were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability, per People vs. Manlulu.

• Penalty and Damages: The RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal in view of R.A. No. 9346 prohibiting the death penalty. The penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, meted out against Susana as an accomplice, was proper. The award of actual damages in the amount of ₱273,132.00 plus interest from the filing of the information until fully paid was sustained. The award of moral damages of ₱1,000,000.00 was reduced to ₱200,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings endured. The award of exemplary damages was reduced from ₱200,000.00 to ₱100,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. The RTC erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the payment of damages, as this did not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal and the accomplice. Per People vs. Montesclaros, the entire amount of civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities, and actual participation. Petrus should shoulder a greater share than Susana, who was adjudged only as an accomplice. Petrus was liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total damages of ₱573,132.00, or ₱382,088.00, and Susana for the remaining one-third (1/3), or ₱191,044.00.

• Elements of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — The elements are: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. The Court applied these elements to the facts, finding that Petrus, a private individual, kidnapped Alastair by using a sleeping substance, detained him in a house where he was handcuffed and chained, and demanded US$600,000.00 for his release.

• Elements of Accomplice Liability under Article 18 of the RPC — The requisites for a person to be considered an accomplice are: (1) community of design—knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, the accomplice concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) cooperation in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. The Court found that Susana knew of her husband's criminal design but kept quiet and never reported the incident, instead staying with him and giving food to the victim, thereby supplying material and moral aid.

• Requisites for Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence — Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The Court applied this doctrine to the combination of facts, including the victim's rescue in the accused's house, the taxi in his possession, the ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping, and the DNA match.

• Waiver of Objection to Warrantless Arrest — Any objection to the procedure followed in the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. The Court applied this doctrine, finding that the accused-appellants never objected to their warrantless arrests before entering their pleas and fully participated in the trial, thereby waiving any objection.

• Apportionment of Civil Liability Among Co-Accused — The entire amount of civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities, and actual participation. The Court applied this doctrine from People vs. Montesclaros, apportioning two-thirds of the damages to the principal and one-third to the accomplice.

• "The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination." — This passage from People vs. Maxion, quoted by the Court, establishes the standard of appellate review for credibility findings, which the Court applied in affirming the trial court's assessment of the prosecution witnesses.

• "In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained." — This passage articulates the two-fold burden of the prosecution in criminal cases, which the Court found was satisfactorily discharged through positive identification and circumstantial evidence.

• "The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage states the requisites for conviction based on circumstantial evidence under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which the Court applied to the combination of established facts in the case.

• "The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation." — This passage from People vs. Montesclaros establishes the doctrine of apportioning civil liability among co-accused according to their degrees of participation, which the Court applied in dividing the damages between the principal and the accomplice.

• People vs. Maxion, 413 Phil. 740 (2001) — Controlling precedent on the standard of appellate review of trial court findings on witness credibility, quoted by the Court to justify affirming the RTC's assessment of the prosecution witnesses.

• People vs. Algarme, 598 Phil. 423 (2009) — Followed for the rule that trial court factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

• People vs. Bacalso, 395 Phil. 192 (2000) — Followed for the rule that the prosecution must prove both the commission of the crime and the identity of the person responsible beyond reasonable doubt.

• People vs. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158 (2002) — Followed for the rule that it is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their accosters.

• People vs. Bringas, 619 SCRA 481 (2010) — Followed for the rule that absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists.

• People vs. Canlas, 423 Phil. 665 (2001) — Followed for the requisites of conviction based on circumstantial evidence under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

• People vs. Flores, 389 Phil. 532 (2000) — Followed for the corollary rule that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused.

• People vs. Cenahonon, 554 Phil. 415 (2007) — Followed for the elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

• People vs. Fabros, 429 Phil. 701 (2002) — Followed for the elements required under Article 18 of the RPC for a person to be considered an accomplice.

• People vs. Toling, 180 Phil. 305 (1979) — Followed for the rule that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice.

• People vs. De Vera, 371 Phil. 563 (1999) — Followed for the rule that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

• People vs. Silvano, 403 Phil. 598 (2001) — Followed for the rule that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses.

• Lumanog vs. People, 630 SCRA 42 (2010) — Followed for the rule that discrepancies between a sworn statement and a testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused.

• People vs. Tamsi, 437 Phil. 424 (2002) — Followed for the rule that sworn statements are often executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident.

• People vs. Reyes, 600 Phil. 738 (2009) — Followed for the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.

• People vs. Li, 467 Phil. 582 (2004) — Followed for the rule that the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.

• De Asis vs. Hon. Romero, 148-B Phil. 710 (1971) — Followed for the rule that any objection to the procedure followed in the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea.

• People vs. Lagarto, 383 Phil. 591 (2000) — Followed for the rule that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.

• People vs. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701 (1994) — Followed for the rule that the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.

• People vs. Calimlim, 416 Phil. 403 (2001) — Followed for the rule that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

• People vs. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013) — Followed for the reduction of exemplary damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

• People vs. Montesclaros, 607 Phil. 296 (2009) — Controlling precedent on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities, and actual participation.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. The Court applied this provision in finding Petrus guilty as principal, having established the elements of intent to deprive the victim of liberty, actual deprivation of liberty, and the motive of extorting ransom.

• Article 18, Revised Penal Code — Defines accomplices and the requisites for accomplice liability. The Court applied this provision in finding Susana liable as an accomplice, having established community of design, cooperation in the execution of the crime, and a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the accomplice.

• Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. The Court applied this provision in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal.

• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides the requisites for conviction based on circumstantial evidence. The Court applied this provision in upholding the conviction based on the combination of established facts and circumstances.

• Article 2219, Civil Code — Provides for moral damages. The Court applied this provision in awarding moral damages for the trauma from mental, physical, and psychological ordeal suffered by the victim and his family.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied by the RTC in determining the penalty for Susana as an accomplice, with the minimum penalty taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty.

• Justice Antonio T. Carpio
• Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
• Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
• Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen