People vs. Villegas

A habitual delinquency statute may be applied when the offense giving rise to the additional penalty was committed after the law's effectivity, even if the prior convictions relied upon occurred before the statute was enacted, provided the statute does not expressly require otherwise. Additionally, an information charging attempted robbery need not enumerate the specific personal property targeted, so long as it alleges intent of gain, the means of force employed, and that non-completion was due to third-party intervention rather than voluntary desistance.

Leoncio Villegas y Tuliao, also known by the aliases Lucio Villegas and Francisco Bravo, was a person with a recorded criminal history of eight prior convictions for theft and two for estafa, the last conviction dating February 3, 1925. He was charged under an information that alleged both the attempted robbery in an inhabited house and his status as a habitual delinquent pursuant to Act No. 3586 of the Philippine Legislature, a statute addressing habitual criminality that took effect in 1929 (the original Act, No. 3397, having been passed in 1927).

On or about July 9, 1930, in the City of Manila, Leoncio Villegas y Tuliao entered the dwelling house of Miss S. H. Olson, situated at No. 558 San Luis Street, by cutting off and forcibly breaking open the wire screen of a window — an opening not intended for entrance or egress — and gaining access to the first floor of the premises. The information charged that he did so willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent of gain and against the consent of the owner, proposing to take, steal, and carry away personal property valued at ₱1,000 contained in the dwelling. He did not accomplish his purpose not because of his own voluntary desistance, but because of the timely detection and intervention of third persons who caused his arrest.

The information further alleged that Villegas had previously been convicted eight times of theft and twice of estafa by final judgments of competent courts, the last conviction dating February 3, 1925, rendering him a habitual delinquent under Act No. 3586. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty; the following day, accompanied by his lawyer, he withdrew that plea and entered a plea of guilty. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and, as recidivist and habitual criminal, sentenced him to two months' arresto mayor under the Revised Penal Code plus twenty-one years' imprisonment under Act No. 3586, with costs.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Petitioner contended that the crime to which he pleaded guilty was not attempted robbery in an inhabited house but, at most, trespass to dwelling, arguing that the allegations in the information touching his purpose in breaking into the house were mere conclusions drawn by the fiscal rather than statements of fact.
• Retroactivity of Act No. 3586: Petitioner argued that Act No. 3586, which took effect in 1929, should not be given retroactive effect unless expressly so provided, and that his former offenses had been punished by judgments rendered prior to the enforcement of said Act, thus precluding application of the additional penalty for habitual criminality.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the information sufficiently charged attempted robbery in an inhabited house, or merely trespass to dwelling, such that the plea of guilty was properly received.
• Application of Habitual Delinquency Law: Whether Act No. 3586 may be applied to impose the additional penalty for habitual criminality when the prior convictions relied upon were obtained before the statute took effect.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Yes. The information sufficiently alleged facts constituting attempted robbery in an inhabited house, including intent of gain, the use of force upon things, and that non-completion was due to third-party intervention rather than voluntary desistance. The absence of a detailed list of the personal property targeted did not vitiate the proceedings, as it was not jurisdictional in nature.

• Application of Habitual Delinquency Law: Yes. Act No. 3586 was properly applied. It is sufficient that the crime giving rise to the application of the additional penalty was committed after the law became effective; it is not necessary that the prior felonies constituting habitual criminality have been committed or punished after the law took effect.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The defense argued that the information charged only trespass to dwelling because the allegations regarding the defendant's purpose were mere conclusions of the fiscal. The Court rejected this characterization, finding that the information set forth facts — not mere conclusions — establishing intent of gain: the defendant proposed to take, steal, and carry away personal property valued at ₱1,000 by means of force upon things, and his failure was due not to voluntary desistance but to third-party intervention. While the information could have been drafted with greater clarity, its contents were deemed sufficient. The use of the language of the law in the information was held not to be a defect. The absence of a detailed list of the personal property found in the house did not vitiate the proceedings or the judgment, as it was not jurisdictional in nature; the defendant could have demanded such a list but failed to do so, thereby waiving the objection, which could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

• Application of Habitual Delinquency Law: The defense contended that Act No. 3586 should not be given retroactive effect because the prior convictions were obtained before the statute's enactment. The Court held that, unless otherwise provided by statute, it is not necessary that the former felonies constituting habitual criminality have been committed after the habitual criminal law took effect; it is sufficient that the crime whose prosecution gives rise to the application of the additional penalty was committed after the law became effective. This rule was found to be in accord with North American jurisprudence, as cited from Corpus Juris: "Unless otherwise provided by statute, in order to authorize the infliction of a more severe penalty upon conviction for a second or a subsequent offense, it is not necessary that the first conviction should occur subsequent to the enactment of the statute."

• Sufficiency of Information in Robbery Charges — An information charging attempted robbery need not enumerate in detail the specific personal property targeted, provided it alleges the essential elements of the offense: intent of gain, the means of force employed, and the reason for non-completion. The absence of a detailed property list is not jurisdictional and is waived if not raised before or during trial. The use of statutory language in an information is not a defect.

• Retroactive Application of Habitual Delinquency Laws — Unless a statute expressly provides otherwise, a habitual delinquency law may be applied when the current offense — the prosecution of which triggers the additional penalty — was committed after the law took effect, even if the prior convictions relied upon to establish habitual criminality were obtained before the law's enactment. The operative trigger is the commission date of the current offense, not the dates of the prior convictions.

• "Unless otherwise provided by statute, in order to authorize the infliction of a more severe penalty upon conviction for a second or a subsequent offense, it is not necessary that the first conviction should occur subsequent to the enactment of the statute." — This passage, quoted from 16 Corpus Juris 1341, articulates the controlling rule on the retroactive application of habitual delinquency statutes and forms the ratio decidendi for the second assignment of error.

• "It is not necessary that the former felonies constituting the habitual criminality have been committed after the law regarding habitual criminals took effect; it is sufficient that the crime, the prosecution of which gives rise to the application of the additional penalty for habitual criminality, has been committed after said law became effective." — This is the Court's own formulation of the rule governing the temporal application of Act No. 3586, distinguishing the trigger offense from the predicate prior convictions.

• U. S. vs. Salcedo, 4 Phil. 234 — Cited for the proposition that the use of statutory language in an information is not a defect.
• U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122 — Cited alongside U. S. vs. Salcedo for the same proposition regarding the sufficiency of informations using the words of the law.
• U. S. vs. Go Changco, 23 Phil. 641 — Cited for the same proposition that using the language of the statute in an information is not a defect.
• U. S. vs. Del Rosario, 2 Phil. 127 — Cited for the rule that objections to the sufficiency of an information not raised below are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

• Paragraph 2, subsection 5, Article 508, Penal Code — Applied as the base penalty for attempted robbery in an inhabited house, imposing two months' arresto mayor.
• Act No. 3586 of the Philippine Legislature — The habitual delinquency statute under which the additional penalty of twenty-one years' imprisonment was imposed, based on the defendant's eight prior theft convictions and two estafa convictions. The Court held that its application was proper because the current offense was committed after the law took effect in 1929, notwithstanding that the prior convictions predated the statute.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concurred.