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People vs. Valdesancho

The accused was acquitted of two charges of rape. Vicente Valdesancho y Delmo, brother-in-law of complainant Elvie Basco, had been charged with raping her on August 15 and 16, 1994 in Mabitac, Laguna, and convicted by the trial court to two terms of reclusion perpetua. The prosecution sought to prove the 1994 dates, while the defense presented alibi and school records to show non-residence and presence elsewhere on those dates. Because the trial court instead convicted for rapes supposedly committed on August 15 and 16, 1993, a variance the accused had no opportunity to meet, reversal was required on due process grounds.

Primary Holding

An accused cannot be convicted of an offense committed on dates materially different from those alleged in the information and litigated at trial, as conviction without opportunity to defend against the substituted dates violates the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and to due process. Although the date of rape is generally not an essential element, it became essential here to the alibi defense framed around the charged 1994 dates.

Background

Vicente Valdesancho y Delmo is the husband of Erlinda Valdesancho, elder sister of complainant Elvie Basco. At the request of their mother Leonida Basco, Elvie and her younger brothers were sent to live with the Valdesancho spouses in San Antonio, Mabitac, Laguna in order to study there. No extrinsic statutory or historical backdrop beyond this familial and custodial arrangement is needed to understand the dispute.

History

  1. Mar 27, 1996

    Filing of Informations

    Two informations for rape allegedly committed on August 15, 1994 and August 16, 1994 were filed against the accused.

  2. Trial court

    Rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape, sentencing him to two reclusion perpetua and ordering payment of P100,000.00 moral damages and costs, with credit for preventive imprisonment.

  3. Appeal to the Supreme Court

    Accused assigned errors on credibility and on conviction for 1993 offenses different from the 1994 charges alleged.

Facts

In 1994, Elvie Basco, then fourteen years old and in Grade 1 at Barangay San Antonio School, lived with her brothers Erick and Eddie in the house of her sister Erlinda and brother-in-law Vicente Valdesancho in San Antonio, Mabitac, Laguna, having transferred there on June 24, 1994 at their mother Leonida Basco's request so the children could study. According to the prosecution, in the early morning of August 15, 1994, while Erlinda was in Manila and Elvie's brothers slept in the other room, Valdesancho called Elvie to his room to powder his back, then held her when she sought to cook breakfast, tied her hands behind her back, removed her shorts and panty and his pants, forcibly spread her legs despite her pleas, and had carnal knowledge of her causing bleeding, afterwards warning her not to tell anyone on pain of death to her and her family. The prosecution further recounted that in the evening of August 16, 1994, while Elvie was studying, Valdesancho called her to his room to look under the bed for a chick, blocked her exit, laid her on the bed, removed her shorts and panty, kissed her on the cheeks and lips, and again had carnal knowledge of her against her will, repeating the death threat.

Elvie kept the incidents to herself for fear of the threats. In September 1995, while already residing with her brother and mother in Barangay Minayutan, Famy, Laguna, and alarmed because Valdesancho stayed in their house for less than a month and gave her malicious looks, she reported the rapes to her Tiya Soling, who informed Leonida; Leonida verified the account with Elvie and, after initial hesitation because the accused was her son-in-law, accompanied her to the Mabitac police station. Elvie executed a sworn statement on January 15, 1996, and upon advice was medically examined by Dra. Nimfa Pastrana on January 13, 1996, whose January 19, 1996 certificate found old hymenal incomplete lacerations at 12, 5 and 4 o'clock and old complete lacerations at 3 and 7 o'clock, opined as possibly caused by a male organ or fingers inserted months or years before, with a logbook notation that Elvie said the rape occurred on August 4, 1994.

For the defense, Erlinda testified that she was home on August 15 and 16, 1994 while her husband was in Sta. Maria helping friends cook for the town fiesta about five kilometers away, that nothing unusual happened, but later added that Elvie no longer lived with them by summer vacation of 1994 and had transferred to Minayutan, Famy, then Saksak, Sta. Maria, and Ilog Putol, Siniloan, supporting this with certifications that Elvie finished Grade 1 in 1993-1994 at Paaralang Elementarya ng San Antonio and studied Grade 2 in 1994-1995 at Minayutan Elementary School with attendance from August 1 to 31, 1994. Aquilino Agustin testified that Valdesancho helped butcher a pig and cook in Sta. Maria on August 15-16, 1994, though varying on whether departure was in the afternoon of August 16, 1994 or the next morning; teacher Mercedita Ramos and District Supervisor Edgardo Planillo testified on school records showing Elvie in Grade 2 in Minayutan for 1994-1995 with only one day's absence; and Valdesancho denied the charges, attributing them to Leonida's ill will over her live-in relationship with a lesbian named Melita Flores and over arson complaints, while claiming he was in Sta. Maria on August 15, 1994 until afternoon and at home on August 16, 1994, with Elvie already residing 30 kilometers away in Minayutan.

