People vs. Veneracion

Where the law prescribes a single, indivisible penalty for an offense, the court has no discretion to impose any other penalty. For the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the mandatory penalty is death, not reclusion perpetua.

Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero were charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, for the rape and killing of a seven-year-old girl. The trial court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt but, citing the judge's religious convictions, sentenced them to reclusion perpetua instead of the death penalty. The prosecution moved for reconsideration to correct the penalty, but the trial judge denied the motion, claiming it had lost jurisdiction after the accused perfected their appeal.

• Nature of the Case: The accused were charged with the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide for the rape and killing of a seven-year-old girl, Angel Alquiza.
• Trial and Judgment: After trial, the RTC found Lagarto and Cordero guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The decision, however, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, citing the judge's religious opposition to the death penalty.
• Prosecution's Motion: The City Prosecutor moved for reconsideration, arguing that the law mandated the death penalty for Rape with Homicide.
• Trial Court's Refusal: The RTC denied the motion, not on the merits, but on the procedural ground that it had lost jurisdiction due to the accused's perfected appeal.
• Sole Issue on Certiorari: The petition did not challenge the finding of guilt but solely questioned whether the judge's refusal to impose the mandatory death penalty constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Mandatory Penalty: Petitioner (The People) argued that Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 unequivocally provides that the penalty for Rape with Homicide is death, leaving the trial judge no discretion to impose reclusion perpetua.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the judge's imposition of a different penalty based on personal religious beliefs, in direct contravention of the clear text of the law, constituted a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment amounting to grave abuse of discretion.

• Loss of Jurisdiction: Respondent Judge argued that once the accused perfected their appeal, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and could not act on the prosecution's motion for reconsideration.
• Academic Issue: In his separate dissent, Justice Vitug suggested that the petition had become academic because the case was already on appeal before the Supreme Court, which could review the penalty de novo.

• Jurisdiction and Discretion: Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua for Rape with Homicide instead of the mandatory penalty of death.

• Jurisdiction and Discretion: The trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The law prescribes a single, indivisible penalty of death for Rape with Homicide. The judge's duty was to apply the law as written, regardless of personal beliefs. His refusal to do so rendered the portion of the judgment imposing reclusion perpetua void. The appeal from that void judgment was inefficacious, so the trial court did not lose jurisdiction. The case was remanded for the imposition of the correct penalty.

• Mandatory Penalties and Judicial Discretion — When the law prescribes a single, indivisible penalty for a crime, the court has no discretion to impose a different penalty. The court's duty is to apply the law, not to pass upon its wisdom, efficacy, or morality.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Penalty Imposition — A judge's deliberate imposition of a penalty contrary to the clear mandate of the law, based on personal beliefs, constitutes a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment amounting to grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

• "Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless."
• "The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death."
• "Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the Legislature... The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them."

• People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 36 (1951) — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that judges must apply the law as it stands, regardless of personal views on its harshness or morality, and that doing otherwise constitutes reversible error.

• Section 11, Republic Act No. 7659 (amending Article 335, Revised Penal Code) — The statute in force at the time of the crime's commission. It explicitly states: "When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The Court held this provision to be mandatory and free from judicial discretion.
• Section 1, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Court — Cited for the duty of the court to render a judgment of conviction and impose "the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law."

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa (with separate opinion), Justices Florenz D. Regalado (with separate opinion), Hilario G. Davide, Jr., (concurred with the dissent), Teodoro R. Padilla, Jose C. Nacional, Reynato S. Puno, Jose A.R. Melo, Justine P. Hermosisima, Jr., Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr., Vicente V. Mendoza, and Flerida Ruth P. Romero. Justice Vitug dissented.

• Justice Vicente V. Vitug — Dissented on the ground that the petition had become academic because the criminal case was already on appeal before the Supreme Court. He argued that an appeal brings the entire case up for review, including the penalty, and that the petition should be dismissed or consolidated with the appealed case to avoid a precipitate ruling.