People vs. Valledor

The exempting circumstance of insanity requires proof of complete deprivation of intelligence at the very moment of the act, and mere abnormality of mental faculties or a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia does not exempt an accused from criminal liability where his conduct during the offense—selective targeting, expressions of motive, and flight—demonstrates discernment and freedom of will.

Enrico A. Valledor, a 30-year-old provincial jail guard at the Palawan Provincial Jail and resident of Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, had a documented history of mental disorder. His mother, Pacita Valledor, had observed abnormal behavior beginning in January 1990 and disclosed that insanity ran in their family. A medical practitioner, Dr. Deriomedes de Guzman, had diagnosed Valledor with "psychosis with schizophrenia" and prescribed Thoracin, which temporarily stabilized him. The victims—Elsa Rodriguez, Roger Cabiguen, and Ricardo Maglalang—were neighbors of Valledor. Roger Cabiguen had been suspected by Valledor of killing his pet dog sometime in 1980, and Elsa Rodriguez had rejected Valledor's courtship in 1989, at one point spitting on and slapping him.

On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was inside his bedroom at Burgos Street, Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, working on a lettering job. With him were his first cousin, 25-year-old Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua. Roger was seated on his bed working at his table, Elsa was across the table, Antonio was on the left side, and Simplicio was seated near the door on Roger's right side.

Accused-appellant Enrico Valledor suddenly entered the room, called out Roger's nickname "Jer," and immediately attacked him with a knife. Roger parried the thrust and was stabbed on the right forearm instead. Accused-appellant then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and uttered the words "Ako akabales den, Elsa" (I had my revenge, Elsa). He fled immediately, leaving Simplicio and Antonio unharmed. On their way to the hospital, Antonio noticed a commotion and learned from bystanders that their neighbor Ricardo Maglalang had likewise been stabbed by accused-appellant. Elsa was declared dead on arrival at the hospital, while Roger was treated for a 5-centimeter wound on his right forearm.

The prosecution established that accused-appellant had suspected Roger of killing his pet dog in 1980 and had courted Elsa in 1989, only to be rejected; on one occasion, Elsa spat on and slapped him. The defense of insanity rested on evidence that in January 1990, accused-appellant's mother noticed him behaving abnormally—restless, unable to sleep, and complaining that neighbors were spreading rumors that he was a rapist and a thief. Dr. Deriomedes de Guzman diagnosed him with "psychosis with schizophrenia" and prescribed Thoracin, which kept him sane for two months. On March 4, 1991, his mother again noticed strange behavior and left to buy medication, but upon returning found him gone.

On the morning of March 6, 1991, accused-appellant was seen swimming across a river in Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan. Barangay Captain Rufino Nuñez and Councilman Antonio Sibunga pulled him from the water and took him aboard a pump boat. Inside the boat, he kept crying and saying his family would be killed. Suspecting mental illness, the barangay captain asked Sibunga to accompany him to Puerto Princesa City. At about 1:00 p.m., upon reaching Junction I, accused-appellant jumped off the jeepney and boarded a tricycle. At around 2:00 p.m., his mother found him standing in the middle of the road, dusty and dirty. When asked where he came from, he answered "Pinatay niya kayong lahat." Thirty minutes later, he was arrested and detained.

On March 11, 1991, City Health Officer Dr. Manuel Bilog examined accused-appellant and found him cooperative but talkative and incoherent, disoriented as to time, place, and person, and recommended commitment to the National Mental Hospital. The defense also presented the April 27, 1992 findings of Dr. Guia Melendres of the National Center for Mental Health, which diagnosed accused-appellant with psychosis or insanity classified under schizophrenia—a thought disorder characterized by deterioration from previous level of functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas of reference, delusion of control, suspiciousness, poor judgment, and absence of insight—as well as psychoactive substance use disorder, alcohol abuse. Dr. Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist at the PNP Medical Service, was presented to interpret these findings.

• Insanity Defense: Accused-appellant argued that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the fact that when he committed the offenses charged, he was mentally ill, out of his mind, or insane at the time, invoking the exempting circumstance of insanity under the Revised Penal Code.

• Insanity as Exempting Circumstance: Whether accused-appellant was legally insane at the time of the commission of the crimes such as to exempt him from criminal liability.
• Frustrated vs. Attempted Murder: Whether the crime committed against Roger Cabiguen constitutes frustrated murder or only attempted murder, given the nature of the wound sustained.
• Civil Liability: Whether the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, actual damages, and temperate damages were properly determined.

• Insanity as Exempting Circumstance: No. The defense of insanity was rejected because the accused's deliberate acts—selective targeting of victims, utterance of words indicating revenge, and immediate flight—demonstrated that he was not completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will at the time of the offense.
• Frustrated vs. Attempted Murder: The conviction for frustrated murder was modified to attempted murder. The wound on Roger Cabiguen's right forearm was not fatal, and where the wound inflicted is not sufficient to cause death, the crime is only attempted murder since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death.
• Civil Liability: The awards were modified. The unsubstantiated awards of ₱14,000.00 as actual damages and ₱15,000.00 for loss of income to Roger Cabiguen were deleted and replaced with ₱10,000.00 as temperate damages. The heirs of Elsa Rodriguez were awarded ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱29,250.00 as actual damages based on the parties' agreement.