The trial court credited the prosecution and convicted, but reasoned that although the informations alleged August 15 and 16, 1994, the complainant, being of tender age and Grade 1 education with cases filed two years later, could not remember exact dates, and found certainty only that molestation occurred while she resided in the accused's house and studied at San Antonio Elementary School, that is in the year 1993, convicting for two rapes on August 15 and 16, 1993.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Credibility and Weight of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the prosecution version and in disregarding the defense version.
  • Variance in Dates and Right to be Informed: Petitioner maintained that conviction for two counts of rape allegedly committed on August 15 and 16, 1993, when the informations charged August 15 and 16, 1994, deprived him of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, as his entire alibi defense had centered on the 1994 dates.

Issues

  • Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the prosecution version over the defense version.
  • Variance Between Allegation and Conviction: Whether conviction for rapes found to have been committed on August 15 and 16, 1993, when the informations alleged August 15 and 16, 1994, violates the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and to due process.

Ruling

  • Credibility of Witnesses: Not passed upon as unnecessary, acquittal having been ordered on due process grounds arising from the variance in dates.
  • Variance Between Allegation and Conviction: Yes. Conviction was reversed and acquittal ordered, the accused having been denied due process by conviction for 1993 offenses without opportunity to defend against them, in violation of Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution and the right to be informed.

Ruling Rationale

  • Credibility of Witnesses: No separate evaluation of credibility was undertaken, disposition turning entirely on the fatal variance between the dates charged and proved and the dates of conviction, rendering discussion of conflicting testimonies unnecessary to acquittal.
  • Variance Between Allegation and Conviction: Although the date of rape is generally not an essential element, it became essential to the alibi defense here; the informations and all prosecution evidence pointed to August 15 and 16, 1994, and the accused proved where he was and where Elvie resided on those dates, including presence in Sta. Maria for the fiesta and Elvie's Grade 2 schooling in Minayutan. Conviction for August 15 and 16, 1993, on the theory that the young, Grade 1 complainant could not remember exact dates after two years, left the accused with no chance to prove his whereabouts on the substituted dates, constituting plain denial of due process under the rule that conviction for an offense not alleged violates the right to be informed.

Doctrines

  • Date of rape as non-essential element; exception when material to defense — While the date of commission of rape is generally not an essential element, it becomes essential when the defense of alibi is anchored on the dates alleged, so that failure to allege and prove the correct dates, followed by conviction on different dates, denies due process.
  • Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation — In all criminal prosecutions the accused must be informed in writing of the charges to enable preparation of a defense, to allow plea of conviction or acquittal as a bar to further prosecution for the same cause, and to inform the court whether facts alleged suffice in law to support conviction; to convict for an offense not alleged violates this constitutional and procedural right, pursuant to Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  • Sufficiency of information as to time, place, and circumstances — Every crime being composed of certain acts and intent, these must be set forth with reasonable particularity of time, place, names, and circumstances, stating facts not mere conclusions of law, as expounded in U.S. vs. Karelsen.

Key Excerpts

  • "This Court has many times declared that the date of commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime." — States the general rule on dating rape charges, qualified in this case where dates became essential to alibi and due process.
  • "To convict an accused for an offense not alleged in the complaint or information violates such right." — Articulates the ratio for reversal, linking the variance to the constitutional right to be informed and to be heard.
  • "He had no opportunity to defend himself on the rapes allegedly committed on the earlier dates. This is plain denial of due process." — Explains why shifting conviction from the charged 1994 dates to 1993 dates was fatal despite the general rule on dates.

Precedents Cited

  • People vs. Lim, 312 SCRA 550 (1999) — Cited as authority for the general rule that date of rape is not an essential element.
  • People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 (1997) — Cited for the same general rule on non-essentiality of date in rape.
  • People vs. Hortillano, 177 SCRA 729 (1989) — Cited for the same general rule on non-essentiality of date in rape.
  • People vs. Cruz, 259 SCRA 109 (1996); People vs. Victor, 245 SCRA 392 (1995); People vs. Joya, 227 SCRA 9 (1993) — Cited to support the due process and right-to-be-informed guarantee under Article III, Section 14.
  • U.S. vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223, 226; Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518, 527 (1996); People vs. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360 (1998) — Cited for the rationale requiring written notice of charges and reasonable particularity of time, place, names, and circumstances, and for the rule that conviction for an unalleged offense violates the right to be informed.

Provisions

  • Section 14, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that no person shall be held liable without due process and that the accused in all criminal prosecutions shall be informed of the nature and cause of accusation and enjoy the right to be heard; applied to reverse conviction for 1993 rapes never charged.
  • Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended — Provides the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation; applied as procedural basis for holding the variance fatal.
  • Article 29, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Cited in the trial court's judgment for crediting preventive imprisonment; rendered moot by acquittal on appeal.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Chief Justice Davide, Jr. (Chairman), and Justices Pardo and Ynares-Santiago concurred. Justice Kapunan was on leave.