People vs. Violin

Treachery absorbs the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and a wound inflicted by a stray bullet upon a hidden person—not the target of the assault—constitutes only slight physical injuries, not frustrated murder, absent any intent to kill that person.

The Astorga and Figueroa families were political rivals in the municipality of Daram, Samar. Dioscoro Astorga Jr., the victim, was the Police Station Commander of Daram and was being groomed to succeed his father, the incumbent mayor. Miguel Figueroa, the former mayor, was planning a political comeback. The accused—Antonio Violin, Eutiquio Cherriguene, and Remegio Yazar—were employees and followers of the Figueroas. Cesar Allego, who remained at large, was the Punong Barangay of San Jose, Daram, and nephew of a vice-mayoralty candidate running under the Figueroa ticket.

On the evening of 31 December 1985, Darmo Astorga was at the house of his sister in Bgy. Muñoz, Catbalogan, Samar, together with his brother Dioscoro Astorga Jr., the Police Station Commander of Daram, and other relatives. Cesar Allego, Punong Barangay of San Jose, Daram, arrived seeking Dioscoro Jr.'s help in settling a dispute with a certain Mrs. Agas. Dioscoro Jr. agreed on the condition that Allego conduct him and Darmo back to Catbalogan that same night. Before departing, the Astorga brothers and Allego stopped by the wharf and drank three bottles of beer each. While the brothers were drinking, Allego walked to a motorboat docked nearby and conversed with Antonio Violin, Eutiquio Cherriguene, and Remegio Yazar.

The group left for Bgy. San Jose at around 9:00 o'clock that evening aboard Violin's motorboat, with Violin, Cherriguene, and Yazar among the passengers. Upon reaching Bgy. Pait, Violin disembarked but agreed to meet Allego later at a public dance in Bgy. San Jose. The remaining party arrived at Bgy. San Jose at around 11:30 p.m. Yazar and Cherriguene accompanied the group to Allego's house but left after Allego promised to follow them at the dance. Allego then summoned Mrs. Agas to a meeting, but she had not yet returned from fishing. Dioscoro Jr. requested Allego to take them back to Catbalogan, but Allego refused, citing lack of transportation. The brothers were thus constrained to spend the night at Allego's house, while Allego left to attend the public dance.

At around four o'clock the following morning, 1 January 1986, Dioscoro Jr. and Darmo were roused from sleep by Allego, who invited them to eat and drink. Violin, Cherriguene, and Yazar were already drinking beer in the kitchen. After a few rounds, Allego asked Violin to buy more beer; Violin left, followed by Cherriguene and Yazar. Shortly after, Dioscoro Jr. stood up to urinate but Allego told him to relieve himself outside, as Allego himself intended to use the comfort room. Dioscoro Jr. went out, leaving Darmo alone in the kitchen. Suddenly, Darmo heard several gunshots. He ran toward the door but was met by Dioscoro Jr., who was bleeding, staggering, and about to fall. Dioscoro Jr. told Darmo to hide or he might also be shot by the three—Violin, Cherriguene, and Yazar. Darmo crawled and hid under a table measuring about three feet wide, seven feet long, and two feet four-and-a-half inches tall. From this position, he saw Violin standing at the kitchen door, firing at Dioscoro Jr. and shouting, "Tapos ka, ayos na an singkwenta mil pesos (P50,000.00) nga bayad ni Cata." A stray bullet from Violin's firearm grazed the right side of Darmo's head. Yazar also fired at Dioscoro Jr., saying, "Kapitan, waray na kamo kuntra hit election, waray na kuntra iton mga Figueroa." Cherriguene, positioned outside the kitchen window, likewise fired at Dioscoro Jr. The three assailants then searched for Darmo but failed to find him, and left toward the coconut trees behind the house.

