People vs. Vilo

Where a killing is laid as an overt act of treason, it becomes identified with treason and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
The requirement under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code that all the Justices voting must be unanimous for the imposition of the death penalty is a substantive right; Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, reducing the required number of votes to eight, cannot be applied retroactively to an offense committed before its enactment without violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Roman Vilo was a former member of the USAFFE who, after being arrested and tortured by Japanese forces in 1942, was compelled to join the Bureau of Constabulary under the Japanese-sponsored government. In 1944, while stationed in Cebu, he took part in the apprehension, torture, and killing of civilians linked to the guerrilla resistance movement.

• The Overt Acts: On April 15, 1944, in Carcar, Cebu, appellant Roman Vilo, a member of the Japanese-controlled Philippine Constabulary, participated in the apprehension and torture of Amando Satorre, Ireneo Medel, Maximo Satorre, and Eusebio Rezada, and in the killing of Mando Satorre, all of whom were connected with the resistance movement. On the same day, Vilo apprehended Laureano Raponoya, a suspected guerrilla, and delivered him to the Japanese, who tortured him. In March 1944, in Pinamungahan, Cebu, Vilo took part in the apprehension, torture, and killing of one Segundo, a guerrilla volunteer guard. The victims were bayoneted, and at least one had his knees slashed to make the body fit into a grave.

• Claim of Duress: Vilo alleged that he had been inducted into the USAFFE in March 1942, was arrested by the Japanese four months later with forty-two others, subjected to torture that required two months of hospitalization, and afterward was forced to join the puppet Philippine Constabulary. He contended that these circumstances left him without choice but to commit the acts charged.

• Prosecution Admission: The prosecution acknowledged that one count regarding an arrest was not supported by the required two witnesses. The two remaining counts, however, were deemed sufficient.

• People’s Court Finding: The trial court convicted Vilo of the complex crime of treason with murder and imposed the death penalty, finding the overt acts proved beyond reasonable doubt and rejecting the defense of duress.

• Duress: Whether appellant acted under duress that would exempt him from criminal liability for treason.
• Complex Crime: Whether the killing of Amando Satorre and Segundo constituted a separate offense that could form a complex crime of treason with murder, or was merely an element of treason.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of armed band and use of torture could be appreciated to justify the death penalty.
• Death Penalty — Voting Requirement: Whether the death penalty could be imposed given that one Justice dissented from its propriety, in light of Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 9 of Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948).

• Duress: The defense of duress was not substantiated. Appellant’s prior arrest and alleged torture did not amount to an imminent threat that left him no choice but to commit the specific overt acts almost two years later. The particularly brutal manner in which the killings were carried out indicated voluntary and willing participation, not coercion.

• Complex Crime: Because the killings of Amando Satorre and Segundo were pleaded as overt acts of treason, they became identified with the crime of treason. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, they could not be punished separately or used to form a complex crime with treason to increase the penalty. The conviction was therefore modified to simple treason.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The presence of two aggravating circumstances—armed band and the use of torture and other atrocities instead of a less painful method of execution—was established. These circumstances made the death penalty imposable for the crime of treason.

• Death Penalty — Voting Requirement: Under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall not be imposed unless all the Justices voting are unanimous as to its propriety. One Justice dissented from the imposition of the death penalty, breaking unanimity. The majority’s view that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948—permitting the death penalty upon the vote of eight Justices—could be applied retroactively was not given effect. The ponente, Justice Paras, held that the unanimity requirement conferred a substantive right on the accused that a later procedural statute could not retroactively remove without violating the ex post facto clause. To give effect to that view, the ponente switched his vote, and the penalty was accordingly lowered to reclusion perpetua.

• Absorption of Killing in Treason — When a killing is alleged as an overt act of treason, it is so identified with treason that it cannot be the subject of a separate charge or be used to create a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The killing merges into the treason offense. (Citing People v. Prieto and People v. Labra.)

