People vs. Venus

An information alleging habitual delinquency must specify with sufficient clearness and certainty the dates of (1) the commission of the previous crimes, (2) the last conviction or release, and (3) the other previous convictions or releases of the accused, so that the court may properly determine whether the requisites of Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code are satisfied; a general averment of habitual delinquency, even on a plea of guilty, is insufficient to sustain the additional penalty.

The defendant, Bienvenido Venus, was prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code for robbery in an inhabited house, with an allegation that he was a habitual delinquent under Article 62. Article 62 provides that a person is deemed a habitual delinquent if, within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction for the crimes of robbery (robo), theft (hurto), estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. The provision imposes an additional penalty on habitual delinquents, and the Supreme Court had, in a series of cases beginning as early as 1923, addressed the degree of specificity required in the information to sustain such a finding.

On March 16, 1936, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance an information charging Bienvenido Venus with the crime of robbery in an inhabited house. The information alleged that on or about March 9, 1936, Venus entered the house occupied by Zoila de Talaban at 1328 M. Natividad Street, Manila, by breaking the hasp of the door secured by a padlock, and once inside took and carried away, with intent of gain and without the owner's consent, personal properties belonging to de Talaban with a total value of ₱188.50. The information further alleged that Venus was a habitual delinquent, having previously been convicted by final judgment rendered by a competent court, once for the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house and once for theft, the date of his last conviction being November 14, 1934.

Venus pleaded guilty to the information. The trial court rendered judgment imposing an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from four months and one day of arresto mayor to three years, three months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, with accessory penalties, and ordering him to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ₱97.50, representing the value of the personal properties not recovered, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The articles recovered from the accused were ordered returned to the complainant. The trial court took into account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, as the date of the prior conviction for theft was specified in the information, but it refused to consider Venus a habitual delinquent under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court reasoned that the allegation of habitual delinquency was deficient because the information did not specify when the accused committed the crime of attempted robbery and when he was convicted for that offense.

From this decision, Venus appealed to the Supreme Court. There was no question as to his guilt. The sole question on appeal concerned the penalty. Counsel de oficio for the appellant recommended confirmation of the lower court's decision, while the Solicitor General recommended that Venus be adjudged a habitual delinquent.

• Sufficiency of the Penalty: Counsel de oficio for the appellant recommended confirmation of the decision of the lower court, effectively accepting the penalty as imposed by the trial court without seeking modification.

• Imposition of Habitual Delinquency: The Solicitor General argued that the defendant-appellant should be adjudged a habitual delinquent, asserting that unlike the information in People vs. Masonson, the information in the present case specified the particular offense (attempted robbery in an inhabited house) for which the defendant was alleged to have been previously convicted and also the date of the last conviction for theft, which occurred prior to the commission of the offense charged.

• Habitual Delinquency: Whether the allegation of habitual delinquency in the information was sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant is a habitual delinquent under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court was correct, given the plea of guilty and the presence of the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.

• Habitual Delinquency: No. The information was insufficient to sustain a finding of habitual delinquency because it failed to specify the date of the conviction for attempted robbery, leaving it uncertain whether the prior convictions satisfied the temporal requisites of Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Proper Penalty: The penalty was modified. Because the plea of guilty offset the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the penalty under Article 299 for robbery in an inhabited house by unlawful entry was imposed in the medium degree per Article 64, yielding an indeterminate sentence of six months and one day to two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional.

• Habitual Delinquency: The information alleged that the accused had been previously convicted once for attempted robbery in an inhabited house and once for theft, with the date of the last conviction being November 14, 1934. While the Solicitor General correctly noted that, unlike in People vs. Masonson, the information specified the particular offense and the date of the last conviction for theft, this did not cure the deficiency. The information failed to specify the date of the conviction for attempted robbery. The two previous convictions may have taken place on the same date (November 14, 1934) or on two different dates so close together as to warrant considering them as only one conviction for purposes of habitual delinquency, as held in People vs. Santiago and subsequent cases. Moreover, prior convictions must precede the commission of the crime charged to constitute an element of habitual delinquency, and without the dates of the prior convictions and the commission of the prior crimes, the court could not determine whether the ten-year period requirement of Article 62 was satisfied. The Court therefore directed prosecuting attorneys to specify in informations the dates of (1) the commission of the previous crimes, (2) the last conviction or release, and (3) the other previous convictions or releases, to avoid both the improper imposition of the additional penalty on a plea of guilty to a general allegation and the escape of hardened criminals from the deserved additional penalty.

