People vs. Ulep

A police officer who kills a suspect in the performance of duty may be convicted of homicide rather than murder where the fatal shot was inflicted after the victim was already incapacitated and prostrate, negating both the second requisite of fulfillment of duty (that the injury be the necessary consequence of due performance) and the element of treachery, provided an incomplete justifying circumstance and mitigating circumstances are properly appreciated.

SPO1 Ernesto Ulep was a veteran police officer with eighteen years of service and several commendations, assigned together with SPO1 Edilberto Espadera and SPO2 Crispin Pillo to secure the premises of the Roman Catholic Church of Kidapawan. On 22 December 1995, Buenaventura Wapili, a resident of Mundog Subdivision, Poblacion Kidapawan, Cotabato, suffered what appeared to be a mental breakdown, becoming violent and uncontrollable. His brother-in-law Dario Leydan and neighbors attempted to restrain him but failed, prompting Leydan to seek police assistance through policewoman Norma Plando, a neighbor who radioed the three officers. The Office of the Ombudsman for the Military thereafter filed an Information for murder against Ulep.

At around two o'clock in the morning of 22 December 1995, Buenaventura Wapili was suffering from a high fever and was heard talking insensibly to himself in his room at Mundog Subdivision, Poblacion Kidapawan, Cotabato. His brother-in-law, Dario Leydan, convinced him to come out and talk, but Wapili said he could not understand himself. Wapili returned to his room and turned off the lights, but moments later the lights went on again and Leydan heard a disturbance inside, as if furniture was being smashed. Leydan called Pastor Bonid of the Alliance Church of Kidapawan to help "pray over" Wapili, but they could not enter the room as Wapili had become wild and violent. Suddenly, Wapili bolted out naked and chased Leydan. Leydan, with the aid of two neighbors, attempted to tie Wapili with a rope but failed, as Wapili was much bigger and stronger than any of them. Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy, kept running without any particular direction.

Leydan went to the house of policewoman Norma Plando, a neighbor, and asked for assistance. As Wapili passed by Plando's house, he banged her parked vehicle. Using a hand-held radio, Plando contacted SPO1 Ernesto Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto Espadera, and SPO2 Crispin Pillo, all assigned to secure the nearby Roman Catholic Church of Kidapawan. At around four o'clock in the morning, the three officers arrived at the scene aboard an Anfra police service jeep, all armed with M-16 rifles. They alighted when they saw the naked Wapili approaching. The kind of weapon Wapili carried is disputed: the police claimed he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's relatives and neighbors said he had no bolo, only a rattan stool.

SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons or they would shoot him. Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing. When Wapili was about two to three meters away, Ulep shot him with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of the body. As Wapili slumped to the ground, Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head, literally blowing his brains out. The post mortem examination by Dr. Roberto A. Omandac, Municipal Health Officer of Kidapawan, showed five gunshot wounds: one on the right parietal area of the head with fractures and evisceration of brain tissues, one on the right cheek, one on the abdomen, and two on the right thigh. Dr. Omandac concluded that the shots were fired at close range, perhaps within twenty-four inches, based on powder burns around some wounds, and that the head wound — which caused instantaneous death — was inflicted while the victim was in a lying position.

The trial court found Ulep's claim of self-defense unpersuasive, noting that the victim was already on the ground when the fatal headshot was fired and that Ulep's two companions did nothing to help him, which was unnatural behavior for police officers if the victim had truly endangered Ulep's life. The trial court convicted Ulep of murder, finding treachery present, and sentenced him to death.

• Fulfillment of Duty: Whether the killing of Wapili by SPO1 Ulep was justified under Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code as having been done in the performance of official duty.
• Self-Defense: Whether the killing was justified by self-defense, given that the victim was already prostrate on the ground when the fatal headshot was inflicted.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing, thereby qualifying the offense to murder.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in determining the proper penalty.

• Fulfillment of Duty: No, not fully. While Ulep initially acted in the performance of a lawful duty to render police assistance, the second requisite — that the injury caused be the necessary consequence of due performance of duty — was lacking, because the fatal headshot inflicted on the prostrate victim was unnecessary.
• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression had already ceased when Ulep shot the victim in the head, as the victim was lying prone on the ground, bleeding, and possibly unconscious; there was no longer any danger to Ulep's life at that point.
• Treachery: No. The victim was given sufficient warning — a warning shot and a verbal admonition — before being shot, and the decision to kill was made in an instant rather than deliberately adopted to ensure execution without risk to the offender.
• Proper Penalty: The conviction was modified from murder to homicide. An incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 69 and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender were credited, reducing the penalty from reclusion temporal to an indeterminate sentence ranging from prision correccional medium to prision mayor minimum.

• Fulfillment of Duty: The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires two requisites: first, that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office; and second, that the injury caused or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty. The first requisite was satisfied because Ulep and the other officers set out to perform a legal duty — to render police assistance and restore peace and order at the subdivision where Wapili was running amuck. During the first stage of the incident, Ulep's decision to respond with gunfire to halt the victim's menacing advance was justified, as a police officer is not required to afford the victim the opportunity to fight back or to pause and coolly reflect in the heat of a close-quarters encounter. However, the second requisite was lacking. During the second stage, after Wapili slumped to the ground from multiple gunshot wounds, he no longer posed a threat and was incapable of mounting aggression. Sound discretion and restraint dictated that Ulep, a veteran policeman, should have ceased firing. The fatal headshot was obviously unnecessary and was not a necessary consequence of the due performance of duty.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense requires unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. Here, the aggression initially begun by the victim had already ceased when Ulep shot him in the head, as the victim was lying prone, bleeding, and possibly unconscious. From that moment, there was no longer any danger to Ulep's life, and the claim of self-defense must fail.

• Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. The Court found nothing in the evidence showing that the assault was sudden and unexpected or that Ulep deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to insure the killing without the victim's opportunity to defend himself. On the contrary, the victim was given more than sufficient warning — a warning shot and a specific order to lower his weapons. The killing was not sought on purpose; Ulep went to the scene in pursuance of official duty after being summoned for assistance. The victim's helpless position was merely incidental to his having been previously shot in the performance of duty, not the product of a deliberately adopted mode of attack. Treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and convincingly as the crime itself; any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. For failure of the prosecution to prove treachery, the offense was reduced to homicide.

• Proper Penalty: The Court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for a penalty lower by one or two degrees when the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify it. Only the first of the two requisites of Article 11, paragraph 5 was fulfilled, making Article 69 applicable. The Court also credited the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as the police blotter showed that Ulep reported to police headquarters and surrendered himself immediately after the killing. Article 249 prescribes reclusion temporal for homicide. With the incomplete justifying circumstance, the penalty was reduced one degree to prision mayor, to be imposed in its minimum period due to the voluntary surrender and the absence of any aggravating circumstance. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum was taken from the minimum period of prision mayor and the minimum from prision correccional in any of its periods.

• Justifying Circumstance of Fulfillment of Duty (Article 11, par. 5, Revised Penal Code) — Requires two requisites: (1) that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, and (2) that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. Both must concur; the absence of either prevents full justification. In this case, the first requisite was present but the second was lacking because the fatal headshot on the prostrate victim was unnecessary.

• Incomplete Justifying Circumstance (Article 69, Revised Penal Code) — When the deed is not wholly excusable due to the lack of some conditions required to justify or exempt from criminal liability, a penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed, provided the majority of such conditions be present. This is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance that cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances and reduces the penalty by one or two degrees. Applied here because only one of two requisites of fulfillment of duty was present, warranting a penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for homicide.

• Elements of Self-Defense — (a) Unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non; without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. Here, aggression had ceased when the victim was already prostrate, negating self-defense.

• Treachery — Present when the offender commits a crime against persons employing means, methods, or forms that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. Treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and convincingly as the crime itself; any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of the accused. Not appreciated here because the victim was warned before being shot and the decision to kill was made in an instant.

• Burden of Proof in Justifying Circumstances — Upon admitting the killing, the accused assumes the burden of proving legal justification clearly and convincingly. He must rely on the quantitative and qualitative strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if the prosecution's evidence were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused admitted the killing.

• "The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill." — This passage articulates the principle limiting police use of lethal force and frames the Court's reasoning for holding Ulep criminally liable despite his official capacity.

• "Sound discretion and restraint dictated that accused-appellant, a veteran policeman, should have ceased firing at the victim the moment he saw the latter fall to the ground. The victim at that point no longer posed a threat and was already incapable of mounting an aggression against the police officers. Shooting him in the head was obviously unnecessary." — This is the ratio decidendi for the finding that the second requisite of fulfillment of duty was absent, establishing the boundary between justified and excessive use of force.

• "We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights." — This passage reflects the Court's policy rationale and is frequently cited in discussions of police use of force standards.

• People vs. Cario, G.R. No. 123325, 31 March 1998, 288 SCRA 404 — Cited for the proposition that upon admitting the killing, the accused assumes the burden of proving legal justification and must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not the weakness of the prosecution.
• People vs. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, 18 September 1990, 189 SCRA 700 — Cited for the elements of self-defense and the doctrine that unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense.
• People vs. Villegas, G.R. No. 118653, September 23, 1996, 262 SCRA 314 — Cited for the definition of treachery under the Revised Penal Code.
• Lacanilao vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-34940, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 563 — Cited for the nature of incomplete justifying circumstance as a privileged mitigating circumstance that cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances and reduces the penalty by one or two degrees.
• People vs. Pinto, G.R. No. 39519, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 9 — Cited for the principle that police officers' judgment and discretion in the performance of their duties must be exercised within reasonable limits and in conformity with sound discretion and the spirit and purpose of the law.

• Article 11, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office. Applied to determine whether Ulep's killing of Wapili was justified; the first requisite was satisfied but the second — that the injury be the necessary consequence of due performance of duty — was absent.
• Article 69, Revised Penal Code — Incomplete justifying circumstance; provides for a penalty lower by one or two degrees when the deed is not wholly excusable due to the lack of some conditions required to justify the act. Applied to reduce the penalty from reclusion temporal to prision mayor because only one of two requisites of Article 11, paragraph 5 was present.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide. Applied as the base penalty after the Court reduced the conviction from murder to homicide.
• Article 61, paragraph 2, and Article 71, Revised Penal Code — Provisions governing the graduation of penalties. Applied in conjunction with Article 69 to reduce the penalty one degree from reclusion temporal to prision mayor.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the minimum and maximum of the indeterminate sentence: the maximum taken from the minimum period of prision mayor, and the minimum from prision correccional in any of its periods.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Ynares-Santiago, J., was on leave.