When Darmo emerged and found his brother dead, he searched for Dioscoro Jr.'s firearm but could not locate it. He found a bolo in the kitchen and went outside looking for the assailants, but they were gone. He returned to find Allego sprawled in the bathroom, crying. Darmo asked Allego to bring him to Catbalogan, but Allego did not respond. A barangay councilor among the people who gathered at the scene assisted Darmo back to Catbalogan, where he informed relatives of what happened and proceeded to the hospital for treatment. Dr. Honorata L. Gabon autopsied the cadaver and ascertained the cause of death as cardiorespiratory failure secondary to severe hemorrhage from multiple gunshot wounds. The prosecution theorized that the killing was politically motivated, presenting testimonies that Miguel Figueroa and Catalino Figueroa had earlier approached hit men for a contract on Dioscoro Jr.'s life.

The defense invoked alibi for all three accused. Yazar, overseer of Catalino Figueroa's coconut plantation and cattle ranch, claimed he was in Manila from 23 December 1985 to the first week of February 1986. Cherriguene, another ranch caretaker, stated that he attended a birthday celebration on the evening of 31 December 1985 and remained there until five o'clock the next morning, corroborated by Beatriz Donaire and Antonio Coo. Violin testified that he disembarked at Bgy. Pait and spent the entire night drinking with friends at his house, learning of the murder only the following morning when Allego dropped by after taking Darmo to the hospital. He admitted owning the motorboat used by the Astorgas and that Allego was his boat mechanic and pilot. The trial court found the prosecution's eyewitness, Darmo Astorga, credible and positive in his identification of the assailants, and rejected the defense of alibi as self-serving. The trial court found the killing qualified by treachery and aggravated by craft and abuse of superior strength, and convicted the three accused of murder and frustrated murder.

• Alibi: Petitioners maintained that they could not have participated in the killing, each asserting a different location at the time of the incident—Yazar claimed to be in Manila, Cherriguene at a birthday celebration, and Violin at his residence in Bgy. Pait.
• Impossibility of Concealment: Petitioners argued that Darmo, standing five feet five inches tall, could not have hidden under a table measuring only three feet wide, seven feet long, and two feet four inches high, and that his vision would have been so inhibited that he could not have identified the attackers.
• Intoxication: Petitioners postulated that Darmo was drunk and therefore incapable of accurate perception, anchoring this on the fact that he drank beer the night before and again before the shooting.
• Inconsistencies in Testimony: Petitioners attempted to destroy Darmo's credibility by pointing to alleged confusion regarding minor details—the number of doors in Allego's house, who walked ahead to the kitchen, and whether the accused were standing or sitting.

• Political Motivation: The prosecution maintained that the killing was politically motivated, presenting testimonies of Mateo Villaganes and Nestor Pahayahay that Miguel Figueroa and Catalino Figueroa had earlier approached hit men for a contract on Dioscoro Jr.'s life.
• Positive Identification: The prosecution relied on the clear and categorical identification by Darmo Astorga, the lone eyewitness and survivor, whose credible and positive testimony was sufficient to justify conviction.

• Sufficiency of Identification and Alibi: Whether the positive identification of the accused by the sole eyewitness, Darmo Astorga, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder notwithstanding the defense of alibi.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the killing was properly qualified by treachery and aggravated by craft and abuse of superior strength.
• Nature of the Crime Against Darmo: Whether the crime committed against Darmo Astorga is frustrated murder or slight physical injuries.

• Sufficiency of Identification and Alibi: Yes. The conviction was sustained, Darmo Astorga's positive and credible identification of the accused having prevailed over the inherently weak defense of alibi.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery was sustained as the qualifying circumstance; craft was struck down for lack of evidence of intellectual trickery or cunning; abuse of superior strength was struck down as an independent aggravating circumstance because it is necessarily absorbed in treachery.
• Nature of the Crime Against Darmo: Slight physical injuries, not frustrated murder. The wound was caused by a stray bullet fired at Dioscoro Jr., with no indication that Violin knew Darmo was hiding under the table or intended to kill him.