• Proper Penalty: The defendant could not be considered a habitual delinquent but only a recidivist. The plea of guilty offset the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. Under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for robbery in an inhabited house by means of unlawful entry, where the criminal is not armed and the value of the property stolen does not exceed ₱250, was to be imposed in the medium degree in accordance with Article 64. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court fixed the indeterminate penalty at six months and one day to two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional.

• Sufficiency of Allegations for Habitual Delinquency — An information alleging habitual delinquency must specify with sufficient clearness and certainty the dates of (1) the commission of the previous crimes, (2) the last conviction or release, and (3) the other previous convictions or releases of the accused. A general averment of habitual delinquency is insufficient, even on a plea of guilty, to sustain the additional penalty provided by Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court applied this doctrine by finding the information deficient for failing to allege the date of the conviction for attempted robbery, thereby making it impossible to determine whether the temporal requisites of habitual delinquency were met.

• Prior Convictions Must Precede the Crime Charged — In order for former convictions to constitute an element of habitual delinquency, they must precede the commission of the crime charged. The Court relied on People vs. Santiago and People vs. Masonson to reinforce that convictions occurring after the commission of the offense charged cannot be counted for habitual delinquency purposes.

• Plea of Guilty Offsets Recidivism — A plea of guilty offsets the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, such that the penalty for the crime charged is imposed in the medium degree pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

• "It is therefore urged upon prosecuting attorneys that in the prosecution of cases of this nature, they should not content themselves with a general averment of habitual delinquency but should specify the dates (1) of the commission of the previous crimes, (2) of the last conviction or release, and (3) of the other previous convictions or release of the accused." — This passage articulates the Court's directive on the required specificity of informations alleging habitual delinquency, establishing the three categories of dates that must be alleged.

• "The defendant and appellant in the case at bar can not be considered a habitual delinquent but only a recidivist. As the plea of guilty offsets the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the penalty provided for in article 299 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of robbery in an inhabited house by means of unlawful entry where the criminal is not armed and the value of the property stolen does not exceed 250 pesos, should be imposed in the medium degree in accordance with the provisions of article 64 of the Revised Penal Code." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the proper penalty, applying the rule that a plea of guilty offsets recidivism and results in imposition of the penalty in the medium degree.

• People vs. Masonson, G.R. No. 44527, March 31, 1936 — The Court distinguished this case, noting that while the information in Masonson used the vague term "similar offense" without specifying the particular crimes, the present information did specify the offenses; however, Masonson's broader principle—that insufficient allegations cannot sustain habitual delinquency—was followed.
• People vs. Santiago, 55 Phil., 266 (1930) — Controlling precedent establishing that prior convictions must precede the commission of the crime charged to constitute habitual delinquency, and that multiple convictions on the same or close dates may be treated as one for habitual delinquency purposes.
• People vs. Nayco, 45 Phil., 167 (1923) — Early precedent where the Court refused to impose the additional penalty for habitual delinquency due to insufficiency of allegations in the information, cited as foundational authority for the doctrine.
• People vs. Dominguez, G.R. No. 44221, January 8, 1936, 62 Phil., 975 — The Court held that an allegation of eleven prior convictions for estafa and eight for theft, without specifying dates of last conviction or release or dates of other convictions, was insufficient to sustain habitual delinquency on a plea of guilty.
• People vs. Morales, 61 Phil., 222 — The Court held that an information alleging habitual delinquency must state the date of the accused's last conviction or release, not merely the date of commission of the subsequent offense, as what is material is the date of conviction of the subsequent offense in relation to the date of release or last conviction.
• People vs. Siojo, G.R. No. 36835, 57 Phil., 1005 — Cited for the proposition that the judgment must be rendered within ten years from the accused's last conviction or last release to sustain habitual delinquency.

• Article 62, Revised Penal Code — Defines habitual delinquency: a person is deemed a habitual delinquent if, within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction for the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of said crimes a third time or oftener. The Court found the information insufficient to support a finding under this article because the dates of the prior convictions and the commission of the prior crimes were not adequately alleged.
• Article 299, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for robbery in an inhabited house by means of unlawful entry. The Court applied this provision where the criminal was not armed and the value of the property stolen did not exceed ₱250.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of penalties when aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present. The Court applied paragraph 4, providing that when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances (the plea of guilty having offset recidivism), the penalty is imposed in the medium degree.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the minimum and maximum of the indeterminate penalty, resulting in six months and one day to two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concurred.