People vs. Villonez

Treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger, provided the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate; where treachery is present, abuse of superior strength is absorbed and need not be separately appreciated.

Accused-appellants Regando Villonez, Ruel Santos, and Emerlito Santos were charged together with several co-accused (who remained at large) with the murder of Gerardo Longasa on 3 May 1994 in Malabon, Metro Manila. Two separate informations were filed — Criminal Case No. 14943-MN against Regando and Ruel (with unidentified "John Doe" co-accused), and Criminal Case No. 15506-MN against Emerlito and his brothers Eduardo, Reynaldo, Fernando, and Rudy Santos — both charging the same killing. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried before Branch 170 of the RTC of Malabon. Ruel Santos was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.

On 3 May 1994, at around 9:00 p.m., Edgar Jimenez was resting inside his store at Hulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, when a certain Tonton informed him that his close friend Gerardo Longasa had a fistfight with one "Rudy," alias "Dede," at Liwayway Street, Baritan, Malabon. Edgar proceeded to the area to mediate, passing through Javier II Street. Along Javier II Street, a group of seven armed men, including accused-appellants Regando Villonez, Ruel Santos, and Emerlito Santos, attacked Edgar. Ruel hit him on the forehead and back with a bottle. Edgar managed to escape and, while fleeing, ran past Longasa, who appeared drunk. When Edgar called out to Longasa, the attackers were already upon him.

From a distance of about eight arms' length, Edgar witnessed the attack on Longasa, the scene being illuminated by a large fluorescent lamp about three arms' length away. Emerlito struck Longasa with a 2 x 2 inch piece of wood, while simultaneously Regando and Ruel struck Longasa with bottles. Rudy Santos and Eddie Santos then stabbed Longasa seven and eight times respectively, even as two other persons named Rey and Budda held Longasa's arms. Longasa fell to the ground. Edgar rushed to Longasa's house and reported the incident to the latter's parents.

Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy on Longasa's corpse. He found multiple abrasions, contusions, lacerated wounds, and six stab wounds on the victim's body. Of the six stab wounds, stab wounds numbered 1 and 3 on Longasa's chest — which perforated the right ventricle and penetrated the lower and upper lobes of the left lung respectively — caused his death. Dr. Mendez explained that the abrasions were caused by a hard, rough surface such as cement or a piece of wood, the contusions and lacerations by a blunt object such as a bottle or piece of wood, and the stab wounds by a sharp-bladed instrument.

Regando interposed alibi and denial, claiming he was having a conversation with Arthur Aquino at the premises of Ruel's house at the time of the incident, and that upon hearing of a slaying at Javier II Street, they went to the scene and found Longasa lying in a pool of blood. Arthur Aquino corroborated this account. Ruel, who was 16 years old at the time, claimed he was at his grandmother's house on Javier II changing clothes after a bath when he heard screams, went to the scene, and saw Longasa's body. Emerlito claimed he was on his way to borrow P500 from his mother when he was informed that his brother Fernando was involved in a fight at Liwayway Street; he rushed there, found his brother being ganged up on by Edgar Jimenez and another person, and exchanged blows with Edgar until Edgar jumped into a river. Emerlito then returned to Liwayway Street, saw no one, proceeded to Javier II, and was advised to go home after someone told him his brother had stabbed and killed a man.

