People vs. Verceles

All co-conspirators in a robbery are equally liable as principals for a rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The discharge of an accused as a state witness is valid when the requisites under Rule 119, Section 17 are satisfied, and even an improper discharge does not render the testimony inadmissible.

The accused were charged with Robbery with Rape under Article 299, paragraph A(2) in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, for allegedly breaking into the house of Rosita Quilates in barangay Malibong, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, taking personal properties valued at P60,000.00, and raping Maribeth Bolito on the same occasion. Of the five accused, Mamerto Soriano and Pablo Ramos remained at large, while Mario Verceles, Felix Corpuz, and Jerry Soriano were brought to trial. The prosecution moved to discharge Jerry Soriano as a State Witness, which the trial court granted.

Mario Verceles, Felix Corpuz, Mamerto Soriano, Pablo Ramos, and Jerry Soriano were charged with Robbery with Rape for allegedly breaking into the house of Rosita Quilates in barangay Malibong, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, on October 19, 1996, taking personal properties valued at P60,000.00, and raping Maribeth Bolito on the same occasion. Of the five, Mamerto Soriano and Pablo Ramos remained at large; only Mario Verceles, Felix Corpuz, and Jerry Soriano were brought to trial. All three pleaded not guilty, and the prosecution moved to discharge Jerry Soriano as a State Witness.

According to state witness Jerry Soriano, on October 18, 1996, the five accused boarded a tricycle owned by Mario Verceles to visit his cousin in barangay Goliso. At 8:00 in the evening, they proceeded to barangay Malibong to visit Pepe, a compadre of Mamerto Soriano. Before reaching Pepe's place, they stopped at the house of Jerry's grandmother, Rosita Quilates. Jerry sensed that his companions had an evil plan, so he and Pablo Ramos tried to leave, but Mamerto Soriano poked a gun at Jerry and told them not to leave. They were tied under a mango tree while the three proceeded to the house. When Jerry and Pablo woke up at 2:00 a.m., they saw the three accused carrying a TV set, VHS, and other things, and they helped load the items into the tricycle. Several days later, the items were sold, and Jerry was given three hundred pesos.

Maribeth Bolito testified that at around 2:00 in the morning of October 19, 1996, she was awakened by a man fondling her breast and other private parts. She tried to resist but was overpowered, and the man had a gun pointed at her head. She identified her aggressor as Mamerto Soriano. While being ravished, she saw two men standing at the door, whom she identified as Mario Verceles and Felix Corpuz. Soriano undressed her, kissed her body, and fondled her breasts for five minutes. She pretended to be thirsty, and Soriano brought her to the kitchen, where he removed his pants, laid her on the floor, and tried to insert his penis inside her vagina. Maribeth lost consciousness, and when she came to, her private part was very painful and the three accused were gone.

Dr. Revelina Millan examined Maribeth on October 20, 1996, and found a healed laceration at the 9 o'clock position, with no hematoma or abrasion, and the vaginal smear was negative for spermatozoa. SPO2 Eduardo Fernandez investigated the robbery and testified that the malefactors entered through the window of one of the bedrooms, took personal properties valued at P60,000.00, and that a necklace was recovered from Felix Corpuz. Rosita Quilates testified that she learned from her granddaughter that her house was robbed and that she recovered the properties from Andres Tirano, who bought them from Mamerto Soriano.

In defense, Felix Corpuz testified that on October 19, 1996, he was in Manila working as a carpenter, having stayed there from October 5, 1996, and did not visit his hometown until October 27, 1996. Ernesto Lambino, Jr. corroborated this, testifying that he recruited Felix to work in Tambo, Rizal, Parañaque, and that Felix worked from October 6 to October 26, 1996. Mario Verceles testified that on the evening of October 18, 1996, he attended a wake in San Jacinto, Pangasinan, where he played cards until 4:00 a.m. of October 19, 1996, and left at 5:00 a.m. He learned the police were looking for him when his wife fetched him in Mapandan, Pangasinan, and he arranged his surrender through the barangay captain. Police Inspector Rodolfo Tadeo corroborated that Verceles voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 1996.

• Discharge of State Witness: Accused-appellants contended that the discharge of Jerry Soriano did not comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court, arguing that his testimony did not constitute direct evidence but was at most circumstantial and of minuscule importance.
• Most Guilty: Accused-appellants argued that Jerry Soriano was the most guilty because he admitted his guilt regarding the commission of the crime together with Mamerto Soriano.
• Conspiracy: Accused-appellants alleged that the trial court erred in appreciating conspiracy among the accused.
• Voluntary Surrender: Mario Verceles argued that the trial court erred in not considering voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, as he immediately proceeded to the barangay captain upon learning that police were searching for him.
• Damages: Accused-appellants alleged that the trial court erred in awarding damages to the private complainants.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Solicitor General argued that the surrender of Mario Verceles was not voluntary and spontaneous because it took him 16 days to show up from the commission of the crime on October 19, 1996, to November 4, 1996.

• Discharge of State Witness: Whether the trial court erred in discharging Jerry Soriano as a state witness.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was sufficiently proved by the prosecution.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether Mario Verceles was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Damages: Whether the trial court erred in its award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and civil indemnity.

