People vs. Webb

The trial court does not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying a motion to take the depositions of foreign witnesses during trial when the anticipated testimony is merely corroborative of documentary evidence already admitted, and any perceived error in such denial constitutes an error of judgment reviewable by appeal, not an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb stands accused of Rape with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 95-404 before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. To substantiate his defense of alibi—that he was in the United States at the time of the crime—Webb sought to present documentary evidence and the testimonies of five U.S. residents and officials. Because these witnesses resided outside Philippine jurisdiction and could not be compelled by subpoena, Webb moved to take their oral depositions before Philippine consular officers in the United States during the course of the trial.

• The Criminal Charge: Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape with Homicide pending before Branch 274 of the RTC of Parañaque, presided by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.
• Motion to Take Depositions: On May 2, 1997, during the course of the trial, Webb filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition of five U.S. residents (Steven Bucher, Debora Farmer, Jaci Alston, Ami Smalley, and John Pavlisin) before a Philippine consular officer. Webb invoked Section 4, Rule 24 (now Rule 23) of the Rules of Court, arguing that the witnesses were outside the court's subpoena power and their testimonies were material and indispensable to his defense.
• Prosecution's Opposition: The prosecution opposed the motion, contending that Rule 24 (Rule 23) does not apply to criminal cases, and that Rule 119 of the Rules of Court only allows conditional examination of witnesses before trial, not during trial, and not outside Philippine jurisdiction.
• RTC Denial: The trial court denied the motion on June 11, 1997, and subsequently denied Webb's motion for reconsideration on July 25, 1997.
• Court of Appeals Reversal: Webb elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari. The CA granted the petition, ruling that Rule 23 applies suppletorily to criminal proceedings, that depositions may be taken before a consular officer, and that denying the motion violated Webb's right to due process.
• Superfluous Nature of the Evidence: The Supreme Court noted that the depositions were sought primarily to establish the admissibility of Defense Exhibits "218" and "219." However, the trial court had already admitted these exhibits in its order dated July 10, 1998, rendering the issue moot. Moreover, a comparison of these exhibits with previously admitted documentary evidence revealed that they were of the exact same nature and contents, merely printed on different dates or signed by different officers. The defense had already presented at least 57 witnesses and 464 documentary exhibits, many of which were identical in nature to the documents the proposed deponents would authenticate.

• Petitioner People of the Philippines argued that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to criminal proceedings.
• Petitioner contended that the CA erred in ruling that depositions may be taken before a consular officer where the prospective witnesses reside.
• Petitioner maintained that the CA erred in ruling that respondent was deprived of due process by the trial court.
• Petitioner asserted that the trial judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and any perceived error would be merely an error of judgment correctible by appeal, not certiorari.

• Respondent Webb argued that the taking of depositions pending action is applicable to criminal proceedings.
• Respondent contended that depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken before a consular officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States.
• Respondent maintained that the denial of his motion violated his constitutional right to due process and to present evidence in his defense, as he could not compel the attendance of the foreign witnesses through subpoena.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to take depositions, thereby warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
• Substantive Issues: Whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (Depositions Pending Action) is applicable to criminal proceedings; whether the denial of the motion to take the depositions of foreign witnesses during trial violates the accused's right to due process.

• Procedural: The Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The trial court's denial of the motion was an exercise of its judgment and discretion, especially considering the superfluous nature of the evidence. Any error in this regard is merely an error of judgment, which is reviewable by a timely appeal, not by a special civil action for certiorari. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in findings.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the depositions would be superfluous and cumulative. The primary reason for seeking the depositions—to foreclose objections to the admissibility of Exhibits "218" and "219"—was rendered moot by the trial court's admission of those exhibits. Furthermore, the contents of these exhibits were identical to previously admitted evidence. Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, a court may stop the introduction of further testimony when the evidence on a particular point is already so full that additional witnesses cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. The Court also noted that depositions, as a mode of discovery, should be taken before trial, not during. The denial of the motion did not violate due process, as Webb had ample opportunity to present his side, having already presented 57 witnesses and 464 exhibits. Due process is not a monopoly of the defense; the State is also entitled to due process.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the trial judge's denial of the deposition motion, grounded on the superfluous nature of the evidence, was a valid exercise of discretion and did not amount to grave abuse.
• Power of the Court to Stop Further Evidence — Under Section 6, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. The Court relied on this principle to justify the trial court's denial of the motion, emphasizing that the proposed depositions would be merely corroborative of already admitted documentary evidence.

• "Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of Law."
• "It must be borne in mind in this regard that due process is not a monopoly of the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due process as much as the accused."
• "In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court."

• Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523 [1911] — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that procedure should facilitate, not thwart, justice. The Supreme Court implicitly distinguished or declined to apply this to justify overriding the trial court's discretion on superfluous evidence.
• Webb, et al. v. People of the Philippines, et al., 276 SCRA 243 [1997] — Cited by the Supreme Court to demonstrate that the trial court had already admitted the documentary exhibits in question, rendering the deposition issue moot and academic.
• Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159 [1998] — Cited by the Supreme Court as authority for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.

• Section 1, Rule 23, Rules of Court — Depositions pending action. The Court of Appeals held this applies suppletorily to criminal cases; the Supreme Court reversed, noting that depositions as a mode of discovery should be taken before trial, and the evidence sought was already admitted.
• Section 4, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Conditional examination of witnesses for the accused before trial. The Court noted this applies to conditional examinations before trial, whereas the deposition was sought during trial.
• Section 6, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court — Power of the court to stop further evidence. The Court applied this provision to justify the trial court's denial of the motion, as the proposed depositions were merely corroborative of already admitted evidence.

Kapunan, J., and Pardo, J., concurred. Puno, J., filed a concurring opinion.

• Chief Justice Davide — Filed a separate opinion (text not provided in the decision excerpt).