People vs. Valdez

When homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the illegal possession or use of such firearm may no longer be separately charged under R.A. 8294, and the use of the unlicensed firearm is treated merely as an aggravating circumstance, which cannot be appreciated if its retroactive application would result in a higher penalty unfavorable to the accused.

The accused, Domingo Valdez y Dulay, was charged with murder for shooting Labrador Valdez y Madrid and illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866 for using an unlicensed firearm in the killing. The crimes allegedly occurred on October 31, 1995, in Pangasinan. At the time of the incident, P.D. 1866 penalized illegal possession of firearms with reclusion perpetua if homicide or murder was committed with the unlicensed firearm. However, R.A. 8294, which amended P.D. 1866, took effect on July 6, 1997, treating the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide merely as an aggravating circumstance rather than a separate offense.

On October 31, 1995, at around 9:00 p.m. in Sitio Laclac, Barangay San Roque, San Manuel, Pangasinan, Marcelo Valdez was under his nipa house talking with his son, Labrador Valdez. Labrador was lying sideways on a carabao sled, facing his father at a distance of less than two meters. Other housemates, including Rolando Valdez, Imelda Umagtang, and an eight-year-old boy, were upstairs preparing to sleep. Suddenly, two consecutive gunshots were fired from the western side of the house. The first shot hit Labrador's left forefinger and thumb, while the second shot hit him two inches from the left shoulder below the neck, exiting at the right side just below the breast. The assailant immediately ran away towards the west.

Marcelo called for help while Labrador managed to walk upstairs to the kitchen. The gunfire and Marcelo's cries alerted Rolando and Imelda, who rushed to the kitchen and saw Labrador bathed in his own blood. When Rolando asked Labrador who shot him, the victim replied that it was Domingo Valdez. When Labrador's brother and in-laws arrived and asked what happened, he again identified Valdez as the assailant. After an hour, a passenger jeep was found to transport the victim to the hospital, but he had already succumbed to his wounds. The next day, Dr. Asuncion Tuvera conducted an autopsy, revealing that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage from the gunshot wounds.

Valdez was charged with murder and illegal possession of firearms. His defense rested on denial and alibi, claiming he was hauling and transporting 27 cavans of palay with Reymante and Conrado Centino from 6:00 to 9:00 p.m. that evening, after which they had supper and drank wine until 11:00 p.m. The distance between the crime scene and the Centinos' house was about one kilometer, which could be walked in 30 minutes. The trial court, however, credited the positive identification by Marcelo Valdez and the victim's dying declarations, convicting Valdez of both charges and imposing the death penalty for murder and reclusion perpetua for illegal possession of firearms.

• Reasonable Doubt: Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, relying on his defense of denial and alibi.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance, as well as evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and nighttime as aggravating circumstances.
• Application of R.A. 8294: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not applying R.A. 8294, which amended P.D. 1866, and in convicting him for two separate offenses instead of treating the illegal possession of the firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
• Dying Declaration: Appellant contended that the victim's statements identifying him as the assailant could not be admitted as a dying declaration because the declarant was not conscious of his imminent death. He also argued that the witness's identification was doubtful due to poor lighting and the witness's age, and that a witness's sworn statement omission was a contradiction.

• Credibility and Identification: Whether the prosecution established the identity of the appellant as the assailant beyond reasonable doubt despite his defense of alibi and alleged inconsistencies in witness testimonies.
• Dying Declaration: Whether the victim's statements identifying the appellant as his assailant were admissible as dying declarations under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Whether treachery attended the killing to qualify the crime as murder.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and nighttime were properly appreciated as aggravating circumstances.
• Retroactive Application of R.A. 8294: Whether R.A. 8294 should be applied retroactively to treat the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance rather than a separate offense, and whether such aggravating circumstance can be used to impose the death penalty.

