People vs. Victoria

Treason may be committed by a single overt act or a series of overt acts at different times, making it a continuous crime; where the aggravating circumstances of treachery, aid of armed persons, and deliberate augmentation are inherent in the very overt acts that constitute aid and comfort to the enemy, they are essential elements of the offense and cannot be separately appreciated as aggravating circumstances. The conviction for treason was affirmed, but the death penalty could not be imposed for want of unanimity, and reclusion perpetua was substituted.

Carmelito Victoria, a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, was charged with treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code for acts committed during the Japanese occupation from March 1942 to February 1945. He served as a member of the Intelligence Unit attached to the Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, and later joined the Makapili organization, a pro-Japanese armed group. The case arose in the context of the post-war prosecution of Filipino collaborators who had adhered to the enemy and given aid and comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces during the occupation.

Carmelito Victoria, a Filipino citizen, was accused of treason for a series of overt acts committed during the Japanese occupation from March 1942 to February 1945, in which he allegedly adhered to the Empire of Japan and gave aid and comfort to the enemy. The information charged him with seven counts. On October 6, 1944, Victoria, then a member of the Intelligence Unit attached to the Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, joined an armed enemy patrol of approximately eight spies and a Japanese soldier that went to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking Labak Bocohan, Lucena, accusing Unson of hiding guerrillas. When guerrillas appeared and killed one of the spies, Victoria directed men in the patrol to pick up the dead spy and carry him away. That same afternoon, the same party, including Victoria and eight members of the Japanese Military Police, returned to the Unson house and arrested Federico Unson, Isaias Perez, and Ruben Godoy. With their hands bound, the three were tortured and taken away; the houses of Unson and Perez were set on fire. The following day, the mutilated corpses of Unson and Perez were found near their burned houses—Unson's body, still tied to a tree, had been disemboweled by bayonet thrusts, and Perez's corpse appeared ankleless and mutilated. Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison in Lucena and never heard of again.

On December 21, 1944, Victoria, accompanied by armed Japanese spies Pedro Raviñera, Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda, Alberto Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and others, went to the house of Jose Unson in Lucena and arrested him on the charge of possessing a short-wave radio and furnishing information to the guerrillas. Jose Unson was released the same day but rearrested the next day and brought to the Japanese garrison; he never returned. His skull was later exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several months after the arrest. On February 10, 1945, Victoria, in the company of Jacinto Pineda, Leonardo Coronel, Jose Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and Pedro Raviñera—all armed members of the Kempei Tai Intelligence Unit—went to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over to Japanese Military Police concealed nearby; nothing was heard of Romulo since.

On December 21, 1944, at about five o'clock in the morning, Victoria, accompanied by two Japanese Military Police and two undercover operatives, went to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, apprehended him, conducted a search, and brought him to the Japanese garrison where he was subjected to torture—suspended in the air for fully twenty minutes—on the charge of being pro-American and an adviser of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas. On or about June 1944, Victoria, accompanied by an armed group of undercover operatives, went to the house of Melecio Labalan, Sr., arrested him, and brought him to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, where he was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla. Victoria later accepted three chickens from Labalan's wife, which he gave to the interpreter at the Kempei office, promising to see what he could do about Labalan's situation.

The information also charged Victoria with causing the arrest of Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, on March 9, 1944, who was brought to Fort Santiago and tortured and unlawfully detained until September 20, 1944, and with joining the Makapili organization in February 1945, taking military training from the Japanese, bearing arms, participating in the raid and burning of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, carrying ammunition and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army, and performing sentry duty at Mount Malipuño. The People's Court found counts one, two, three, four, and six fully supported by the evidence, while counts five and seven were not proven. The trial court rejected Victoria's defenses of alibi and claimed coercion, crediting the positive and straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses over his testimony that he had been forced to accompany the Japanese and had interceded on behalf of prisoners.