Conrado Gungon testified for the defense that he saw Fernando Santos and a certain Rey chasing Longasa at Javier II, followed them to a corner near General Luna Street, and saw Fernando and Rey stab Longasa with no other companions. The trial court found Edgar Jimenez's testimony credible and found conspiracy among the accused, rejecting the defense of alibi for failure to prove physical impossibility. The trial court ruled out treachery but appreciated abuse of superior strength as the qualifying circumstance, and convicted all three accused of murder.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Accused-appellants attacked the credibility of lone eyewitness Edgar Jimenez, arguing his testimony was uncorroborated, incredible, and fabricated. They questioned why Edgar took a longer route through Javier II Street instead of crossing the bridge, found illogical his failure to shout for help or save Longasa, and theorized that Edgar could have been a participant in the rumble, making him biased and unreliable. They also pointed out that Edgar was running away from the scene and could not have witnessed the crime, and that no one corroborated his testimony.
• Inconsistencies in Testimony: Ruel claimed Edgar committed inconsistencies on material points, particularly regarding who actually stabbed Longasa and how many times, and whether Edgar was running away or staying at a safe distance. Ruel also found it illogical that the accused would attack Edgar but then vent their ire on Longasa while allowing Edgar to witness everything and walk away untouched.
• Hearsay: Ruel argued that Edgar Jimenez was not competent to testify on Ruel's participation because he was not an eyewitness, rendering his testimony hearsay.
• Defense Witnesses' Credibility: Accused-appellants insisted on the credibility of their defense witnesses, claimed they explained their whereabouts during the offense, and asserted they had corroborating witnesses. Ruel argued the prosecution did not disprove Emerlito's testimony that Edgar was in a river near Liwayaway Street during the incident, and that Gungon's testimony disproved Edgar's account.
• Absence of Conspiracy: Accused-appellants asserted there was no sufficient proof of conspiracy, arguing that the short interval between the attack on Edgar and the attack on Longasa precluded a preconceived plan, and that if conspiracy existed, all accused would have stabbed Longasa rather than some only hitting him with bottles or wood.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Upheld: The OSG maintained that the alleged lapses in Edgar Jimenez's testimony were duly explained and the inconsistencies were too trivial to impair his straightforward account. Edgar's failure to help his friend was understandable given the aggressors' strength of number. The OSG stressed that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is entitled to great respect on appeal.
• Judicial Knowledge: The OSG argued that it is of judicial knowledge that persons have been assaulted for no apparent reason, addressing Ruel's claim of lack of logic in Edgar's version.
• Rejection of Gungon's Testimony: The OSG considered Gungon's testimony undeserving of consideration, noting his failure to explain why he gave his account only on 1 August 1995 — fifteen months after the incident — and that his long unexplained silence made his testimony unworthy of belief.
• Alibi and Conspiracy: The OSG agreed with the trial court's rejection of alibi, noting no showing of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the crime scene, and that they were positively identified by Edgar. As to conspiracy, the OSG argued it could be deduced from the manner of the commission of the offense and the concerted acts of the accused.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Whether the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Edgar Jimenez.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the guilt of accused-appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed among the accused in the killing of Gerardo Longasa.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Whether treachery, rather than abuse of superior strength, was the proper qualifying circumstance.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: No. The trial court's assessment of Edgar Jimenez's credibility was upheld, his testimony being consistent, corroborated by medico-legal findings, and free from the exceptions warranting appellate disturbance of trial court credibility findings.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The guilt of accused-appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt through the positive identification by the eyewitness and the corroboration of the medico-legal report; the defense of alibi failed for lack of proof of physical impossibility.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established from the concerted and simultaneous acts of the accused in attacking the victim, demonstrating a joint purpose and community of intent.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Yes, treachery — not abuse of superior strength — was the proper qualifying circumstance. The execution of the attack, made impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate, satisfied treachery, which absorbed abuse of superior strength.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: The trial judge had the distinct advantage of personally hearing the testimonies and observing the deportment of the witnesses. The settled rule is that the trial judge's findings on credibility will not generally be disturbed unless arbitrary or unless facts and circumstances of weight and influence were overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. None of these exceptions were shown. Edgar told a consistent story throughout his two turns at the witness stand, corrected misimpressions by the judge and counsel, and satisfactorily explained apparent lapses. His frankness about his criminal record as a drug user bolstered rather than impaired his credibility, as a criminal record does not necessarily make one an incredible witness. Inconsistencies between his testimony and his sworn statement were adequately explained by the inherent infirmity of affidavits taken ex parte, which are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate. Dr. Mendez's autopsy findings corroborated Edgar's account, as the victim's injuries reflected the severe beatings narrated by Edgar.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the eyewitness. Accused-appellants failed to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene at the time of the crime. On the contrary, Regando and Ruel admitted they could reach the crime scene by walking in a short time, and Emerlito acknowledged his involvement in a fight preceding the killing and conceded he was able to return to or near the crime scene at about the time of the offense. The alibi sufficient to acquit must show physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene, which was not established.

