People vs. Verges

A sudden and unexpected assault that leaves the victims unable to mount an effective defense constitutes treachery and qualifies a killing to murder, but evident premeditation requires proof of (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifesting that determination, and (c) sufficient time for reflection—none of which is inferred solely from gang membership or the fact that the accused armed themselves beforehand. Quasi-recidivism under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code applies when prison records show the accused were serving final sentences, and their admission without objection precludes a belated challenge to admissibility.

Rivalry between the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik and Sigue-Sigue Commando gangs inside the New Bilibid Prisons led to a stabbing rampage on May 4, 1969. Members of the Commando gang, confined in Dormitory 4-C, attacked passing Sputnik members who were being transferred to another dormitory, killing three. Informations for murder were filed only in 1970 against eighteen accused. Some died, some escaped, and one was tried separately. The remaining appellants were convicted and sentenced to death, prompting automatic review by the Supreme Court.

• The Gang Rivalry: Appellants and co-accused were prisoners at the New Bilibid Prisons, confined in Dormitory 4-C, and belonged to the Sigue-Sigue Commando gang. A violent rivalry existed with the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik gang, housed in Dormitory 5-B. Revenge for a prior death of a Commando member motivated a plan to attack the Sputniks.

• The Attack: On the morning of May 4, 1969, prison guards were transferring Sputnik members from Dormitory 5-B to Dormitory 4-D. As the unarmed Sputnik prisoners passed in front of Dormitory 4-C, the Commando members suddenly rushed out and attacked them with improvised bladed weapons. The assault lasted two to three minutes. The victims—Alberto Rubiso (28 stab wounds), Pedro Trijo, and Jaime Caballero (10 stab wounds)—died from multiple stab wounds inflicted with sharp pointed instruments. Prison guards and soldiers intervened, after which the attackers retreated into Cell No. 4 of Dormitory 4-C.

• Investigation and Confessions: Prison guards investigated the incident and took written extra-judicial statements from the accused. The appellants admitted in their sworn statements, signed and sworn before the Administrative Officer of the Bureau of Prisons, that they participated in the plan to avenge their fallen member and executed the attack. Their confessions detailed the planned retaliation. The weapons used were collected from the dormitory. Prison records (Exhibits II, II-1 to II-14) showed that all appellants were serving final sentences at the time.

• Lambino’s Defense: Brigido Lambino, who filed a separate brief, claimed he was playing mahjong with another inmate at the “pasillo” outside Cell No. 2 and did not join the attack. He presented a corroborating witness.

• Trial Court Findings: The lower court found all appellants guilty of three counts of murder, appreciating evident premeditation and treachery as qualifying circumstances and quasi-recidivism as an aggravating circumstance. It rejected the claim of lack of instruction.

• Evident Premeditation: Whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation attended the killings.
• Treachery: Whether treachery was present in the sudden and simultaneous attack on the unarmed victims.
• Quasi-Recidivism: Whether the appellants were properly considered quasi-recidivists under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether lack of instruction and the surrender of weapons should be credited as mitigating circumstances.
• Lambino’s Criminal Liability: Whether the trial court correctly found Brigido Lambino guilty beyond reasonable doubt given his alibi and the voluntariness of his confession.

• Evident Premeditation: The qualifying circumstance was not established. The elements—(a) time of determination, (b) an act manifestly indicating the offender clung to that determination, and (c) sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution for dispassionate reflection—were not proven. The written statements did not disclose a specific agreement to kill the Sputnik members the following morning; the accused could not have known of the scheduled transfer. The facts proved only a gang war where retaliation was a natural element, and the appellants merely exploited a sudden opportunity. Arming oneself with bladed weapons in the context of gang rivalry did not by itself satisfy the requisites of evident premeditation.

• Treachery: Treachery was present. The attack was sudden, unexpected, and executed in a manner that ensured its accomplishment without risk to the attackers from any defense the victims might offer. The inmates bolted out and ambushed the passing, unarmed Sputniks in an abrupt and simultaneous assault. Prison guard testimony corroborated that the victims were ambushed and had no reasonable opportunity to mount an effective defense.

