People vs. Ulep

Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, notwithstanding that the special complex crime is classified as a crime against property. In applying treachery to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide, which is a crime against persons, and not at the constituent crime of robbery. The crime does not lose its classification as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance; treachery merely increases the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

The appellant Felipe "Boy" Ulep was charged, together with five other accused, with the crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated murder in an Information dated November 2, 1987. The charge arose from an incident on March 20, 1987, in Manggahan, Bicos, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, where the accused allegedly conspired to rob Alfredo Roca of thirty cavans of clean palay and, in carrying out the robbery, killed three persons and attempted to kill Alfredo Roca. All of the accused remained at large except for appellant, who was arrested on January 5, 1990, and pleaded not guilty during arraignment on January 25, 1990. A separate trial was granted to appellant to expedite the hearing of his case.

On March 20, 1987, between 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m., Alfredo Roca was in his farm in Manggahan, Rizal, Nueva Ecija to thresh palay. With him were his son Marjun Roca, his wife Benita Roca, his mother Febe Roca, and his daughter Virgilita Roca-Laureaga. Alfredo, Benita, and Febe were about to take their lunch inside his hut, while Marjun and Virgilita were standing outside.

Alfredo noticed the arrival of an owner-type jeep with trailer which stopped near his hut. He recognized the occupants as the accused: Antos Dacanay, Edgardo "Liling" Areola, William Ancheta, Lito de la Cruz, Ely Calacala, and appellant Felipe "Boy" Ulep. Dacanay, Areola, and Ancheta stood on one side of the irrigation canal facing Marjun. From a distance of 10 to 12 meters, Alfredo saw Dacanay suddenly pull out a gun and shoot Marjun on the head, causing him to fall. As Marjun lay on the ground, Areola and Ancheta shot him again. Thereafter, Ulep, de la Cruz, and Calacala started firing at Alfredo's hut. Alfredo was able to escape by diving into the irrigation canal, but Benita and Febe were fatally hit by the initial volley of gunfire. Ancheta then hurled a grenade which exploded near the hut. When the group ran out of bullets, Alfredo emerged from the canal and saw the group load 35 sacks of palay onto the trailer, each sack containing an average of 50 kilos valued at ₱4.50 per kilo. The group then boarded their jeep and left.

Virgilita Roca-Laureaga corroborated her father's account. From a distance of 10 meters, she saw her brother Marjun fall after being shot by Dacanay. After the grenade explosion, Areola aimed his gun at her and pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire because he had apparently run out of bullets. She also saw appellant Ulep fire his gun at her father's hut.

Dr. Aurora Belsa, assistant provincial health officer of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, conducted the autopsies and found that: (1) Marjun sustained gunshot wounds in the head, stomach, and chest; (2) Benita suffered gunshot wounds that punctured her small and large intestines; and (3) Febe's gunshot wounds in her chest damaged her lungs, heart, and liver. All wounds were fatal. Emilio Roca, 81 years old and husband of Febe, testified on the civil aspect, stating that the family incurred ₱85,000 in wake and funeral expenses and that he suffered depression, lived in fear, and was forced to sell his house and transfer residence.

The defense presented a different version. Appellant Ulep, a cogon-gatherer in the farm of Edgardo Areola, alleged that at around 10:30 a.m. on March 20, 1987, he went to Areola's farm to check the palay crops. While beside the irrigation ditch, he noticed 10 male strangers in the vicinity of Alfredo's hut. He saw Alfredo attempting to throw a grenade but two women prevented him by embracing him, causing Alfredo to drop the grenade. Alfredo then jumped into the irrigation canal, and the grenade exploded. Appellant claimed he never saw his co-accused nor heard any gunshots. Federico Catalan, appellant's neighbor and a barangay captain, testified that he was with appellant between 12:00 noon and 12:30 p.m. and that they went home to eat lunch at 1:00 p.m., but on cross-examination he declared that he heard a gunshot at around 1:00 p.m.

The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay various amounts of damages.

• Formal Offer of Evidence: Appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in admitting and giving weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite the prosecution's failure to make a formal offer before they testified, in violation of Rule 132, Sections 34 and 35 of the Rules of Court.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding that his guilt for the crime charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt, assailing the testimonies of Alfredo and Virgilita as unbelievable and contrary to human nature.
• Defense Evidence: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in disregarding the evidence adduced by the defense, particularly his alibi.
• Direct Relation Between Robbery and Killing: Appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove the special complex crime of robbery with homicide because there was no showing that the perpetrators killed the victims in order to steal the palay.