• Acts Do Not Constitute Treason: Petitioner argued that the acts he committed do not constitute treason but are ordinary crimes against the victimized persons.
• Penalty Unjustified: Petitioner maintained that the death penalty imposed by the lower court is unjustified.
• Forced Participation: Petitioner claimed he joined the Japanese in their raids only because he was forced to do so, and that he went to the Japanese garrison either in obedience to a summons from his friend Captain Yuki or to intercede on behalf of prisoners.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Petitioner argued that his conduct in aid of the guerrillas should be considered in mitigation of his criminal responsibility, and that the purpose of penalty being correction rather than public vengeance, such purpose would not be attained with his death.
• Jurisdiction: Petitioner alleged that the People's Court had no jurisdiction, the charges being merely upshots of the wrong theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, recommended the imposition of the death penalty in view of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information—treachery, aid of armed persons to insure impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary for their commission.
• Righteous Acts Do Not Mitigate: Respondent argued that the performance of righteous actions, no matter how meritorious, is not a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs, and that even if the accused had saved many lives, causing the killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy nonetheless makes him a traitor.

• Nature of the Offense: Whether the acts committed by the accused constitute treason or merely ordinary crimes.
• Jurisdiction: Whether the People's Court had jurisdiction to try the case.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the circumstances of treachery, aid of armed persons, and deliberate augmentation should be considered as aggravating circumstances or are essential elements of the crime of treason.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty should be affirmed.

• Nature of the Offense: Yes. The acts committed by the accused constitute treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as they constituted adherence to the enemy and the giving of aid and comfort through overt acts including armed raids, arrests, torture, and killings.
• Jurisdiction: Yes. The allegation that the People's Court lacked jurisdiction based on the theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty was found to be without merit.
• Aggravating Circumstances: The majority held that the aggravating circumstances should be considered as aggravating; the ponente maintained that they are essential elements of treason and cannot be separately appreciated. Nine justices sided with the majority view; the ponente dissented.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: No. The death penalty was not imposed for want of unanimity among the justices, and reclusion perpetua was imposed instead, the ponente taking the position that the medium penalty provided by law was the appropriate punishment.

• Nature of the Offense: The accused, a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, wilfully adhered to the enemy by serving as a member of the Kempei Tai Intelligence Unit and joining the Makapili organization. The overt acts charged—armed raids on residences, arrests of suspected guerrillas, torture, and killings—constituted aid and comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces. The lower court's factual conclusions on counts one, two, three, four, and six were fully supported by the evidence, including the clear, positive, and straightforward declarations of prosecution witnesses. The accused's own testimony, even if accepted, could not overthrow the prosecution's evidence. His claim that he was forced to participate, that he interceded for prisoners, and that he too had helped the guerrillas did not relieve him of criminal responsibility for the proven acts of treason.

• Jurisdiction: The argument that the People's Court lacked jurisdiction, premised on the theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty, was rejected as without merit. The accused, being a Filipino citizen, owed allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and his duty of allegiance was not suspended during the Japanese occupation.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The majority of nine justices held that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, aid of armed persons, and deliberate augmentation should be considered as aggravating, supporting the Solicitor General's recommendation for the death penalty. The ponente, however, maintained that these circumstances were essential elements of the treason committed, reasoning that treason is a continuous crime that may be committed by a single act, a series of acts, or several series of acts at different times, as held in Guinto vs. Veluz. Because the very nature of the overt acts constituting aid and comfort to the enemy inherently involved treachery, armed assistance, and unnecessary wrongs, these circumstances could not be separately appreciated as aggravating.

• Imposition of Death Penalty: Because the Court was not unanimous in imposing the death penalty—the ponente alone voting for reclusion perpetua—the death penalty could not be imposed. The penalty was accordingly modified to reclusion perpetua, the medium penalty provided by law, together with a fine of ₱15,000 and costs. The ponente's reasoning was that the aggravating circumstances were absorbed into the essential elements of treason, leaving no independent aggravating circumstances to warrant the maximum penalty.