• Insanity as Exempting Circumstance: The law presumes all persons to be of sound mind and all acts to be voluntary; he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence referring to the time preceding the act or the very moment of its execution. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act—a total deprivation of freedom of the will—and mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." Five circumstances demonstrated that accused-appellant was not legally insane at the time: (1) Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to him but he chose to stab Roger and Elsa; (2) he called out Roger's nickname before stabbing him; (3) Simplicio and Antonio inside the room were left unharmed; (4) he uttered "Ako akabales den, Elsa" (I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and (5) he hurriedly left the room after stabbing the victims. These acts showed awareness, control, and discernment. His prior acts of crying, swimming in the river with clothes on, and jumping off the jeepney were not sufficient to prove legal insanity at the time of the crime. Medical findings showing mental disorder after the commission had no bearing on liability; what is decisive is the mental condition at the time of perpetration.

• Frustrated vs. Attempted Murder: The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death. The 5-centimeter wound on Roger Cabiguen's right forearm was not fatal. Pursuant to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted crime is lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Before its amendment by R.A. No. 7659, Article 248 provided that the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Under Article 61(3), the penalty two degrees lower is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. With no modifying circumstance, the medium period—prision mayor minimum—was imposed, with an indeterminate sentence applying the next lower penalty as minimum.

• Civil Liability: The award of ₱14,000.00 as actual damages and ₱15,000.00 for loss of income to Roger Cabiguen was deleted for lack of substantiating evidence. In lieu thereof, temperate damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code were awarded at ₱10,000.00, since Roger suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount could not be proved with certainty. The ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity for the death of Elsa Rodriguez was affirmed. An additional ₱50,000.00 as moral damages was awarded, needing no proof since the conviction for murder suffices as justification. Actual damages of ₱29,250.00 were awarded to the heirs of Elsa Rodriguez based on the agreement of the parties.

• Presumption of Sanity — The law presumes all persons to be of sound mind and all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously. The burden of proving insanity as an exempting circumstance rests on the party invoking it, and the evidence must refer to the time preceding the act or the very moment of its execution. The Court applied this by requiring accused-appellant to overcome the presumption, which he failed to do.

• Legal Standard of Insanity — Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent," deprived of reason, and acting without the least discernment. The Court found that accused-appellant's selective targeting, expression of motive, and flight negated complete deprivation of intelligence.

• Decisiveness of Mental Condition at Time of Offense — Medical findings showing mental disorder after the commission of the crime have no bearing on criminal liability. What is decisive is the mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Post-commission diagnoses of schizophrenia do not retroactively establish insanity at the time of the act.

• Attempted vs. Frustrated Murder (Non-Fatal Wound) — Where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death as a consequence. The 5-centimeter forearm wound on Roger Cabiguen did not qualify as frustrated murder.

• Temperate Damages in Lieu of Unsubstantiated Actual Damages — Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot be proved with certainty. The Court substituted ₱10,000.00 temperate damages for the deleted unsubstantiated actual damages and loss of income awards.

• "In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be 'so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.' He must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the legal standard for insanity as an exempting circumstance, distinguishing legal insanity from mere mental abnormality.

• "Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution." — This establishes the burden of proof and the temporal requirement for the insanity defense, both critical for bar review.

• "A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so." — This encapsulates the principle that bizarre or irrational conduct preceding or surrounding the offense does not, without more, establish legal insanity at the time of the act.

• "The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death." — This states the controlling rule for distinguishing frustrated from attempted murder based on the fatality of the wound inflicted.

• People vs. Estrada, 333 SCRA 699 — Followed for the formulation that insanity requires complete deprivation of intelligence and that mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
• People vs. Almedita, 145 SCRA 451 — Followed for the presumption of sanity and the principle that it is improper to presume acts were done unconsciously.
• People vs. Villa, Jr., 331 SCRA 142 — Followed for the proposition that insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties manifested in language and conduct, and may be shown by surrounding circumstances.
• People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708 — Followed for the principle that acting crazy does not necessarily and conclusively prove legal insanity.
• People vs. Trinidad, 169 SCRA 51 — Followed for the rule that where the wound inflicted is not sufficient to cause death, the crime is only attempted murder.
• People vs. Balderas, 276 SCRA 471 — Followed for the penalty computation in attempted murder under Articles 51 and 61(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Del Valle, G.R. No. 119616, December 14, 2001 — Followed for the award of temperate damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code in lieu of unsubstantiated actual damages.
• People vs. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 126136, April 5, 2002 — Followed for the award of moral damages without need of proof upon conviction for murder.

• Article 12, Revised Penal Code — Provides the exempting circumstances, including insanity. The Court applied paragraph 1, requiring complete deprivation of intelligence or freedom of the will, which accused-appellant failed to prove.
• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for a principal of an attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Applied to determine the penalty for attempted murder against Roger Cabiguen.
• Article 61(3), Revised Penal Code — Provides the rule for computing penalties two degrees lower. Applied to derive prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium as the penalty two degrees lower than reclusion temporal maximum to death for murder.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (before amendment by R.A. No. 7659) — Defined the penalty for murder as reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Applied as the baseline for computing the penalty for attempted murder.
• Article 79, Revised Penal Code — Provides for suspension of sentence when the accused is found to be suffering from a serious mental disorder. The trial court invoked this to suspend service of sentence and order confinement at the National Center for Mental Health.
• Article 2224, Civil Code — Authorizes temperate damages when pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot be proved with certainty. Applied to award ₱10,000.00 to Roger Cabiguen in lieu of deleted unsubstantiated actual damages.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the minimum penalty for attempted murder as the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense.

Davide, Jr., Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concurred.