• Sufficiency of Identification and Alibi: Alibi is the weakest of all defenses and cannot stand against strong and positive identification. The accused's testimonies and those of their witnesses were self-serving and fell flat against Darmo Astorga's clear and categorical account. The trial court correctly observed that positive identification by a survivor of the attack was not shaken, and that a lone witness's credible and positive testimony suffices for conviction. The defense's objection that Darmo could not have hidden under a small table was rejected as speculative: Darmo's act was spontaneous and instinctive, his life was at stake, and he had no luxury of time to find a comfortable hiding place. The contention that his vision would have been inhibited was dismissed as based on a false premise. Darmo's ability to identify the weapons used was bolstered by his membership in the Civilian Home Defense Force, which made him knowledgeable in firearms identification. His recall of the assailants' utterances was explained by the fact that they attacked alternately, focusing his attention on each perpetrator. The alleged intoxication was pure conjecture, as no evidence showed Darmo was deprived of his perceptive faculties; his detailed account demonstrated full awareness. The alleged inconsistencies pertained to minor and inconsequential matters that did not substantially affect the findings.

• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery was properly appreciated because the victim was not afforded any opportunity to defend himself, and the assailants ensured the crime's consummation with the least risk to themselves. The three conspirators attacked as soon as Dioscoro Jr. stepped out of the house, and he had no inkling he would be assaulted, considering all were guests of Cesar Allego. Craft was not established because there was no showing that the accused employed stealth or covert machinations to camouflage their intentions. Abuse of superior strength could not be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance because, when treachery qualifies the crime of murder, abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former—a principle settled as early as 1914 in United States vs. Estopia.

• Nature of the Crime Against Darmo: The crime committed against Darmo was slight physical injuries, not frustrated murder. Antonio Violin fired at Dioscoro Astorga Jr. and not at Darmo. There was no indication that Violin knew Darmo was hiding under the table. Darmo himself admitted he was injured by a stray bullet that grazed the right parietal region of his head. The wound was diagnosed as superficial and required treatment for only three days. Frustrated murder requires intent to kill and the performance of all acts of execution that would produce death but for causes independent of the perpetrator's will; here, the stray nature of the bullet and the absence of any intent to kill Darmo negated frustrated murder.

• Alibi as the weakest defense — Alibi is the weakest of all defenses and cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused by a credible eyewitness. For alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate not only that he was elsewhere but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. In this case, the accused's alibis were self-serving and contradicted by Darmo's categorical identification.

• Sufficiency of a lone eyewitness — The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to justify a conviction. The prosecution need not present multiple witnesses if the lone witness's account is clear, consistent on material points, and convincing.

• Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength — When treachery qualifies the killing as murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily absorbed in treachery and cannot be appreciated independently. This principle has been settled since United States vs. Estopia (1914).

• Frustrated murder requires intent to kill — Frustrated murder requires that the accused performed all acts of execution that would produce the victim's death as a consequence, but the death did not result by reason of causes independent of the perpetrator's will. Where the wound is caused by a stray bullet fired at another person, with no evidence that the accused intended to kill or even knew of the hidden victim's presence, the crime is only slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.

• "We have ruled, time and again, that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and cannot stand against strong and positive identification." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on the relative weight of alibi versus positive identification, a principle consistently applied in Philippine criminal jurisprudence.

• "When treachery qualifies the crime of murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former. This we ruled as early as 1914." — This passage articulates the principle that treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength, preventing double appreciation of circumstances arising from the same facts.

• "The crime of slight physical injuries, not frustrated murder, was committed against Darmo Astorga. Antonio Violin fired at Dioscoro Astorga Jr. and not at Darmo. There is not the slightest indication that at that time Violin knew that Darmo was hiding under a table." — This passage defines the ratio decidendi for downgrading the crime against Darmo, establishing that intent to kill the actual victim is essential for frustrated murder and that a stray bullet inflicting a superficial wound negates such intent.

• People vs. Juliano, No. L-33053, 28 January 1980, 95 SCRA 526 — Cited for the definition of craft as the use of intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the accused, which the Court found was not established in this case.

• United States vs. Estopia, 28 Phil. 97 (1914) — Cited as early authority for the principle that abuse of superior strength is necessarily absorbed in treachery when the latter qualifies the crime as murder, barring independent appreciation of the former as a generic aggravating circumstance.

• Article 266, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes slight physical injuries. The Court applied this provision in lieu of frustrated murder, finding that Darmo's superficial wound—caused by a stray bullet and requiring only three days of treatment—constituted slight physical injuries rather than frustrated murder, which requires intent to kill and the performance of all acts of execution that would produce death.

Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concurred.