• Quasi-Recidivism: The application of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code was proper. The prison records (Exhibits II, II-1 to II-14, and I and J), admitted without objection at trial, showed that all appellants were serving final sentences at the time of the offense. The challenge to their admissibility raised for the first time on appeal came too late.

• Mitigating Circumstances: Lack of instruction was correctly denied. Illiteracy alone does not constitute the mitigating circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one’s acts, which was not shown. The surrender of weapons was not analogous to voluntary surrender and, in any event, there was no evidence that the surrender was made voluntarily or spontaneously, as it occurred inside the dormitory after the incident.

• Lambino’s Criminal Liability: Lambino’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. His extra-judicial confessions acknowledging participation in the attack prevailed over his trial testimony of alibi. No evidence suggested the confessions were extracted by force or intimidation; thus, the presumption of voluntariness stood. Consequently, he was also guilty of three counts of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism.

• Evident Premeditation (Elements) — The circumstance requires proof of: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to that determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of the act and to permit his conscience to overcome the resolution. These elements cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the accused acted in concert, or that they armed themselves during a gang war. The offenders must have specifically agreed to kill the victims on that particular occasion.

• Treachery (Aleivosia) — Treachery exists when the attack is sudden, unexpected, and made under conditions that insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the victim might make. A simultaneous, abrupt ambush of unarmed victims who are given no chance to mount an effective defense qualifies the killing to murder.

• Quasi-Recidivism (Article 160, RPC) — A quasi-recidivist is any person who commits a felony before beginning to serve a sentence, while serving, or after serving and while being brought to or confined in a penal institution. The fact of previous final conviction may be proven by prison records. When such records are admitted without objection at trial, their admissibility cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal.

• Lack of Instruction as Mitigating Circumstance — Illiteracy is not sufficient to constitute lack of instruction under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. It must be coupled with lack of sufficient intelligence and understanding of the full significance of the criminal act.

• Surrender of Weapons vs. Voluntary Surrender — The surrender of weapons to authorities after the commission of a crime is not analogous to voluntary surrender of the person and does not constitute a mitigating circumstance absent proof of voluntariness and spontaneity.

• Extra-Judicial Confession vs. Alibi — An extra-judicial confession, shown to have been given voluntarily, prevails over an uncorroborated defense of alibi.

• “[T]he written statements of the appellants do not disclose that they specifically agreed in the evening of May 3, 1969, to kill members of the rival Sputnik gang the following day. ... All that they prove is the existence of a gang war ... where revenge or retaliation would be a natural element. ... The fact that the appellants were forearmed with bladed weapons does not prove evident premeditation. For in the light of the gang rivalry, it was to be expected that the members of the opposing gangs would arm themselves.” — This passage explains why the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not present, distinguishing gang warfare planning from the required deliberate, specific intent.

• “It is manifest that the sudden and simultaneous attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting victims was one which they could not have reasonably expected. Moreover, it was made under conditions which made it impossible for them to mount an effective defense.” — This captures the factual basis for finding treachery.

• “Some members of the court including the undersigned believe that the sub-human conditions which prevailed at the New Bilibid Prisons at the time of the incident were largely responsible for the brutalization of the inmates therein and because of such fact the imposition of the death penalty is not warranted.” — Reflects the Court’s humanitarian consideration that contributed to reducing the penalty.

• People v. Beralde, L-32832, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 125 — Cited for the three requisites of evident premeditation, which the prosecution failed to prove.

• People v. Magpantay, 12 SCRA 389 (1964) — Cited in support of the trial court’s denial of the alternative mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

• People v. Geronimo, 53 SCRA 246 (1973) — Cited for the principle that illiteracy alone does not constitute a mitigating circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one’s acts.

• Article 160, Revised Penal Code (Quasi-Recidivism) — Applied to the appellants because their prison records, admitted without objection, showed they were serving final sentences when they committed the murders. The penalty of death (later reduced to reclusion perpetua) was imposed as the maximum for the offense due to this provision.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (Murder) — The killings were classified as murder, qualified by treachery. The penalty imposable for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death.

• Article 13, Revised Penal Code (Mitigating Circumstances) — The claim of lack of instruction was denied because the defense failed to prove the requisite lack of sufficient intelligence accompanying illiteracy.

Chief Justice Fernando, and Justices Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera concurred.