• Treason as a Continuous Crime — Treason is a crime of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act, by a series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only at a single time but at different times, making it a continuous crime. The number of counts charged does not change the nature of the offense. This doctrine was applied to support the ponente's view that the aggravating circumstances were inherent in the overt acts constituting treason and could not be separately appreciated, since the crime's continuous nature means that treachery, armed aid, and unnecessary wrongs are absorbed into the acts that give aid and comfort to the enemy.

• Righteous Acts Do Not Mitigate Treason — The performance of righteous actions, no matter how meritorious, is not a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs. Even if the accused had saved many lives, causing the killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy nonetheless makes him a traitor. This principle was applied to reject the petitioner's argument that his aid to guerrillas should mitigate his criminal responsibility for treason.

• Unanimity Required for Death Penalty — Where the members of the Court are not unanimous in voting for the imposition of the death penalty, the death penalty cannot be imposed, and the next lower penalty must be substituted. This rule was applied when nine of ten participating justices voted for death but the ponente dissented, resulting in the imposition of reclusion perpetua.

• "The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs, and although appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he had caused the killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor." — This passage articulates the principle that meritorious acts cannot offset criminal liability for treason, rejecting the defense that the accused's aid to guerrillas should mitigate his responsibility.

• "The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act, by a series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much so that there are some accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number not changing the nature of the offense committed." — This passage defines treason as a continuous crime and forms the basis for the ponente's reasoning that aggravating circumstances are absorbed into the essential elements of the offense.

• "For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the members of this Court in the imposition of the death penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs." — This is the dispositive portion of the decision, reflecting the procedural rule that unanimity is required for the death penalty and the resulting reduction to reclusion perpetua.

• Guinto vs. Veluz, 77 Phil. 801 — Cited as authority for the proposition that treason is a continuous crime that may be committed by a single overt act or a series of overt acts at different times. The ponente relied on this case to argue that the aggravating circumstances were essential elements of treason rather than independent aggravating factors.

• Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 — Referenced in Justice Paras's separate concurring and dissenting opinion, where he maintained in conformity with his dissenting opinion in that case that Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not in force at the time of the commission of the crime.

• Article 114, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of treason. The provision was applied to convict the accused, a Filipino citizen, for adhering to the enemy and giving aid and comfort through overt acts including armed raids, arrests, torture, and killings during the Japanese occupation. The medium penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed in lieu of the death penalty.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concurred.

• Feria, J. (concurring) — Concurred with the majority in finding the appellant guilty of treason with two aggravating circumstances, and dissented from the ponente's position that prevented the imposition of the death penalty. Justice Feria argued that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and deliberate augmentation have nothing to do with the integral elements of the crime of treason as defined in the Revised Penal Code, and that the fact that treason may be committed by a single overt act or a series of acts does not make those circumstances essential elements of the offense. He maintained that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery and deliberate augmentation, which were not necessary to give aid and comfort to the enemy and therefore could properly be considered as aggravating.

• Paras, J. (concurring and dissenting) — Concurred partly in the result. He held that the information and evidence sufficiently made out at least a case of murder qualified by treachery, and that the appellant had committed other atrocities for which he could be convicted. He maintained, in conformity with his dissenting opinion in Laurel vs. Misa, that Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not in force at the time of the commission of the crime. He agreed that reclusion perpetua was the appropriate penalty but argued that the fine should be eliminated and the appellant should instead be ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the proper amount.

• Perfecto, J. — As ponente, Justice Perfecto dissented from the majority on the penalty, maintaining that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, aid of armed persons, and deliberate augmentation were essential elements of the treason committed and could not be separately appreciated as aggravating circumstances. He reasoned that treason is a continuous crime whose very nature absorbs these circumstances into the overt acts constituting aid and comfort to the enemy. His dissent on the penalty prevented unanimity and resulted in the imposition of reclusion perpetua instead of death.

• Paras, J. — Justice Paras dissented on the legal basis of the conviction, arguing that Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not in force at the time of the commission of the crime, following his dissenting opinion in Laurel vs. Misa. He also argued that the fine should be eliminated and replaced with an order for the appellant to indemnify the heirs of the victims.