• Unanimity Requirement for the Death Penalty as a Substantive Right — Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code grants an accused a substantive right to the requirement that the death penalty may not be imposed without the unanimous vote of all the Justices participating in the case. A subsequent statute that lowers the required concurrence to a majority or a fixed number (e.g., eight) cannot be applied retroactively to offenses committed before its enactment, as doing so would impair a substantive protection and violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The unanimity provision assures that no room for doubt exists as to the appropriateness of the extreme penalty.

• “The killing of Amando Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an element of treason, and it therefore ‘becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.’ ” (articulating the absorption rule)

• “Under article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the death penalty shall not be imposed when all the Justices are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of death cannot be imposed upon the appellant.” (stating the unanimity bar)

• “After the inclusion of the provisions of article 47 in the Revised Penal Code, no accused could be sentenced to death except when there was unanimity among the Justices as to the propriety of the penalty; and this requisite correspondingly accorded the accused a substantive right. … The provision can indeed be likened to that referring to mitigating or aggravating circumstances upon which the proper period of the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is dependent.” (explaining why the unanimity rule is substantive, not merely procedural)

• People v. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329 (80 Phil. 138) — Followed; established that a killing charged as an element of treason cannot be the subject of a separate penalty or combined with treason under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

• People v. Labra, L-386, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1) 159 (81 Phil. 377) — Followed; reaffirmed the same absorption principle.

• U.S. v. Gomez and Coronel, 22 Phil. 279 — Cited in support of the ponente’s view that a procedural law with prejudicial effect on the accused cannot be given retroactive effect unless the statute expressly provides for retroactivity.

• People v. Victoria, 44 Off. Gaz. (7) 2230 (78 Phil. 122) — Invoked in the separate opinion of Justice Perfecto for the proposition that the use of armed bands and torture are inherent elements of the pattern of treason under Japanese influence and should not be treated as separate aggravating circumstances.

• Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894) — Cited in the dissent of Justice Feria for the proposition that a statutory change in the number of judges required to decide a case is procedural and not ex post facto.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Governs complex crimes. Not applied to enhance the penalty because the killing was absorbed by treason.

• Article 47, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the death penalty shall not be imposed when all the Justices voting on the case are not unanimous as to its propriety. Applied as a substantive safeguard to prevent the imposition of the death penalty.

• Section 9, Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) — Stated that when the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall be determined by eight Justices, and if eight fail to reach a decision, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed. The majority opined this provision could apply retroactively, but the ponente’s vote, based on non-retroactivity, prevented its application.

• Article III, Section 11 (1935 Constitution) [now Article III, Section 22, 1987 Constitution] — Prohibition against ex post facto laws. The ponente relied on this constitutional protection, reasoning that retroactive application of the reduced voting requirement would impair a substantive right.

Pablo, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concurred.
Moran, C.J., Bengzon, and Montemayor, JJ., concurred in the result.
Justice Perfecto concurred in the result but filed a separate opinion dissenting on the appreciation of aggravating circumstances.

• Justice Perfecto (dissenting on aggravating circumstances) — Argued that the aggravating circumstances of armed band and the use of torture should not be considered as modifying circumstances but as essential elements of the treason committed by appellant. According to the doctrine in People v. Victoria, such methods were part of the pattern of brutal suppression followed by those who collaborated with the Japanese, and therefore should not independently aggravate the penalty.

• Justice Feria (dissenting on the penalty) — Contended that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 was purely procedural and should apply retroactively without offending the ex post facto clause, in accordance with prevailing American jurisprudence. He argued that the majority had already resolved, prior to deliberation, that the new law applied to pending cases. Because eight Justices, including the ponente, believed the death penalty was warranted, the dissent of one Justice on a purely legal question (rather than on the propriety of the penalty itself) could not defeat the imposition of the death penalty. He maintained that the ponente’s vote to impose reclusion perpetua, based solely on his personal dissenting view on retroactivity, was an improper nullification of the majority’s earlier ruling and should be disregarded; the death sentence should have been affirmed.