• Conspiracy: For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. The agreement to commit a crime may be gleaned from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose or design, concerted action, and community of intent. The accused simultaneously attacked Longasa, with two holding his hands or arms, some striking him with a piece of wood or bottles, and two others stabbing him, continuing until he fell dead. These acts clearly pointed to a joint purpose to accomplish the desired end.

• Qualifying Circumstance: The trial court erred in ruling out treachery on the ground that the victim had engaged in a prior fight and was thus forewarned. Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person; what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. The overwhelming number of the accused, their use of weapons against the unarmed victim, and the fact that the victim's hands were held behind him precluded any possibility of defense. Abuse of superior strength, which the trial court appreciated, was absorbed in treachery and was no longer separately appreciated.

• Trial court's findings on credibility of witnesses — The trial judge's findings on the credibility of witnesses will not generally be disturbed on appeal unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, which if considered would have affected the result. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the trial court's assessment of Edgar Jimenez's testimony, finding none of the exceptions present.

• Infirmity of affidavits — A sworn statement or affidavit, being taken ex parte by a person other than the witness, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of suggestions and inquiries. Omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. An affidavit taken ex parte is generally considered inferior to testimony made in open court. The Court applied this to explain inconsistencies between Edgar's testimony and his sworn statement.

• Alibi and physical impossibility — The defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification of the accused. To acquit on the basis of alibi, the accused must prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime. The Court found that all three accused-appellants admitted they could reach or were near the crime scene, negating physical impossibility.

• Conspiracy inferred from concerted acts — Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of an agreement for an appreciable period. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. The agreement may be gleaned from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose or design, concerted action, and community of intent. The Court found conspiracy from the simultaneous attack, the holding of the victim's arms, the use of various weapons, and the continuation of the attack until the victim died.

• Treachery despite forewarning — Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. The Court applied this to correct the trial court's ruling, finding treachery present because the overwhelming number of armed attackers and the restraint of the victim's hands precluded any defense.

• Absorption of abuse of superior strength in treachery — Where treachery is present, abuse of superior strength is absorbed and need not be separately appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. The Court accordingly struck the trial court's appreciation of abuse of superior strength and substituted treachery as the qualifying circumstance.

• "Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on treachery that corrects the trial court's erroneous appreciation, establishing that forewarning does not negate treachery where the attack's execution renders defense impossible.

• "For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution." — This formulation defines the standard for inferring conspiracy from concerted acts, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on conspiracy.

• "The alibi which is sufficient to acquit an accused of a criminal charge must be that which shows it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime." — This passage states the canonical test for the sufficiency of alibi as a defense, a standard repeatedly invoked in Philippine criminal law.

• People vs. Leoterio, 264 SCRA 608 (1996) — Cited for the doctrine that the trial judge's findings on the credibility of witnesses will not generally be disturbed on appeal unless arbitrary or unless weighty facts were overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.
• People vs. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733 (1995) — Cited for the doctrine on the infirmity of affidavits taken ex parte as inferior to testimony in open court.
• People vs. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 (1996) — Cited for the rule that alibi must demonstrate physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene to be a sufficient defense.
• People vs. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79 (1996) — Cited for the principle that conspiracy may be inferred from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense and the concerted acts of the accused.
• People vs. Landicho, 258 SCRA 1 (1996) — Cited for the rule that treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned, and that abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7659) — Prescribes the penalty for murder as reclusion perpetua to death. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua on Regando and Emerlito, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
• Article 68, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the offender is a minor under eighteen but over fifteen, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. Applied to Ruel Santos, who was 16 years old at the time of the offense, resulting in the imposition of reclusion temporal.
• Article 63, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of penalties when neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present. Applied in fixing the penalty for Regando and Emerlito.
• Article 61, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Provides the rule for determining the penalty next lower in degree. Applied in computing Ruel's penalty.
• Article 64, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applied to Ruel's penalty.
• Section 20, paragraph 2, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Referenced for the principle that a criminal record does not necessarily make one an incredible witness.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concurred.