People vs. Yatco

At the stage of trial, a trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in completely excluding an accused’s extrajudicial confession merely because conspiracy has not yet been proved by other evidence; the confession is admissible against the declarant under the rule of multiple admissibility and may be admitted conditionally for the purpose of proving conspiracy.

The People of the Philippines prosecuted Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban for murder before the CFI of Quezon City, presided over by Judge Nicasio Yatco. The evidentiary dispute turns on Section 14 of Rule 123, which governs an accused’s extrajudicial confession as evidence against him, and Section 12 of Rule 123, which governs a conspirator’s act or declaration against a co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by other evidence.

On March 22, 1955, the City Attorney of Quezon City filed an amended information in the CFI of Quezon City, Criminal Case No. Q-1G37, charging Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity was still unknown with having conspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos. Trial began on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution presented its evidence.

On May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation about the making of a certain extrajudicial confession allegedly made before him by Juan Consunji, counsel for Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against Panganiban. The trial court ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. The fiscal then asked whether counsel was also objecting to the admissibility of Consunji’s confession as against Consunji himself, and the trial court replied that it would be premature because of its ruling that a confession cannot be proved unless conspiracy is first proved through a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances as required by law.

The prosecution moved in writing for reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but the motion was denied. The alleged confessions, both in writing and in tape recordings, had not yet been identified—the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions—and had not been formally offered in evidence. The Solicitor General then brought the matter to the SC by petition for certiorari, seeking review and annulment of the lower court’s order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of Consunji and Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

• Exclusion of Confessions: The Solicitor General sought review and annulment of the lower court’s order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

• Hearsay: Counsel for Alfonso Panganiban objected to any evidence on Juan Consunji’s extrajudicial confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against Panganiban.

• Exclusion of Confession as Evidence Against Declarant: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in completely excluding Consunji’s extrajudicial confession even as evidence against Consunji himself.
• Prior Proof of Conspiracy: Whether the trial court prematurely excluded the confessions of Consunji and Panganiban for lack of prior proof of conspiracy.
• Waiver/Motu Proprio Exclusion: Whether the trial court could exclude the confessions motu proprio on a ground not raised by the objecting counsel.

• Exclusion of Confession as Evidence Against Declarant: Yes. The trial court gravely abused its discretion; under Section 14, Rule 123 and the rule of multiple admissibility, Consunji’s confession was admissible as evidence of his own guilt.
• Prior Proof of Conspiracy: Yes. The exclusion was premature; Section 12, Rule 123 applies to statements made during the conspiracy, not to a confession made long after it ended, and the confessions had not yet been offered to prove conspiracy.
• Waiver/Motu Proprio Exclusion: No. The right to object is a waivable privilege; the trial court could not disregard the evidence on its own motion on a ground different from Panganiban’s hearsay objection.

• Exclusion of Confession as Evidence Against Declarant: The SC held that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution’s evidence on the alleged confessions of Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made. Section 14, Rule 123 provides that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged may be given in evidence against him. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji’s confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was nevertheless admissible as evidence of the declarant’s own guilt. The SC cited U.S. vs. Vega, People vs. Bande, and People vs. Buan, and held that the confession should have been admitted as such.

• Prior Proof of Conspiracy: The rule cited by the lower court, Section 12 of Rule 123, provides that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The SC held that the rule manifestly refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end, citing U.S. vs. Empeinado, U.S. vs. Raymundo, and People vs. Badilla. Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them; the alleged confessions had not yet even been identified, much less formally offered in evidence. The prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy before the confessions were formally offered. The SC therefore held that it was premature for the trial court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy. The lower court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admitted the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. In the final determination of the case, the trial court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible and reject what should be excluded under the rules of evidence. The SC also invoked the policy in Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co. against premature exclusion of evidence, with greater reason in criminal cases where unjustified exclusion may lead to erroneous acquittal or dismissal from which the People can no longer appeal.

• Waiver/Motu Proprio Exclusion: The SC noted that the exclusion of the proffered confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban’s counsel, but upon an altogether different ground issued motu proprio by the trial court. Panganiban’s counsel objected to Consunji’s confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. The trial court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection that the confessions could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances, and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the trial court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence, citing Marella vs. Reyes.

• Multiple Admissibility of Evidence — Evidence may be admissible for one purpose even if it is inadmissible for another. In this case, Consunji’s confession was inadmissible against Panganiban as hearsay and could not by itself prove conspiracy without other evidence, but it was nevertheless admissible as evidence of Consunji’s own guilt under Section 14, Rule 123.
• Conditional Admission and Policy Against Premature Exclusion — At an early stage of trial, a court may admit evidence conditionally where the offeror states that the proof will be connected later, leaving the trial court to distinguish admissible from inadmissible evidence in its final determination. The SC applied this by holding that the confessions should have been admitted conditionally to establish conspiracy, giving the prosecution a chance to place all relevant evidence on record.
• Conspirator’s Declaration Under Section 12, Rule 123 — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against a co-conspirator only after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The SC held that this rule covers statements made during the conspiracy and in furtherance of its object, not a confession made long after the conspiracy had ended.
• Waiver of Objection to Evidence — The right to object to evidence is a mere privilege that may be waived; if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived, and the court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence. The SC applied this because the trial court excluded the confessions motu proprio on a ground different from Panganiban’s hearsay objection.

• "Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such." — This is the core ruling on multiple admissibility: the confession was inadmissible against the co-accused but still admissible against the declarant.
• "the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges." — This states the conditional-admission remedy and explains why complete exclusion was premature.
• "By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1)." — This defines the waiver rule and condemns the trial court’s motu proprio exclusion.
• "There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal." — This explains the policy against premature exclusion in criminal prosecutions.

• U.S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41 — Cited with Bande and Buan for the rule that an extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence of the declarant’s own guilt despite being inadmissible against a co-accused.
• People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37 — Cited with Vega and Buan for the same rule on admissibility of a confession against the declarant.
• People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296 — Cited with Vega and Bande for the same rule on admissibility of a confession against the declarant.
• U.S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil. 613 — Cited to distinguish Section 12, Rule 123: the conspirator-declaration rule covers statements during the conspiracy, not a confession made after it ended.
• U.S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil. 416 — Cited with Empeinado and Badilla for the same distinction on conspirator declarations.
• People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718 — Cited with Empeinado and Raymundo for the same distinction on conspirator declarations.
• Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1 — Cited for waiver of objection to evidence and the court’s lack of power to exclude evidence motu proprio on a ground not raised.
• Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil. 807, 816-817 — Cited for the policy against premature exclusion of evidence and in favor of conditional admission where the offeror will connect the proof later.

• Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court — Provides that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged may be given in evidence against him. The SC applied this to hold that Consunji’s extrajudicial confession was admissible as evidence of his own guilt.
• Section 12, Rule 123, Rules of Court — Provides that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The SC applied this to hold that the rule did not justify excluding a confession made long after the conspiracy ended, and that the exclusion was premature because conspiracy could still be proved by other evidence before formal offer.