• Discharge of State Witness: No. The trial court did not err in discharging Jerry Soriano as a state witness, as his testimony was absolutely necessary, corroborated in its material points, and he did not appear to be the most guilty.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was sufficiently proved by the prosecution, as the accused-appellants were one in design with Mamerto Soriano in taking personal properties by breaking a window, and they did nothing to prevent the rape.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. Mario Verceles was not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as his surrender was not spontaneous and unconditional; he submitted himself to the police only to clear the matter and to know why the police were looking for him.
• Damages: The award of moral damages was reduced from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00; exemplary damages were deleted for lack of aggravating circumstances; and P50,000.00 was awarded for civil indemnity.

• Discharge of State Witness: The requirements for the discharge and utilization of an accused as a state witness are enumerated in Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: (a) absolute necessity for the testimony; (b) no other direct evidence available; (c) testimony can be substantially corroborated; (d) the accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) the accused has not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. The trial court did not err in discharging Jerry Soriano. First, his testimony was absolutely necessary as the prosecution had no direct evidence to prove the identity of the malefactors. He had personal knowledge of the robbery when he saw the three accused return carrying the stolen properties. Second, his testimony was corroborated by Maribeth Bolito's testimony that there were three malefactors, Rosita Quilates' testimony that her properties were stolen, and SPO2 Renato Solomon's testimony that the stolen properties were recovered from Andres Tirano. Lastly, Jerry Soriano did not appear to be the most guilty, as he was not a co-conspirator in the robbery with rape; he merely accompanied the accused and received three hundred pesos. The question of whether he appears to be the most guilty is a factual issue, and the trial court's discretionary judgment is seldom interfered with except in cases of grave abuse of discretion. Even granting that not all requisites were present, the improper discharge of an accused will not render inadmissible his testimony nor detract from his competency as a witness, as no question of jurisdiction is involved.

• Conspiracy: The Court agreed with the trial court that conspiracy was sufficiently proved. The accused-appellants were one in design with Mamerto Soriano in taking personal properties by breaking a window. In the course of the robbery, Mamerto Soriano raped Maribeth Bolito while the accused-appellants stood outside the door and did nothing to prevent him. Once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of robbery, they are both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The rule is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape.

• Voluntary Surrender: For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the accused must comply with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. Evidence showed that Mario Verceles' surrender was not spontaneous and unconditional; he submitted himself to the police only to clear the matter and to know the reason why the police were looking for him, and when asked what his involvement was, he answered that he did not know anything about the crime. Citing People vs. Abella, the Court held that when the accused goes to a police station merely to clear his name and not to give himself up, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated.

• Damages: The Court modified the award of moral damages from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00, as this award is not intended to enrich the victim but to compensate for her suffering. The trial court committed a reversible error when it awarded exemplary damages of P100,000.00 despite the absence of one or more aggravating circumstances. The records were bereft of evidence to support the claim for the value of unrecovered properties belonging to Rosita Quilates. Maribeth Bolito should have been awarded P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, as it is mandatory upon a conviction of rape, and such indemnity is distinct from moral damages and based on different jural foundations.

• Discharge of Accused as State Witness — Under Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the requisites are: (a) absolute necessity for the testimony; (b) no other direct evidence available; (c) testimony can be substantially corroborated; (d) the accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) the accused has not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. The Court applied these requisites and found them satisfied, and further held that even an improper discharge does not render the testimony inadmissible.

• Conspiracy in Robbery with Rape — Once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of robbery, they are both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The Court applied this rule to hold the accused-appellants liable as principals.

• Voluntary Surrender as Mitigating Circumstance — The requisites are: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary, with a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally. The Court applied this doctrine to deny the mitigating circumstance to Mario Verceles, as his surrender was not spontaneous and unconditional.

• "We have previously ruled that once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape." — This states the controlling doctrine on conspiracy in robbery with rape, which is the core basis for the conviction of the accused-appellants.

• "The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape." — This articulates the canonical rule on the liability of co-conspirators in robbery with rape.

• "For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture." — This defines the requisites for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which the Court applied to deny the benefit to Mario Verceles.

• People vs. Sison, 312 SCRA 792 (1999) — Cited for the principle that the trial court's discretionary judgment on whether an accused appears to be the most guilty is seldom interfered with by appellate courts except in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
• People vs. Bariquit, 341 SCRA 600 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the improper discharge of an accused will not render inadmissible his testimony nor detract from his competency as a witness.
• People vs. Mendoza, 292 SCRA 168 (1998) — Cited for the doctrine that once conspiracy is established in robbery, all are equally culpable for rape committed on the occasion of the robbery.
• People vs. Lascuna, 225 SCRA 386 (1993) — Cited in support of the rule that all who took part in a robbery are liable as principals for rape committed on the occasion thereof.
• Roca vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 414 (2001) — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. De Vera, 308 SCRA 75 (1999) — Cited for the principle that voluntary surrender is not a mitigating circumstance where the accused goes to the authorities for an entirely different matter.
• People vs. Abella, 318 SCRA 270 (1999) — Cited for the rule that when the accused goes to a police station merely to clear his name and not to give himself up, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated.
• People vs. Diopita, 346 SCRA 794 (2000) — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity is mandatory upon a conviction of rape and is distinct from moral damages.

• Article 299, paragraph A(2), Revised Penal Code — The provision under which the accused were charged for robbery, in relation to Article 335 on rape.
• Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code — The provision under which the accused were convicted and penalized for Robbery with Rape, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• Rule 119, Section 17, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — The rule enumerating the requirements for the discharge and utilization of an accused as a state witness, which the Court applied to uphold the discharge of Jerry Soriano.
• Article 2230, New Civil Code — The provision on exemplary damages, which the Court applied to delete the award for lack of aggravating circumstances.

• Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman)
• Vitug, J.
• Carpio, J.