N/A — The decision does not recount the appellee's arguments separately; the prosecution's case is presented through the testimonies of its witnesses.

• Formal Offer of Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite the prosecution's failure to make a formal offer thereof.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alfredo Roca and Virgilita Roca-Laureaga.
• Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in disregarding appellant's defense of alibi.
• Robbery with Homicide: Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, particularly the direct relation between the robbery and the killing.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether treachery and band attended the commission of the crime.

• Formal Offer of Evidence: No. Appellant waived the procedural error by failing to make a timely objection when the witnesses were called to testify without any prior offer, and by cross-examining them, thereby impliedly acquiescing to the materiality, competence, and relevance of their testimonies.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Yes. The trial court's evaluation of the facts and its conclusions were fully supported by the evidence; Alfredo and Virgilita were straightforward and categorical, had no ill-motive to testify falsely, and their testimonies were corroborated by medical findings.
• Alibi: No. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses, and appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene, especially since Areola's farm was just beside Alfredo's farm.
• Robbery with Homicide: Yes. The prosecution adequately proved the direct relation between the robbery and the killing; the assailants loaded the sacks of palay immediately after shooting the victims, and the bringing of a trailer indicated a common, preconceived plan to rob.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. Only treachery and band were established; evident premeditation and disregard of respect due to age and sex were not proven. Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, and the crime was committed by a band since all six armed accused acted together.

• Formal Offer of Evidence: Under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and Section 35 requires that the offer of testimonial evidence be made at the time the witness is called to testify. However, the right to object can be waived. Because appellant failed to raise the issue of the prosecution's failure to formally offer the testimonies before the trial court, the objection raised for the first time on appeal was not entertained. Appellant's cross-examination of the witnesses impliedly acquiesced to the materiality, competence, and relevance of their testimonies.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: When the issue of credibility of a witness is involved, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, which was in a better position to resolve the matter, having heard the witness and observed his deportment during trial, unless certain facts of value were plainly ignored. Alfredo and Virgilita were straightforward and categorical in their narration, and despite grueling cross-examination, they never wavered. Their credibility was bolstered by the absence of any improper motive to testify falsely and by their relationship to the victims, as it would be unnatural for relatives of victims in search of justice to impute the crime to innocent persons. The alleged inconsistencies referred only to minor matters and did not taint their credibility, as different persons may have different impressions or recollections of the same incident, and their separate versions were substantially similar on material points. Their testimonies were also supported by the medical findings of Dr. Belsa.

• Alibi: The time-tested rule is that alibi cannot prevail over the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses. Appellant failed to prove that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. His claim that he was in Areola's farm from 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. did not negate the possibility that he had gone to Alfredo's farm during that period, considering that Areola's farm was just beside Alfredo's farm. Moreover, appellant's alibi was considerably weakened by major inconsistencies between his testimony and that of Federico Catalan: appellant testified he heard no gunshot, while Catalan heard a gunshot at about 1:00 p.m.; appellant claimed he went to his in-laws' house after work, while Catalan stated they went home to Villa Paraiso together.

• Robbery with Homicide: There is robbery with homicide when there is a direct relation or an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the killing takes place prior or subsequent to the robbery or whether both crimes are committed at the same time. The prosecution adequately proved the direct relation: immediately after shooting the victims, the assailants loaded the sacks of palay onto the trailer, with no conversation and no hesitation, indicating a common, preconceived plan. The bringing of a trailer showed their intention was not only to kill but to rob as well. The group tried to kill all members of the Roca family to ensure lack of resistance to their plan to take the palay. Whenever homicide is perpetrated with the sole purpose of removing opposition to the robbery or suppressing evidence thereof, the crime committed is robbery with homicide. Robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself, and the review of the records led the Court to conclude that robbery was established beyond reasonable doubt.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information — treachery, evident premeditation, band, and disregard of respect due to age and sex — only treachery and band were established. There was treachery because the victims could not have possibly been aware that they would be attacked, and there was no opportunity for them to defend themselves as the assailants suddenly and without provocation almost simultaneously fired their guns. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. Citing People vs. Escote, Jr., the Court reiterated that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. In applying treachery, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide, which is a crime against persons, and not at the constituent crime of robbery. The crime does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated; treachery merely increases the penalty conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense was also proven to have been executed by a band, as a crime is committed by a band when at least four armed malefactors act together, and all six accused were armed with guns which they used on their victims.

• Treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide — Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. In the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide, which is a crime against persons, and not at the constituent crime of robbery, which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime. The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance; treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.

• Direct relation between robbery and killing — There is robbery with homicide when there is a direct relation or an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the killing takes place prior or subsequent to the robbery or whether both crimes are committed at the same time. Whenever homicide is perpetrated with the sole purpose of removing opposition to the robbery or suppressing evidence thereof, the crime committed is robbery with homicide. In order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself.

• Alibi — Alibi cannot prevail over the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.

• Waiver of objection to formal offer of evidence — The failure to make a formal offer of testimonial evidence, as required by Rule 132, Sections 34 and 35 of the Rules of Court, is a procedural error that can be waived. The adverse party waives the objection by failing to make a timely objection when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent, and by cross-examining the witnesses, thereby impliedly acquiescing to the materiality, competence, and relevance of their testimonies. An objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be entertained.

• "In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of 'homicide' and not to the constituent crime of 'robbery' of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the doctrine that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, resolving the apparent tension between the crime's classification as a crime against property and the application of a circumstance that pertains to crimes against persons.

• "There is robbery with homicide when there is a direct relation or an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the killing takes place prior or subsequent to the robbery or whether both crimes are committed at the same time." — This states the controlling test for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, requiring a direct relation or intimate connection between the robbery and the killing.

• "Inconsistencies among witnesses testifying on the same incident may be expected because different persons may have different impressions or recollections of the same incident. One may remember a detail more clearly than another. Witnesses may have seen that same detail from different angles or viewpoints. That same detail may be minimized by one but considered important by another. Nevertheless, these disparities do not necessarily taint the witnesses' credibility as long as their separate versions are substantially similar or agree on the material points." — This quotation from People vs. Fabros, cited by the trial court and adopted by the Supreme Court, explains why minor inconsistencies in witness testimonies do not necessarily impair credibility, provided the versions agree on material points.

• People vs. Escote, Jr., 400 SCRA 603 [2003] — Controlling precedent, cited by the Court en banc, establishing the principle that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, applied to the constituent crime of homicide rather than the constituent crime of robbery.
• People vs. Fabros, 214 SCRA 694 [1992] — Followed, cited for the principle that inconsistencies among witnesses testifying on the same incident may be expected and do not necessarily taint credibility as long as their separate versions are substantially similar on material points.
• People vs. Hernandez, 46 Phil. 48 [1924] — Followed, cited for the definition of robbery with homicide, requiring a direct relation or intimate connection between the robbery and the killing.
• People vs. Madrid, 88 Phil. 1 [1951] — Followed, cited for the principle that whenever homicide is perpetrated with the sole purpose of removing opposition to the robbery or suppressing evidence thereof, the crime committed is robbery with homicide.
• People vs. Rubio, 257 SCRA 528 [1996] — Followed, cited for the requirement that robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide.
• People vs. Abrazaldo, 397 SCRA 618 [2003] — Followed, cited as the basis for granting temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for burial expenses when no receipts were presented.
• Catuira vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 398 [1994] — Followed, cited for the principle that the failure to object to the admission of evidence operates as a waiver of the objection.
• People vs. Rama, 374 SCRA 447 [2002] — Followed, cited for the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses.
• People vs. Merino, 321 SCRA 199 [1999] — Followed, cited for the rule that a witness's testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to show any improper motive why he should testify falsely.
• People vs. Aliben, 398 SCRA 255 [2003] — Followed, cited for the rule that alibi cannot prevail over the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses.
• People vs. Sebastian, 378 SCRA 557 [2002] — Followed, cited for the definition of treachery as the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.

• Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code — The provision defining the penalty for robbery with homicide as reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision but held that the death penalty could not be imposed because the crime was committed on March 20, 1987, prior to the effectivity of RA 7659 on December 31, 1993, leaving only the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — The provision governing the application of penalties in cases where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty. The Court cited this provision in explaining that treachery, as a generic aggravating circumstance, merely increases the penalty for robbery with homicide conformably with this article.
• Rule 132, Section 34, Rules of Court — The provision stating that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The Court applied this provision but held that appellant waived the procedural error by failing to make a timely objection.
• Rule 132, Section 35, Rules of Court — The provision requiring that the offer of testimonial evidence be made at the time the witness is called to testify. The Court noted that the prosecution failed to comply with this requirement but that appellant waived the error.

Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.