People vs. Veloso

A search warrant that does not name the person to be seized is not void if it contains a sufficient description of the person to enable the officer to identify him. The warrant's description of John Doe as the person who had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo sufficiently identified Veloso, who was the manager of the club, and the police could identify him without difficulty.

The case arose under the Philippine Organic Act, which guaranteed the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures and required that no warrant issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. The Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure contained provisions of the same import, requiring that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. The accused, Jose Ma. Veloso, was a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature and the manager of the Parliamentary Club, an organization occupying the building at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila.

In May 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature and the manager of the club. The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. On May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila applied for and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court.

The application for the search warrant stated that Geronimo did not know who occupied the premises and that according to the best of his information the house was occupied by John Doe. The search warrant commanded the police to search the person of John Doe and the house at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo for devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, including money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly known as monte. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above-mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker ascended a telephone pole so as to enter a window of the house, while other policemen headed by Townsend broke in the outer door.

Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused, the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search. At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. Policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.

All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon. The defense was planted squarely on the contention that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force. The trial judge, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, deduced from the search warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently identified therein, and the trial court considered the allegation that Veloso was a member of the House of Representatives as an aggravating circumstance.

• Illegality of the John Doe Search Warrant: The appellant argued that the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant, since the law, constitutional and statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the application "particularly" describe the person to be seized, and a failure thus to name the person is fatal to the validity of the search warrant.
• Right to Resist Illegal Official Action: The appellant argued that to justify search and arrest, the process must be legal, and illegal official action may be forcibly resisted. Citing Wharton's Criminal Procedure and Commonwealth vs. Crotty, the appellant maintained that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe," is void without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended.

• Sufficiency of the Description of the Premises: The Attorney-General argued that the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands," which was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched, and the police officers were accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises.
• Authority to Arrest Without a Warrant: The Attorney-General added the argument that the police were authorized to arrest without a warrant since a crime was being committed, although the Court found it unnecessary to comment on this contention.

• Validity of the John Doe Search Warrant: Whether the search warrant that named "John Doe" instead of Jose Ma. Veloso was valid despite the constitutional and statutory requirement that the person to be seized be particularly described.
• Justification for Resistance: Whether Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force on the ground that the search warrant was illegal for failing to name him.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Position: Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the accused's position as a member of the House of Representatives as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing.

• Validity of the John Doe Search Warrant: Yes. The search warrant was valid. Although the warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso, it contained a description of the person to be seized—John Doe, who had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo—and since this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify him without difficulty.
• Justification for Resistance: No. Veloso's violent resistance was not justified. To authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest, and here there was possibly a proper case for protest but no case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's idea of a debatable legal question.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Position: No. The Court doubted that advantage was taken by the offender of his public position when he resisted the officers of the law, since the offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige of his office as a means to commit a crime, and Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just as stoutly.

• Validity of the John Doe Search Warrant: The Court reasoned that the Organic Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, and the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void "except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty. The Court also noted that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club purposes, not the home of Veloso or the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature, a camouflaged club with a high sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but intended for nefarious practices, where there would commonly be varying occupancy and a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown to the police.
• Justification for Resistance: The Court held that a search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it is issued, and no presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. However, the Court reasoned that in defense of himself, any member of his family or his dwelling, a man has a right to employ all necessary violence, but even in the home, and much less so in a club or public place, the person sought to be arrested or to be searched should use no more force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the officers. To authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest, but there was no case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's idea of a debatable legal question. The Court agreed with the trial judge and the Attorney-General that the search warrant was valid and that the defendant had been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Position: The Court doubted that advantage was taken by the offender of his public position when he resisted the officers of the law. The offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige of his office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just as stoutly as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty, accordingly, falls within the medium of that provided by the Penal Code.

• John Doe Search Warrants — A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," is void without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served, stating his personal appearance and peculiarities, his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that the warrant's description of John Doe as the person who had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo sufficiently identified Veloso as the manager of the club.
• Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest — A person sought to be arrested or searched has a right to resist by force, using no more than was necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer, but only where the warrant is defective and void on its face and the officer had no right to arrest the person on whom he attempted to serve it. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that to authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest, and where there is only a debatable legal question, excessive violence is not justified.
• Strict Construction of Search Warrants — A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it is issued, and no presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. The Court applied this doctrine by examining the warrant's description of the person to be seized and finding it sufficient.

• "A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, 'for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect.'" — This passage articulates the standard of strict construction applied to search warrants and the rationale for such strictness, emphasizing the distressing and humiliating effect of their execution.
• "Under the authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, 'except in those cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.' The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served." — This passage states the controlling rule for John Doe warrants and the exception that saves them from invalidity, which the Court applied to uphold the warrant in this case.
• "To authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. There was no case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's idea of a debatable legal question." — This passage defines the standard for when resistance to agents of authority is justified, requiring that the illegality be clearly manifest rather than merely debatable.

• Commonwealth vs. Crotty, 10 Allen (Mass.) 403 (1865) — Controlling precedent cited with approval by the United States Supreme Court, holding that a warrant against "John Doe or Richard Roe" without further description was insufficient, illegal, and void, and that the defendant had a right to resist by force using no more than necessary. The Court distinguished this case by finding that the warrant here contained a sufficient description of the person to be seized.
• Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920) — Followed as a precedent where the regularity of the issuance of a search warrant was also questioned, cited by the Court as authority for considering the appellant's authorities on John Doe warrants.
• Reed vs. Rice, 2 J. J. Marshall (Ky.) 44 (1829) — Cited for the proposition that search warrants must be strictly construed and no presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process.
• Smith vs. McDuffee, 72 Ore. 276 (1914) — Cited for the same proposition regarding strict construction of search warrants.
• Steele vs. U. S., U.S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed. 757 (1925) — Cited for the prevailing rule that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.
• Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439 (1909) — Cited for the rule that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause.
• People vs. Chan Fook, 42 Phil. 230 (1921) — Cited for the proposition that to authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest.

• Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution — Cited as the source of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, which the Court noted was incorporated into the Philippine Bill of Rights.
• Eleventh and Eighteenth Paragraphs, Philippine Bill of Rights, Organic Act — Cited for the guarantees that "the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated" and "that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
• Section 97, Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure — Cited for the requirement that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."
• Section 98, Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure — Cited for the requirement that after the judge or justice shall have examined on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, and shall have taken their depositions in writing, the judge may issue the warrant.
• Section 99, Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure — Cited for the form of the warrant, which must command the officer to make immediate search on the person or in the house situated, describing it with reasonable particularity.
• Section 105, Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure — Cited for the provision that "a person charged with a crime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime."
• Article 252, Penal Code — The provision under which the accused was charged and convicted of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred. Villa-Real, J., took no part.