• Credibility and Identification: Yes. The positive identification by the victim's father and the victim's own statements prevailed over the inherently weak defenses of denial and alibi.
• Dying Declaration: Yes. The victim's statements were admissible as dying declarations, having been made under consciousness of impending death, concerning the cause and circumstances of his death, by a competent witness, in a criminal case for murder.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Yes. Treachery attended the killing because the victim was shot suddenly and unexpectedly while lying on a carabao sled, giving him no opportunity to defend himself.
• Aggravating Circumstances: No. Evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and nighttime were not appreciated for lack of factual basis.
• Retroactive Application of R.A. 8294: Yes. R.A. 8294 applies retroactively because it is favorable to the accused, treating the illegal possession as an aggravating circumstance and precluding a separate charge. However, the aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated to impose the death penalty because it would be unfavorable to the accused.

• Credibility and Identification: The defense of alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail against positive identification. The distance between the crime scene and the place where appellant claimed to be was only one kilometer, which could be negotiated in 30 minutes on foot, making it physically possible for him to be at the crime scene. The lighting from a kerosene lamp was sufficient for the septuagenarian father to identify the appellant, who was about two meters from the lamp and less than a meter from the victim.
• Dying Declaration: The elements of a dying declaration are present: the declaration was made under consciousness of impending death, as shown by the extent and seriousness of the wounds; the deceased was competent as a witness; the declaration concerned the cause and circumstances of his death; and it was offered in a criminal case for murder. The fact that a witness did not mention the declaration in her sworn statement, claiming she "forgot," did not negate its admissibility, as the sworn statement itself actually contained the information.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Treachery was present because the attack was sudden and unexpected, giving the victim, who was lying on a carabao sled conversing with his father, no opportunity to repel or defend himself.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Evident premeditation was absent because there was no evidence of contemplation or cool reflection. Abuse of superior strength, if present, was absorbed in treachery. Nighttime was not appreciated because there was no proof that the appellant specifically sought the darkness of night to perpetrate the crime.
• Retroactive Application of R.A. 8294: Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony. Since R.A. 8294, which took effect in 1997, treats the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder merely as an aggravating circumstance rather than a separate offense, it is favorable to the appellant and applies retroactively. Thus, the separate charge for illegal possession of firearms must be dismissed. However, while the use of an unlicensed firearm is an aggravating circumstance under R.A. 8294, it cannot be appreciated to impose the higher penalty of death because doing so would be unfavorable to the appellant. Therefore, the penalty for murder is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

• Dying Declaration — A dying declaration is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule when: (1) the declaration was made by the deceased under consciousness of impending death; (2) the deceased was competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; and (4) it is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry. The declaration need not be directed only to the person inquiring; anyone who has knowledge of what the declarant said can testify.
• Retroactive Application of Penal Laws — Penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, as provided in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. An amendatory law that reduces the penalty or treats a separate offense as an aggravating circumstance is favorable and applies retroactively, but the aggravating circumstance cannot be used to impose a higher penalty if such application would be unfavorable to the accused.

• "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." — This passage quotes the provision of R.A. 8294 that the Court applied retroactively to dismiss the separate charge of illegal possession of firearms and treat the use of the unlicensed firearm merely as an aggravating circumstance.
• "the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be appreciated in this case because its retroactive application would be unfavorable to the accused, since the higher penalty of death would necessarily be imposed." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning for not appreciating the aggravating circumstance of using an unlicensed firearm, establishing the principle that retroactive application of favorable penal laws cannot be used to impose a higher penalty.

• People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr., 309 SCRA 466 — Cited as controlling precedent for the ruling that the use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be separately charged under R.A. 8294 and that the death penalty cannot be imposed when the retroactive application of the aggravating circumstance would be unfavorable to the accused.
• People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611 — Cited to support the proposition that evidence of motive is inconsequential when the identity of the culprit has been positively established, and that the use of an unlicensed firearm should only be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Marollano, 276 SCRA 84 — Cited for the elements required for the admissibility of a dying declaration.

• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony. The Court applied this provision to give retroactive effect to R.A. 8294.
• Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Defines a dying declaration as the declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending death, received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. The Court used this to admit the victim's statements identifying the appellant.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision, imposing reclusion perpetua after disregarding the aggravating circumstance of using an unlicensed firearm.
• Republic Act No. 8294 — Amends P.D. 1866 by providing that if homicide or murder is committed with an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered an aggravating circumstance. The Court applied this retroactively to dismiss the separate charge for illegal possession of firearms.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.